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Abstract
This dissertation argues that the dynamics, trajectories and outcomes of the 
Norwegian-led intervention in Sri Lanka from 2001 to 2006 to end the protracted 
armed conflict in the island can be productively understood as a ‘clash of 
governmentalities’, as the result of the simultaneous pursuit of competing 
idealizations of how populations, territory and forms of political rule should be 
organized. The first part of the study sets out what is meant by a ‘clash of 
governmentalities’, a concept that turns on the different exercises of sovereignty, 
discipline and governmental modes of power in the service of competing 
rationalities of rule. The excavation of competing governmentalities, it is argued, 
provides a novel and insightful way of looking at the consequences of 
international interventions in sites o f ‘internal’ conflict such as Sri Lanka. The 
second part of the study explores the Norwegian-led peace process in Sri Lanka to 
show how two governmental rationalities, here termed Liberal Peace and Tamil 
Freedom, clashed via a myriad of micro-practices and ultimately produced an 
impasse which led not to lasting peace, but renewed war. The thesis thus 
examines the consequences of Liberal Peace, a political rationality which posits 
economic interdependence, democracy and the rule of law as constituting the 
sustainable foundations for world peace, encountering other, ‘local’ governmental 
projects which are also trying, sometimes violently, to reorder places in the global 
South according to their own rationalities of rule. The thesis concludes with a 
brief discussion of how the concept of a clash of governmentalities lends itself to 
further empirical and theoretical research.
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1. Govemmentality in a warzone
1.1 Global peace and local wars
Contemporary international efforts to end the ‘internal’ conflicts of the global 
South take place within a framework of establishing what is now labelled ‘liberal 
peace’, which posits economic interdependence, democracy and the rule of law as 
constituting the sustainable foundations for world peace (Willett 2005). 
Interventionist practices to this end, such as ‘conflict transformation’, ‘peace 
building’, ‘democratisation’ and so on, are thus part of a wider project of global 
reordering that has been increasingly pursued in the past two decades by powerful 
Western liberal states and their associated organizations, institutions and agencies. 
Whilst the growing literature on liberal peace has accorded the term different and 
seemingly incompatible meanings, Richmond (2007) notes that a ‘peace-building 
consensus’ has nonetheless emerged on what the objectives of international 
‘peace’ interventions should be, as well as on what constitutes an end to conflict 
and how this is to be achieved. In other words, “there is concurrence on the main 
root causes of violence, how they should be addressed, and who should do so” 
(Ibid:85). Duffield (2001:11) has described this concurrence as a combination of 
liberal economic and political tenets (‘liberal’) and the international policy 
predilection towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction (‘peace’) that 
has increasingly informed international approaches to Southern conflicts. 
Moreover, although Richmond sees ‘liberal peace’ as an over-stretched label 
applied today to a wide range of conceptions of peace, variations that result in 
international policy ‘dissensus’ (2006b:292), he notes that, nonetheless, what 
constitutes “peace, and its conditions, is commonly assumed to be well 
understood by all who make up what is often referred to as the international 
community” (2008: l) .1 At the same time, despite almost two decades of West-led
1 Richmond (2006b, 2007) categorizes liberal peace into four forms: ‘victor’s peace’ (imposed by 
military force and hegemonic coercion), ‘institutional peace’ (resting on the efforts to anchor states 
within a liberal normative and legal context), ‘constitutional peace’ (turning on democracy, free 
trade and cosmopolitan values) and ‘civil peace’ (resting on individual agency, rather than state, 
multilateral or international agency). The nuances and merits of this categorization are less
efforts to end conflict in the global South, it is increasingly acknowledged that 
“there is still a huge gap between the grim reality of declared and undeclared 
wars, of frozen, latent and protracted conflicts and what conflict transformation 
approaches have been capable of delivering” (Ropers 2008:1), The string of 
failures in this ‘global’ experiment in social engineering (Paris 1997) has not 
prompted rethinking of the concept of liberal peacebuilding itself - i.e. why this 
‘huge gap’ exists - but has instead led to considerable scholarly and policy debate 
over how it could yet be closed.2
This dissertation seeks to explain this gap between intent and outcome that 
emerges when strategic efforts to produce liberal peace in Southern warzones 
encounter other projects underway in these sites. The focus here is on 
contemporary international interventions to end the protracted ‘intra-state5 
conflicts of the global South.3 In other words, the thesis examines how 
international frameworks, combining themes of international security, 
development, peace, and liberal governance - which came together in the ‘War- on 
Terror’, seek to eliminate perceived threats to a sought after global order, one now 
termed liberal peace, and the consequences of these powerful, multifaceted 
interventions.
This examination of global liberalism’s engagements in the ‘internal’ wars of the 
global periphery uses as a case study the Norwegian-led intervention from 2001 to 
2006 to end the protracted armed conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the 
armed opposition movement, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This
important to this study, which focuses on the ‘political rationality’ that, as outlined in Chapter 4, 
informs all these forms.
2 As Nobert Ropers, a senior international peacebuilding practitioner, notes, the majority of these 
efforts focus on “the complementarity of different levels o f intervention (multi-track), the timing 
of interventions (multi-step), the interdependence of issues (multi-issue) -  and particularly the 
interaction of peace-related interventions with other issue areas like relief and development, 
human rights and constitutional reform” (2008:1).
3 As Mark Duffield (1998:97) has pointed out, the term ‘internal’ or ‘intra-state’ war is misleading. 
Not only have other states -neighbours or distant powers -  often long been involved in such 
conflicts either indirectly, via proxies or favoured local actors (including the state in question), or 
sometimes directly, but a variety of aimed challengers to the state have often relied on external 
linkages and global networks for military, economic and political sustenance of their projects, as 
has the conflict state itself. For the sake o f convenience, however, the term is used in this 
dissertation.
9
intense and extensive West-led effort to end one of South Asia’s longest running 
conflicts brought several major states and multi-lateral donors together in what 
has been described as a “more robust and multi-faceted international response to 
conflict and peace dynamics than has historically been the case” (Goodhand et al 
2005:10). However, even before the Norwegian-led peace initiative began, Sri 
Lanka, a developing country gripped by ethnic violence yet demonstrating 
consistent economic growth and practicing electoral democracy, had long been an 
important site for the expansion of global liberal governance. The vision of global 
peace pursued by this project turns on an ideal of the modem state, its citizen and 
its society, which is held, once rendered ubiquitous, to lead inexorably to the 
emergence of a pacific, liberal world order. In 2002, despite the previous decades 
of deepening ethnic enmity, massacres and high intensity war, international actors 
were steadfastly of the view that Sri Lanka was a self-evident opportunity for “an 
internationally supported success story in liberal peacebuilding” (Goodhand et al 
2005:67). However, despite ‘robust and multi-faceted’ international involvement, 
the Norwegian initiative did not succeed in moving Sri Lanka from a ceasefire to 
a permanent peace. Instead, simmering violence resumed in late 2003 and 
escalated into open, if then undeclared, hostilities by 2006. Even by 2004 various 
aspects of the international peace intervention -  including Norway’s conduct as 
facilitator -  was being subject to a variety of diagnostic studies and sometimes 
harshly critical commentary by donor-funded researchers, international think 
tanks, conflict-resolution NGOs, peace scholars and others. What is striking about 
much of these disparate analyses is how the same conceptions of the conflict, its 
protagonists, the island’s peoples and, especially, peace, are to be found 
embedded in them. What is equally striking is how analyses and commentary by 
those deemed to be outside the liberal peace community reflected different 
embedded conceptions of the same phenomena, conceptions that contrast sharply 
with those shared within. The content and consequences of these contrasts are the 
specific focus of this study. In short, the dissertation’s research question is: how 
can we best explain the dynamics and seemingly perverse outcomes of the 
Norwegian-led international peace initiative in Sri Lanka from 2001 to 2006?
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1.2 The argument in brief
Against conventional, top-down analyses that explain developments in ‘internal’ 
conflicts and international interventions in them in terms of the relative power of 
external and internal actors, or other structural factors, this dissertation argues that 
the dynamics, trajectories and outcomes of international interventions to produce 
peace in Southern warzones can be productively understood as a clash o f 
governmentalities i.e. as the result of the simultaneous pursuit of competing 
idealizations of how populations, territory and forms of political rule should be 
organized so as to secure and foster the wellbeing of the population. While this 
may seem an obvious claim, given how the violence of war is often directed 
against enemy populations (and not just their political goals), the argument 
presented here refers to a much deeper condition, whereby competing 
governmental rationalities seek to order and invest the fabric of routine -  i.e. non­
violent, or ‘peace-time’ -  politics, as well as war itself, and operating through 
diffuse networks and mundane practices, seek to make possible the flourishing of 
(these rationalities’ respective conceptions of the ‘good’, well behaved) 
population. Population here therefore does not refer to a self-evident or pre­
formed ethnic or religious group, but to the human collective whose members 
conduct themselves in keeping with the ‘right disposition’ of people and things 
inherent to the governmental rationality in question. Those who do not, 
meanwhile, become targets for correction and reform, or for exclusion and 
elimination.
In other words, it is posited here that govemmentality, and in particular the notion 
of competing governmentalities, provides a novel way of studying international 
interventions in Southern conflicts, one that has considerably more analytical 
utility than conventional approaches based on rational-actor calculations, clashes' 
of ideology or ‘competing nationalisms’, which is how the conflict in Sri Lanka, 
for example, has typically been explored. In contrast to such conventional 
analyses, the dissertation argues that the sometimes perverse outcomes of 
international interventions in the global South are not mere programmatic failures 
(say of the use of sanctions, incentives and conditionalities) or self-interested
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resistance to a self-evident liberal peace, but can in fact be traced to the active 
pursuit of differing conceptions o f ‘peace’ i.e. the set of appropriate sociopolitical 
conditions deemed necessary for the wellbeing of the population. More precisely, 
a clash of governmentalities plays out in simultaneous attempts, undertaken 
within different governmental rationalities, to create new subjectivities and to 
alter or destroy ‘existing’ ones; or, rather, to elevate particular subjectivities above 
those others that the objects of government -  individuals, organisations, human 
collectives - may be living or inclined to take up (Briggs 2001). As a senior 
Norwegian diplomat crisply put it, the international peace intervention in Sri 
Lanka sought “to create new realities” (NW01 August 16, 2006). Thus, a clash of 
governmentalities manifests in the development of new forms of disciplining that 
undermine or supplant ones already at play, the identification of ‘achievements’ or 
goals of one rationality as ‘problems’ for another rationality - and the associated 
devising of appropriate ‘solutions’, and, not least, the invocation of different 
exercises of sovereignty, all in the pursuit of conflicting governmental ends.
Beyond a framework for understanding how the competition between projects by 
protagonists and others in an ‘internal conflict’ are constitutive of political, social 
and territorial spaces, the notion of govemmentality also helps analyse the 
dynamics of contemporary multifaceted, multi-actor, international interventions in 
these warzones to ‘resolve conflict’, ‘build peace’, promote ‘ethnic 
reconciliation’, ‘fight terror’, and so on. Not only are international interventions, 
more generally, situated within one political rationality or other, but they will, in 
all probability, encounter other political rationalities, embodying contradictory or 
sometimes overlapping conceptions of the ‘right disposition’ of people and things, 
already playing out in these places, including through violent conflict. 
International efforts to pursue ‘peace’, ‘security’, ‘development’, etc. in Southern 
warzones, inevitably are, or become, part of the complex dynamics of these 
places, and this dissertation seeks to demonstrate how dynamics and outcomes of 
international efforts to end ‘internal’ conflicts cannot be separated from the 
specific governmental ambitions inherent to such ‘external’ interventions which, 
even imder the rubric of ‘peace’, seek to confront, alter and exploit the 
specificities of Southern warzones in the pursuit of a radical ‘global’ vision, that 
of liberal peace.
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This introductory chapter first explains the dissertation’s adoption of the 
analytical framework of govemmentality, and then outlines the contours of the 
case study, Sri Lanka, with reference to the three political rationalities -  two 
‘local5, one ‘global5 - that continued to clash during the 2001-2006 international 
peace intervention. It ends with an outline of the chapters to follow.
1.3 The analytical approach 
Conventional analyses
The point of departure for this study is that conventional ways of understanding 
international engagement with conflict zones in the global South are inadequate 
for a variety of reasons. To begin with, the state, as a centralized authority with a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, has come to have a commonsensically 
privileged role in analysis of ‘internal’ conflict, in the search for ‘root causes5, 
and especially in strategies and efforts to end or resolve conflict and ‘build5 peace. 
The state also frequently occupies an important place in the legitimating 
narratives (Krishna 1999, Campbell 1998) put forward by various protagonists for 
their respective projects (for example, state oppression or protecting territorial 
integrity). ‘Solutions5 are also debated in terms o f ‘power-sharing5 i.e. the 
appropriate form of state structure (such as federalism or devolution). The 
(foreign) state is also privileged in analyses of international engagements within 
Southern sites. Ranging from realist arguments turning on attributed geopolitical 
interests of ‘great powers5 to evaluations of the impact of aid donors5 policies, 
much of such analyses, including supposedly critical ones, typically focus on the 
interests, motives and actions of neighbouring and distant states and their 
institutions and agencies. As Rose notes, this centrality of the state in 
conventional analyses of politics is perhaps inevitable, forged as these were at a 
time when the centralized nation-state with its monopoly of force seemed the 
natural frame for understanding political systems, and interactions between such 
entities constituted the realm of international politics (1999:1). Even the impacts 
of the celebrated phenomenon of ‘globalisation5 are often studied in terms of the
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changes it is said to be wreaking 011 states and their interactions with each other 
and with a host of ‘new’ non-state actors said to be ‘now5 active in ‘global’ 
politics (e.g. Held et al 1999, Josselin and Wallace 2001).
Equally importantly, quite apart from a focus on institutions such as the state, as 
Rose (1999:1, see also Valverde 1996) also notes, conventional ways of thinking 
about politics often also embody particular ideas about the human beings who are 
subjects of power i.e. as individualized, autonomous and self-possessed political 
subjects of right, will and agency. They also take human collectivities (such as 
classes, races or interest groups) as singularities possessed of identities which 
provide the basis for interests and political actions. Thus conventional analysis 
also treats non-state actors -  such as armed groups, NGOs, businesses, or faith 
groups -  and even populations -  for example ‘local communities’, ‘Tamils’, ‘the 
poor’ or ‘nationalists’ -  as self-evident objects possessed of discernible interests, 
attitudes, needs, wants, lacks and degrees of rationality (or ‘fanaticism’).
Freedom, moreover, is taken in such analysis as the absence of coercion or 
domination i.e. as “a condition in which the essential subjective will of an 
individual, a group or a people could express itself and [is] not silenced, 
subordinated or enslaved by an alien power” (Ibid). Such analytical beginnings 
inevitably entrain certain lines of inquiry - Who holds power? In what and whose 
interests do they wield it? How is it legitimated? Who does it represent and serve? 
etc. -  and turn on a variety of self-evident analytical dichotomies -  such as 
international/ internal, state/ civil society, public/ private, legal/ illegal, coercion/ 
freedom and domination/ emancipation (Ibid, O’ Malley etal 1997:503).
In sum, then, such analysis generates a variety of problems. Taking for granted the 
centrality of the state engenders realist and quasi-realist forms of analysis, 
whereby the outcomes of conflict and interventions are attributed primarily to the 
relative power of external and internal actors. Assuming the unity of the state and 
other non-state actors encourages adoption of a positivist epistemology and 
neglects the consequences of identity being contingent, rather than fixed. It is for 
such reasons important aspects of international politics, including the ‘huge gap’ 
between global peace efforts and local conflicts, “have proved highly troubling for
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the social sciences, wedded as these often are to an understanding of social 
totalities and bounded spaces” (Lamer and Walters 2004b:4).
Studying ‘government’
This dissertation adopts a different approach, one which grew out of the writings 
of Michel Foucault and has since been developed extensively by a growing 
number of scholars dissatisfied with conventional understandings of politics, 
especially power, and concerned, as Foucault was, with unsettling the “self­
evidences on which out' knowledges, acquiescences and practices rest” (1991c:76, 
see 2008 2-3). This approach, which emerged from the rethinking of political rule 
set out by Foucault in three series of lectures delivered at the College de France 
(2003, 2007, 2008) in which he discussed the theme of ‘Govemmentality’ (and 
the closely related one of ‘Biopolitics’), breaks with the assumptions inherent to 
theories of the state, the notion of ideology, questions of the possession and 
source of power, and so on, and instead regards the exercise of political power and 
authority as anything but self-evident. In this regard govemmentality has 
significant continuity with Foucault’s better known observations about 
power/knowledge (Gordon 1980). In seeking out the history of the self-evident 
‘truths’ produced by the practices of government, the growing literature inspired 
by the notion of govemmentality “offers critical insights about the constitution of 
our societies and our present” (Lamer and Walter 2004:2). To begin with,
Foucault saw ‘government’ not just as rule by the state but more generally, as the 
‘conduct o f conduct’ i.e. the endeavour to shape, guide, direct, by different 
calculated means, the behaviors of others, be they the inhabitants of a territory, the 
crew of a ship, the members of a household, employees of a firm, or others 
(2007:193-5, 2008:1-2). In this regard, it is possible to talk about the government 
of a household, a religious order, the family, etc and thus the ‘state’ is but one 
mode of government, albeit a specific one to which all other forms of governing 
are ‘internal’ (2007:93,2008 1-2), or rather, the state “is the correlative of a 
particular way of governing” (2008:6). Moreover, rather than being centralized 
and effected ‘top down’, political power is understood here as exercised through 
“a profusion of shifting alliances between diverse authorities pursuing projects
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that govern a multitude of facets of economic activity, social life and individual 
conduct” (Rose and Miller 1992:174). As Foucault puts, it, “the term itself, 
power, does no more than designate a domain of relations” (2008:186). He adds, 
moreover, “what I have proposed to call govemmentality, that is to say, the way 
in which one conducts the conduct of men, is no more than a proposed analytical 
grid for these relations of power” (Ibid).
The study of politics can therefore be more productively pursued by investigating 
the formation and transformation of thought (‘rationalities’) informing theories, 
proposals, strategies, etc and the. means (‘technologies’) for the ‘conduct of 
conduct’, rather than concentrating on the specificity of institutions, including 
those making up the state or the realm of the ‘international’. In other words, the 
focus of such analysis is directed towards those specific kinds of reason which 
make possible the exercise of government, the ‘conduct of conduct’. Reason here 
does not refer to some transcendental form, but to any rationality informing 
calculations about how to conduct human conduct i.e. to any “reasonable and 
calculable measure of the extent, modes and objectives of governmental action” 
(2008 92). Analysis is thus directed at “the invention, contestation, 
operationalization and transformation of more or less rationalized schemes, 
programmes, techniques and devices which seek to shape conduct so as to achieve 
certain ends” (Rose 1999:3, emphasis added). How does federal partitioning of 
states come to be held as eminently preferable to the separation of waning 
peoples through states of their own? How does instituting charges for the supply 
of clean water become the proper action for a responsible state? How does free 
trade become accepted as a global boon and untrammelled immigration a global 
threat? How do Tamils come to see themselves as a ‘nation’, rather than a 
‘minority’ and to pursue ‘national liberation’ instead o f ‘minority rights’? With an 
ambition to ‘denaturalise’ the world, a govemmentality approach also prompts 
consideration of how governing involves specific representations, knowledges and 
expertise regarding that which is to be governed (Lamer and Walters 2004b: 2). 
Moreover, - even though Foucault himself though the term govemmentality to be 
an ‘ugly’ one (2007:115) - Dean points out how the idea of a mentality o f  
government emphasizes the way in which the thought involved in practices of
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government is collective and taken-for-granted i.e. how it is not usually open to 
questioning by its practitioners (1999:16).
The state is not, of course, to be discarded from such analysis; it remains an 
important node in networks of governance. Rather, it should be relocated, situated 
within, rather than above, flows of power, and thus considered as the effect of 
such flows, rather than their source (Gordon 1980:4, Foucault 2002b). Such de­
centering approaches - which have, after Foucault, sought to ‘cut off the king’s 
head’ (1979:88-9, see discussion in 2008:77) -  have been deployed with 
considerable explanatory force, for example in studies during the 1990s of the 
transformation in late modernity of rule in Western states i.e. of the superseding 
of welfarism by neoliberalism.4 Although the concept of govemmentality 
originally emerged in the context of explaining a particular form of political 
power emergent within the nation-state in Europe and has largely been deployed 
to this purpose until recently (see Chapter 2), it nonetheless also provides a 
particularly effective way to study the myriad interactions amongst the disparate 
actors in the international (see, for example, Walters and Haahr 2005 and the 
contributions to Lamer and Walters 2004a). Dislocating institutions, including 
states, from the centre of political analysis, revealing these as one of many effects 
of power, and focussing instead on the rationalities guiding the practices of 
numerous official and unofficial actors that ‘at a distance’ shape the conduct of 
individuals, populations and other entities, govemmentality lends itself to a novel 
analysis of the ‘international’, a realm supposedly constituted by political 
relations conducted in the absence of overarching authority. Indeed, Foucault’s 
diffuse conception of power seems tailor-made for studying the workings of what 
David Held (cited in Guibemau 2001) describes as the contemporary world “of 
multilayered power, multilayered authority and complex forms of governance”. 
Not all agree with this stance, of course, and such objections are taken up in 
Chapter 2. At a minimum, however, as Larner and Walters argue, such an 
approach enables us “to move the debate beyond the conventional view of power 
as something that is possessed by given actors (individual, capital, state) towards
4 See, for example, Burchell et al 1991, Barry et al 1996, Dean 1999, Hindess 1993, 1997, Miller 
and Rose 1990, O’ Malley 1996, Rose 1999, Rose and Miller 1992, among others
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an examination of the heterogeneous discourses and practices in terms of which 
power is exercised ” and thus to “disrupt and disturb accepted understandings and 
open up questions that might otherwise not be asked.” (2004b: 17, emphases 
added).
How and why questions
The positivist orientation of conventional analyses, which include (neo)realist, 
(neo)liberal and Marxist studies, take as self-evident the objects visible on their 
field of study and proceed to examine the inteiplay of interests, stated or hidden, 
which guide actions and interactions amongst them. As Doty (1996) has pointed 
out, such approaches obscure the productivity of practices i.e. how practices are 
constitutive of meanings and identities. Practices here includes scholarship, of 
course, despite attendant (self-)assertions of many thinkers5 ‘objectivity5. By 
contrast, a govemmentality approach is among those that treat ‘reality5 as socially 
constructed (e.g. Campbell 1992). The importance of undertaking empirical 
studies that proceed from this conceptualisation of reality is that analysis moves 
away from (conventional) why questions to how questions (Doty 1996:4).5 
Moreover, such analyses look not only at how social identities and reality are 
constructed, but what practices and policies are thereby made possible (Ibid). For 
example, quite apart from how an individual comes to see herself as Tamil (and 
what exactly that means), whether she ‘is5 a member of a persecuted nation or a 
disadvantaged minority has very different consequences for understanding Sri 
Lanka's armed conflict and, therefore, for what kind of resolution can and should 
be pursued. Thus, by focusing on the productive aspect of power neglected by 
why questions, how questions “highlight the way power constitutes particular 
modes of subjectivity and interpretative dispositions55 (Ibid). What is incited and 
encouraged is thus as important as what is repressed and disciplined (Barry et al 
1996). Having said this, the pmpose of an analytics of government is not to 
expose ‘hidden5 motives or to uncover domination in disguise. As Li (2007:9)
5 As Foucault puts it: "Let us not ask why certain people want to dominate, what they seek, what is 
their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at the level o f ongoing subjugation, at 
the level o f those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our 
gestures, dictate our behaviors, etc.” (1980d:97, emphasis added. See also 1979:95).
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points out, such a quest narrows analysis unnecessarily, obscuring much of what 
happens in the process of government itself.
There is, however, another important aspect of govemmentality analysis. This 
dissertation is concerned not only with political rationalities, the production of 
subjectivities and the conduct of conduct ‘at a distance’, but also with the 
consequent effects i.e. with the decisions, actions and calculations engendered on 
the terrain of government by these rationalities, subjectivities and programmes of 
rule. Why, for example, did the LTTE insist on a specific sequencing of the 2002- 
3 negotiation agenda and the international community on another? Why was 
tipping the post-ceasefire military ‘balance’ in favour of the Sri Lankan military 
and against the LTTE a contribution to peace for international actors? In other 
words, the dissertation does not restrict itself to how questions, but also seeks to 
explain some of the important developments, trajectories and outcomes of the 
Norwegian-led peace process in Sri Lanka i.e. it attempts to answer some why 
questions also. A govemmentality approach makes this possible. Indeed Valverde 
celebrates govemmentality as an approach which promises to “finally lay to rest 
the old and fruitless divisions of labour between social researchers describing the 
how and theoreticians explaining the why” (1996:358, see also O’ Malley et al 
1997:503).°
This dissertation is interested in contestations also, specifically those that spring 
from the competing ambitions of different governmentalities. It attempts, 
therefore, to engage analytically with the unpredictable outcomes of what 
Foucault has termed the “witches’ brew” of politics (1991c:81). In a context, as 
this study argues, of multiple governmental projects, informed by multiple 
rationalities, underway simultaneously in the same space (‘Sri Lanka’), an attempt 
is made here to “examine the ways in which creativity arises out of the situation 
of human beings engaged in particular* relations of force and meaning, and what is 
made out o f the possibilities o f that location” (Rose 1999:279, emphasis added).
In short, the dissertation seeks to demonstrate how resistance to a given set of
6 Valverde’s approach is in contrast, for example, to Rose’s (1999) who, while acknowledging that 
an “analysis o f the forms of contestations” that arise ill politics is important, focuses in the main on 
excavating the rationalities embedded in governmental ambitions and projects.
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governmental ambitions may be traced not to apathy, economic self-interests, 
irrationality or a priori opposition to government’s sought after ‘right disposition’ 
of people and things (Foucault 2007:96), but to the pursuit of different 
conceptions of what constitutes this right disposition. To this end, the dissertation 
foregrounds empirical research which is concerned not only with rationalities -  
which are rarely explicit, but are to be found embedded in manifestos, policies, 
plans, white papers, expert reports, academic studies and other texts -  but also 
with the practices which are informed by and thus render ‘real’ these rationalities.
1.4 Ordering Sri Lanka
The island’s conflict
The Sri Lankan conflict is one of the world’s most protracted. Since long- 
simmering tensions between the island’s Tamil community and the Sinhala- 
dominated state erupted into open confrontation between several militant groups 
and the Sri Lankan armed forces in the early 1980s, the conflict has grown 
steadily in intensity and complexity.7 The LTTE, which, after a series of 
internecine clashes, established its dominance over the other Tamil militant 
groups by the mid-80s, since developed both a conventional military force and a 
civil administrative apparatus in those parts of the island it had established control 
over. These were subsequently destroyed in the high-intensity fighting o f2006- 
2009. The war* between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the LTTE 
occurred in four- phases (commonly referred to as the Eelam Wars I-IV) of
7 Tambiah, adopting a stance that “ethnicity is a man-made identity” (1986:128), summarises the 
island’s ethnic makeup thus: “today most Sri Lankans would think of their population as divided 
into three ‘ethnic’ categories or communities: the Sinhalese, who are a majority, constituting 74%; 
the Tamils, the besieged minority, at about 18.2%; and the Muslims, who make up 7.4%. The 
Tamils themselves, are by general consent divided into two categories: the Sri Lankan Tamils, 
who comprise 12.6% of the population and consider themselves indigenous and whose migration 
from South India stretched from the early centuries AD to the fifteenth century or thereabouts, and 
the Indian Tamils, who make up about 5.6%, the majority of whom trace their origins to the waves 
of South Indian laborers brought by the British from 1825 onwards. ... The Muslims are 
distinguished [from Tamils) as an ethnic community on account of their religion alone” (Ibid:3-4), 
Although the island’s population “has always been heterogeneous, ... the [Sri Lankan] Tamils 
have predominated the northern and eastern regions for centuries while the Sinhalese majority 
primarily lives in the central, western and southern parts. The Indian Tamils live on near the 
central highland estates, within the Sinhalese regions” (Winslow and Woost 2004:6, insert added).
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increasing intensity and territorial scale: 1983-88, 1990-94, 1995-2001, and from 
2006 to 2009.8 Since the conflict began, there have been five formal attempts to 
resolve it through negotiations, in 1985, 1987, 1989-90, 1994-95 and the 
Norwegian-led peace process of 2001-2006. All have proved abortive, with the 
fighting resuming with greater ferocity each time. Inevitably, the origins, causes 
and character of Sri Lanka’s conflict are intensely contested. The LTTE argued it 
is spearheading an armed struggle for self-determination and political 
independence (the state of Tamil Eelam) for the Tamil people in their homeland as 
a response to institutionalised racism and genocidal violence by the Sinhala- 
dominated Sri Lankan state. In short, the LTTE asserts it is waging a ‘national 
liberation struggle’. On the other hand, describing itself as a beleaguered 
democracy, the Sri Lankan state denounced the LTTE as a terrorist challenge to 
its authority, unity and territorial integrity. The state therefore asserted it is 
‘fighting terrorism’.9
While the armed conflict is typically dated from 1983,10 it is increasingly accepted 
that the antecedents to Sri Lanka’s present-day problems began long before. 
Although there is inevitably disagreement as to which elements of the past matter 
and how much, the rise of Sinhala majoritarianism in the post-independence 
Ceylonese, later Sri Lankan, state and the attendant expansion in Tamil demands 
for greater political power, are generally accepted and have been extensively 
discussed through a range of analytical lenses.11 The consequent search for
8 The period late 1987 to early 1990 also comprised high intensity conflict between the Indian 
Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and the LTTE, concluding with the withdrawal of Indian forces 
which had sought to disarm the LTTE under die rubric of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.
9 Apart from the conflict with the LTTE, the Sri Lankan state has also faced two armed 
insurrections -  in 1971 and 1988-89 - by the Sinhala nationalist group, the Janatha Vimulcthi 
Perumana (JVP). Both uprisings were violently crushed by the government of the time with 
enormous casualties. The JVP has since established itself as a right-wing political party and 
steadily increased its standing -  it is now the third largest Sinhala party, behind the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP).
10 In July 1983 the LTTE carried out is first major attack, killing 13 soldiers of an army patrol. The 
anti-Tamil pogrom that erupted with the state funerals of the soldiers a week later is often posited 
as a reaction to the attack -  though Tamils argue the massacre was preplanned and executed with 
state support (see Thornton and Niththyananthan 1984) - and the rapid expansion o f Tamil 
militancy thereafter as a reaction to the pogrom.
11 A number of authors have identified the political ascendancy of a majoritiarian Sinhala Buddhist 
nationalism and the ‘reactive’ emergence of Tamil nationalism as initiating the armed conflict in 
the early 1980’s. This literature has advocated a solution that recognizes in various forms Tamil
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‘origins’, ‘root’ causes, ‘underlying factors’, drivers, and so on, has led to debates 
on the extent, form and causes of discrimination - indeed whether it is 
discrimination, as opposed to, say, simply state neglect or incapacity (e.g. as in 
reports by World Bank and other IFIs) - the reasonableness or otherwise of the 
Tamil demand for independence and armed struggle, what other solutions might 
be appropriate, what the ‘Tamils’ are (a ‘minority’, a ‘nation’, an ‘ethnic group’ or 
something else) -  and hence what they are entitled to, whether there is such a 
thing as a ‘Tamil homeland’, and similar- questions. Meanwhile, since the early 
nineties, a substantial and growing literature has sought to examine Sri Lanka’s 
crisis via the analytical lenses that emerged from theorisation of ‘internal’ 
conflicts of the global South after the end of the Cold War. In much of this 
recent literature, the conflict is most commonly characterised as the military 
pursuit of two extreme goals, by the LTTE and the Sinhala-dominated state 
respectively: creating an independent Tamil state and maintaining a unitary state. 
The ‘solution’ to the conflict is therefore commonsensically held to be a
nationalist demands for greater self governance (e.g. Pomiambalam 1983, Tambiah 1986, 1992; 
Manogaran 1987, Wilson 1988, Bose 1994, Krishna 1999, Balasingham 2004). This argument has 
been fiercely contested by the historian K. M De Silva (1986) and Sinhala-Buddhist ideologues, 
who posit the rise o f Sinhala Buddhist majoritarianism as legitimate and natural and blames the 
conflict largely on the Tamils, characterized as a privileged minority with an unjustified sense of 
entitlement. Other authors have suggested that Sinhala and Tamil nationalisms are ideologies 
instrumentally produced by ambitious political elites rather than outcomes of historical processes 
(e.g. Shastri 1994, Pfaffenberger 1994, Stokke 1998) A separate strand of scholarship has focused 
on the structural weaknesses and decay of Sri Lanka’s political institutions as an explanation for 
the emergence and escalation of the ethnic conflict (e.g. Manor 1979, Moore 1985, Herring 2001, 
Dunham 2004, De Votta 2004). Since the early eighties a growing literature has historically and 
anthropologically unpacked the collective ethnic and political identities at play in the conflict. 
Characterizing identities as ‘constructed’ rather than ‘real’ this literature has sought to interrogate 
the veracity of identity claims by ‘deconstructing’ and ‘de-stabilizing’ the monolithic identities 
posited by the conflict’s protagonists (e.g. Abeysekera and Gunasingha 1987, contributions to 
Spencer 1990, Jeganathan and Ismail 1995). The focus on ethnic identities has also produced work 
that has studied anthropological and historical roots of Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil identities as a 
means of understanding the ideological forces behind of Sri Lanka’s conflict, (e.g. ICapferer 1988, 
Kemper 1991, Gunasingham 1999, Wilson 2000, Bartholomeusz 2002, Indrapala 2005). 
Meanwhile, a ‘post-ethnicity’ literature suggests that “whatever the impetus for a war’s 
development, whether rooted in the past or the consequence of twentieth century political and 
ideological underpinnings, an explanation o f origins no longer sei'ves as an explanation of  
persistence” (Winslow and Woost 2004:8, emphasis added).
12 These include literatures in the categories of the ‘security-developmenf nexus (e.g. World Bank 
1999,2003; Bastion 2003, 2005; Oftad 2002, Mayer et al 2003, Hyndman 2003), the political 
economy of conflict (e.g. Gamburd 1999, Arunatileke et al 2001, Bush 2003, Gunaratne 2003, 
Korf2004), ‘complex emergency’ (e.g. Goodhand and Hulme 1999), and so on. Other literature 
examines the factors that render ‘peace’ elusive in Sri Lanka (e.g. Loganathan 1996, Bush 1999, 
Norell 2000, Lewer and William 2002, Social Indicator 2004, Samset 2004, Saravanamuttu 2003, 
Uyangoda 2003a, 2003b; CPA 2005, Frerks and Klem 2005).
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‘compromise5 somewhere between these two constitutional extremes (e.g. CPA 
2006, Ropers 2008)13 or the ‘competing nationalisms5 (Goodhand 2001) 
underpinning these. Thus, centring on the post-colonial state, the LTTE, economic 
trajectories, the historical origins of the island's peoples and so on, much of this 
literature reproduces many of the problems outlined earlier, taking for granted the 
identity of the actors involved in the Sri Lankan space and attributing various 
values, interests and tendencies to them. Meanwhile, the literature 
‘deconstructing5 the identities involved in the conflict, while questioning the 
‘reality5 of the narratives being put forward by the protagonists or ‘their 
supporters5, does not engage with the politics or dynamics of the armed conflict 
itself. In this context, it is worth noting, save some notable exceptions,14 how 
Hellman-Raj anayaganT s observation fifteen years ago is still pertinent:
“few discussions of Tamil militancy have gone beyond 
horrified rejection of its methods and ‘barbarism5. It 
has never been taken seriously and its origins and 
ideological reasons laid bare. As a political movement 
it has been denied existence, it is a movement with no 
past and no future, just a sordid present55 (1994:7).
As a result, much of the literature on Sri Lanka participates, deliberately or 
unselfconsciously, in specific ways in the various phenomenon they are trying to 
explain. As Uyangoda points out, “when people publish books, write articles or 
present seminal* papers on the ethnic question of a particular state, they quite 
consciously take part in the events of the biography of the state55 (1998:168).15 
While this text is no exception, in contrast to the bulk of the literature on Sri 
Lanka, it takes seriously the rationalities embedded in the violent projects
13 A statement on ‘The need for a national debate on the federal idea’ issued by the Centre for 
Policy alternatives (CPA), a leading liberal/neoliberal Sri Lankan think-tank, on behalf o f 1,000 
delegates of 25 organisations who met in Colombo on Feb 6, 2006, stated: “we believe ... that a 
federal Constitution offers a reasonable accommodation or compromise in a conflict where one 
side is committed to a unitary state and the other a separate state.”
14 Including Bose 1994, Krishna 1999, Balasingham 2004, Stokke 2006 and O’ Duffy 2007
15 In particular, as Uyangoda also points out, “a major problem associated with all leading Sri 
Lankan political science practitioners is that they have also been practitioners of politics, having 
closely aligned themselves with the state at some phase of its recent formation, though under 
different regimes and leaders” (1998:196).
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underway in the island to reorder territory, populations and security and their 
relations. Specifically, it seeks to foreground the competing political rationalities 
and governmental projects undertaken in the island since independence in 1948 
(chapter 4) and particularly after 2001 (chapters 5-8) -  rationalities often to be 
found embedded within the scholarly literature itself - and make them and their 
interactions the object of analysis. This section briefly outlines Sri Lanka’s post­
independence history and the competing Tamil and Sinhala narratives, and 
thereafter engages, also briefly, with one notable explanation for the emergence of 
protracted armed conflict in the island: Stokke’s (1998) study of Tamil and 
Sinhala nationalisms as “post-colonial political projects from ‘above’.”
Antecedents to war
To begin with, the present Sri Lankan state is a colonial construct. Whilst there is 
scholarly disagreement over the island’s pre-colonial history, the imposition in 
1833 of a single administrative structure for its entirety was a British colonial 
decision, following centuries of incremental - Portuguese, Dutch and British - 
conquests and parallel rule of its parts. Nonetheless, at independence in 1948, Sri 
Lanka (then Ceylon), with high human development indicators and well- 
developed infrastructure, was expected to become a model democracy. Instead, as 
Oijuela puts it,
“Sri Lanka could be seen as a textbook example of an 
ethnic conflict, where economic, political and cultural 
deprivation and grievances of a minority have provoked 
a violent rebellion against a state that has come to be 
seen as representative of only the majority ethnic 
group” (2003:198).
Discrimination against the Tamils by the Sinhala-dominated state has been 
discussed in several scholarly works and paradoxically, for reasons discussed 
later, even in some donor studies.16 Steady ‘Sinhalisation’ of the post-colonial
16 See, for example, Bose 1994, Little 1994, Krishna 1999, Bartholomeusz 2002, Winslow and 
Woost 2004, De Votta 2004, World Bank 2003, JBIC 2003.
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state since the fifties has resulted in a state bureaucracy, judiciary, police and 
military with an entrenched majoritarian ethos. Even by the mid seventies, well 
before the armed conflict began, Sri Lanka is held to have “regressed to an 
illiberal, ethnocentric regime bent on Sinhala superordination and Tamil 
subjugation” (De Votta 2004:6). Sri Lanka’s post-independence governments 
have alternatively been led by the two main Sinhala parties, the ‘rightist’ UNP 
(United National Party) and the ‘leftist* SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party), “with 
diametrically opposed approaches to economic policy, but sharing a tendency to 
compete for votes ... by appealing to Sinhala chauvinist sentiment” (Winslow 
2004:32), a process De Votta (2004) has termed ‘ethnic outbidding.’ The gradual 
embedding of majoritarianism in state structures resulted in policies such as the 
imposition in 1956 of Sinhala as the official language (instead of English) and 
later the exclusion of Tamils from state jobs (then the largest employment sector) 
and from access to universities (Goodhand 2001, JBIC 2003:12-17). A policy of 
recruiting only Sinhalese into the military was introduced in 1962, the beginning 
of today’s ‘ethnically pure’ military (Blodgett 2004:54, Tambiah 1986) while 
state-sponsored Sinhala colonisation of Tamil and Muslim areas (Peebles 1990, 
Manogaran 1994) sought to radically alter the Northeast’s demography and 
undermine non-Sinhala claims for autonomy (Rampton and Nadarajah 2008, see 
especially Gunaratane 1988). Apart from this escalating structural violence, post­
independence history has been marked by large-scale mob violence directed 
against the Tamils in 1956,1958, 1977,1981 and 1983 (Krishna 1999:67), a 
dynamic echoed in the various rounds of conflict, where massacres of Tamil 
civilians -  by aerial and artillery bombardment, especially recently - have became 
routine. By the fifties Tamils were agitating through mass protests and civil 
disobedience for greater autonomy (in the Northeast) and in the mid-seventies the 
demand for a federal state became a call for independence. As the state responded 
with greater military repression, simmering militancy turned into armed struggle, 
exploding into open war- in the wake of the 1983 state-backed anti-Tamil pogrom 
(Bose 1994:74).
There are, of course, competing Tamil and Sinhala narratives for the island’s pre­
colonial history and post-independence developments. Both, however, “invoke the 
cultural-historical origins of the nations and the question of post-colonial
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oppression of one nation by the other” (Stokke 1998:85). The empirical validity or 
otherwise of these narratives, summarised and well referenced in Stokke5 s study, 
are of little consequence to this dissertation’s questions. However, they contain 
some useful signposts ahead of this study of competing mentalities of rule, and are 
thus briefly outlined here. The Sinhala narrative holds the Sinhalese to be the 
island’s first settlers and to be descendents of Aryan immigrants from North India, 
who subsequently defended the island against repeated invasions from South 
India. This mytho-narrative is set out most vividly in the Mahavamsa and 
Dipavamsa chronicles, written by Sinhala Buddhist monies, and holds Buddha to 
have ordained the (unified) island to have a special position as a redoubt for 
Buddhism and entrusted its safekeeping to the Sinhalese. History is thus a series 
of heroic defences of this unified sanctuary against invading Tamils seeking to 
subordinate or destroy the Sinhala nation. The Tamil narrative holds Tamils (in 
the Northeast) to predate the arrival of the Sinhalese (in the South). Successive 
European colonial conquests resulted in the subjugation, at different historical 
times, of the Tamil and Sinhala kingdoms, a narrative reinforced by the history of 
colonial rule: territories in the Northeast and the South were administered 
separately by even the British (who defeated the Dutch, who had defeated the 
Portuguese), until 1833. Post-independence narratives are also mirror images. In 
the Tamil narrative, the British handover to a Sinhala-majority state and polity in 
Ceylon set in train the present history of majoritarian discrimination, state- 
oppression and Tamil resistance. The Sinhala narrative holds the Tamils -  who 
are a majority in the region, and thus posing a structural threat to the Sinhalese on 
the island - as having had a privileged position under colonial rule and what 
Tamils see as discrimination to be merely steps towards correcting the effects of 
colonial favouritism.
Competing projects
In a close examination of Sinhala-Tamil dynamics from independence to the early 
eighties, Stokke (1998) argues Sinhala and Tamil nationalisms cannot be seen as a 
question of congruence between the territoriality of the Sri Lankan state and the 
claimed territoriality of dhamma dipa and Tamil Eelam respectively, or as an
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outcome of exploitation and domination between two nations, but should instead 
be understood as “post-colonial political projects constituted by nationalist 
material and discursive practices.” Adopting a Marxian framework, and tracing 
post-independence socio-economic and political developments in the island, he 
argues, these practices “have been initiated by segments of the dominant class for 
the purposes of mobilization within political alliances[:] ethnic class alliances, 
political patron-client networks, and strategic government [i.e. ruling] alliances” 
(Ibid: 109, inserts added). Moreover, Stokke attributes such alliances to have 
restrained escalation of ethnic tensions in early post-colonial period and argues 
that the later “neglect” of the material and discursive practices of ethnic class 
alliances and, especially, strategic ruling alliances undermined the legitimacy of 
the political system. This he holds, in turn, to have led to a “radicalisation” of 
Tamil nationalist demands in the seventies and the emergence of Tamil militancy 
(“from below”) in the eighties.
Unlike studies that seek to establish the veracity or otherwise of various aspects of 
Tamil and Sinhala narratives or, conversely, dismissing these wholesale, examine 
democratic and constitutional mechanisms, war economies, etc to explain the 
emergence of today’s ‘crisis of the state’ (Goodhand 2001), Stokke’s study is 
important as it takes seriously the impact and contingent nature of material and 
discursive practices. However, it ultimately relies on a structural (Marxian) 
framework focussing on dominant class interests, to arrive at the ‘real’ reasons for 
Sri Lanka’s inexorable slide into violent conflict. The collaboration, despite 
tensions, between Tamil and Sinhala elites in the period just before and after 
independence, as well as the fitful negotiations between them in the three decades 
after 1948 prompts his scepticism of both narratives and the proffered reasons for 
various actors’ political actions. However, the reduction of discursive and material 
practices to cynical projects forecloses examination of their content and their 
significant productive effects, including the production, reshaping and 
reproduction of dangerously polarised identities and subjectivities, both individual 
and collective, and the associated pursuit of increasingly powerful and violent 
programmes towards (re)ordering the nexus of security, population(s) and
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territory on the island.17 Moreover, it does not examine why these particular 
discursive practices, and not others, came to the fore; those of Sri Lanka’s 
Muslims, the island’s third largest community, for example, do not, unlike the 
Tamils’, challenge dominant Sinhala ones. Nor does it explain why dominant 
class interests have not led to the emergence and uptake of new (ameliorative) 
discourses and practices, especially amid the inexorable disintegration of the 
island’s socio-economic and socio-political fabrics due to protracted, high 
intensity and extremely ‘dirty5 conflict. Finally, it is also worth noting that the 
rationales proffered by today’s protagonists do not rely in the first instance on 
historical narratives, but are quintessentially (late) modern: ‘national liberation’, 
‘state oppression5, ‘self-determination’, etc. on the one hand and ‘fighting 
terrorism’, ‘unity and territorial integrity’, ‘multi-ethnicity and democracy5, etc. 
on the other.
This dissertation adopts a different framework, that of an analytics of rule (Dean 
1999, see also Foucault 1979:82-91), which, rather than seeking out hidden 
interests, takes the will to govern seriously. As Li (2007:9), drawing on 
Ferguson’s (1994) ‘Anti-Politics Machine’ puts it, interests are part of the 
machine, but they are not its master term. The analytics of government undertaken 
by this dissertation frames Sri Lanka as the site of an ongoing clash of two 
rationalities of rule, two different visions of how population, territory and security 
should be organised so as to achieve a ‘better world’. Adopted narratives, like 
other texts, are thus not the source of particular ways of thinking about rule, but 
are embodiments of them. These two political rationalities clashing in Sri Lanka, 
labelled here as ‘Sinhala-Buddhism5 and ‘Tamil Freedom5 respectively, both 
foreground collectives, the former seeing a hierarchy between Sinhalese and 
others as the ‘right disposition’ of things, the latter seeing equality between the 
Tamil and Sinhala collectives instead. Sinhala-Buddhism and Tamil Freedom are 
examined more thoroughly in Chapter 4. The focus of this dissertation is however 
on the clash between Tamil Freedom and that political rationality, here labelled
17 Krishna (1999:34-35) emphasizes the role of narrative in the production of identity, o f providing 
people “with a way of being in this world” and points out how narrative achieves meaning as lived 
practice beyond the margins of text: “narratives not only discursively articulate social reality, but 
are central to its endless and agonistic reinterpretation.”
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‘Liberal Peace’ (and also discussed in Chapter 4), that has in recent decades 
informed international efforts to shape dangerous global borderlands (Duffield 
2002) like Sri Lanka and to integrate them into a pacific world order.
1.5 Producing Liberal Peace
International interventions in the global South have today come to be based on 
converging conceptualisations of poverty, conflict, development and security: 
while poverty and underdevelopment are blamed for eruptions of violence, 
conversely, enduring conflict is deemed to retard development and, thus, the 
consolidation of peace.18 In short, it is now taken-for-granted that “there will be 
no lasting security without development and no effective development without 
security and stability” (G8, cited in Willet 2005). The normative goal of 
establishing global liberal peace is thus deemed to require not only developing the 
periphery but also ending the conflicts (i.e. ensuring security) within it. Moreover, 
global liberal governance (Dillon and Reid 2000,2001), while still 
conceptualising conflict as essentially an ‘exogenous shock’ to development 
(Willet 2005:573), does not see the process of ending conflict as merely seeming 
a return to an earlier status quo so that interrupted processes of development can 
resume but, rather, as the transformation of the state and its society into a new 
mesh of internal and external relations in which the re-emergence of violence is 
actively precluded - even if the conditions for peipetual peace have not yet been 
reached. The imperative for liberal peace is therefore to “change the dysfunctional 
and war-affected societies it finds on its borders into cooperative, representative 
and, especially, stable entities” (Duffield 2001:11). It is in the pursuit of this 
“radical mission to transform societies as a whole, including the attitudes and 
beliefs of the people within them” (Ibid:258) - which Paris (2002) has termed a 
‘mission civilisatrice’ - that the liberal peace comes to confront at its boundaries 
institutions, nouns and practices that violently differ from its own (Dillon and
18 This conflation of ‘Security’ and ‘Development’ has now become orthodoxy in institutions like 
the World Bank, OECD, etc and has led to a vast literature of analysis and expertise generated, 
especially, by the policy hubs o f global liberal governance (see, for example, OECD 2001 and the 
publications of international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank). For critical 
accounts, see, for example, Buur et al (2007) and Duffield (2001,2007).
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Reid 2000:117). The ideal modem state is a liberal democracy, with a free market 
and globalized economy, progressive development strategies, and guaranteed 
human rights (Richmond 2004:132). It is of no matter that few developing states 
presently meet this standard. Engendered by a belief that “conflict in the South is 
best approached through a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonizing and, 
especially, transformative measures” (Duffield 2001:11 emphasis added), the 
project takes a universal, problem-solving approach towards producing global 
liberal peace. In other words, it matters less how the states or societies in question 
reached their present state of dysfunction and instability than how they respond 
when engaged by the numerous technologies of global liberal governance. 
Moreover, no state or society is too far beyond the pale to be engaged and 
transformed; the only question is how this is to be achieved.
The elements that comprise the liberal peace, the internal coherence of these 
concepts, the compatibility of their juxtaposition, and the theoretical 
underpinnings of the liberal peace, as well as the policy recommendations it 
engenders, have already been subject to a variety of critiques in vast range of 
literature, as has the project of global liberal governance itself.19 Whilst drawing 
on some of these criticisms, this dissertation does not set out to add to those 
discussions but, instead, to examine the consequences at one site, Sri Lanka, of 
this project of global ordering. In other words, it sets out to examine the 
consequences of liberal peace as a global govemmentality encountering other, 
‘local’, govemmentalities which are also trying to (re)order the warzones of the 
South according to their own rationalities of rule
1.6 Chapter Outline
In defense of the dissertation’s adoption of an ‘analytics of government’ approach 
to study, Chapter 2 overviews the field of govemmentality studies to identify 
important analytical strengths and weaknesses, particularly with application.to the 
‘international’, and briefly sets out how this dissertation attempts to draw on the
19 See, for example, Dillon and Reid (2000, 2001), Duffield (2001, 2007), Chandler (2006), 
Richmond (2006, 2007).
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former and guard against the latter. It also outlines how an analytics of 
government can be operationalised in scholarly analysis, through concepts such as 
problematizations, programmes and ‘fields of visibility’. In thus setting out the 
analytical approach adopted by this dissertation, the chapter addresses the 
viability of extending govemmentality as a concept and theoretical approach 
derived from a study of political rationalities in Western -  and Christian -  settings 
to the non-West. It also sets out a defence of the dissertation of the thesis in the 
light of the author’s positionality in relation to Sri Lanka’s politics.
Ahead of the examination of the ‘clash of governmentalities’ that constituted the 
2001-2006 international peace intervention in Sri Lanka, Chapter 3 elaborates 
what is meant,, politically and epistemologically, by the term itself. To this end, 
the chapter sets the out the notions of government (as the ‘conduct of conduct’) 
and govemmentality as a mode of power which, alongside discipline and 
sovereignty, and informed by a specific rationality, seeks to foster the wellbeing 
of a population. In so doing, it discusses the closely related to govemmentality 
concepts of biopower and biopolitics - and explains why the dissertation opts to 
focus, in its limited space, on examining those governmental rationalities 
competing in the Sri Lankan milieu and sketching their biopolitical implications, 
rather than a fuller exploration of the latter.
Chapter 4 discusses three competing rationalities -  ‘Sinhala-Buddhism5, ‘Tamil 
Freedom’ and ‘Liberal Peace’ - that have long informed governmental projects 
and programmes of rule in Sri Lanka. Although, for reasons of space, the focus of 
the dissertation is only on the consequences of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom 
encountering each other in the context of the international peace intervention, 
these cannot be examined without an appreciation of Sinhala-Buddhism, the 
rationality that has informed the conduct of the Sri Lankan state and Sinhala 
polity since independence.
The next four chapters examine how these two rationalities informed the conduct 
of various international and local actors, and how the differences and overlaps 
between them played out within the 2001-2006 international peace intervention. 
They do so, in particular, by examining the production of specific objects,
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behaviours and subjects within the Sri Lankan space.20 To this end, they draw on 
key documents in which these clashing rationalities are to be found embedded and 
consider a number of constitutive ‘speech acts’, including, on the one hand, 
statements by key Western states and organisations, and, on the other, those by the 
LTTE, Tamil political parties and other Tamil actors. These chapters also examine 
a number of practices in which these rationalities are embedded, including third- 
party mediation, ceasefire monitoring, the contest over the agenda for 
negotiations, the idea o f ‘federalism’, the ‘Ponghu ThamiT mass rallies and 
internationally-funded ‘local’ initiatives for ‘conflict transformation’.
Chapter 5 sets out firstly, to outline the main objects that appeared on the terrains 
of government for Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom and, secondly, by 
contrasting the values, interests and capacities attributed to these objects, to 
illustrate how this engendered specific points of contradiction, specific clashes. In 
particular it looks at the problems of government (‘problematizations’) that 
confronted Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom respectively at the start of the 2001- 
2006 international intervention in Sri Lanka.
Chapter 6 thereafter considers some of the ways in which solutions to the 
problematizations identified in Sri Lanka in 2002 were subsequently pursued 
during the Norwegian-led peace process i.e. how efforts were made to close the 
gap between the ideal and the lacks of the real. The objective here is not a 
comprehensive examination of the peace process, an impractical undertaking here, 
but a discussion of some of the more prominent sites of engagement between 
international and local actors i.e. how various programmes envisaged to address 
the problematizations engendered by Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom 
respectively came to collide in different ways when put into practice during the 
Norwegian peace process.
Chapter 7 looks at the inculcation of very different subjectivities by Tamil 
Freedom and Liberal Peace respectively i.e. at how the activities of a range of
20 For an examination of how these rationalities compete in shaping the behaviour of Tamil 
Diaspora communities in Western host states, see Nadarajah 2009.
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local and international actors after 2001 sought to shape, guide and direct 
individuals’ and groups’ behaviour and actions in particular directions and to 
define their fields of possibilities such that they could and would become self- 
governing subjects of Liberal Peace or Tamil Freedom. The chapter thus engages 
with an inherent contradiction of government: how categories to be governed 
appeal' at times as objective realities and at other times as collectivities that do not 
or do no longer properly exist and thus need to be (re)created.
Chapter 8 considers how seemingly straightforward international practices such as 
third party led peace processes, serve to constitute objects and subjects of global 
liberal govemmentality. The chapter argues that the production of the LTTE as an 
actor precariously located 011 the fringes of political legitimacy gave international 
processes their import after 2001, enabling conduct of the LTTE’s conduct by 
harnessing its desires and shaping its choices.
Chapter 9 summarises the ‘clash of govemmentalities’ that constituted the 2001- 
2006 international peace intervention in Sri Lanka outlined in the preceding 
chapters and briefly examines how the concept of a ‘clash of govemmentalities’ 
might enable understandings of resistance to governmental rule and on changing 
relations of force and order in contemporary North-South relations.
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2. Using Govemmentality
Foucault’s reflections on govemmentality and biopolitics, despite a very limited 
extent of these being readily available till recently, have since the early nineties 
increasingly influenced studies in numerous fields of the political and social 
sciences, but not without either dissimilarity amongst its enthusiasts or criticism, 
even scepticism, from others. Moreover, despite a plethora of insightful multi­
disciplinary works, the efficacy of govemmentality, and Foucault’s ideas more 
generally, in studying ‘the international’ or ‘the global’ remains a source of 
disquiet (see, for example, Selby 2007). Whilst the theoretical content of 
govemmentality, of ‘rationalities of rule’, and their linkages with discipline, 
sovereignty, subjectification and biopolitics are taken up in Chapter 3, this chapter 
overviews the field of govemmentality studies to identify important analytical 
strengths and weaknesses, and briefly sets out how this dissertation attempts to 
draw on the former and guard against the latter. The chapter begins with a defence 
of the dissertation’s use of govemmentality and other ideas Foucault arrived at 
while studying politics within the European state, to study a prototypical aspect of 
contemporary international politics, external intervention to produce liberal peace 
in peripheral warzones. The second and third parts of the chapter, drawing 
especially on the works of Mitchell Dean, Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller amongst 
others, discusses briefly how govemmentality and ‘a clash of govemmentalities’ 
can be operationalised in scholarly analysis, through concepts such as 
problematizations, programmes and so on. The last section briefly sets out how 
this methodology has been applied in this dissertation to the Norwegian-led 
intervention in Sri Lanka from 2001 to 2006.
2.1 Govemmentality Studies
Govemmentality studies began flourishing in the 1990s (Lamer and Walters 
2004b:3), influenced by two important edited volumes (Burchell et al 1991, Barry 
et al 1996) and a seminal article by Rose and Miller (1992), The focus of many 
govemmentality scholars of the time was an emergent rationality of rule that had 
been changing the social, economic and political landscape within Western states
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since the late seventies: neoliberalism or advanced liberalism. Rather than treating 
neoliberalism as an ideology, philosophy, nonnative theory or refinement of the 
capitalist agenda, these studies examined it as a rationality of rule infomiing and 
directing the conduct of individuals as well as entities within and beyond the state, 
and thus configuring our political present (Lamer and Walters 2004b:4).
Similarly, studies by Cruikshank (1994, 1999) and Fraser and Gordon (1994) 
examine how the conduct of disparate individuals and groups categorised together 
as ‘the poor’ is conducted by disparate actors -  not just ‘the state’ - via arts of 
government such as ‘empowerment’, ‘self-esteem’ and ‘dependency’. Dean 
(1999) and Rose (1999) have produced substantial works on power and rule in 
today’s Western societies, studies which have also further developed 
govemmentality as an analytical framework. In recent years, govemmentality 
studies have received a powerful new impetus from the publication in English of 
three more of Foucault’s lecture series - ‘Society must be defended: lectures at the 
College de France, 1975-76’ (2003), ‘Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at 
the College de France 1977— 1978’ (2007) and ‘The Birth of Biopolitics:
Lectures at the College de France, 1978-1979’ (2008) -  in which govemmentality 
and the closely related concept of biopower/biopolitics are laid out and 
extensively elaborated upon.
The use of govemmentality to study aspects of ‘the international’, however, was 
slow in coming. As Lamer and Walters (2004b: 5) note in the introduction to 
‘ Global Govemmentality it is paradoxical that the study of the phenomenon of 
‘globalisation’ was exploding in the same period as govemmentality studies was 
flourishing, yet there was little intersection between them. They suggest one 
reason is the disciplinary backgrounds of the earlier govemmentality scholars -  
such as sociology, education and criminology -  which traditionally focus on local 
and national systems of rule. The slow uptake in international studies, however, is 
not due to a limitation of govemmentality itself, as discussed below. Rose and 
Miller (1992:178), insisting that govemmentality, as analytical approach, “applies 
as much to geo-political issues as to those within any national territory”, point out 
that even war*, the quintessential concern of International Relations, is itself 
dependent upon certain practices of conducting conduct, including the elaboration 
of notions of sovereignty over territory unified by language and law, the
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constitution of persons as owing allegiance to specific identities and authorities 
and so on. Moreover, as the recently published lectures reveal, in Foucault’s 
thinking through the history of emergence of governmental power (and especially 
its liberal and neoliberal forms), Foucault was also interested, even if he did not 
focus on them, in archetypical questions of the ‘international’: Westphalia and the 
‘balancing’ of European powers, colonisation and imperial power, globalisation of 
markets and of politics, Europe as a ‘collective subject’, maritime law, 
international institutions and organisation, international aid and post-war 
reconstruction, and so on (see, for example, 2008:51-70,78-79, 2007:289-306). 
Indeed, he explicitly, albeit briefly, applies govemmentality, and competing 
rationalities no less, to explain the rival strategies of England and Austria to shape 
the Congress of Vienna- the former seeing Europe as an economic region in a 
global market (between which England, as a world power, mediates), the latter 
seeing Europe as a set of great powers which must be balanced for a stable peace 
(2008:60).
In any case, this initial domestic orientation of govemmentality studies has now 
changed. The eclectic contributions to Global Govemmentality deal with many 
issues of traditional concern to international studies such as war, peace, refugees, 
world order and European integration. The number of articles and book-length 
works using govemmentality to analyse international issues is growing, revealing 
important taken-for-granted aspects of international studies as contingent and 
transient.21 Ferguson and Gupta (2002) use govemmentality to examine how 
states came to be understood in the first place as entities with particular spatial 
characteristics. Walters and Haahr’s (2005) study of the genealogy of European 
integration explains how ‘Europe’ became a calculable, administratable domain — 
and thus challenge foundational assumptions of the field of ‘European studies’.
Neumann and Sending (2007) even see ‘the international’ as govemmentality, a
22conceptualisation revisited briefly later below.
21 See for example, Bigo 2002, Brigg 2001, Duffield 2007, Fraser 2002, Hindess 2000, 2002, 
Lamer and Walters 2002, Li 2007,Lipshutz with Rowe 2005, Lui-Bright 1997, Ong and Collier 
2005, Salskov-Iverson et al 2000 amongst others.
22 Foucaultian ideas, more generally, have influenced important studies of the international in 
fields as diverse as international security (Campbell 1992, Elbe 2006), asylum and migration (Bigo 
2002, Husymans 2002), international regimes (Keeley 1990), international organisations
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Govemmentality and ‘the international’
Reflecting the discipline’s positivist orientation and oft-overt resistance to 
Foucaultian and poststructuralist ideas more generally, the uptake of 
govemmentality in IR has been slow. Selby, for example, argues emphatically that 
“there are clear limits to the use of Foucault in theorising international and world 
politics” and concludes that if Foucault’s work is to be used “more effectively” 
within IR, it “needs to be situated within a framework which is cognisant both of 
the structural dimensions of power, and the specificity and irreducibility of the 
international” (2007:324, emphasis added). He also suggests that the enabling 
framework could be a Marxist one (Ibid). Whilst built on contestable foundations, 
not all of which can be engaged with here, Selby’s acerbic charge is worth 
examining in defence of this dissertation as it turns on common, if not always so 
explicit, assumptions about Foucault’s work: firstly that, conducted within the 
container of the nation-state, it does not translate or ‘scale up’ into the 
international arena and, secondly, that it is essentiality a critique of liberal 
capitalist societies and thus, when applied to the international, brings inbuilt and 
thus untenable liberal assumptions with it. The latter criticism mirrors, on much 
the same grounds, an assumption ‘govemmentality’ refers to a necessarily liberal 
rationality of rule, an assumption rendered erroneous by Foucault’s own 
discussion of govemmentality (2008:61, see discussion in Chapter 3 below).
To begin with, Foucault’s ideas do not constitute a theory of politics; indeed he 
rejects the use of overarching (‘global’ or ‘totalitarian’) theories, arguing that 
whilst these provide ‘useful tools’, they rely on existing ‘knowledges’ and, thus, 
have ultimately “proved a hindrance to research” (1980d:80-l). Instead, he urges 
an approach of critical examination with a ‘local character’ - i.e. detailed 
empirical work - and celebrates the “insurrection of subjugated knowledges,” 
which, he argues, ‘localized’ research enables (1980d:81).23 This is not, however,
(Merlingen 2003), peacekeeping (Zanotti 2006), North-South relations (Doty 1996), world order 
(Hardt and Negri 2000, Dillon and Reid 2000, 2001, Sending and Neumann 2006) and so on, and 
led to the ‘post-development’ debate (Ferguson 1994, Escobar 1995).
23 By ‘subjugated knowledge’ he not only means the ‘historical contents’ that have been ‘buried 
and disguised’ by the masking order imposed by what he terms ‘functionalist or systemizing
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to settle for a “naive or primitive empiricism” nor to dabble in “any and every 
kind of theoretical approach,” but is rather the pursuit of a “localized, non­
centralized kind of theoretical production, one ... whose validity is not dependent 
on the approval of established regimes of thought” (1980d:81). The point here is 
that Foucault’s work provides a diverse and not integrated (Rose 1999:23) set of 
tools for analysis, rather than a set of theories; tools which may, depending on the 
questions being asked, be combined with those ‘useful5 ones provided by 
‘totalising’ theories. In other words, the research question decides if - and which - 
other frameworks can be useful, contra Selby’s conclusion that Foucaultian ideas 
are useful only if situated in a structural framework. For example, studying two 
centuries of attempts to shape livelihoods, landscapes and identities in Indonesia 
Li has ‘complemented’ Foucault’s ideas with Marxist and Gramscian thought, as 
well as anthropological field work - but she makes clear that she “tolerate[s] the 
untidiness and tension introduced by different theoretical traditions because of the 
distinct questions they pose and the tools they offer to guide my analysis” 
(2007:19, emphasis added). This dissertation, concerned with examining the 
consequences of clashing govemmentalities in the Sri Lankan warzone, does not 
draw explicitly on a ‘global’ theoretical framework, arguing, after Rose 
(1999:279), that “we need no ‘theory of resistance’ to account for contestation, 
any more than we need an epistemology to account for the production of truth 
effects -  except if we wish to use our theory to ratify some acts of contestation 
and to devalue others.”
The main problem with Selby’s argument against applying Foucaultian ideas to 
the international is his assertion of ‘the specificity and irreducibility of the 
international’ -  something Foucaultian and other poststructural scholars will reject 
as their point of departure, arguing, as Rose and Miller put it, that “inter ‘national’ 
relations are constituted in a military-diplomatic complex, through complex 
processes that empower particular agents and forces to speak and act in the name 
of territory” (1992:178, emphasis added). These processes (read material and 
discursive practices) they argue (Ibid),
thought’, but, more importantly, he also means “a whole set o f knowledges that have been 
disqualified as inadequate or insufficiently elaborated” (1980a:81-2).
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“establish the limits of and coherence of the domains of 
political authority, demarcate geographical and 
conceptual spaces of political rule, constitute certain 
authorities as able to speak for a population and place 
them in particular ‘external’ configurations with other 
‘states’ and internal relations in particular* locales”.
Indeed, even the avowedly Marxist scholar, Benno Teschke, challenges the 
“cross-paradigmatic IR consensus that equates the Westphalian Settlement with 
the codification of modern international relations” and, through an empirical 
historical survey, ultimately argues that “the nature and dynamic of geopolitical 
systems are governed by the character of their constitutive units that 
institutionalize specific social property relations prevailing within them” 
(2002:5,9). Selby does not deny that the international is constituted but defends its 
‘specificity and irreducibility’ on a claim that the effects of discourses of ‘nation- 
state’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘anarchy’ and so on have now become so sedimented as to 
be robustly persistent (2007:336-7). In other words, because the inside-outside 
dyad has become a commonsensical basis for international and domestic practices, 
it is ‘irreducible’. Selby’s criticism is thus simply a positivist response to a 
poststructural charge: the latter says it need not be this way, the former says it 
(now) simply is.
That the practices of international order can change -  or in the case of global 
liberal governance, must change -  is not just a poststructuralist stance, as 
underlined by Teschke’s observations above or the call to arms in the name of 
global peace by triumphant liberals like Fukuyama (1992) and Mandelbaum 
(2002). Moreover, Selby criticises Foucault-inspired writings on global order such 
as Hardt and Negri’s (2000) or Dillon and Reid’s (2001) for, firstly, mistakenly 
reading the international as a liberal space and, secondly, for “over-stating ... the 
unity, evenness and indivisibility [of world order]” (Selby 2007:336). However, 
this criticism turns on equating global liberalism, a sweeping biopolitical and 
governmental project, to a liberal world. The self-evident incompleteness of 
global ordering then becomes criticism of claims of a project to this end, firstly, 
and, secondly, of Foucaultian ideas for engendering such a conception (Selby
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2007:337). Neumann and Sending (2007), meanwhile, conceptualise the 
international as “a socially embedded realm of govemmentality [which] sees the 
international as a structure (defined by relations of power) that generates different 
and changing practices of rule (defined as governmental rationality)” (2007:700, 
insert added). Hindess (2000a, 2000b, 2002) examines the inter-state system as 
constituting a dividing practice at the level of the global population and Barry 
(1993) looks at how this appears as a problem for European ‘integration5. 
Neumann and Sending also point out that the international today is a political 
sphere increasingly defined by liberal norms, a process that “transforms the 
modality of governing55 (207:698, emphasis added). Adopting an ‘analytics of 
rule5 approach, they see
“a network of liberal norms that shapes the identities 
and behaviours of states [and which] may be seen as a 
global system of indirect forms of power that guide, 
shape and foster specific types of not only states, but 
also other polities, as well as individuals. It sets up 
standards of behaviour for individuals and models of 
institutions to be implemented and followed by all good 
members of the international community” (2007:699, 
emphasis, inserts added).
That governmental goals are unevenly achieved and are resisted, or that 
governmental programmes are subverted or appropriated, is well recognised, even 
anticipated, by govemmentality approaches.24 Indeed, it is not the extent of rule, 
but the rationality and the practices of effecting rule (within, between, across and 
above territorial states) that govemmentality studies are most concerned with. 
Selby singles out govemmentality when he criticises Foucaultian tools, which he 
acknowledges can help explain the ‘how5 of power, for however not being able to 
explain the ‘when5, ‘where5 and (most significantly, according to him), the ‘why5 
of power (2007:337). Govemmentality, he suggests, can explain how populations 
are administered or subjects constituted in say, modem Turkey, or the disciplining
24 See, for example, Miller and Rose 1990:10, Burchell 1993:273, Valverde 1996, especially O’ 
Malley 1996b
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of African states into ‘good governance’, but cannot explain why the Turkish state 
is more governmentalised than the Syrian one or why there is so much ‘bad 
governance’ in Africa (his examples). Firstly, this criticism stems from an 
erroneous assumption that there can be only one rationality of rule within which 
states can be imbricated (ironically, it is Selby here who makes an implicit 
assumption about Foucault and liberalism). However, it is entirely possible the 
Syrian and Turkish states are govemmentalalised along different rationalities and 
different conceptions of the ‘right disposition of things’ (a point taken up in 
Chapter 3). Secondly, it equates the (present) absence of a governmentality- 
derived answer to the impossibility of one: there is no reason why a study that 
excavates the various rationalities of rule embedded in governmental projects in 
the Turkish, Syrian and African contexts and thereby examines the mechanisms 
through which these are pursued, resisted, subverted and appropriated, cannot 
adequately pursue such questions. The sine quo non however, is solid empirical 
work, a point taken up below. Moreover, these are challenges to which this 
dissertation, which examines the notions o f ‘multiple rationalities’ and ‘clash of 
govemmentalities’ vis-a-vis international practices, responds directly.
Govemmentality and the ‘non-West’
An important question for this dissertation is the viability of extending the concept 
of govemmentality, developed through Foucault’s study of political rationalities 
in the Christian West, to the non-Westem context of places like Sri Lanka. This is 
underscored by the importance of Christianity, in Foucault’s elaboration (2007, 
chapters five to seven), for the emergence and development of govemmentality, 
which he traces through the pastoral logics that provided the backdrop for the 
emergence of the modern administrative state and enervated its functionings.25
25 Although Foucault sees the development o f the theme of pastoral power as having originated in 
the (Mediterranean) East, and especially in Hebrew society (2007:123, 364) -  he asserts “the 
origin of the idea of a government [i.e. conducting the conduct] of men should be sought in the 
East, in a pre-Christian East, first o f all, and then in a Christian East” (Ibid: 123, insert added) - 
nonetheless, he considers the Christian pastorate -  spread in the West through the Roman Empire - 
as “essentially different” from any other, on account of its institutionalization and development 
since the third century which gave rise to “an immense, ... dense, complicated and closely woven 
institutional network,” one that was coextensive with the entire Church and so with Christianity, 
with the entire Christian community” (Ibid: 130, 164). Given the all penetrating grip of the
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Moreover, these concerns are situated in the wider problematic of Foucault’s 
alleged Eurocentricism, the intense debate about which has been ongoing for over 
two decades. The charge springs mainly from the lack of any substantive 
discussion of colonialism, and the limited attention to race, in Foucault’s work 
(Young 2001). It is held, consequently, that Foucault tended to universalise from 
necessarily limited French case studies (Said 1984), that he did not acknowledge 
the extra-European origins of the power techniques he studied (see for example 
Stoler 1995), and that his diffuse conception of power denies intentionality of 
domination and precludes agency for resistance, thus reproducing the colonial 
domination of the colonised (Spivak 1988). Positing as ‘striking’ Foucault’s 
supposed silence on race and colonialism, not least given his contemporaries 
(Sartre, Fanon, Althusser, etc) and the events of the day (French defeats in 
Vietnam, Algeria’s war, and a host of national liberation struggles), Young avers: 
“in fact, Foucault’s work appears to be so scrupulously eurocentric that you begin 
to wonder whether there isn’t a deliberate agenda involved” (2001:395-6).
So there are two distinct questions in all this. Firstly, is Foucault’s work actually 
Eurocentric? Secondly, and more importantly, does this alleged Eurocentrism, if 
indeed it does exist, preclude the use of his analytical tools, especially 
govemmentality, in the non-West? Without rehearsing again the debate about 
Foucault’s alleged Eurocentricism, it is worth noting here why, and how, 
Foucauldian analysis makes possible productive govermnentality-based study of 
non-Western spaces as well as the excavation there of, in his words, ‘subjugated
Christian pastorate on “the material, temporal, everyday life of individuals”, and how “it took 
charge of “a whole series of questions and problems concerning material life”(lbid:229-230), for 
Foucault, the pastorate “sketch[es] out, or is the prelude to,” the emergence o f the forms of 
conducting men that arose in the sixteenth century outside ecclesiastical authority (i.e. in the 
‘public’- i.e. ‘political’ - domain), those forms o f conducting conduct undertaken through political 
institutions and which he terms govemmentality (Ibid: 184, 230, 320). In other words, “with the 
Christian Pastorate, we see the birth of an absolutely new form of power” (Ibid: 183-4), by which 
Foucault means a power “exercised on a multiplicity, rather than a territory”, and for the purpose 
“of those it is exercised over, rather than a superior unit, like a state or sovereign”, and directed at 
all and each, rather than the whole they comprise (Ibid: 129). The Christian pastorate thus provides 
the “historical background” for the development o f govemmentality, a mode o f power whose entry 
into politics in the sixteenth century, Foucault argues, “marks the threshold of the modem state” 
(Ibid: 165). However, he points out, “there was not a transition from the religious pastorate to other 
forms of conduct, conduction or directing. [Instead] there was an intensification, increase and 
general proliferation of this question [of conducting men] and of these techniques of conduct” 
(Ibid:231, inserts added).
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knowledges.’ To begin with, it is argued here that, as demonstrated by Foucault’s 
recently published lecture series, which include pointed discussions of race (see 
especially 2003) and, to a lesser extent, colonialism, the Eurocentricity or 
otherwise of his work depends on what is read into the silences and gaps seen in 
it. At a more foundational level, as Young points out, “it is possible to see that 
Foucault’s account of power is particularly suited to the analysis of racism and 
racialism” (1995:14).26 In any case, race was clearly part of Foucault’s research 
agenda, even if not addressed extensively in his published work (which, it is now 
recognised, only puts forward a small part of his wide and developing research). 
Notably, race is crucial to his work on biopolitics, as well as war (2003, chapter 
eleven). As discussed in The History o f Sexuality and Foucault’s 1976 lecture 
series, published posthumously as Society Must be Defended (2003), race is also 
essential in relation to the constitution of the discourse of sexuality. As Young 
(1995:11) notes, “racism, for Foucault, is not a phenomenon in Western society 
that can be safely compartmentalised as an aberration, but constitutes an 
expansive part of the general production of sexuality.” Aim Laura Stoler (1995) 
has critically developed these extensive thoughts -  which she aptly terms “a 
genealogy of the discourse of race” - by extending them into imperial settings (the 
Dutch East Indies). Foucault also engages extensively with racism, ‘race war’ and 
also the state -  state racism, especially Nazism (2003). Crucially, Foucault argues, 
it is racism that makes acceptable, and thus possible, the mass slaughter of 
modem war - not only in terms of the destruction of the enemy (population), but 
also the sacrifice of those in the state’s charge - by the biopolitical state 
committed to fostering the wellbeing and vitality of its population (2003:256). 
Secondly, Foucault is neither blind to colonialism nor to how it is a mutually 
constitutive experience for the colonising metropole and colonised periphery -  the 
point of departure for much postcolonial scholarship. Indeed in the 1975-6 lecture
26 Notably, Foucault argues that ‘racism’ -  as he theoretically conceives o f it - fast develops with 
colonization and colonial genocide (2003:257). For Foucault, ‘racism’ is not manifest merely as 
the mutual contempt o f hatred between races, but at an even earlier, deeper step: the division of the 
biological continuum of the human race into ‘racial’ distinctions and hierarchies, between good 
and inferior subsets of humanity. Racism is thus the introduction o f a break into the biopolitical 
domain, a break between ultimately “what must live and what must die”, the latter ranging from 
‘enemy races’ to criminals who must be executed (Ibid:254-5, 258).
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series, he explicitly recognises the impact colonial practices came (back) to have 
on the juridico-political structures of the West:
“It should never be forgotten that while colonization, 
with its techniques and its political and juridical 
weapons, obviously transported European models to 
other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang 
effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and the 
result was that the West could practice something 
resembling colonisation, or an internal colonisation, on 
itself’ (2003:103).
South Asia, the region of focus for this dissertation, provides quintessential 
examples of what Foucault terms the ‘boomerang effect’. From the late decades of 
the eighteenth century the British presence in the subcontinent, and British 
relations with South Asians, began to assume the proportions of formal colonial 
dominance, from a trading presence. By the middle of the nineteenth century this 
dominance was being exercised through a territorially bounded and recognisably 
modern administrative state that was legally defined as a subordinate part of the 
British Empire. The colonial state in both India (the territory of today’s Pakistan, 
India and Bangladesh) and Ceylon exercised its rule through governmental and 
biopolitical techniques and institutions that are similar* to, but certainly not
97identical to, those being exercised in Britain. What is notable, however, is that 
whilst, as Prakash discusses (2000), there were clear differences in the biopolitics 
of the two spaces with obvious racial hierarchies and a much greater emphasis on 
repression (sovereign power) in the colonies, many techniques and tactics of 
govemmentality were often pioneered in the subcontinent and only later deployed 
at home. In Britain, for example, there was a close connection between important 
liberal reformers and India28 and many aspects of the liberal reform agenda were 
implemented there before being exported back to Britain. Thomas Metcalfe argues 
that while in Britain liberal reforms were opposed by manifold organised interests,
27 For example, the first comprehensive plan for a ‘rule of property’ in Bengal, drawn up in 1776 
by Philip Francis of the Supreme Council in Calcutta, was inspired by a physiocratic vision of the 
land and the landed gentleman farmer as the source of prosperity.
28 For example both James Mill and John Stuart Mill were employed by the East India Company.
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in India “by contrast, a conquered people could not as easily protest measures 
introduced for their presumed benefit” (1994:29). As a consequence,
“India could become something of a laboratory for the creation 
of the liberal administrative state, and from there its elements -  
whether a state sponsored education, the codification of law, or 
a comprehensively chosen bureaucracy -  could make their way 
back to England itself. Away from the contentious political 
environment of England, liberalism, as a programme for 
reform, developed a coherence it rarely possessed at home.”
The nineteenth century programme of liberal reform was built on an increasingly 
explicit pastoral logic that had entered British colonial rule since the late 
eighteenth century -  in the same period Foucault sees biopower emerging in 
Europe (2003:242).29 This was particularly apparent in the speeches and writings 
of Edmund Burke who insisted that the East India company could no longer 
behave as rapacious merchants but must instead construct a government that ruled 
in the interests of the Indian people (Metcalfe 1994:17-21). The idea of managing 
the population came thereafter to explicitly frame the British exercise of power 
over Indian societies. As Burke put it, “the prosperity of the natives must be 
previously secured, before any profit from them whatsoever is attempted.” 
(Metcalfe 1994:19). Moreover, as David Arnold sets out, during the nineteenth 
century the Indian army and the colony’s jails became “exceptional sites of 
medical observation and control”, while massive public health measures were 
initiated as a guard against the plague epidemic, and small pox vaccination 
became a sign of the colonial government’s benevolence (Arnold 1993:113,135, 
203). At the same time, despite the repression that underpinned it, there were also 
visible limits to what colonial rule could achieve, limits born of the sort of passive 
local resistances that Foucault has termed ‘external blockages’ (Foucault 
2007:194). For example, despite their ambitions to create a class of Indians that 
were English in taste, opinions, morals and intellect, the British had to fashion a
29 Given that the fundamental logic of the colonial state ultimately still remained one of 
strengthening and enriching the imperial centre, this shift could be seen, as Foucault puts it, as “an 
intensification, or internal refinement of this raison d’Etat: it is a principle for maintaining it, 
developing it more fully, and perfecting it” (2008:28).
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policy of neutrality in what education they could institutionalise (Metcalfe 
1994:39 -  40). Whereas in Victorian England all education was religious, a fear of 
religiously inspired revolt prevented the colonial state from introducing 
Christianity to the schools in India, so the state resigned itself to providing 
‘neutral’ - i.e. teaching none, rather than all religions - secular education instead 
(Viswanathan 1990).30 Moreover, by the 1860’s the British had instituted a 
bureaucratic system of law, one which involved both the systematic codification 
of both Hindu and Muslim personal law (that began in the late eighteenth century) 
as well as codes of procedure for both civil and criminal law. The decolonisation 
of South Asia shortly after the Second World War, resulted in the transfer to the 
formerly colonised peoples’ hands of extensive, and long-standing, modern 
administrative structures that were imbued with many of the logics, attitudes, 
calculations and ambitions of the colonial era. The trajectories of individual states 
is varied thereafter. For example, India remains avowedly secular, whilst Pakistan 
is an Islamic republic and Sri Lanka has imposed Buddhism as having a ‘foremost 
place’. The Indian Penal Code is “hugely influenced by Bentham” (Stokes 
1959:229 -  234), and although instituted in 1860, it remains the basis for penal 
codes in post-independence India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. In his 
study of the Indian Army (which notably had not fought for independence, but 
had instead put down rebellions by fellow Indians against British rule), Stephen 
Rosen notes how once liberated from British control, it “did not develop a Hindu 
character” (as might be expected of an institution drawn from a predominantly 
Hindu society), but continued many of its practices of recruitment, patterns of unit 
composition and military organisation, meaning that it remained essentially a 
collection of small, close-knit and inward looking military communities -  
something he suggests precludes large scale, sustained warfighting (1996:199,
30 This was in contrast to Ceylon, where David Little argues the British “played a distinctive role 
in the ‘foil scale ideological attack on Hinduism, Buddhism and local folk traditions.”’ (1994:12). 
This was led by missionaries - whose “most successful weapon was education” -  but they were 
assisted by the colonial government. In Sinhala areas, government and church-run schools 
displaced traditional Buddhist education, shipping the monks of one of their primary functions in 
Sinhala society. There was a more important consequence, in light of the Sinliala-Buddhist revival 
that was to follow: as Little points out, “the [British] government’s general attitude of neutrality in 
religious affairs was quite alien. According to Sinhala tradition, it was not enough for the 
government to refrain from interfering religion and provide some legal protection. The government 
needed to take a more active role. ... Severing the connection between Buddhism and the state 
became an important source of [Sinhala Buddhist] resentment” (Ibid, insert added).
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262).31 Moreover, he argues, “it had to do so in the face of the same Indian social 
realities that faced the British” (Ibid).
In summary, after decolonisation in South Asia, both the colonisers and colonised 
remained profoundly marked - culturally, politically, institutionally, and so on - 
by the colonial experience, in myriad, mundane and often unnoticed ways. In 
other words, while decolonisation effected a radical change in the legal 
relationship of imperial subordination, the institutions, technologies and forms of 
rule instituted during the colonial period remained in place and formed the basis 
of state-society dynamics in the post colonial period, at least initially. ‘European* 
techniques of governmental management that were transferred or created, become 
rooted and mutated -  to varying degrees -  in the non-West. At independence, 
Ceylon, for example, inherited a Westminster style parliament as well as a civil 
service bureaucracy and a ceremonial military modelled on the British ones (as 
chapter 4 discusses, the inexorable ‘govemmentalisation5 in Sinhala-Buddhist 
terms of the Ceylonese, then Sri Lankan, state began soon after). It is also worth 
noting how, even after decolonisation, most British colonial possessions retained 
close links with Britain (symbolised by the Commonwealth). The Royal Military 
Academy at Sandhurst has continued to provide much the officer training for the 
post-independence Indian Pakistani, and, till the mid-nineties, the Ceylonese/Sri 
Lankan militaries, for example. Quite apart from these specific instances of 
ongoing links between the decolonised and the former colonisers, the collective 
colonial experience spans virtually the entire globe: every state or people has been 
involved -  as coloniser or colonised - or been indirectly affected by these 
experiences. Neither are they isolated from each other after decolonisation: these 
peoples and states are also now increasingly enmeshed together in the flows of 
‘globalisation5 wherein the perpetuation and refinement of Western -  i.e.
‘modern’ - administrative state structures and practices is promoted and
31 Ceylon inherited a small, ceremonial, multi-ethnic army modelled on British lines. However, the 
govemmentalisation of the Ceylonese state followed a different trajectory: In 1962, a policy of 
recruiting only from the Sinhalese Buddhist community was instituted -  “the beginning of an 
ethnically pure army” (Blodgett 2004:54). The transformation of the military included the adoption 
of Buddhist rituals officiated by leading monks and the naming of its regiments after Sinhala 
warrior-kings famed for defeating Tamil enemies (Bartholomeusz 2002). See discussion in 
Chapter 4.
47
compelled by a range of international actors and forces in the service of an 
emergent, if resisted, global liberal order.
In conclusion, this section has sought to lay out why, and how, a govemmentality- 
based analysis makes possible the productive study of non-Western spaces. Whilst 
the debate about Foucault’s Eurocentricity will no doubt continue, what the above 
nonetheless makes clear is that Foucauldian thought, and in particular 
govemmentality and biopolitics, is well suited to exploring the changing relations 
of governance, power, subj edification and resistance in the non-West. Indeed, as 
Legg (2007:266) points out, Foucault’s work has successfully been used to 
analyse postcolonial relations throughout the world, including studies of Latin 
America (Trigo 2002, Outtes 2003), Africa (Mbembe 2001) and, of particular 
significance for this dissertation, South Asia.32 Important postcolonial critiques of 
development and this discourse’s (re)production of the ‘Third World’, including 
Ferguson’s ‘The Anti-politics machine’ (1994), Escobar’s ‘Encountering 
development’ (1995) and Dubois’ ‘The Governance o f the Third World’ (1991), 
have also used Foucauldian tools. Govemmentality and biopolitics have been 
fruitfully deployed in studying the non-West (e.g. Legg 2006, Li 2007, Prakash 
1999, Watts 2003) and indigenous peoples in the West (O’ Malley 1996). These, 
as an aside, have been undertaken by both Western and non-Western scholar's. 
Notably, despite his criticism, and later rejection, of Foucault, it was from the 
white Frenchman’s analytical tools that Said drew for his seminal work, 
‘Orientalism’ (1978). Above all, given that Foucault does not put forward an all- 
encompassing theory of power but a set of analytical concepts and tools, it is for 
the scholar to judiciously use these in a given area of study. As Said himself 
notes, “scholars and critics who are trained in the traditional Orientalist disciplines 
are perfectly capable of freeing themselves from the old ideological straitjacket” 
(1978:326).
32 Indeed, Legg also notes that South Asia’s predominance in postcolonial theory may itself be a 
problem, globalizing the experiences of a few colonies -  though comprising a large number of 
diverse peoples -  into the universal experience of the colonised (2007:266).
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2.2 Studying Govemmentality
Beyond conventional analysis
Govemmentality studies have distinct advantages over conventional analysis. 
Firstly, they avoid ontological presuppositions either about individuals or about 
collectivities (Valverde 1996). They also see the theories, ideas, philosophies and 
knowledges that government draws upon as social and cultural products (Dean 
1999:16). As Lamer and Walters (2004b:3) note, as with other poststructuralist 
approaches, govemmentality studies view power as fragmented, insist on the 
constitutive nature of language and view agency in terms of contingent rather than 
fixed subjectivities. The study of mentalities of rule is thus sharply distinguishable 
from sociological and historical approaches. The latter seek to observe and 
document ‘what actually happened5 (i.e. the historic detail of implementing 
government) or ‘what government is really about5 (i.e. the concealed interests or 
underlying explanatory factors explaining governance), while the former seeks to 
understand “how government is thought into being, how practitioners of rule think 
about how best to govern, what concepts they invent or deploy to render their 
subjects governable,55 and so on (O5 Malley et al 1997:502, emphasis added; see 
also Rose 1999:20). Govemmentality can thus be seen as a ‘mid-range 
explanatory level5 between political philosophy and the empirical study of social 
relations (Ibid:504). There can be, however, some negative consequences to this 
approach. Firstly, as O'Malley et al note, it can reduce politics to ‘a mentality of 
rule5, resulting in “an insensitivity to social variation and social heterogeneity55 i.e. 
the understating of the incoherence of power (Ibid, Lamer and Walters 2004b:4). 
A second problem is that in a govemmentality framework, as O5 Malley (1996b) 
points out, resistance to power can appeal* as merely the failure of government -  
i.e. “a negative externality” to rule - and is thus marginalized from analysis. These 
concerns, which are addressed in Foucault's own discussions of govemmentality 
in his lectures, are briefly looked at here.
Govemmentality studies seek to analyse politics by de-centring institutions i.e. 
‘cutting off the king's head'. The way forward, thereafter, is to explain “how ...
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his headless body often behaves as if it indeed had a head” (Dean 1994:156). The 
theoretical object of govemmentality analysis is thus one of political rationalities 
and the technologies of government. It is amid this focus on the workings of loose 
and fluid networks of governance that the incoherence of power or the dynamics 
of resistance can escape scrutiny and the problematization of effects or the costs of 
government can be neglected (O’ Malley et al 1997:509). This is not to say 
govemmentality study cannot be critical; indeed, as O’ Malley et al (Ibid:507) 
point out in their article ‘ Govemmentality, criticism, politics \  their protest is not 
that critique is not immanent or explicit in govemmentality study or that the 
rhetoric adopted often appears “more neutral” than Foucault’s, but that critique is 
limited in form and extent. However, whether this is a failing depends, as noted 
earlier, on what questions are being asked, and to what ends. If the objective is to 
identify a rationality of government and elucidate how it is guiding conduct ‘at a 
distance’ through de-centred networks of power relations -  i.e. to show how a 
headless body behaves as if it had a head - then a govemmentality approach is 
invaluable. If the objective is to explain why government does not succeed or 
examine other aspects of the messiness of politics, or to make emancipation 
possible, then something more needs to be done with govemmentality as a 
framework of analysis.
Towards an explicit programme of emancipation, O’ Malley et al (1997:505), for 
example, call for a new conceptualisation of politics, not “as simply a source of 
programmatic failure and (later) redesign,” but “as relations of contest or struggle 
which are constitutive of government”. In other words, they urge scholars to go 
beyond merely identifying programmes of rule and to engage with the messiness 
of their implementation (Ibid:512) - something which Foucault himself argues for 
in his discussions o f ‘counter-conduct’ (2007: 194-216). This entails, as they 
openly and strongly urge, not only the analyst taking up an explicitly critical 
stance, but asking questions about how this can be carried into emancipatory 
practices. Some scholars engage with contestation by complementing Foucault’s 
ideas with those of Marx or Gramsci - Li (2007), for example, seeks to explain not 
only how the poor are produced but also why some are impoverished and others 
not. This dissertation takes a different approach. It sees important aspects of the 
messiness of politics deemed to be failures of one form of government, as also
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successes of another governmental ambition and vice-versa (see Chapter 4) and as 
the outcomes of competing governmental projects. It is in this way that the notion 
of a ‘clash of govemmentalities5 produces analytical traction and illuminates 
emanicipatory dynamics. The aim of this dissertation is not to theorise resistance 
itself, however (that is, of course, a research project in and of itself) but to use a 
govemmentality framework to engage with contestations that sometimes lead to 
high-intensity violence, without explicit recourse to tools from other frameworks 
or, as noted earlier, without setting out to ratify some acts of contestation and to 
devalue others.
Finally, as Lamer and Walters (2004b:3) point out, a key strength of 
govemmentality research, given its concern with the technical micro-practices of 
power, is that it has been “more historical and avowedly empirical in its 
orientation” than much of poststructuralism. Conceptual devices such as 
strategies, problematizations, programmes, technologies and techniques (see 
below) enable explorations of the “contingencies of the systems of power that we 
inhabit -  and which inhabit us -  today” (Barry et al 1996:4). However, as these 
devices do not comprise a theory in themselves (despite Merlingen’s (2006) 
celebration of ‘govermentality theory’), they also depend on an substantial 
engagement with empirics to provide answers. The difficulties associated with 
any empirical research are thus heightened here. For example, govemmentality 
studies rely to a great extent on texts. As O’ Malley et al (1997:501-2) point out, 
the study of rationalities of rule is undertaken through examining and elaborating 
texts of rule - empirical records of governmental plans, programmes (ideas for 
solutions to problems of government), self-interrogations and so on. Moreover, 
even efforts at governing (i.e. how assemblages of practices, materials, agents, 
techniques - i.e. ‘technologies’ - are deployed to put rationalities into effect) are 
studied by looking at the textual records of these processes (Ibid). However, the 
limitations so engendered are surmountable by observation and interrogation of 
the mundane practices of various agents on the terrain of government i.e. by 
seeing how, and which, rationalities are embedded implicitly and explicitly in 
(self) interests perceived, values held and actions taken by actors operating ‘at a 
distance’ from centres of power. As Stephen Legg puts it, a Foucauldian analysis 
requires a study of texts “should be situated at the contact zone of materiality,
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bodies, objects and practices” (2007:273). As discussed below, this dissertation 
draws not only 011 key texts in which can be found embedded different 
rationalities of rule in Sri Lanka, but also on numerous interviews and many more 
conversations held with a variety both practitioners and subjects of government33, 
the author’s first hand observations of several events and practices that constituted 
‘Sri Lanka and the international5 from 2001 to 2006, as well as a detailed 
following of developments throughout that period.
Problematizations and programmes
Studying govemmentality is therefore about examining how thought operates 
within organized ways of doing things -  ‘regimes of practices5 -  as well as its 
ambitions and its effects (Dean 1999:17-18). The term ‘regimes of practices5 
(Foucault 1991c:75) refers to the historically constituted assemblages through 
which it is possible to do such things as cure, care, punish, educate or counsel 
(Dean 1999:30). They are the institutional practices (“the routine and ritualized 
way things are done in certain places at certain times”) as well as the “different 
ways in which these ... can be thought, made into objects of knowledge, and 
made subject to problematizations [i.e. critiques for reform]” (Ibid:21, insert 
added). From an analytical perspective, there are two important, inter-linked 
dimensions to govemmentality, which Li (2007) labels ‘problematization’, i.e. 
identifying deficiencies of government that need rectifying, and, after Rose 
(1999), ‘rendering technical5 i.e. attempting to deal practically with these required 
rectifications. These two dimensions can also be equated to ‘a set of political 
rationalities5 and ‘a set of technologies of government5 (Rose and Miller 1992, 
Rose 1999, Dean 1999, Salskov-Iversen et al 2000). There is, of course, a close, 
albeit not direct, connection between political rationalities and technologies of 
government, or between ‘problematization5 and ‘rendering technical5, but it is 
analytically useful to separate them.
33 These are not, o f course, exclusive categories, even within the same political rationality. For 
example, in advanced industrial countries, the language of ‘entrepreneurship’ is being applied to 
the activities o f state departments. For example, schools, while getting government funding, are 
meanwhile expected to 'compete’ in a market of education provision (see Burchell 1993:274-5, 
Rose 1993).
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Political rationalities are the thoughts and representations involved when 
problems of government are defined and when appropriate fields of intervention 
are chosen. Examples might include the various ways in which government by the 
state has been organized within Western states, including ‘liberalism’, ‘welfarism’ 
and ‘neo-liberalism’. Rationalities are rarely explicit, however, but are to be found 
embedded in governmental discourse -  i.e. in strategies, policies, plans, projects, 
white papers, green papers, studies and recommendations by academics and 
experts, and so on. Problematizations pose the obligations of rulers in terms of the 
problems they seek to address and perpetually recasts these problems in terms of 
the difficulties and failures (i.e. the discrepancy between ambition and outcome) 
of government (Rose and Miller 1992:181, 191); it shapes what are counted as 
problems, what as failures and what as solutions (Rose 1993:285). Examples of 
governmental problems might include unemployment, youth knife crime, an 
uncompetitive economy, ‘moral decay’ in society or ‘global wanning’. Even 
successes of government can lead to new problems to be solved; for example, 
falling poverty and increasing use of ‘bio-fuels’ were blamed for higher global 
food and grain prices in 2008,
Political rationalities not only shape the identification of problems of government, 
but also the invention of solutions i.e. the design of programmes (Foucault 
1991c: 80-82). As Li succinctly puts it, “the identification of a problem is 
intimately linked to the availability of a solution” (2007:7). Programmes are 
attempts, in the name of a specific set of governmental ends, to regulate, reform, 
organize and improve governmental practices (Dean 1999:32). In the United 
States, for example, the problem of ‘permanent poverty’ has been recast as the 
consequence of a ‘culture of dependency’ amongst welfare recipients (Fraser and 
Gordon 1994) or, alternatively, of a sense of ‘disempowennenf amongst the poor 
(Cruikshank 1999). These problematisations thereafter lead to programmes for 
‘welfare reform9 and for ‘empowerment’. Programmes are thus competing 
proposals for dealing with the findings of problematizations. Although they may 
be articulated with different degrees of explicitness and cogency, programmes are 
ways of producing a preferred social reality by transforming specific locales and 
relations in ways thought desirable (Rose and Miller 1992:181, 183, Dean 
1999:22, see also Miller and Rose 1990:4). In other words, programmes “make
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the objects of government thinkable in a way that appeal's susceptible to 
diagnosis, prescription and cure by calculating and normalizing intervention” 
(Rose and Miller 1992:181, 183). Programmes therefore have both prescriptive 
effects - ‘what is to be done’ -  and codifying effects -  ‘what is to be known’ 
(Foucault 1991c:75).
It is in this context that rationalities of government have been described as 
“irreducibly utopian” (Dean 1999:33). To begin with, government is seen as 
necessary to achieve an improvement of some kind - a type of person, community, 
organization, society or even world to be achieved i.e. a better world, society, way 
of living or way of doing things (Ibid). Government thus envisages the /^-shaping 
of existing relationships between people and things in pursuit of this better world. 
Government is also “inherently optimistic” (Miller and Rose 1990:10): it is taken 
for granted that governmental efforts can achieve their intended outcomes i.e. that, 
“it is possible to re-form human beings, to form or 
shape them or their attributes in some way, and that our 
exertions can be effective in this regard; that we can 
draw upon and apply forms of knowledge to that task, 
that we can gain a secure knowledge of the world and 
of human beings in that world, that we can ‘make 
things better’, improve how we do things, and so on”
(Dean 1999, emphasis added).
The significance of this confidence in being able to render utopia real is 
underlined by the normative scale of governmental ambition, for example to 
reshape how entire societies and the individuals embedded within it conduct 
themselves. However, herein lies a contradiction inherent to any governmental 
rationality: that between what is claimed to exist and how this ‘reality’ also has to 
be brought into existence. In this regal’d, even the state is “at once that which 
exists and which does not exist enough. ... What government has to do must be 
identified with what the state should be” (Foucault 2008:4, emphasis added). 
Hindess notes how collectives to be governed -  such as ‘society’, ‘the working 
class’, ‘the people’, ‘the developing world’, ‘Muslims’ and others -  “appear, at 
times, as objective realities producing effects in the present and possessing
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interests that can or should be represented by some party or movement [and] at 
other times, ... as collectivities that do not (or do no longer) properly exist” 
(1993:308, insert added). As such, in the first case “practical decisions may be 
taken on the basis of what are thought to be the ‘natural’ or essential features of 
such entities and their current situation,” while in the other case “the practical 
issue is how to create or re-create these collectivities” (Ibid). Similarly, 
supposedly ‘natural’ phenomena of government still have to be created and/or 
maintained by deliberate action, such as ‘the market’ (Burchell 1993:271, see also 
Barry et al 1996, Rose 1999:137-8) or ‘civil society’ (Burchell 1993:272, see also 
Dean 1999:124). Capacities and behaviours said to be inherent to objects of 
government also have to be incited or induced. For example, poor farming 
families have to taught how to prosper from fanning (Li 2007), ‘reconciliation’ is 
a way to get ‘naturally’ harmonious ethnic or religious groups to live peacefully 
together, the ‘nation’ must yet be unified and, even though women ‘''can often 
exert considerable influence in bringing warring parties to the negotiating table,” 
nonetheless they need to “encouraged to participate in efforts to prevent conflict 
and build peace” (OECD 2001:85, emphasis added).
Programmes are thus designs for (re)constructing reality, designs that emerge 
from the contested engagements of heterogeneous actors with claims to certain 
knowledges. For example, in post WW2 Britain, the political rationality of 
‘welfarism’ (later replaced by that of ‘neoliberalism’) led to specific 
problematizations such as the declining birthrate, delinquency and anti-social 
behaviour, the problem family, the social consequences of ill health and the 
integration of citizens into the community (Rose and Miller 1992:192). In relation 
to health alone, diverse, competing programmes emerged in the quest to transform 
the unwieldy, dispersed British health apparatus into a ‘calculable universe’ in 
which entities and activities would be mapped, enumerated, translated into 
information that was transmitted, accumulated, compared, evaluated and 
programmed (Ibid: 193-4). Thus, even when it embodies the same political 
rationality, the world of programmes is “heterogenous and rivalrous” with some 
solutions posing problems for others (Miller and Rose 1990:10) - or, as Raco puts 
it, programmes tend to “lack a singular coherence and essence” (2003:79). 
Moreover, programmes don’t take effect “in an integral manner” as they are
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simplified, or some are chosen and others not (Foucault 1991c:80). That 
programmes do not work out as planned, however, cannot be seen solely as the 
difference between “the purity of the ideal and the disorderly impurity of the real” 
but, rather, as the result of
“different strategies that are mutually opposed, 
composed and superposed so as to produce permanent 
and solid effects which can perfectly well be 
understood in terms of their rationality, even though 
they don’t conform to the initial programming”
(Foucault 1991c:80, emphasis added).
Knowledges and language
Proponents of various programmes, meanwhile, “ground themselves in a positive 
knowledge of that which is to be governed, ways of reasoning about it, analyzing 
and evaluating it, identifying its problems and devising solutions” (Miller and 
Rose 1990:7). State professionals, academics and private-sector managers thus 
come to draw on “particular domains of knowledge, fusing them into the 
discourse o f ... authorities” (Salskov-Iversen et al 2000:187). Knowledge here 
refers, as Rose and Miller (1992:177-8) point out, not just to ‘ideas’, but to 
‘know-how’: the assemblage of persons (e.g. generals, architects or accountants), 
theories (e.g. philosophy or medicine), schemes (such as town planning or social 
insurance), techniques (such as medical inspections of children) and so on. As 
Foucault puts it, “the delicate mechanisms of power cannot function unless 
knowledge, or rather knowledge apparatuses, are formed, organised, and put into 
circulation” (2003:33-34). Efforts to organise knowledges, meanwhile, bring with 
them “a whole series of practices, projects and institutions”, through which 
attempts are made to homogenize technical knowledges, resulting in the 
elimination and disqualification of some knowledges deemed useless, the 
normalisation and organisation of the rest -  making them fit together and 
coalesce, and the emergence of a centralisation of knowledges to be controlled 
and selected for use (Ibid: 180-82). International knowledge o f ‘internal conflict’, 
for example, increasingly has in the past two decades come to be framed by new
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logics of ‘greed over grievance’ (Collier 2000), ‘Old Wars/New Wars’ (Kaldor 
1999) and the ‘Security-Development nexus’ (see Buur et al 2007, Duffield 2001, 
2007) which overlap with the broader global institutionalism of neoliberalism.
Crucially, the foregrounding of expertise in solving problems of government 
means that “questions that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered 
nonpolitical” (Li 2007:7, emphasis added). For example, writing on 
developmental efforts in Indonesia, Li outlines how experts designing strategies 
of poverty alleviation often exclude political-economic relations from their 
diagnosis and prescriptions, such as by focusing on the capacities of the poor 
rather than on the practices through which one social group impoverishes another 
(2007:7). What Li calls ‘non-political’ can also be termed ‘de-politicised’ or are 
the effects of what Ferguson (1994) has called ‘anti-politics’. The latter refers to 
how experts frame or reframe dynamics, spaces, practices and outcomes of 
government in ways informed by their own knowledges, thus problematising 
issues in ways that efface important socio-political and socio-economic dynamics 
and instead render a ‘reality’ amenable to the technical solutions that they 
(experts) conveniently have to hand. As such, more than ‘de-politicised’, such 
actions render a problem space ‘re-politicised’ in specific ways with specific 
consequences. Why violent crime rises in Sri Lanka’s south, for example, 
becomes linked to the availability of small aims, army desertion and weaknesses 
in law and order provision, rather than the deleterious impact of privatization on 
fragile rural economies and relentless war in the north. Continuing aimed conflict 
in Sri Lanka becomes a function of continued Tamil Diaspora funding for the 
LTTE (RAND 2001), rather than, say, the state’s reluctance to negotiate or share 
power. Why Tamil expatriates don’t inform on LTTE fundraisers amongst them 
becomes linked to Western states’ failure to provide adequate assurance of 
witness protection (HRW 2006), rather than willing support for Tamil 
independence and aimed struggle. Moreover, the specification of what is 
‘political’ and ‘non-political’, what is the preserve of the state and what is not, 
what are matters for the individual and what are matters of collective response and 
so on, takes place, not necessarily through some ‘top-down’ logic or imposed 
rationality, but through myriad ‘transactions’ - the “series of conflicts, 
agreements, discussions and reciprocal concessions” - all episodes “whose effect
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is finally to establish a de facto, general, rational division between what is to be 
done and what is not done in the practice o f governing [properly]” (Foucault 
2008:12, emphasis, insert added).
Knowledges and expertise posit on the terrain of government objects to be 
reformed and corrected or to be strengthened and improved, as well as the ways of 
doing so. However, knowledges do not merely legitimate existing power relations, 
but constitute new sectors of reality and make new fields of existence practical 
(Miller and Rose 1990:7). As Miller and Rose (Ibid:5) point out, ‘knowing5 an 
object in such a way that it can be governed is more than a purely speculative 
activity:
“It is through such procedures of inscription that the 
diverse domains o f4 govemmentality5 are made up, that 
‘objects5 such as the economy, the enterprise, the social 
field and the family are rendered in a particular 
conceptual form and made amenable to intervention 
and regulation.55
In other words, what is to be governed must first be conceptualised and 
represented. Is Sri Lanka, for example, an established Sinhala-dominated 
ethnocracy or a fledgling multi-ethnic democracy? Thus, far from being mere 
rhetoric, language serves as an “intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering 
reality thinkable55 in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations and 
interventions by governors, experts or managers, as well as the inhabitants of the 
governed domain -  citizens, parents or employees (Rose and Miller 1992:179, 
Miller and Rose 1990:7, Rose 1993:289). In other words, “it is through language 
that governmental fields are composed, rendered thinkable and manageable55 
(Miller and Rose 1990:7). Moreover, the terrain to be governed must be turned 
into information, such as reports, statistics and graphs, i.e. in forms which are 
“stable, mobile, combinable, comparable” and which can be transported to centers 
where calculations and judgements can be made i.e. “these forms enable the 
features of a domain deemed pertinent to be literally re-presented in places where 
decisions about them are made55 -  such as the editor5 s office, the war room or the 
UN Security Council (Ibid). Information is inscribed in such a way as to make the 
domain in question susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention -  it
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places objects and problems of government within the obligations and power of 
governors (Ibid). Thus, “information is not the outcome o f a neutral recording 
function; it is itself a way o f acting on the real” i.e. of constituting ‘reality’ (Miller 
and Rose 1990:7, emphasis added).
2.3 Methodology: an analytics of government
Having set out a set of conceptual devices with which an analysis of the 
contestations inherent to the ‘messiness’ of politics could proceed, this section 
sets out a sketch of a methodology - which Dean (1999) has tenned an ‘analytics’ 
of government - for studying govemmentalities.The starting point of an analytics 
of government is the identification and examination of points of 
‘problematization’ i.e. the specific situations in which governing comes to be 
called into question, the moments and the situations in which the conduct of 
conduct becomes a problem (Dean 1999:27). Problematisations, crucially, are 
made “on the basis of particular regimes of practices of government, with 
particular techniques, language, grids of analysis and evaluation, forms of 
knowledge and expertise” (Dean 1999:28). Analysis starts, therefore not from a 
general theory or set of theoretical principles, but from the kinds of questions 
being asked concerning how governors and the governed conduct themselves. 
This requires attention to the conditions under which it becomes possible to 
consider certain things be ‘true’ -  and hence to say and do certain things about 
human beings and their interrelations i.e. to the different ways in which ‘truth’ is 
produced in social, cultural and political practices (Rose 1999:8, Dean 1999:18). 
The emphasis is deliberately on ‘truth’ and not ‘meaning’; the concern here is not 
the social meanings of actions and events for actors in other times and places, but 
“the ways in which certain languages of description, explanation, calculation and 
judgment came to acquire the value of truth and the kinds of actions and 
techniques that were made possible by such truths” (Rose 1999:8, footnote 8). 
Dean distinguishes four' dimensions that an analytics of government ought to 
examine; which he terms, respectively, as “the fields of visibility of government”, 
“the technical aspect of government”, seeing government as “rational and 
thoughtful activity” and “formation of identities” (Dean 1999:20-38). These
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dimensions presuppose each other, but are not reducible to each other. They are 
summarised here.
An analytics of government asks “what the field of visibility is that characterises a 
regime of government, by what kind of light it illuminates and defines certain 
objects and with what shadows and darkness it obscures and hides others” (Dean 
1999:30).34 Pictorial representations -  such as maps, graphs, management flow 
charts, or tables -  visualise fields to be governed, position actors, priorities, 
linkages, etc and make it possible to ‘picture’ who and what is to be governed, 
how relations of authority and obedience are constituted in space, how different 
locales and agents are to be connected with one another, what problems are to be 
solved and what objectives are to be sought (Ibid). These diagrams of power and 
authority, such as Bentham’s panopticon or maps of crime risk, bring certain 
aspects to the fore and deny others visibility and inspectability. World Bank 
documentation on Sri Lanka, for example, maps the island in terms of 
developmental metrics, effacing ethnically based differences, political claims to 
certain territories, consequences of mytho-narratives, the role of the state in 
racialised violence and so on (see Chapter 4).
Focussing on the technical aspects of government is to ask by what means, 
mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and 
vocabularies is authority constituted and rule accomplished. Technical means are 
a condition of governing and often impose limits over what it is possible to do. 
For example, the managing of ‘national’ economies turns on using certain 
economic models and instruments. This is not to say government is reducible to 
these, but, rather, that technical means are to some extent autonomous and 
irreducible (Ibid:31). Seeing government as ‘rational and thoughtful activity’ 
concerns the forms of knowledge that both inform and arise from the activity of 
governing i.e. what forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of 
calculation, or rationality are employed in practices of governing? How does
34 As Sankaran Krishna points out, “abstraction is never innocent of power. The precise ... 
abstraction in each instance decides what aspects o f a limitless reality are brought into shaip focus 
and what aspects are, literally, left out of the picture” (2001:403) The point is not whether to 
abstract or not -  “it is an unavoidable moment in the constitution of knowledge” -  but “ to be 
vigilant as to what abstraction simultaneously conceals as it reveals” (Ibid).
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thought seek to transform these practices? How do these practices of governing 
give rise to specific forms of truth? How does thought seek to render particular 
issues, domains and problems governable? Govemmentality calls for attention to 
the more or less explicit, purposive attempts to organize and reorganize 
institutional spaces, their routines, rituals and procedures, and the conduct of 
actors in specific ways (Ibid:32).
Finally, through what forms of individual and collective identity does governing 
operate, and which do specific practices and programmes of government try to 
form i.e. what forms of person, self and identity are presupposed by different 
practices of government and what sorts of transformation do these practices seek? 
What statuses, capacities, attributes and orientations are assumed of those who 
exercise authority (from politicians and bureaucrats to experts and advisors) and 
those who are to be governed (for example the poor, ‘nationalists’, an ethnic 
minority)? What forms of conduct are expected of them? What duties and rights 
do they have? How are these capacities and attributes to be fostered? How are 
these duties enforced and rights ensured? How are certain aspects of conduct 
problematized? How are they then to be reformed? How are certain individuals 
and populations made to identify with certain groups, to become good and active 
citizens, and so on? (Ibid:32). This is not to look for the ‘real’ subjects, but those 
envisioned. Regimes of government do not in themselves determine subjectivities, 
they merely seek to produce them by attributing various capacities, qualities and 
statuses to agents and attempting to elicit, promote and foster appropriate; they 
are thus only successful to the extent these agents come to experience themselves 
in these ways.
This dissertation operationalises the analytics of government outlined above in the 
following ways. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the projects of liberal peace and Tamil 
liberation as two different, sometimes overlapping, sometimes competing, sets of 
“rational and thoughtful activities”, seeking to establish in the island of Sri Lanka 
specific ways of ordering state, society and individuals. The problematizations 
and programmes identified in 2002 on these different terrains of government -  
and thus what constitutes their respective “fields of visibility” -  are specifically 
considered in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 and 7 examine some of the “technical aspects
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of government” with reference to these two governnientalities. These chapters, 
and Chapter 8, also consider the formation of identities -  for example, the Tamils 
as members of a nation and, conversely, of a minority in a multi-ethnic state; of 
the LTTE as a bulwark against Sinhala oppression or, conversely, as a dangerous 
political actor, but one indispensable to the project of producing liberal peace in 
Sri Lanka; o f ‘peace-related’, ‘spoiler’ and ‘vulnerable’ entities, and so on. The 
specificities of the Sri Lanka case study are taken up after a discussion of 
govemmentality and, in particular, the notion of a ‘clash of governnientalities’ in 
Chapter 3.
In summary, after Foucault (2007:116-8, 2008:2-3), the first aspect in an analysis 
of the Norwegian-led peace in Sri Lanka is to move outside the taken for granted, 
even emblematic, institutions of peace processes (the conflict actors, mediators, 
etc) and seek to reconstruct the networks of alliance, communications, calculation 
and so on by which specific orderings (of how the world should be) are advanced 
and resisted. In other words, to replace a focus on institutions or actors with an 
overall view of technologies of power -  power in a Foucauldian sense of being 
diffuse and productive. What is the effect, for example, of a secessionist armed 
actor like the LTTE being proscribed as terrorists, or agreeing to consider 
federalism as a ‘solution’? The second aspect, having done this, is to look at the 
various actors’ functions by putting them back into a general economy of power, 
to see how they are located in strategies and tactics that find traction, sometimes 
without their acquiescence or even their awareness. The third aspect is to critically 
question the ‘essentiality’ of objects which serve as ideal types or representations 
against which ‘real world’ entities are measured against. For example, the interest 
is less in what is a ‘democratic state’ or ‘terrorist group’ than how such ideal- 
types influence or structure conflict actors’ actions? In other words, rather than 
seeking to measure institutions, practices and knowledges in terms of the criteria 
and nouns of already given idealobjects, the analysis seeks to grasp how a field of 
‘truth’ is constituted by such technologies. These general principles are 
operationalised, moreover, through the analytics of government outlined above.
To this end, this dissertation draws on key texts in which can be found embedded 
different rationalities of rule, including manifestos, declarations, guidelines,
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assessments, strategy papers, speeches and statements, as well as academic and 
policy researches (a very small selection of key texts is included in appendices). 
The dissertation has also drawn on careful near-daily monitoring of developments 
in Sri Lanka, from before 2001 to after 2006, through media reports, as well as 
scholarly and policy literature. However it also draws 011 insights gained from 
several structured interviews (respondents are listed in the appendices) and many 
more unstructured conversations conducted throughout the 2001-2006 peace 
process and afterwards with both practitioners and subjects of government (these 
are not, of course, exclusive categories, even within the same political rationality), 
including diplomats, political and social activists, demonstrators, soldiers, 
academics, parliamentarians, refugees, journalists, aid workers and others. It is 
also informed by my first hand observations, in that period, of thought and 
practices on ‘Sri Lanka and the international’: as press officer to the LTTE 
delegation at several sessions of the Norwegian-facilitated talks (including one 
from inside the negotiation chamber) and at an international aid conference on Sri 
Lanka; as a participant in numerous discussions hosted by think-tanks, conflict 
resolution NGOs, academics and Diaspora organisations; as a contributor to 
donor-funded studies on ‘strategic conflict assessment’ and ‘conflict- 
transformation’; and, as a member of the Diaspora, in political discussions with 
many ‘ordinary* Tamils. The point here is not to find inconsistencies, falsehoods 
or errors in texts, but to augment the process of excavating mentalities of rule by 
seeing how ideas, concepts, events, assumptions, and so on outlined in texts are 
understood, interpreted, articulated, taken up, and thought up by governors and 
governed.
In concluding this chapter, I would like to state clearly my own positionality in 
relation to Sri Lanka’s politics as undoubtedly my scholarly work is, despite my 
best efforts, shaped by my own subjectivity. My lived experiences as a Tamil, as a 
political activist committed to the self-determination of the Tamil people, and as, 
first a Sri Lankan, and then British, citizen who has lived, studied and worked in 
the West for the past quarter century, no doubt influence my analysis. The 
normativity of my subjectivity has drawn me to this project, a study of the last, 
and abortive, peace effort to resolve Sri Lanka’s protracted crisis. However, I have 
had no desire to use my research, in Rose’s words, “to ratify some acts of
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contestation and to devalue others.” Nonetheless, this may have happened; there 
is, after all, no view from nowhere (Nagel 1986) and every analysis is, in all 
likelihood, shaped by the analyst’s own value-judgments, doctrinal assumptions 
and what Peter Senge (1990) terms ‘mental models’. I have therefore not 
undertaken the futile exercise of seeking out an ‘objective’ standpoint outside 
myself, in completing this dissertation. Rather, I have attempted to engage 
rigorously and sympathetically (i.e. in terms of their own stated goals and 
discernible governmental ambitions, both strategic and tactical) with the 
respective projects of all actors in the Norwegian peace process. How successful I 
have been in this regal'd can be, of course, only for the reader to judge.
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3. Clash of Governnientalities
Ahead of the study of the ‘clash of governnientalities’ that constituted the 2001- 
2006 international engagement in Sri Lanka, this chapter sets out what is meant by 
the notion itself To begin with, the govemmentality studies literature, which has 
expanded significantly in the past two decades, has meanwhile largely tended 
towards an approach based on another, albeit implicit, assumption; it generally 
focuses on a (i.e. single) govemmentality at work in a given space under study 
(though this is changing following the recent publication of Foucault’s lecture 
series, for reasons discussed below). Although in his own elaboration of 
govemmentality, Foucault largely does the same, for example when discussing the 
emergence of neoliberalism in post-WW2 Germany and the United States, or 
laying out the serial transitions in rationalities of rule in Europe (from 
sovereignty, via raison d’etat, to govemmentality), he certainly does not intend 
this to preclude the existence of multiple governnientalities at work in the same 
territorial or constitutional space. The point is emphatically made in his discussion 
o f ‘counter-conducts’ in his 1976 lectures (2007, chapter eight), which is 
examined below. Furthermore, in the closing words of his last lecture in his 1979 
series, Foucault also notes how contestations and debates over how human 
conduct should be directed have today come to constitute ‘politics’ itself 
(2008:313),35 By this Foucault does not, of course, mean that ‘govemmentality’ 
can be reduced to, or is a pseudonym for, ‘politics’, but rather that the dynamics 
of modem political contestation are embedded within and informed by one or, 
quite plausibly, several governmental rationalities, each seeking to promote life 
and manage populations according to its own reason.
35 “You can see that in the modem world, in the world we have known since the nineteenth 
century, a series of governmental rationalities overlap, lean on each other, challenge each other, 
and straggle with each other. .,. And it is all these different arts of government, all these different 
ways o f calculating, rationalizing, and regulating the art o f government which, overlapping each 
other, broadly speaking constitute the object of political debate. ... What is politics, in the end, if 
not both the interplay of these different aits of government with their different referent pointsf,] 
and the debate to which these different arts o f government give rise?” (2008:313, emphasis added). 
In referring to a ‘series’ here Foucault is referring to the ‘transition’ from sovereignty, via raison 
d’etat, to govemmentality and biopolitics.
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This, then, is the stalling point for the conceptualisation of ‘internal’ conflict 
presented in this dissertation, which argues that the protracted, multifaceted and 
sometimes violent political contestations that make up a warzone can be 
productively studied as a ‘clash of governnientalities’ i.e. as the simultaneous 
pursuit of competing idealizations of how population, territory and forms of 
political rule ought to be organized so as to promote the constitution and 
wellbeing of (particular) populations. This may seem an obvious claim given how 
the violence of war is often directed against enemy populations, and not just their 
political goals. However, the argument presented here refers to a much deeper 
condition, whereby competing rationalities invest the web and waft of ‘ordinary’ -  
i.e. non-violent, or ‘peace-time5 -  politics, as well as war itself, and operate 
through diffuse networks and mundane practices to make possible the flourishing 
of their respective conception of the good, or well behaved population and its 
survival against latent threats, including those posed by other subsets of 
humanity.36 Population here, therefore, does not refer to a self-evident or pre­
formed ethnic or religious group, but to that human collective whose members 
conduct themselves in keeping with the governmental rationality in question. 
Those who do not, meanwhile, become targets for correction and reform, or for 
exclusion and elimination — not only physically but also politically, socially, etc.
This understanding of political contestation as the manifestation of competing 
coherent political rationalities working through diverse and disparate actors and 
forces in the same, or overlapping, governmental spaces is ever present, but 
largely underdeveloped, in Foucault’s own work. Nonetheless it holds 
considerable, and as yet largely untapped, analytical promise. Arnold I Davidson, 
editor of the English series of the lectures of 1978 and 1979, arguing that 
“Foucault’s analysis of the notions of conduct and counter-conduct... seems to 
me to constitute one of the richest and most brilliant moments in the entire 
course”, devotes almost his entire introduction to the two volumes to a discussion 
of this dyad (2007 :xix). In elaborating this dissertation’s conceptualization of 
aimed conflicts and international interventions in them as a ‘clash of
36 This is also why the dissertation on the politics and dynamics of contestation during the 2001- 
2006 Norwegian-led international peace initiative, rather than the horrific violence of Sri Lanka’s 
conflict.
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governnientalities5, this chapter draws on Foucault’s discussion of ‘counter- 
conducts’ as well as of the ‘milieu’ -  by which he means both the temporal and 
territorial space to be governed (regulated) and the “combined overall, effects 
bearing on all who live in it” (2007:20-21, 77-78). As discussed below, the idea of 
‘counter-conducts’ is at once both illuminating and constraining, on the one hand 
encouraging the seeking of analytical explanations through the excavation of often 
not obvious political rationalities informing various forms of resistance to a 
prevailing organisation of territory, population and security, and, on the other 
hand, limiting such analysis by privileging a search for deviations, contrasts or 
contradictions in relation to this dominant governmental rationality, rather than an 
exploration of each rationality present in its own right. As such, it is argued here 
that the framework o f ‘multiple govemmentalities’ competing in a given milieu 
holds greater analytical possibility than one of ‘conduct/counter-conducts’.
The chapter begins by exploring those aspects of Foucault’s work on power and 
subjectivity on which the concept of govemmentality stands, including ideas of 
‘government’ as the ‘conduct of conduct’, o f ‘disciplinary’ and ‘sovereign’ 
powers, of the ‘subject’ and of power as productive and as ‘action at a distance’. It 
then examines the concept of govermentality itself - i.e. what is meant by a 
mentality of rule or a political rationality. The chapter also examines the closely 
related to govemmentality concepts of biopower and biopolitics - and explains 
why the dissertation opts to focus, in its limited space, on examining those 
governmental rationalities competing in the Sri Lankan milieu and sketching their 
biopolitical implications, rather than a fuller exploration of the latter. Having thus 
laid out the essential theoretical concepts on which the notion of a ‘clash of 
govemmentalities’ rests, the next section elaborates what is meant, politically and 
epistemologically, by the term. The dissertation’s subsequent chapters then 
illustrate how competing attempts to shape the conduct of organisations, 
individuals and populations in the Sri Lankan space between 2001 and 2006 were 
undertaken through disciplinary, sovereign and governmental powers, to ‘make 
up’ specific kinds of individual and collective subjectivities and to promote and 
ensure the wellbeing of population(s).
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3.1 Government: the ‘conduct of conduct’
Foucault understood ‘government5 not simply as the management of states or as 
political structures but more generally, as ‘the conduct of conduct5 (2002c:341, 
2007:193), by which he meant any endeavor to shape, guide, direct or lead the 
conduct of others or, indeed, of oneself. Those whose conduct is being conducted 
may be the crew of a ship, employees of a business, members of a family or the 
inhabitants of a territory, although amongst this plurality of forms of governing - 
between which there are continuities as well as differences, there is o a specific 
one which can be applied to the state as a whole (Foucault 2007:93). This 
understanding of government as ‘the conduct of conduct5 has continuities with 
Foucault's distinctive conception of power (see Burchell 1993:268), whereby 
power is neither a resource nor a form of legitimation but a relation; power exists 
only insofar as it is exercised by some on others, though sometimes it may be 
underpinned by permanent structures (Foucault 1979, 2002c:340). The exercise of 
power is not about constraining or coercing, but about acting on others5 actions to 
ensure certain behaviours and outcomes. A relationship of power - as opposed to a 
relationship of violence - does not act directly on others but instead operates on 
their ‘field of possibilities5 i.e. it is
“a set of actions on possible actions; it incites, it 
induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult, it 
releases or contrives, makes more probable or less, [and 
only] in the extreme it constrains or forbids entirely55 
(Foucault 2002c;341, insert added).
Crucially, therefore, the existence of an actor's freedom and the exercise of power 
over/on that actor are not mutually exclusive. Rather, the latter is very much 
dependent on the former. A power relationship can only be articulated on the basis 
that firstly, the other (over whom power is exercised) is recognized and 
maintained to the very end as a subject who can act; and secondly, when faced 
with the relationship of power, “a whole field of responses, reactions, results and 
possible inventions may open up55 for this other (Foucault 2002b:340). Governing, 
then, is not simply domination, which discounts or seeks to crush the capacity for
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action of the dominated, but rather to “structure the possible field of action of 
others” (Ibid, emphasis added) i.e. to artificially so arrange things that people, 
following only their own self-interest, will do as they ought (Scott 1995:202). It is 
in this way that governing (the conduct of conduct) takes place ‘at a distance’, 
with those being governed not necessarily being aware how their conduct is being 
conducted, or why, or by whom (Rose 1999). Efforts to act upon others by getting 
them to act ‘in their own interest’ are thus intimately connected to the production 
of self-governing subjects.37 This echoes Foucault’s explication of the productive 
effects of power -  i.e. how power promotes, transforms and acts upon capacities, 
working through, rather than against, subjectivities (1977, 1979). Rather than 
restraining, power produces the sought after behaviour' - such as entrepreneurship, 
patriotism, national unity, or political tolerance. Power is thus not so much a 
matter of imposing constraints as one of ‘making up’ (Hacking 1986 cited in 
Lukes 2005:91) individuals, organizations and populations capable of bearing a 
kind of ‘regulated freedom’ (Rose 1999). This is captured, for example, by the 
notion of ‘responsibilization’ whereby it is the principle of government that the 
governed freely conduct themselves in certain ways -  i.e. ‘properly’ using their 
liberty - and actively involve themselves in resolving the kinds of issues normally 
held to be the responsibility of governmental agencies (Burchell 1993:271, 
O’Malley 1996a: 199-200, Rose 1999:158-160, 174). Stopping the global 
HIV/AIDS pandemic or ‘global warming’, for example, is not only a matter for 
states and international institutions, but also involves responsibilities of 
individuals, families and societies around the world.
Government is for Foucault, after Guillame de La Perrier, “the right disposition of 
things, arranged so as to lead to a suitable end” (2007:96 emphases added),38
37 As Foucault puts it: “people know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they 
do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does.” (personal communication cited in 
Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:187 emphasis added).
38 By ‘things’, Foucault, after La Perriere, is referring to people and their relations with other 
aspects coming under the purview o f ‘government’ i.e. he is relocating the domain of government 
beyond merely territory, as in sovereign rule: “The things government must be concerned about... 
are men in their relationships, bonds and complex involvements with things like wealth, resources, 
means of subsistence, and, of course, the territory with its borders, qualities, climate, dryness, 
fertility and so on. ‘Things’ are men in their relationships with things like customs, habits, ways of 
acting and thinking. Finally they are men in their relationships with things like accidents, 
misfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death.” (2007:96)
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Governing thus “inescapably entail [s] a certain investment of thought, however 
attenuated, and a certain form of reason, however much it may be obscured’5 
(Rose 1999:4,7). In other words, a specific kind of reason makes possible and 
guides any exercise of government. Reason here does not refer to some 
transcendental form, but to any rationality informing calculations about how to 
govern (Foucault 1991c:78-79). Rationality is simply any form of thinking that 
strives to be clear, systematic and explicit about how things are, or how they 
ought to be (Dean 1999:11). Chapter 4, for example, discusses three competing 
rationalities as to how the population(s) of the island of Sri Lanka should be 
ordered: as a single multi-ethnic citizenry, as two equal nations, and as an entitled 
majority and subordinate minorities. Moreover, a given rationality, in and of 
itself, does not set out what the specific policies of government should be i.e. 
whilst it may inform strategies of rule, it does not determine them. Instead, a 
rationality defines “the essential problem-space” in which government takes place 
and does so in such a way that makes government thinkable and practicable 
(Burchell 1993:272). Federalism and independent statehood, for example, are both 
ways of pursuing the freedom and progress of the Tamil nation (see chapter 4). 
Efforts at governing may be formally set out -  for example, in research studies, 
manifestos, policy documents, pamphlets and speeches - or manifest themselves 
within particular types of practice (Rose 1999:4). In summary, as Dean (1999:11) 
puts it, the idea of government can be captured thus:
"Government is any more or less calculated and 
rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of 
authorities and agencies, employing a variety of 
techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape 
conduct by working through desires, aspirations, 
interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and 
with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable 
consequences, effects and outcomes.”
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Governing 6 at a distance’
Practices of government are, therefore, the calculated and deliberate attempts to 
shape and regulate conduct in specific ways, and in the service of specific ends. 
They are undertaken not only by the assemblage called the ‘state’, but also by a 
range of entities and agents which function ‘at a distance’ from the state, pursuing 
their own interests and objectives but from their own locations within a specific, if 
not immediately apparent, rationality of rule, which is thus advanced by their 
actions. Such practices of conducting conduct are especially visible in Western 
states today, where political rationalities termed neoliberalism and advanced 
liberalism - which turn on the ‘self-interested’ individual, ‘markets’, ‘small 
government’ etc. - have increasingly become the noun. These mobile mechanisms 
of power work through the invocation and harnessing of specific interests, 
ambitions, beliefs, values, capacities and behaviour in individuals and entities -  
businesses, banks, charities, trade unions, families, and so on - as well as, of 
course, within the diverse components of the state; through ever-evolving bodies 
of knowledge and expertise; and through the ever-changing networks in which all 
these come to be embedded.
Governing is inextricably bound up with the activities and calculations of 
independent -  ostensibly ‘non-political’ - authorities, such as doctors, social 
workers, parents or managers (Rose 1999:49). Doctors, dieticians, psychologists, 
fitness instructors, health food producers, and celebrity chefs are all involved, for 
example, in governing the health of the population. As Davies puts it, 
governmental strategies “must always operate via intermediary institutions of one 
sort or another, each with its own expert system for analyzing and altering social 
behaviour” (2006:252; see also Rose 1993:285). International ambitions for a 
harmonious Sri Lankan citizenry, for example, are pursued through a shifting 
network of international and local NGOs that, drawing on international experts 
and knowledges, promote political tolerance, ethnic reconciliation and 
‘development’ that are held to collectively turn antagonistic ethnic groups into a 
civic polity (see chapter 7). Governing ‘at a distance’ -  in both relational and 
spatial senses - takes place when the ‘macro’ ambitions of governors come to be
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pursued by others acting in their micro-spaces and in the service of their own 
interests and objectives i.e. when actors interpret the values of other actors in their 
own terms such that these come to provide norms and standards for their own 
ambitions, judgements and conduct (Rose 1999:49-50). As Foucault (2008:44-45) 
puts it, “governmental reason works with interests. ... It is through interests that 
government can get a hold on everything that exists for it in the form of 
individuals, actions, words, wealth, resources, property, rights, and so on”. 
Therefore, this is not a question of top down imposition of rule, but the forging of 
alliances between the aims of governors (those seeking to direct conduct in 
specific ways) and the diverse projects of subjects of government, including 
organizations, groups, and individuals. Rose and Miller term this complex process 
translation (1992, see also Miller and Rose 1990 and Rose 1999:47-51). 
Translation occurs where
“one actor is able to require or count on a particular 
way of thinking and acting from another, hence 
assembling them together into a network not because of 
legal or institutional ties or dependencies, but because 
they have come to construe their problems in allied 
ways and their fate as in some way bound up with one 
another” (Miller and Rose 1990:10).
Foucault’s detailed discussion of the emergence of neoliberalism in the post WW2 
Germany (2008: chapter 4) is a quintessential illustration of the process of 
translation, whereby occupying Western powers, formerly exiled free-market 
ideologues, socialist parties, trade unions, and others came to operationalise this 
political rationality - even though not all of them fully shared all its tenets - 
through their calculations and actions on the basis of their disparate, sometimes 
contradictory, particular interests. In post-2002 Sri Lanka, as discussed in Chapter 
7, Tamils facing a variety of day-to-day difficulties came to see alleviation of their 
individual hardships as contingent on the establishing of an LTTE-run interim 
administration for the Northeast. Again, this is not to say all those operating 
within a particular rationality necessarily share that rationality entirely or 
subscribe to its ideals. Not all Tamils who demanded an LTTE-run administration, 
for example, supported armed struggle or were committed to an independent
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Tamil Eelam. Nor are all NGOs undertaking ‘development’ in Sri Lanka 
committed to the liberal peace tenets of liberal democracy and free markets. As 
Hindess notes, “most if not all of the governmental devices that might be seen as 
falling under the heading of the liberal mode of government could be and were 
supported by those who had no particular commitment to liberalism as a doctrine” 
(1993:310). This highlights one reason why government, which seeks to 
orchestrate the behaviour of others, is an inherently unpredictable and risky 
business. Translation, as Rose (1999:51) puts it, is “an imperfect mechanism and 
one subject to innumerable pressures and distortions: it is not a process in which 
rule extends itself unproblematically across a territory, but a matter of fragile 
relays, contested locales and fissiparous affiliations”.
Translations link the general to the particular, one place to another, a range of 
distant experts to calculations at a political centre; it shifts a way of thinking from 
the political centre to a multitude of other places such as workplaces, classrooms 
and homes (Ibid). However, translation is a multi-directional, not unidirectional, 
flow, with government by authorities itself becoming subject, from a given 
political rationality, to scrutiny, problematization and demands for reform. For 
example, the rationality of neo liberalism leads to demands for the privatization of 
state assets or the withdrawal of state regulation in the interests of (creating or not 
disrupting) the ‘market’. In Sri Lanka, the rationality termed ‘Sinhala Buddhism’ 
in this dissertation leads to demands on the state to ‘promote’ Buddhism (at home 
and abroad) and repel challenges to its duty to safeguard the island as a sanctuary 
for Buddhism (Bartholomeusz 2002, see discussion in Chapter 4). It is in this 
sense also that Foucault describes the shift from sovereignty to govemmentality 
(discussed below) as not so much the ‘etatisation’ (i.e. extension of state 
domination of society) of society, but as the ‘govemmentalisation’ of the 
(administrative) state (2007:109; see also discussion in Dean 1999:102-111,193- 
200).
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Discipline and subjects
The conduct of conduct is distinct from controls 011 conduct, a form of 
individualizing and normalizing power that Foucault termed disciplinary power 
(1977). This refers to how, through hierarchical observation and normalizing 
judgment institutionalized in prisons, schools, factories, asylums and similar 
assemblages, appropriate competencies, capacities and self-regulations of conduct 
can be inculcated by structured regimes of reward and punishment. By reducing 
deviations from standards -  i.e. eliminating ‘gaps’, disciplinary assemblages are 
thus geared towards producing a specified order or normality. The primary 
function of disciplinary power is therefore to train, to correct, to develop ‘second 
nature’, rather than merely to inflict punishment on deviants. In this logic of 
‘correction’, discipline includes the use of rewards as well as penalties, and indeed 
weights the former over the latter (Ibid: 180). Behaviour, meanwhile, is seen to fall 
not on either side of a dividing line, as in mere prohibition, but along a continuum 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ poles, a continuum that is possible to quantify, to 
calibrate rewards and penalties to, and along which those being trained can be 
distributed. Progress (i.e. improvement) is thus rendered measurable. Disciplinary 
power therefore “compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, and 
excludes. In short, it normalizes” (Ibid: 183, emphasis original, see also 2003:252- 
3, 2007:56-7).
It is through such calibrated regimes of gratification-punishment that discipline 
can ‘make up’ or produce individuals suitable for (re)integrating into society -  
such as ‘skilled’ workers, ‘reformed’ criminals, or ‘rehabilitated’ alcoholics. As 
such, discipline “is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both 
as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault 1977:170, emphasis 
added). In Sri Lanka, international practices such as the ‘Global War on Terror’, 
third-party mediation and reconstruction aid together constituted a disciplinary 
framework in which the transformation of the LTTE from ‘armed group’ or 
‘conflict specialist’ to a political party and its political goal from independence to 
federalism, was pursued (see Chapter 8). It is in this sense that disciplinary power 
becomes constitutively linked to the emergence of new ways of thinking about
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political rule, of governing the conduct of the population, especially those of its 
‘abnormal’ subsections. Regimes of discipline, with their characteristics of spatial 
separation, regimes of rewards and punishment and calibrated effects of training, 
which expanded in schools, hospitals, factories and armies in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, escape from these institutions, serving to produce dominant 
behaviours in wider society (Foucault 2003:242,250). They can be discerned, not 
only within state institutions, but outside these and in places ‘beyond the state’
(e.g. Cruikshank 1999). For example, in the modern work place, ‘codes of 
conduct’, ‘probationary’ periods, ‘bonus’ schemes and ‘up or out’ promotional 
policies constitute mechanisms of discipline that incite, induce, seduce and make 
more or less possible different sorts of behaviour'.
It was Foucault’s concern with “the techniques by which the individual could be 
integrated into the social entity” (2002b:410) that also leads to his notion of a 
‘disciplinary society’, and the age of ‘social control’, characterised by ‘constant 
supervision’ (2002d:57-59). The schoolteacher, the jail warden, the psychiatrist, 
the physician, all exercise power not only by their constant supervision of 
individuals, but also though their generation of the appropriate knowledge (‘know 
how’) to do so. The individual, moreover, is an object of study, of knowledge. In 
contrast to inquiry - which identifies what might or might not have happened, 
supervision is concerned with what might happen: is the individual behaving as 
she should, is she progressing or not, etc. Such knowledges thus come to be 
organised around certain norms i.e. in terms of what is normal or not normal, what 
one must or must not do, and so on. This epistemological power is characterised 
by constant examination and supervision and has led, Foucault (2002d) argues, to 
the ‘human sciences’, such as psychiatry or psychology. Supervision, moreover, is 
not merely a relation of power between the state and the population, but also 
between individuals and other individuals, between groups and other groups in 
society. Such supervision may not be directly in service of the authorities, but, 
often driven by a need to preclude the deployment of the state’s terrifying and 
ruthless authority, ends up so. For example, organisers of Tamil public rallies and 
demonstrations today increasingly supervise the behaviour' of participants — e.g. 
how grievances being protested are expressed and articulated -  so as to avoid state 
intervention, either by riot police or through later anti-terrorism prosecutions
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(Nadarajah 2009). The state thus comes to possess not only apparatus of coercion 
but also, by induction, new ones of control. In short, control ‘from below’ 
becomes integral to control ‘from above,’
The most efficacious exercise of discipline is not having to discipline in the first 
place. This does not simply mean obedience of those being governed but rather 
their uncontested, willing adoption of appropriate behaviour. In other words, 
government is achieved not by continuous coercion but by inculcating a new self- 
consciousness that results in the appropriate behaviour and thus precludes the 
need for coercion or violence (which nonetheless may remain in the background). 
Governing ‘at a distance’ thus takes place through the self-regulation and self- 
governance of those being governed. However, as individuals or specific groups 
or populations do not come pre-formed in ways amenable to government, attempts 
to actively constitute and construct new subjectivities embodying effective forms 
of self-governance are an integral part of governing. Sought after subjectivities 
include not only individual ones -  such as the ‘entrepreneur’, the ‘patriot’, the 
‘citizen’, or the ‘moderate’-  but also collective ones, such as Taw abiding 
Diasporas’, ‘well integrated immigrants’, and ‘hard working families’. Concepts 
such as these, or even broader ones such as ‘the community’, ‘society’, ‘the 
public’, ‘the working class’, ‘the people’, ‘the nation’, ‘Muslims’, or ‘the 
international community’, are projections of collectivities that never quite come 
into existence, but perform an important political function in the way that they are 
used in governmental efforts (Davies 2006).“While these conceptions reflect little 
on social relations as they actually are, they say a great deal about dominant 
strategies for regulating and producing them” (Ibid:253, emphasis added). In the 
pursuit of government, ‘existing’ categories and subjectivities are recast into more 
suitable ones (e.g. Raco 2003, Li 2007) or whole new ones are brought into being 
(e.g. Cruikshank 1999).39 At the heart of the contradictions in Sri Lanka is the
39 Dillon and Reid (2001:48) note that one of the distinguishing characteristics of global liberal 
governance is “the variety of ways in which populations are defined as subject/objects of all kinds 
of global biopolitical power/knowledge concerns.” Quite apart from populations being assigned to 
one state or another (Hindess 2000a, 2000b, 2002; but see Ong’s (1998) discussion o f ‘flexible 
citizenship’), there are logics governing the movement of various other populations, including 
refugees, tourists, students and migrants (Dean 1999:100). The commonsensical ‘global’ 
categories of the ‘poor’, the ‘marginalised’, the ‘trafficked’, and so on, whilst comprising different
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individual Tamil, whose subjectivity is being shaped simultaneously by three 
different governmental projects - as a member of a (persecuted) nation, an 
(upstart) minority and a (harmonious) multi-ethnic citizenry (see Chapter 4).
However, it is not enough that categories suitable for government are conceived 
or discovered, they must, conversely, also be produced i.e. the categorised objects 
must take up and internalise the characteristics, values, capacities, ambitions, 
interests, etc attributed to them, and behave accordingly. For example, the 
unemployed become ‘job-seekers’ only when they seek out ‘re-training’, eschew 
state ‘handouts’ (formerly ‘income-support’) and long for an to end their 
enfeebling ‘dependency’ on welfare. Tamils become a nation when they stand 
united against Sinhala oppression or a ‘minority’ when they seek co-existence 
with Sinhalese as part of multi-ethnic citizenry. Actors categorised as ‘moderates’ 
and ‘extremists’ in a socio-political space become so when they adopt appropriate 
behaviours: moderates denouncing and distancing themselves from extremists, 
extremists either condemning moderates (as ‘traitors’, say) or, even better, 
‘transforming’ themselves into ‘moderates’. To ask how governing works is 
therefore to ask how individuals and groups are formed -  both in thought and in 
‘reality’ - as various types of agents with particular capacities and possibilities of 
action (Dean 1999:100).
3.2 Governmentality 
Governing the population
Foucault coined the tenn ‘governmentality’ in reference to a specific form of rule 
in Europe since the eighteenth century, which he saw as having replaced that of 
‘sovereignty’, by which he meant the kind of rule exercised by a prince over his 
territory or an emperor over his empire (see discussion in 2007, chapter4).40
people in disparate, contingent circumstances, nevertheless come to form the basis for ‘global 
solutions’ to address the difficulties they face and pose.
40 Foucault also describes the early post-monarchic state as “a set o f individuals whose behaviour 
become involved, more and more markedly, in the exercise of sovereign power” (2000b:68)
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Sovereignty, Foucault argues, is an art of government focussed chiefly on the well 
being of the sovereign and the maintenance or expansion of his territory. He 
contrasts this with governmentality, whereby the inhabitants of a territory and 
their well being becomes the focus of rule.41 Thus, it is the purpose of rule that 
first differentiates sovereignty and governmentality. Another difference is the 
means of rule. Sovereign power can be conceptualised as ‘power of death’ -  the 
threat of violent punishment for breaches of law (law is deemed to be the will, and 
thus the very being, of the sovereign; a breach of the law is thus an attack on the 
sovereign). In contrast, in governmentality the emphasis moves to ‘power over 
life’. In other words, “the ancient power to take life or let live was replaced by the 
power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” -  the latter, for example, 
being called for when a danger is posed to others (Foucault 1979:138, emphasis 
original). Moreover, rather than constituting rule itself, law becomes just one of 
many tactics for fostering and managing life (Ibid:87, see also Rose 1993:286-7). 
Beyond the ‘mere’ enactment of legislation, there are many other ways to ensure 
citizens, for example, ‘go green’, maintain a ‘work/life balance’, provide for old 
age, pursue ‘life-long education’ and otherwise keep themselves healthy, wealthy 
and happy. The crucial linkage between population and power, i.e. biopower, is 
discussed below.
There is also a difference in what constitutes the expertise of rule. For a sovereign, 
this might constitute the knowledge of divine and human laws. But for 
government, i.e. the ‘right disposition of things, arranged to lead to a suitable 
end’, this will not suffice; the purpose of government is not a common good as 
such, but an end ‘suitable’ for each of the things being governed. Good 
government stems thus not Rom knowledge of divine and human laws, but from 
knowledge of ‘tilings’ and how to arrange them. Foucault uses the apt metaphor of 
a ship to capture this sense of government: governing a ship means looking after 
not only the crew, but also managing the boat, its cargo, eventualities (storms,
41 Li has criticized this ideal type dichotomy of sovereignty and governmentality, pointing to the 
more benevolent exercise of rule by some sovereigns, rule which turned on the well being of their 
subjects (2007:12-13). Foucault also admits that this contrast can be overstated, pointing out that 
the purpose of sovereignty is the exercise o f ‘good’ sovereignty i.e. that there is “an circularity” to 
sovereignty” (lbid:98) However, as Merlingen (2006:184) notes, this abstracted dyad between 
sovereignty and governmentality is invaluable in grasping the specificity of the latter.
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rocks, etc) that might beset it, and so on (2007:97, 123). There is for government, 
therefore, a plurality of specific aims, a series o f specific finalities - finalities 
which may indeed turn out to be contradictory or incompatible with each other. 
Modern government, for example, seeks to cut crime, raise profits, reduce 
unemployment, protect the environment, fight terrorism, reduce health risks, and 
control immigration, all at the same time. These diverse practices and their effects, 
however, “constitute a set bound together by an intelligible connection”, a guiding 
conception of “the best possible way to govern” i.e. a governmental rationality 
that frames ‘'"what is to be done and what is not done in the practice o f 
governing>X2QQ8:2,12,18)
Crucially, the shift from sovereignty to governmentality turns on what Foucault 
calls “one of the great innovations in the techniques of power”, namely, “the 
emergence o f ‘population’ as an economic and political [concept]” (1979:25, 
insert added), as a specific phenomenon with its own particular variables, such as 
birth and death rates, life expectancy, etc. This is both an epistemological and a 
political development. ‘Population’ is thus not simply a collection of legal 
subjects nor (as it might be considered under sovereignty) a human labour mass, 
but a set of elements that both form a general system of living beings and also 
offer “a holdfor concerted intervention (through laws, but also through changes 
of attitude, of ways of doing things and ways of living that may be brought 
about)” (Foucault 2007:366, emphasis added). Like the ‘economy’, which is also 
“a level of reality and a field of intervention for government” (Ibid: 95), 
‘population’ is a device of government, a ‘natural’ entity dependent on factors that
42 • •can be ‘artificially’ or deliberately managed. Crucially, this means that states are 
not necessarily populated by an inescapable ‘natural’ progression, but can, in fact, 
influence and shape how they are to be populated. Political economy emerges, 
moreover, when it becomes clear that the relationship between population and 
resources cannot be managed by an exhaustive regulatory and coercive system
42 Indeed, another “great discovery o f political thought”, according to Foucault, is “the idea of 
society” -  “a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of  
disturbance [that government also has to deal with]” (Foucault 1989:261 cited in Barry et al 
1996:9 emphasis original). See discussion on ‘economy’ and ‘society’ in Rose and Miller 
(1992:182); see also Burchell 1993:274
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(Ibid: 3 66). Government thus conies to have as its end not simply the act of 
government itself, but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its 
condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health and so 011 (Ibid: 105). (The 
particularity of seeing population as ‘living ‘ -  i.e. biological - beings is taken up 
later in the discussion of biopower/politics). In contrast to sovereign rule, the care 
for individual life becomes the duty of the state (Foucault 2002b:404) - though the 
specific terms of this care are not necessarily a given, as discussed below in 
relation to ‘multiple governmental ities’ and ‘counter-conducts’. In summary, 
therefore, govern mentality forms among a range of state and ‘non-state’ entities as 
“a perception of the good society and the means to attain it” (Salskov-Iversen et al 
2000:185-6). Foucault himself defines governmentality as:
“the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, 
analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that 
allow the exercise of [a] very specific, albeit very 
complex, [form of] power, that has the population as its 
target, political economy as its major form of 
knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential 
technical instrument” (2007:108, inserts added),43
Sovereignty-Discipline-Government
Despite the pastoral ethos (see Foucault 2007, chapters 5-9) of governmentality’s 
focus on population, this certainly does not mean the end of discipline -  indeed, 
Foucault argues discipline was never more important or valued than when 
attempting to manage population, not only in depth, but “in all its fine points and 
details” (2007:107, see also 7-8). Discipline is required for managing those 
subgroups of the population which, by virtue of their apparent unwillingness or 
incapacity to adhere to societal norms, are deemed to require detailed supervision. 
The populations of territories under colonial rule were a good example of this, as 
is modern day Europe’s management of gypsies, ‘aliens’, ‘animal rights activists’,
43 ‘Security’ here can be understood as modes of ‘regulation’ of men and things. Apparatuses of 
security thus include not only the military, police and intelligence services, but also systems of  
health, education and social welfare as well as mechanisms for managing the economy (Dean 
1999:20).
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Muslims, Tamil expatriates, youth in inner city ‘slums’, and others who are 
subjected to various forms of disciplining that do not, in the main, extend to the 
population at large. Sovereignty as a mode of power has not disappeared either. 
Indeed, with the emergence of governmentality, the question of sovereignty is not 
eliminated, but more sharply posed (Ibid:106).44 However, the question is no 
longer as how theories of sovereignty can explain how to govern, but what 
juridical and institutional forms, and what legal basis, should the sovereignty of 
the state rest on (Ibid). ‘Political sovereignty’ -  the state over its citizens, for 
example, or the corporation over its employees -  still presides over the domain to 
be ruled; and although, in principle, “it cannot do just what it likes” (Burchell 
1993:272), it often does, as exemplified by many of the practices of the ‘War on 
Terror* -  Guantanamo and Abu Graibh, rendition, water boarding, and so on (see 
Mythen and Walklate 2006). As Rose (1999:24) puts it, “no complex analysis is 
required to count the costs in lies and lives of these ways of exercising power”.
Foucault (2007:107-8) argues that the change in arts of government does not 
entail the effacing of one epoch by another:
“We should not see things as the replacement of a 
society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and 
then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of 
government. In fact we have a triangle: sovereignty, 
discipline and governmental management, which has 
population as its primary target and apparatuses of 
security as its essential mechanism.”
This triangular* relationship does not mean either a hierarchy of efficiency or 
competition between these simultaneous forms of power - although Foucault 
(2007:108) argues governmentality has over time attained a “pre-eminence” over 
the others in contemporary (i.e. Western) forms of rule. A technology of security 
(regulation) will take up and even multiply juridical (sovereign) and disciplinary 
elements “and redeploy them within its specific tactic” (Ibid:8-9, see also 
Foucault’s discussion of the imbrication of discipline in biopolitics (2003:250-53).
44 It is worth noting Foucault’s observation that governmentality could overtake sovereignty only 
after Western monarchies became free of the “great military, political and economic emergencies” 
that plagued Europe for the entire seventeenth century (2007:101, 2008:5-6).
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In other words, as Dean (1999:19-20) succinctly puts it, “while governmentality 
retains and utilizes the techniques, rationalities and institutions characteristic of 
both sovereignty and discipline, it departs from them and seeks to reinscribe and 
recode them” in the service of its own ends. Governmentality takes individuals 
(the subjects of sovereignty) and their forces and capacities (that discipline seeks 
to mould) “as resources to be fostered, to be used and to be optimised” for the 
ends of government (Ibid). Thus rather than only governing through free will, 
governing also takes place upon individuals, against their will (Davies 2006). 
Despotism, in other words, can be for the good of the ruled (see discussion in 
Valverde 1996) or, as Rose puts it, “even terror can be a calculated instrument of 
government, as can violence” (1999:24).
Governmentality, liberalism and freedom
Developed through reference to the form of rule that had emerged in the former 
monarchies of Europe, like his home country France, Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality has long been taken for granted by many to constitute a ‘liberal’ 
form or rule (see the contributions to Gordon et al (1991) and Burchell et al 
(1996), for example). Though this is erroneous, the assumption is critically 
discussed here given its prevalence in much of the field of governmentality 
studies (and criticisms of it, as discussed in Chapter 2), especially in relation to 
liberal and neoliberal forms of rule in which the Liberal Peace is rooted. Possible 
reasons for the assumption that governmentality is inherently liberal rule include 
both the limited availability of Foucault’s work on governmentality (only one of 
his lectures in the three series had been transcribed and published before the turn 
of the century) and the emphasis in governmentality (over sovereignty) on the 
welfare of the governed individual, as well as governmentality’s reliance on the 
freedom of individuals to act in their perceived interests for its functioning. 
However, while government is the ‘right disposition’ of things-arranged so as to 
lead to suitable ends (Foucault 2007:96), there is no given precept within this 
conception as to what these ends should be (a point returned to below). Moreover, 
while government may be concerned with population, political economy and 
apparatuses of security, this does not mean the pastoral ethos of governmentality
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is necessarily liberal. For example, National Socialism was also a distinctive 
political rationality, with a specific perception of a ‘good society’ and ‘right 
disposition’ of people and things that informed the horrific means and strategies 
used to pursue it (Foucault 2008:106-17, 2003:258-60; see also Burchell 1993:270 
and Dean 1999:138-145). Similarly, other rationalities that might be labelled 
‘classical liberalism’, ‘welfarism’, ‘neo-liberalism’, ‘communism’, and so on, are 
more or less coherent, but discemibly different, conceptions of what the aims, 
objects, means and ends of government ought to be.
Foucault makes emphatically clear' in his lectures on governmentality (now fully 
transcribed and published, also in English) that governmentality does not refer to 
liberal rule:
“why speak of liberalism,” he asks, “and a liberal art of 
government, when it is quite clear’ the things I have 
referred to and the features I have tried to indicate 
basically point to a much more general phenomenon 
than the ... economic doctrine or ... the political 
doctrine or the economic-political choice of liberalism 
on the strict sense” (2008:61).
Moreover, he is at pains to make clear that even when he uses the term ‘liberal 
governmentality’, he is not referring to liberalism as commonly understood i.e. as 
a doctrine based on the inalienable rights of man:
“we should be clear- that when we speak of liberalism 
with regard to this new art of government 
[governmentality], this does not mean we are passing 
from an authoritarian government... to a government 
which becomes more tolerant, more lax, more flexible.”
(Ibid: 62).
Reiterating that “I did not want to say there was an increase in the quantity of 
freedom” in the shift from sovereignty to governmentality, Foucault adds this 
(increase) was neither the case nor not the case. This is because ‘freedom’ has a 
specific meaning for him:
“We should not think about freedom as a universal 
which is gradually realised over time, or which
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undergoes quantitative variations, or is particularised in 
time or geography. ,., Freedom is never anything other 
.,. than an actual relation betw>een governors and 
governed, a relation in which the measure of the ‘too 
little’ existing freedom is given [i.e. defined] by the 
‘even more5 freedom demanded” (Ibid:63, emphasis, 
insert added).
It is in this sense, rather than the ‘liberal’ one of the guaranteeing of a priori 
individual rights, that Foucault sees governmentality as only possible through, and 
by reliance on, the existence of certain freedoms of each (2007:49, 2008:63). 
Moreover, as Hindess (1997:269, see also Rose 1993:297, Burchell 1993:276) 
argues, the enlightenment ideal of the autonomous self, recognising no authority 
not of its own choosing, is itself another Western construction of the subject i.e. it 
is “dependent and subordinate, even as it pretends to independence and 
autonomy.” In other words, liberalism’s taken-for-granted notions of ‘minimal 
government’ and free and well-behaved citizens depend, crucially, on the 
behaviour of citizens being “substantially and effectively” governed in other ways 
—“especially acquired habits of self-control, reinforced by the normative gaze of 
other and the work of a variety of state and non-state agencies” (Ibid:263, Rose 
1993:291). The point here is that seeing governmentality as a liberal form of 
power because of its reliance on individual autonomy turns on a conception of this 
(individual autonomy) that is not as ‘natural’ as liberals suggest it is, but is rather 
a contingent (individual) subjectivity which is sine qua non for liberal rule.
In any case, liberal societies often practice palpably illiberal rule, either over 
groups at home or populations in other places, as in colonial rule (Kalpagam 
2000, Ferguson and Gupta 2004). Modem liberal societies have proved to be 
‘demonic’ (Foucault 2002a:311) and have produced knowledges like eugenics as 
well as practices like forced sterilization and attempted genocide. Even today’s 
taken-for-granted category of ‘liberal-democracy’ effaces quite different 
rationalities of rule - consider, for example, those of today’s United States, 
Sweden, Israel and South Africa. Moreover, even liberalism, with its insistence on 
individual liberty, carries “a division between those who are capable of bearing 
the responsibilities and freedoms of mature citizenship and those who are not”
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(Dean 1999:146). J. S. Mill, in his treatise, ‘On Liberty \  unabashedly advocates 
the illiberal rule of those not yet ready for liberal rule (such as ‘backward’ nations 
in the colonies) and does so in the interests of liberalism: “despotism is a 
legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be 
their improvement” ([1859] 1975:15-16 cited in Valverde 1996:360). As Valverde 
(1996) notes, this is not a racist exception to liberal rule, but as much about the 
meaning of liberalism as its scope. Authoritarianism is thus an element even in 
liberal forms of rule (Ibid: 147). Furthermore, there are prominent examples of 
what Dean (1999, chapter 7) calls ‘authoritarian governmentality5. Apart from 
Nazi Germany and China (Dean’s case studies), examples include Apartheid 
South Africa and, as argued in Chapter 4, Sinhala-Buddhism in Sri Lanka. These 
forms of rule embody specific notions of the ‘right disposition’ of people and 
things, and of the appropriate responsibilities of individuals, populations and the 
state, but in ways that clearly are not ‘liberal’, turning, for example, on hierarchies 
of race or ethnicity.
3.3 Governmentality and Biopolitics
Foucault’s work on governmentality emerges out of his efforts to explore the 
phenomena he terms biopower and biopolitics. Biopower refers to the “set of 
mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species 
become the object of political strategy, of a general strategy of power” (Foucault 
2007:1, emphasis added). Biopolitics is thus a matter of talcing control of life 
itself, of administratively - i.e. deliberately - ensuring the regulation of the 
biological processes of the population so as to foster its size, capacities and 
vitality (2003:246-7). In other words, “how, starting from the eighteenth century, 
modem Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that 
human beings are a species” (2007:1), by which he does not mean this happens 
for the first time -  famines and epidemics have been the concern of rulers for 
millennia, but that life now increasingly become subject to continuous 
surveillance and application of regulatory and corrective mechanisms (1979:142- 
44), a development mutually constitutive of the development of capitalism 
(Ibid: 140-142). It was Foucault’s pursuit of this theoretical concern (‘the
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government of the living’ i.e. the power that operates through humans as a living 
species, as a population) that informed the research agenda elaborated in his three 
lecture series between 1975 and 1979 (2003, 2007, 2008) and the publication The 
History o f Sexuality (1979), and led to his development of concepts such as 
government (conduct of conduct), governmentality as well as biopolitics and 
biopower. Biopower/biopolitics and governmentality are thus closely related 
concepts. The former, crucially, is concerned with the biological dimensions of 
politics and begins by treating the “population” as “a set of coexisting living 
beings with particular' biological and pathological features, and which as such falls 
under specific forms of knowledge and [management] technique” (2007:367, 
insert added).
The population, as a political and epistemological unit, a global mass, has specific 
characteristics: a birth rate, a death rate, levels of illness or accidents, and so on. 
Crucially, these ‘natural’ characteristics are seen to be impacted by a number of 
processes inherent to the population which are amenable to deliberate 
management i.e. they can be ‘artificially’ increased or reduced by active 
intervention. It is these processes which become the focus of biopolitics, as targets 
to be controlled and managed. The emergence of biopolitics is thus intrinsically 
linked to a range of ever-expanding knowledges about these characteristics, as 
well as, especially, the emergence of ‘statistics’ which enables them to be tracked 
and studied. Ambitions to manage a population in terms of its vitality imply 
complex systems of coordination and centralization, and thus lead to the 
administrative apparatuses of the modem state: “apparatuses of security ... have 
to be installed around [each] element inherent to a population of living beings so 
as to optimize a state of life” (2003:244,246, 250). At an obvious level, the 
ambition to reduce or eradicate illnesses or those biological phenomena that sap 
the population’s productivity (see today’s concerns with alcohol or drug (ab)use, 
for example) leads to the emergence of practices such as public hygiene, 
vaccination, etc as well as the institutions to coordinate medical care and 
normalize certain knowledges. Biopolitics also encompasses efforts to manage 
those phenomena other than illness that impact the productivity of the population 
-  old age, accidents, infirmaries and other anomalies -  and lead to social 
management techniques such as insurance, savings, safety measures and charities.
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Mechanisms such as statistical estimates and forecasts are essential to making 
these possible. Crucially, it is not the natural characteristics of the population that 
are the point of intervention, but those biosocial processes by which these are 
determined. Moreover, the apparatuses of security (i.e. regulation) seek not to 
eradicate illness or mortality, but to manage them by keeping them at acceptable 
levels, at an appropriate ‘average’ or sustainable ‘equilibrium’ (2003:246). 
Management -  i.e. governance - thus has as its goal the population itself -  i.e. the 
optimizing of its vitality and productivity. Management, however, takes place not 
only at the macro-level of population, but also at the individual level -  looking 
after one’s health, providing for one’s old age, etc - and the family -  having more 
or less children, for example. Discipline (operating at the level of the individual 
body) and regulation (operating at the level of population) are therefore not 
mutually exclusive forms of power, but are articulated together, in service of an 
overarching goal (Ibid:250-51).
Paradoxically, as Foucault notes, biopower, with its the strategic logic of 
increasing the vitality and productivity of population, emerges in a period also 
marked by mass genocides, total war and the advent of nuclear weapons. Given 
that biopower’s objective is essentially to make live, how can it also kill or 
exclude and let die? For Foucault, the answer is found in racism, by which he 
means the division of humanity into distinct, hierarchically ordered groups. This 
does not refer only to ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ categories, but also the distinction 
between the ‘good’/‘normal’ population and those subgroups of humanity that are 
deemed incapable of responsible conduct or self-regulation -  the mad, the 
disabled, the deviant, the criminal (see discussion in Dean 1999:138-48). Both 
nuclear weapons and capital punishment are thus biopolitical technologies. As 
Foucault puts it, “racism is a way of introducing a break into the domain of life 
under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” 
(2003:254) - for the sake of the population’s vitality and survival, that is. This is 
not to say racism is a new phenomenon that manifests when biopower emerges, 
but that racism is inscribed in the very mechanisms of the biopolitical state. This 
notion of racism -  as the subdivision of the human continuum into sub­
populations ordered in a hierarchy of worth, between good/fit collectives and 
those that are inferior and/or pose threats to the former (Ibid:254-60) - allows
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analytical purchase on phenomena such as war as well as routine politics. The 
normalizing society, as Foucault puts it, is founded on a ‘race war’ along a 
recurrent binary division in society and the logic that: “we have to defend society 
against all the biological threats posed by the other race, the subrace, the 
counterrace that we are, despite ourselves, bringing into existence” (Ibid:61-62). 
Social normalization is therefore society’s permanent attempt at its internal 
purification (Ibid:62).4:5
What immediately comes to the fore in all this, therefore, is the specificity of the 
governmental reason(s) informing the logics of different forms of biopolitical 
management. Biopolitics thus deals with the population as a political problem, a 
problem that is at once scientific and political (2003:245). In this way, biopolitics, 
as Foucault notes “is only part of something larger, which [is] ... governmental 
reason” (2008:22fn, insert original) and notes how the biopolitical strategies and 
techniques of the nineteenth century he studied “were inseparable from the 
framework of political rationality within which they appeared and took on their 
intensity” -  ‘liberalism’ in this case (2008:317). As detailed in Chapter 4, this 
dissertation examines three different governmental rationalities that compete to 
order territory, populations and political rule in Sri Lanka -  Sinhala-Buddhism, 
Tamil Freedom and Liberal Peace. Each seeks to foster the flourishing of 
population in keeping with its own conception of the right disposition of people 
and things. Sinhala-Buddhism posits the island as firstly, the homeland of the 
Sinhala people and, secondly, a bastion for the defence of Buddhism, a task which 
is the responsibility, moreover, of the Sinhala. This hierarchical ordering includes 
non-Sinhalese, and non-Buddhist Sinhalese, groups as part of the island’s 
population but only on these specific terms. In contrast, Tamil Freedom conceives 
of Tamils and the Sinhalese as comprising distinct and equal (i.e. equally 
valuable) collectives on the island and, secondly, holds that the Tamil collective’s
45 As Dean notes, it is this proclivity to divide “the population into subgroups which contribute to 
or retard the general welfare and life of the population” that has led to “the discovery among the 
population of the criminal and dangerous classes, the feeble-minded and the imbecile, the invert 
and the degenerate, the unemployable and the abnormal and has led to attempts to prevent, contain 
or eliminate them” (1999:100). In today’s Western states, for example, ‘Muslim extremists’ or 
‘home grown terrorists’ emerge alongside ‘moderate Muslim communities’ and ‘disadvantaged 
youths’ from ‘deprived communities’.
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wellbeing can succeed only free of Sinhala domination. Liberal Peace turns on a 
specific ideal of the state and its society in which all individuals are equal, and 
socio-political life is regulated by peace, democracy and free markets.
Each rationality invests socio-political regulatory processes that seek to foster the 
wellbeing of the population as well as the correction or exclusion and elimination 
of those who do not include themselves on this basis. In Sinhala-Buddhism terms, 
this includes the state-supported establishment of militarised Sinhala colonies in 
(Tamil-speaking) areas, as well as the building of Buddhist temples and funding 
of archaeological searches for Sinhala historical traces in these places and the 
direction of international developmental aids towards such projects of 
demographic reordering. Liberal Peace invests processes to foster ‘multi-ethnic 
civil society’, free economic exchange, ‘enterprise’, ‘plurality’, and so on. Tamil 
Freedom seeks to create social and political spaces that enable the flourishing of 
Tamils’ cultural and economic development. Conversely, as manifested most 
clearly in wartime, these rationalities seek to correct or eliminate, those who do 
not conduct themselves in keeping with their tenets. In Sinhala-Buddhism terms 
this includes the infliction of mass bombardment and blockades on food and 
medicine (Paust 1997, HRW 2009) on people who refuse to accept the privileging 
of Sinhala and Buddhism at the apex of socio-political ordering. In Liberal Peace 
terms, this includes the withholding of reconstruction and rehabilitation aid from 
those who place themselves beyond the state’s writ or support armed challenges to 
its sovereignty (those bearing arms are of course confronted through military, 
political and legislative measures to fight ‘terrorism’), and the exclusion from 
political processes to those, rather than embracing ‘multi-ethnic pluralism’ 
subscribe to ‘extremist’ notions such as an independent Tamil Ealatn state, or 
‘Tamil self-determination’. In Tamil Freedom’s terms, those ‘traitors’ who work 
with the Sinhala state and its military are eliminated and those refuse to conduct 
themselves as part of the Tamil nation are excluded from its political deliberations 
and decisions.
These three rationalities and their implementations and contestations are further 
discussed in the following chapters. Within the constraints of its allotted space, 
this dissertation is concerned more with excavating the governmental rationalities
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investing disparate -  political, economic and social - processes underway during 
the 2001 to 2006 international intervention in Sri Lanka, than the equally valuable 
exercise of exploring their profound biopolitical implications. This is because a 
thorough understanding of governmental rationalities must necessarily precede a 
study of the biopolitics they inform. In his lectures elaborating the emergence of 
governmentality and the birth of biopolitics, Foucault sets out “to show how the 
central core of the problems that I am trying to identify is population,,(2008:21). 
“But”, he says,
“it seems to me that the analysis of biopolitics can only 
get underway when we have understood the general 
regime of this governmental reason.. this general 
regime we can call the question of truth [...] within 
governmental reason. Consequently it seems to me that 
it is only when we understand what is at stake in this 
governmental regime ... will we be able to grasp what 
[its] biopolitics is” (Ibid:21-22, insert added).
3.4 Clash of governmentalities
Having set out the notions of government (as the ‘conduct of conduct’) and 
governmentality as a mode of power which, alongside discipline and sovereignty, 
and informed by a specific rationality, seeks to foster the wellbeing of a 
population, the chapter sets out the notion of a ‘clash of governmentalities’ i.e. of 
the competing rationalities for the direction of human conduct, that this 
dissertation argues enables a more productive study of Southern warzones and 
international interventions in them.46 To this end, this section discusses on
461 bonow the term ‘clash of governmentalities’ from O Tuathail and Dahlman (2004) who coined 
it in reference to the conflict in Bosnia. However, this dissertation goes well beyond their 
strikingly limited use of governmentality> as both political rationality and mode of power. To begin 
with, whilst they posit a number of governmental rationalities, both in the international community 
(including a ‘global liberal govennnentality’), and Balkan actors (“All Serbs in one state” and 
“Croatia for the Croats”, for example - which they also characterise as ‘ethnonationalist 
governmentality’), they do not work through the content o f these rationalities - i.e. what’s at stake 
in the ensuing clash. Of course, this does not, in and of itself, preclude the specificity of these 
political rationalities. However, it is in the analytical operationalising of these that significant 
weaknesses emerge of O Tuathail and Dahlman’s conceptualisation o f a ‘clash of 
governmentalities’. Many of the (in)decisions and (in)actions of the international community, for
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Foucault’s notion o f ‘counter-conducts’ and its possibilities and limits before 
setting out how a clash of governmentalities operates, and thus serves as a 
framework for such analysis.
Conduct and Counter-conducts
In his extensive discussion of the emergence of the Christian pastorate (the 
religious ambition to conduct souls which he sees as the ‘prelude’ to 
governmentality, the political ambition to conduct ‘men and things’)47, Foucault 
also briefly looks at the emergence of “some points of resistances” to this 
emergent pastoral power, resistances that he terms “revolts of conduct” or 
“counter-conducts” (2007:194-216). These, he says, “are movements whose 
objective is a different form of conduct [to that of the Christian pastorate], that is
example, are put down to (unspecified) strategic ‘interests’. This is not to say such interests do not 
exist, but they cannot stand as explanations without elaboration of the governmental calculations 
that produce them. Consequently, the analysis tends overall towards a positivist, quasi-realist one. 
This is exacerbated, for example, by the arbitrary division of international actors between states on 
the one hand, and, on the other, international media, UN agencies and other non-state actors, 
which are deemed to have different, but ‘globe-spanning’ governmentalities. Conversely, the 
pursuit o f ethno-nationalist visions of Bosnia are held ultimately to be consequences of the 
individual ambitions, thinking, and calculations of the Serbian and Croatian leaders (Slobodan 
Milosovic and Franjo Tudjman). In other words, the underlying assumption is o f latent ethno- 
nationalist solidarity in the three populations of Bosnia which are vented consequent to the efforts 
of the Serbian and Croatian state (leaders) to dismember Bosnia. Thus, although the Bosnian 
conflict and international engagement with it are held, quite plausibly, to be shaped by “two 
geopolitical visions of that state, competing governmentalities with very different notions o f how 
territory, population and political life should be ordered” (Ibid: 139-40), the analysis assumes these 
to be effected ‘top-down’ and on the basis o f pre-formed actors -  states, paramilitaries, ethnic 
groups, and so on - with self-evident attributes and interests. As such, ‘governmentality’ becomes 
shorthand for ‘nationalist ideology’ in the analysis. Indeed, at times ‘governmentality’ stands in 
for individual actors’ ‘mentality’. Furthermore, O Tuathail and Dahlman focus primarily on 
sovereign (ethnic cleansing by paramilitaries, for example, or fiats by various UN High 
Commissioners pursuing post-ethnic cleansing resettlement) and, to a limited extent, disciplinary 
(international conditionalities to ensure refugee returns to their original homes, for example) 
modes of power seeking to shape reorderings of territories in terms o f which ethnicities are 
permitted to live in these; multi-ethnic populations for the international community, and 
exclusively one ethnic group for local (Serb, etc) administrators. In other words, there is little or no 
attention to governmental power - i.e. how well-behaved subjects of the various governmental 
rationalities are brought into being -  either in terms of how networks of actors come to turn those 
formerly vested in a ‘multi-ethnic Bosnian state’ (which the authors assert as a reality denied by 
the international community) into those seeking exclusivist territorial arrangements, or how the 
latter come internalise and take up their new subjectivities. In contrast to O Tuathail and 
Dahlman’s admittedly short, but sweeping, text which elides such concerns, this dissertation posits 
such questions as fundamental to what is termed here a ‘clash of governmentalities’ i.e. how 
competing rationalities engender practices that are actually constitutive o f political and social 
identities (i.e. subjects) and territorial spaces.
47 See discussion in Chapter 2, subsection titled ‘Governmentality and the “non-West”.
91
to say: wanting to be conducted differently, by other leaders . . towards other 
objectives ..., and through other procedures and methods.” (Ibid: 194, insert 
added). In that sense, there is a “specificity”, an inherent rationality, to these 
refusals, revolts, and resistances. In using such labels for these resistances, 
however, Foucault does not see these as responses to the Christian pastorate -  in 
that case, he notes, the pastorate itself emerged in ‘reaction’ to, or ‘with hostility 
to’, a range of older religious behaviours and sects in the Middle East from the 
second to fourth centuries (Ibid: 195). Thus, even though it is not possible to say 
which came first and which later, he nonetheless sees “an immediate and founding 
correlation between conduct and counter-conduct” (Ibid: 196). By way of 
illustration, Foucault details five ‘main’ examples (he lists many more) of 
counter-conduct in the Middle Ages to the massive Christian pastorate, each with 
its own ‘fundamental theme’(asceticism, communities, mysticism, Scripture and 
eschatological beliefs), as well as three more counter-conducts against emerging 
political governmentality in Europe: conscientious objection to war (against 
volunteer soldiering as an ethic of the ‘good citizen’, i.e. against society’s values 
and obligation to the nation); the emergence of secret societies which, adopting 
increasingly political objectives (from earlier ones of religious dissidence), aspire 
to a ‘counter-society’ to the prevailing ones; and the refusal to abide by the 
government of modem medicine (refusing vaccination or treatments, and so on). 
Against the powerful clashes of governmentality considered in this dissertation, it 
is worth noting here how these examples of counter-conduct are episodic and 
‘small’ in comparison to the scale and depth of the conduct they are countering 
(the analytical implications are discussed below). What is important for Foucault, 
however, is how these counter-conducts are not stand-alone phenomena: “the 
specificity of these struggles, these resistances to conduct, does not mean they 
remained separate or isolated from each other, with their own partners, forms, 
dramaturgy, and distinct aim. In fact they are always, or almost always, linked to 
other conflicts and problems” (Ibid: 196). Examples of the latter in the Middle 
ages include struggles between the bourgeoisie and feudalism, the uncoupling of 
urban and rural economies, the status of women in religious or civil society, and 
so on. “Though these revolts of conduct may be specific in their fonn or objective, 
whatever their specificity, they are never autonomous, they never remain 
autonomous” (Ibid: 197).
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When examining the organized, protracted and large scale political agitation and 
armed violence that are often manifested in Southern warzones, the notion of 
‘counter-conduct5 is at once both illuminating and constraining. On the one hand 
it encourages the seeking of analytical explanations through the excavation of 
often not obvious political rationalities informing, and advanced by, various forms 
of often violent resistance to a talcen-for-granted dominant organisation of 
territory, population and security. On the other hand, the coeval assumption of ‘an 
immediate and founding correlation5 between conduct and counter-conduct can 
limit analysis by privileging a search for deviations, contrasts or contradictions in 
relation to a prevailing governmental rationality, rather than an exploration of 
each present rationality in its own right. In other words, despite Foucault's 
recognizing the specificity of counter-conducts, his elaboration of a ‘counter­
conduct5 can itself serve to foreground the ‘dominant5 rationality, rather than the 
full measure of the other rationalities in question -  for example, he points out that 
the five counter-conducts to pastoralism are “not absolutely external55 to 
Christianity (Ibid:214-215). What is important, therefore, is to excavate the 
“reasoned, reflected, coherence55 of the ‘principles of rationalization5 inherent to a 
governmental rationality (2008:18). The ‘local5 rationalities of Sinhala-Buddhism 
and Tamil Freedom, for example, overlap in some ways with the global rationality 
of Liberal Peace, but also contradict it in important ways. However, to begin by 
seeing them as ‘correlated5 to Liberal Peace, can preclude analytical pursuit of the 
full extent of their specificities, a point underscored by their emergence and 
contestation with each other several decades before Liberal Peace, in its present 
manifestation, enters the Sri Lankan milieu. As such, it is argued here that a 
starting point of ‘multiple5 governmentalities competing in a given milieu holds 
greater analytical possibility than one of ‘counter-conducts5.
Struggle to shape subjects
Multiple governmentalities can be pursued at the same time in the same 
constitutional and temporal space - even though the effects of one may be, or 
appear' to be, ‘dominant5 over others at a particular time. The differences between
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these rationalities in terms of the ends, means and objects of government can 
therefore result in important contestations, as well as cooperation that might stem 
from their similarities. As noted earlier, government’s utopian telos (Dean 
1999:33) envisages and requires the re-shaping of relationships between people 
and things. It is precisely in this sense of the pursuit of differing conceptions of a 
‘good society’ or ‘better world’ and of better ways of doing things (Ibid), that it 
becomes possible to speak of ‘competing’ governmentalities or a ‘clash of 
governmentalities’. To speak o f ‘multiple’ governmentalities is not, however, to 
suggest there aren’t or cannot be overlaps between them. Governmentalities are 
thus distinguishable by the important differences in their utopian conceptions; 
differences, moreover, that cannot be reduced merely to the variations in the 
specific goals pursued by the individual actors operating within each of these 
rationalities. The notion of ‘clash’, on the other hand, refers not to an 
instantaneous confrontation that renders one rationality inoperative in the 
presence of the other. Rather, it refers to the notion of ongoing ‘struggle’
(Foucault 1980a:164, 1980b: 143-44, 2002c:346-8), If a relation of power 
constitutes the defining of the ‘field of possibilities’ for the actions of the other 
(over whom power is exercised), then this is achieved when stability replaces the 
‘free play of antagonistic reactions’ (Foucault 2002c:346-47). The objective of 
‘struggle’, then, is the ‘fixing’ of power relationships, of rendering them stable. 
However the notion of ‘struggle’ is, in and of itself, an insufficient explanation for 
the contestations that lead to the ‘messiness’ of politics; it becomes analytically 
useful “only ... if one establishes concretely - in each particular case - who is 
engaged in struggle, what the struggle is about, and how, where, by what means 
and according to what rationality it evolves” (Foucault 1980a: 164, emphasis 
added). It is in this sense that the idea of a ‘clash of governmentalities’ comes to 
provide analytical traction: governmentalities can be distinguished by their 
utopian conceptions and ends which can be excavated and brought to the fore by 
careful empirical analysis which considers the different problems of rule that 
come to be identified, the solutions proposed for these problems, and the different 
uses to which technologies of government are consequently put.
In addition, and of specific interest to this dissertation, what are seen as failures of 
attempts at government can also be related to what is seen as successes of
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simultaneous other attempts at government undertaken from within other 
different, competing rationalities. Competing governmentalities thus play out 
through ever-changing networks in which the formation, disruption and 
reformation of subjectivities and alliances is ceaseless. Individuals and agencies 
operating at a distance from authorities through their ‘own’ interests, ambitions 
and actions, become embedded and re-embedded in these ever-changing 
networks. Crucially, therefore, a particular rationality can come to displace or 
subsume another through the outcomes of the struggles, the recurrent series of 
contestations and cooperations that occur- across their overlapping terrains of 
government. A clash of governmentalities thus plays out in attempts to create new 
subjectivities and to alter or destroy ‘existing’ ones - or, rather, as Briggs (2001) 
puts it, in attempts to elevate a particular subjectivity above any others that the 
object of government may be living or inclined to take up. It thus engenders the 
development of new forms of discipline that undermine or supplant ones already 
at play, the identification of ‘achievements’ and goals of one rationality as 
‘problems’ within another, and the associated devising of appropriate ‘solutions’. 
Not least, a clash of governmentalities also results in the invocation of acts of 
sovereignty in the pursuit of conflicting governmental ends.
Therefore, what might appear as resistance to governmental ambitions (say liberal 
peace) may be traced, not to ‘irrationality’ (‘ancient hatreds’, for example), 
amoral self-interest (‘greed over grievance’), an outright rejection of a self-evident 
‘right disposition’ of men and tilings (‘barbarism’ or ‘evil’), but to different 
conceptions of what this right disposition should be and presently is not. For 
example, the rejection of federalism as a ‘self-evident’ solution to a ‘separatist’ 
conflict may not necessarily stem from actors’ unscrupulous self-interest in 
continuing violence or pathological intransigence, but from a different rationality 
which considers federalism - which sets limits on territorial self-rule whilst 
weakening centralized power - as incompatible with the right disposition of 
things. For example, alternative rationalities might see particular forms of 
federalism as constituting a rejection of a people’s right to self-determination (i.e. 
to choose their own form of governance), or conversely, the ceding of territory 
that is a people’s historical possession or ‘birthright* to violent interlopers (see 
Chapter 4). Thus even the notion of ‘compromise’ over one issue or other might
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seem rational or ‘normal’ within one rationality, but constitute a violation of the 
ideals or principles of government in another.
3.5 Governmentalities in a warzone
In conclusion, this chapter has sought to elaborate the concept of a ‘clash of 
governmentalities’ as a way of analytically engaging with the complex dynamics, 
trajectories and outcomes of Southern warzones. It argued these are often places 
where different governmental rationalities are violently competing in physical and 
epistemic terms to reorder population, territory and security according to different 
ideals of a better world, different understandings of the ‘right disposition’ of 
people and tilings. In service of each competing rationality, governmentality, 
discipline and sovereign modes power operate together, as a ‘triangle’, to produce 
sought-after conducts in a variety of micro-locales, through the inculcation of 
specific subjectivities in individuals, organizations and populations. A warzone 
can thus be conceptualized in terms of another notion Foucault raises, albeit 
briefly, in his lectures: that of the ‘milieu’ (2007:20). Foucault uses the milieu to 
conceptualize the (putative) space of government, by which he means not (just) 
territory, but also the series of possible events that has to be regulated in it to 
achieve a sought after set of ends of government. So, firstly, “the milieu is that in 
which the government takes place” (Ibid:21). Taking the example of a town -  a 
human creation organized to specific purposes and specific logics (i.e. to achieve 
specific types of circulation, such as trade, and prevent others, such as vagrants 
and disease) -  Foucault sees a milieu as “a set of natural givens -  rivers, marshes, 
hills -  and a set of artificial givens -  an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, 
etc.” (Ibid:21). Secondly, a milieu comes into being conceptually through 
government: “the apparatuses of security [regulation of circulation] work, 
fabricate, organize, and plan a milieu even before [it] is formed and isolated” as a 
unit of regulation (Ibid). The milieu is a conceptual frame that allows governors to 
govern, by linking all the elements that comprise what is to be governed as well as 
those that bear on these: “what one tries to reach through the milieu is precisely 
the conjunction of the series of events produced by these individuals, populations, 
and groups, and the quasi-natural events which occur* around them” (Ibid). It is,
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therefore, a field o f intervention for governors in which individuals come to be 
managed as a population, rather than a set of legal subjects, or a multiplicity of 
organisms. Finally, the milieu “is a certain number of combined, overall effects on 
all who live in if ’ (Ibid, emphasis added).
It can be seen immediately that the notion of milieu helps capture the imprecise, 
ceaselessly changing, and volatile space that comprises a warzone such as ‘Sri 
Lanka’, as well as the myriad efforts undertaken by ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
governors to reshape, dominate, control and administer its multiple facets and 
dimensions. This is, in and of itself, not a radical idea; for example, there is an 
extensive and growing scholarly and policy literature that conceptualizes places 
like Sri Lanka as a ‘conflict system’ (Wils et al 2006, Ropers 2008). Systemic 
thinking-based analysis, however, nonetheless starts mapping a conflict system by 
inventorying self-evident conflict actors, with claimed or attributable interests, 
and seeking their lines of comiection and impact. Whilst the notion of a system 
allows a widening of the analytical lens (to include diasporas and external 
ideologues, for example) and to look for the self-sustaining logics of war, these 
are nonetheless positivist approaches that draw on conventional understandings of 
power and consequently miss the powerful effects of conduct being conducted in 
accordance with coherent governmental rationalities through diffuse networks and 
ways of doing things. For example, following the military defeat of the LTTE in 
mid 2009, it is almost impossible to capture -  without recourse to conceptions 
such as nationalist ideology, say - the continuing bitter contestation between the 
governmental rationalities of Sinhala-Buddhism, Tamil Freedom and Liberal 
Peace in shaping what the future ‘Sri Lanka’ should be (see Chapter 4). The 
notion of a milieu, however, directs analytical focus towards the decentred effects 
of power that are manifest in a given space. The milieu enables analysis of 
Southern warzones, in particular by illuminating the different overlapping spaces 
to be governed within different governmental rationalities. Territorially, for 
example, the limit for Tamil Freedom is the Northeast of Sri Lanka and various 
Western cities where Tamils reside; to Sinhala-Buddhism, the entire island; and 
for Liberal Peace, the horizon of regulated conduct is the entire globe. It is to the 
study of these three specific governmentalities that the dissertation now turns.
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4. Three Rationalities
This chapter outlines three different rationalities -  three different conceptions of 
the ‘right disposition’ of people and things, three different visions of what 
constitutes a ‘better world’ -  that have been clashing in the Sri Lankan space from 
well before the Norwegian-led international ‘peace’ engagement began in 2001. 
The powerful and unpredictable effects of competition between these rationalities, 
which are labelled in shorthand here as ‘Liberal Peace’, ‘Sinhala-Buddhism’ and 
‘Tamil Freedom’, has resulted in outcomes which have appeared differently in 
terms of each of these rationalities.48 This chapter argues that what appears as a 
‘success’ of government in one rationality can also be seen an abject ‘failure’ in 
another rationality. In other words, what appeal’s as resistance to rule within one 
rationality may constitute rule itself in another. For example, the production of an 
all-Sinhala military with an ethos and ceremonial rituals steeped in Buddhism 
may fall short of the ideal of secular aimed forces desired by Liberal Peace, but is 
very much part of the ‘right disposition’ of people and things sought by Sinhala- 
Buddhism.
The three governmentalities studied here thus position the actors involved -  both 
‘locals’ (the Sri Lankan state and its agencies, the LTTE, the island’s ethnic- 
groupings, NGOs, political parties, social movements and others) and 
‘internationals’ (other states, IOs, IFIs, INGOS, etc.) -  as different sorts of objects 
on their respective terrains of government. Moreover, the problematizations, 
programmes and uses of various technologies of governance engendered by these 
different rationalities resulted in efforts to transform the subjectivities of 
individuals, organizations and communities in often, though not always, divergent 
ways. Although, for reasons of space, the focus of the dissertation is on the 
consequences of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom encountering each other in the 
context of the international peace intervention in Sri Lanka, these cannot be
48 These labels are not intended to carry any specific normative or value judgment. Rather, they 
seek to capture essential elements of powerful political rationalities that have guided the actions of 
various actors over several decades. The labels ‘liberal peace’ (lower-case) and ‘Tamil liberation’ 
(or ‘Tamil national liberation’) are used in this dissertation to describe the end-goals sought by the 
programmes of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom respectively.
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examined without recognising the rationality that has increasingly informed the 
conduct of the Sri Lankan state and Sinhala polity since independence in 1948, 
Sinhala-Buddhism. The first three sections of this chapter discuss Liberal Peace, 
Sinhala-Buddhism and Tamil Freedom, respectively, in terms of the political 
rationalities and the governmental processes in which these are embedded. The 
final section discusses the interplays between these govemmentalities, particularly 
in the context of ‘violence’ or ‘conflict’, even before the 2001-2006 international 
engagement.
The first section sets out the rationality of Liberal Peace and discusses how this 
results in specific problematizations and programmes in the context of Southern 
warzones generally (Chapter 5 discusses the specificity of Liberal Peace in Sri 
Lanka itself) with particular* emphasis on what the UN-established International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), for example, calls 
“secessionist violence” or “a conflict between a state party and an insurgent 
Minority” (2001:26, 36, capitals original). As apolitical rationality, Liberal Peace 
turns on an specific ideal of the modern state, its citizen and its society which, 
once rendered ubiquitous, is held to lead inexorably to the emergence of a pacific, 
liberal world order. The essential elements of Liberal Peace are peace, democracy 
and free markets - which Mandelbaum (2002) characterises as “the ideas that 
conquered the world” - or, as one donor-funded study on Sri Lanka puts it,
“liberal democracy and market sovereignty” (Goodhand et al 2005). In this 
political rationality, not only does the combination of democracy and free markets 
constitute the bar* to future violent conflict (‘Liberal’), they are also the means by 
which the ‘conflict-ridden’ societies of the global South can gradually divest 
themselves of their debilitating antagonisms and other* lacks and thereby attain a 
state of perpetual peace (‘Peace’). As the chief Norwegian facilitator, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen (2002), put it, “peace is an aim in itself. But 
peace is also a means. A means for the betterment of human life.”
Thus, embodying out not only the goals of government, but also how these ought 
to be pm’sued (and, just as crucially, by whom), liberal peace constitutes a specific 
global governmental project (see Dillon and Reid 2000), which sees the process of 
ending conflict not as merely securing a return to an earlier status quo so that the
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interrupted processes of development can resume, but instead the transformation 
of the problematic Southern states and societies into a new mesh of internal and 
external relations in which the re-emergence of violence is actively precluded 
(Duffield 2001). Over past decades, this transfonnatory logic has been embedded 
in countless policy documents and research analyses by Western states and their 
associated organizations, institutions and agencies to such an extent it has come to 
constitute the ‘commonsense’ of international intervention in Southern sites. Two 
archetypal texts49 are drawn on here: the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee’s (DAC) ‘Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict’ (2001)50 
and the ICISS’s ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (2001). These are especially 
applicable to places like Sri Lanka where internal conflict and state repression 
have long been underway, and while they have seemingly different foci 
(ameliorating and preventing internal conflict, and rationalising external 
intervention on behalf of populations at risk, respectively) both are quintessential 
embodiments of Liberal Peace.
The second section discusses Sinhala-Buddhism, a rationality which posits a 
specific linkage between the populations, territory and political rule in Sri Lanka 
i.e. that the island is firstly, the homeland of the Sinhala people (‘Sinhala’) and, 
secondly, a bastion for the defence of Buddhism, a task which is the 
responsibility, moreover, of the Sinhala (‘Buddhism’). This ordering accepts non- 
Sinhalese (and non-Buddhist Sinhalese) groups as part of the island’s population 
but only on these specific terms. This rationality has led, especially after 
independence, to the identification of specific problems and the pursuit of specific 
programmes towards addressing the departures brought about by colonial rule 
from this ‘right disposition’ of people and things. These programmes have 
included demographic (re)engineering in the Tamil and Muslim-dominated areas 
of the island via state-sponsored settlement of Sinhalese (Tambiah 1986, Peebles
49 Both emerged from networks of extensive consultation involving governments, NGOs, policy 
think tanks and individual experts, mainly, unsurprisingly, from the global North.
50 In 1997 the OECD’s DAC issued what it described as its ‘ground-breaking’ guidelines on 
‘Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st century.’ These were 
incorporated in 2001 into the guidelines on ‘Helping Prevent Violent Conflict.’ The latter is of 
particular interest in contexts like that of Sri Lanka as, according to DAC, it “relates primarily to 
collective conflict -  conflict among groups within or across nations” (2001:17).
100
1990, Manogaran 1994), transformation of the military into a Sinhala guard for 
the protection of Buddhism (Bartholomeusz 2002), the merging of religion and 
rule, symbolised by the adoption of Sinhala and Buddhist motifs in affairs of state, 
and so on. In short, the post-colonial state has been ‘govemmentalised’ (Foucault 
2007:109; see also Dean 1999:102-111,193-200) in terms of the rationality of 
Sinhala-Buddhism. The elements that comprise Sinhala-Buddhism are found 
embedded in manifestos and statements over the years of Sinhala leaders and 
political parties, the constitutions of 1972 and 1978, and other texts.
In contrast, the third rationality discussed here, Tamil Freedom, firstly, conceives 
of Tamils and the Sinhalese as comprising distinct and equal (i.e. equally 
valuable) collectives on the island (‘Tamil’) and, secondly, holds that the Tamil 
collective’s pursuit of progress, broadly defined, should be unhindered, in 
particular by Sinhala domination (‘Freedom’). As discussed in the third section, 
developments in post-independence Sri Lanka led to the emergence of specific 
problematizations and programmes in the rationality of Tamil Freedom. 
Consequent programmes have including the pursuit of territorial autonomy 
(federalism and, later, independence and statehood) and armed struggle (a ‘war for 
national liberation’). Whilst the focus of this dissertation is on how ‘Tamil 
Freedom’ was pursued amid the international peace intervention after 2002, the 
effects of this political rationality are illustrated briefly in this chapter through 
discussions of problematizations and programmes in the context of the British 
Colonial state, the newly independent state of Ceylon and later rule by Sinhala- 
dominated governments. The elements that comprise ‘Tamil Freedom’ are found 
embedded in the manifestos and statements of leading Tamil political parties, 
power-sharing proposals put forward by successive Tamil leaderships, including 
the LTTE, and in landmark Tamil declarations at specific post-independence
51junctures over the years.
51 Two key texts, Vaddokoddai Resolution and Thimpu Declaration, are reproduced in the 
Appendices.
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4.1 Liberal Peace
The rationality of Liberal Peace
Liberal Peace assumes a conception of peace that is rarely explicated or critically 
discussed, but is nonetheless held to be universally accepted (Richmond 2006b). 
This universality turns on core assumptions about the nature of individuals and the 
requisite conditions for human progress. In short, the liberal peace is based on 
liberal and, especially, neo-liberal conceptions of the individual and his/her 
relationship to the state and society. Beyond these fundamentals for perpetual 
peace, Liberal Peace also includes imderstandings of how these might be attained 
i.e. it engenders roles and responsibilities for international actors and the global 
market in the establishment and subsequent maintenance of appropriate relations 
within and across the boundaries of problematic states. Duffi eld’s outline of 
liberal peace captured the idea of both rationality and project, in the sense that the 
term combines and conflates liberal economic arid political tenets with the policy 
tendency towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction as a solution to 
the conflicts of the South (2001:11). The liberal peace thus reflects a consensus, 
albeit a weak one, between major Western states, donors, agencies, NGOs and the 
UN that, not only does ‘peace’ incorporate market democracy, development and 
the rule of law, but “international intervention, both humanitarian or security 
oriented, should be contingent upon this” (Richmond 2006b:292). This ambition, 
it goes without saying, requires the transformation of the malformed individuals, 
societies and states that global liberalism sees in the fractured South into specific 
idealised forms commensurate with the tenets of liberal peace (Duffield 
2001:11,259, Dillon and Reid 2000:117-8).
To begin with, liberalism is concerned in particular with the maximisation of 
individual liberty and, especially, the defence of that liberty against the state.52 
The individual is deemed to be a rational, interest-motivated economic ego by
52 Whilst there is a vast literature on liberalism and neo-liberalism as philosophies, political 
doctrines or ideologies, this dissertation draws on the literature that takes these as governmental 
rationalities (see, for example, the writings of Graham Burchell, Mitchell Dean, Bany Hindess, 
Peter Mitchell, Pat O’ Malley, Nikolas Rose and, of course, Michel Foucault).
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nature (Burchell 1993:271). She is also seen, equally naturally, as a member of 
society and of that part of humanity that the state has oversight over (Ibid).
Society is thus a container that is coincident with the nation (Dean 1999:124) and 
nation, crucially, refers to the (entire) population of the territorial state.33 
Moreover, this conceptualisation of the individual is held to result in, firstly, “the 
fissiparous tendency of economic egoism which leads exchanging individuals to 
engage in an abstract form of activity involving relations with others that are 
indifferent to their membership of any particular society or nation” and, secondly, 
the “complex interplay of particular localized patterns of sociability, of 
allegiances and antagonisms” that constitutes social life (Burchell 1993:271-2, 
emphasis added) -  i.e. the ceaseless unmaking and remaking of ‘civil society’, 
considered in Liberal Peace as a natural domain of “self-sundering unity” (Gordon 
1996:257). Antagonisms within society are therefore to be expected -  it is what 
consequences these have and how they are resolved that matters.
In governmental terms, liberalism is centred on the regulative ideal of personal 
autonomy, including ideas of personal independence, rationality and responsibility 
(Hindess 1993:301). Individual freedom is thus conditional on the ‘proper5 -  i.e. 
responsible - use of that liberty (see Dean 1999:117-8). Meanwhile, the 
individual’s responsibilities are set alongside those of the state: liberalism “sets 
limits on the state’s capacity to know and act by situating it in relation to the 
reality of the market... and, more broadly, of civil society, as quasi-natural 
domains with their own intrinsic dynamic and forms of self-regulation” (Burchell 
1993:269-270, emphasis added). However, neo-liberalism accords the state a role 
not as ‘passively’ allowing the market to ‘naturally’ appear but, rather, as actively 
constituting, and thereafter defending, the market.54 Economic and social 
advancement therefore turns not on welfare provision by the state, but on 
sovereign power’s ending of exploitation and enabling of economic opportunity 
for all individuals. Welfare interventions by the state may be permitted insofar' as
53 This refers to the ideal, of course, and not actuality, wherein problematic subgroups will require 
subjection to disciplinary power and sovereign action before (re)integration into society and the 
nation, thereby ensuring these can be maintained as an ongoing governmental field.
54 “The market exists, and can only exist, under certain political, legal and institutional conditions 
that must be actively constructed by government” (Burchell 1993:270-1)
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it encourages and reconstructs self-reliance in both providers and recipients of 
services (Rose 1999:265).
These elements constitute the basic framework for liberal peace. However, in 
those swathes of the South deemed to be riven by ethnic and religious 
antagonisms, stricken by the deprivations of armed conflict, impoverished by 
under-development and unscrupulous forms of extraction or exploitation (held to 
lead to or be the basis for violence) and governed by weak, failing or corrupt 
states, these fundamentals become the building blocks of a more complex vision 
of what individual, society and state should be. Ethnic and religious identities, 
whilst unavoidable, need to be rendered unproblematic by suitable legal and social 
restraints on particularist ambitions. Identities must be protected, but the 
maximisation of individual liberty is the priority. Individual, i.e. human, rights 
thus come to be placed at the top of an implicit and sometimes explicit hierarchy 
of rights, with ‘communal rights’ rendered effective not by legal or constitutional 
codification, ideally, but by the absence of individual unfreedom. Ethnic and 
religious identities must not be fettered within the realm of societal interaction, 
but should be excluded as a basis for politics (in the interests of the liberty of 
other groups) by the discipline and sovereignty of law, if not by the spread of 
appropriately pluralist societal values. Cosmopolitanism and ‘civic’ nationalism — 
based on the identity of the secular democratic state - must trump those of ‘ethno- 
nationalisms’ or religious ‘fundamentalism’.
‘Civil society’, meanwhile, provides the arena for particularistic mobilisation 
while public debate is a sine qua non for the resolution of ensuing antagonisms. 
Civil society is a check on the state, but also allows the state to progress by 
governing less: “a legitimate state authority and a healthy civil society reinforce 
each other” (OECD 2001:15). Political power must be pursued by democratic 
mobilisation and competition amid adequate safeguards against particularist 
forces capturing power to the detriment of others. Furthermore, just as economic 
interdependence amongst states underpins peaceful relations between them, 
economic exchange and (thus) interdependence between the individuals making 
up various identity-based groups that comprise society will serve to efface 
manifest or latent antagonisms and prevent their recurrence. Societal conflict
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cannot be avoided, but armed conflict can and must be actively forestalled. In this 
regard robust mechanisms of democracy and competitive dynamics o f ‘civil 
society’ renders recourse to violence undesirable, especially given its obvious 
deleterious effect on networks of economic exchange. However, in the last 
instance, the state must intervene and uphold the rule of law.
Liberal Peace thus posits itself as the inverse of conflict. Or rather, it posits 
conflict as the failure, if not rejection, of liberal peace. In other words, ‘violence’
-  except by the legitimate authority of the state -  is an unqualified anathema. The 
mechanisms of ‘civil society’ (for debate) and democracy (for access to power) 
make resort to violence unnecessary. As Richmond notes, “democracy as the 
standard form of conflict-avoiding polity has been universalized by the liberal 
international community (Richmond 2006b:4), or, as Goodhand pithily puts it, 
“democracy is seen by many as a conflict prophylactic” (2006:34), Communal 
animosities may of course emerge -  for example out of (mis)perceived 
contradictions between individuals’ contingent and subjective identities, and 
violence may yet result, perhaps as a consequence of successful mobilising by 
self-interested factional elites, turning individuals and communities against each 
other. In the first instance, it is the responsibility of the state to maintain law and 
order and to protect citizens from each other. Thereafter, amid assured security, 
civil society and democratic politics would ensure such tensions work themselves 
out peacefully and thus be ameliorated. As such, identity - for example ‘ethnic’ - 
conflicts are a threat to liberal peace itself (Richmond 2007:82), undermining the 
bonds between citizens and between citizen and state as well as the civic identities 
on which these turn.
In short, liberal peace holds that the individual (citizen) cannot attain his/her full 
potential through his/her maximalised liberty, except within the framework of a 
robust, democratic and market friendly state, a pluralist polity and a cosmopolitan 
society. Crucially, therefore, if these are not in place, they must be consciously 
built. This is less a matter of forming institutions, though these are essential, than 
inculcating a specific rationality amongst the individuals who make up society 
and constitute the citizenry of the state: “since war is made in the minds of men 
and it is in the minds of men the defences of peace must be constructed”
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(UNESCO 1945). Therefore, while peace is held to be a ‘natural’ condition of 
humanity, unlike war - leading to the assumption that while the nature of war may 
be contested, the nature of peace is not (Richmond 2007:11) - it nonetheless has to 
be maintained by watchfulness and appropriate interventions.
Liberal Peace as government
Whilst the notion of ‘transformation’ reflects the utopian character of Liberal 
Peace as a rationality, the question is transformation of what, from what to what, 
and by whom? To begin with, the establishing of the liberal peace is “irrevocably 
linked to the territorially sovereign state as an umbrella for political community” 
(Richmond 2007:13). As much as the state must be restrained in the interest of 
individual autonomy, the state, with international support, is also responsible for 
establishing the rule of law, protection of human rights, setting up the market to 
support development and poverty alleviation efforts and so on (OECD 2001:17). 
The territorial state, moreover, constitutes the boundary of the ‘nation5 and 
‘society5 on whose behalf these steps are to be undertaken. This includes, 
therefore, the totality of communities and actors hitherto engaged in violence 
against each other and, quite possibly, the state. Creating the ideal modem state 
entails the “construction of liberal democracy, with a free market and globalized 
economy, progressive development strategies, and guaranteed human rights55 
(Richmond 2004:132, emphasis added), but this arrangement of people and things 
is predicated on assumptions about the individual, society and state that are not 
usually reflected in the practices of politics underway in Southern warzones 
(Dillon and Reid 2000:118).
Liberal Peace thus is, like other governmental rationalities, both inherently 
ahistoric and eternally optimistic. While the presence of stark antagonisms, and 
perhaps even ‘ancient hatreds5, are acknowledged or even anticipated in conflict 
states, these are deemed to be containable, effaceable and possible to preclude 
from recurrence by the economic interdependence and democratic ethos that 
would result from transformation. The failings of the state, which might include 
structural weaknesses, militarisation, lack of popular legitimacy, institutionalised
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racism, and so on - failings that might have manifested in state repression or even 
genocidal violence - are also considered addressable through transformation. In 
short, Liberal Peace turns on the certainty that, given a bounded territory and a 
population, no matter how riven, a liberal democratic state, a multi-cultural 
nation, a pluralist polity, a vibrant civil society and a globalised market economy 
can sooner or later be constructed -  provided, of course, the appropriate external 
interventions are undertaken and the course is stayed. Stabilising the weakened, 
even failing, post-conflict state is, meanwhile, the first step towards pursuing 
liberal peace, while the cornerstones of Liberal Peace are the technologies of 
human rights, democracy and human security (Richmond 2007:10). Liberal Peace 
thus simultaneously engenders two forms of responsibilization; firstly, on the 
people, societies and states of the conflict and poverty-stricken Southern warzone 
to transform and, secondly, on the international community to assist, enable and 
ensure this transformation. Whilst the implicit and sometimes explicit self­
accorded trusteeship of the international community is widely recognised, what is 
important here is how transformation, as a relation of government, accords rights 
and responsibilities to both those to be transformed and those effecting 
transformation. In other words, success or failure of government, here both 
transformation and effecting transformation, is a measure o f the international 
community, as much as the state and society in question.55 It is worth reiterating 
here how liberal peace is a global project, failure in which cannot be 
countenanced.
However, while the utopian ethos of Liberal Peace sees anything as possible, it 
doesn’t see everything as permissible. For example, the territorial integrity of the 
dysfunctional state remains inviolable, even in the context of popular- internal 
demands for self-determination. So strong is the utopian telos of Liberal Peace, 
the prevention of secession and the maintenance of the state’s territorial integrity 
can be considered integral to it. Even the ICISS, looking at situations where
55 For example, the OECD exhorts donor agencies to work towards the future integration of the 
state into the global order, if necessary, bringing their own governments into shaping the recipient 
state’s policies in “trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs, defense, and development 
cooperation” (OECD 2001:17). In preparation, therefore, donors must “address democracy, 
security and better governance as major issues” (OECD 2001:18).
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external interventions which violate state sovereignty may be warranted by the 
brutality of the state concerned, warns that any external intervention should not 
encourage demands for secession and, indeed, even intervention based on the 
‘responsibility to protect’ (people against their state, in this instance) must be on 
the premise that such demands are rejected.56 Even in the case of state violence 
against a section of its population so severe as to warrant international 
intervention, “the objective overall is not to change constitutional arrangements, 
but to protect them” (ICISS 2001:44). And even though the state in question 
might have engaged in racialised killings and ‘ethnic cleansing’ or attempted 
genocide, the solution is not to allow secession but to involve the aggrieved 
community in the process of transforming society and state (ICISS 2001:36).
At first glance, it might seem there is nothing inherently contradictory between 
the fundamentals of Liberal Peace and political independence for a given 
community; there is no reason why states like Kosovo or Eritrea are less likely to 
be liberal market democracies than Serbia or Ethiopia of which they were once a 
part. Moreover, given the liberal ethos underpinning the principle of self- 
determination, the demand for independence cannot be denied on liberal grounds. 
However, with the territorial state as the container for the ‘multi-ethnic’ nation, 
the notion of separate ‘homelands’ is deeply problematic, being held to be 
inherently exclusivist and divisive. In other words, although -  or, perhaps given 
that - a stable liberal peace is ultimately achievable, ‘separatist’ or ‘ethno- 
nationalist’ demands should not be entertained. As Richmond points out, 
understandings of ‘ethnic conflict’ are “generally set against the foil of liberal 
peace” (2007:82) and reducing the resolution of these ‘internal’ wars to the 
construction of liberal statehood, “the subtext of much of this literature is that 
ethnic conflict is both a threat to the liberal peace, but also legitimates 
intervention to construct the liberal peace” (Richmond 2007:82). This has
56 The ICISS notes: “Another difficulty that can arise with internationally endorsed and externally 
applied preventive measures is that political leaders facing internal rebellion or secessionist 
violence will often be concerned about giving additional momentum or “legitimacy” to those 
causing their problems. Those concerns should be understood and appreciated, and a careful 
evaluation always made of the risks o f well-intentioned efforts in fact making the situation worse. 
It is also critical in this regard that those wanting to help from outside completely recognize and 
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries concerned, and confine their efforts 
to finding solutions within those p a r a m e te r s (2001:25, emphases added).
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important implications when it comes to the forms of internal segmentation (say, 
federalism) in the context of identity-based demands for autonomy (see Chapter 
5). In any case, it is held that genuine commitment to (liberal) peace on the part of 
the secessionists means they would, in fact, be prepared to ‘compromise’ on their 
demand. Or rather, in another strand of circular logic, to insist on independence 
when the state could be transformed into a liberal democracy is tantamount to 
rejecting the tenets of Liberal Peace.
The problematic of ‘violence’
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the dizzying array of 
problematizations and programmes that have emerged from the rationality of 
Liberal Peace in the past two decades. Instead the main issue considered in this 
chapter is the problematic o f ‘violence’; as Richmond (2007:3) observes, “the 
problem of peace is that first war must be eradicated or managed.” The 
significance of this largely de-politicised catch-all problem o f ‘violence’ - which 
includes the activities of ‘armed groups’, extra-judicial killings or torture by state 
forces, communal clashes, even domestic abuse - is, as discussed here, in how it 
then engenders specific solutions. Efforts to eradicate war turn inevitably on how 
what causes conflict is conceptualised.57 Liberal Peace posits poverty and uneven 
or under-development as fundamental conditions for conflict. Exploitation by 
unscrupulous economic actors, perhaps including sections of the state, is another. 
So are ‘exclusivist’ identities -  ethnicity, religion, tribalism, clan, etc -  which, 
unlike the ‘civic’ identities of citizenship, camiot encompass the totality of the 
state’s population and therefore provide inherent fault lines within society along 
which hostilities could erupt. Emerging grievances are seen to explode into open 
conflict when triggered by external shocks - such as a sudden change in terms of 
trade - and mobilized by political entrepreneurs (Goodhand 2006:37). Identities 
are seen by some to be ‘created’ around ‘grievances’ by ‘conflict specialists’ such
57 See Goodhand (2006, Chapter 2) for an overview and brief discussion o f the different strands of 
(internal) conflict-related theory that have informed Liberal Peace policy analysis and 
programmatic actions in the past two decades. These include those that might be termed ‘New 
Wars/Old Wars’ (Kaldor 1999) and ‘Greed over Grievence’ (Collier 2000) and have been 
paradigmatic in forming programmatic solutions to the problem o f ‘violence’ in the global South.
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as armed groups. So, for example, frustrations due to poverty may come to be 
mobilised into ethnicity-based ‘grievances’. Conflict can thus be seen as the 
reordering of society in non-liberal or illiberal terms, with ‘greed’, rather than 
‘grievance’ often as the driving force (see Keen 1998, Kaldor 1999, Collier 2000). 
Thus, just as local ‘conflict entrepreneur's’ are deemed to have mobilised ethnicity 
into violently antagonistic formations, Liberal Peace requires the dismantling of 
these regressive groupings and the remobilising of their members into a 
multicultural and pluralist collective with a civic identity - one centred, moreover, 
on a responsive and robust state equipped with mechanisms for peacefully 
resolving disputes. More generally, it is thus accepted that, although poverty and 
conflict are inextricably linked, in the wake of protracted conflict, with its 
attendant ‘legacies of conflict’, economic growth alone cannot be expected to 
remedy the problem of civil war (Goodhand 2006:37) and more comprehensive 
transformation processes are required.
As noted above, the ultimate objective of Liberal Peace is a world comprising 
stable, peaceful, democratic states. Crucially, the way to reach this goal in places 
riven by ethnic or religious violence is to stabilize, restructure and reform the 
existing state; in particular to build institutions to support ‘democracy, security 
and better governance’ and to forge a national society based on ‘multiculturalism 
and pluralism.’ The OECD guidelines exemplify Liberal Peace’s 
conceptualization of ‘ethnic’ conflicts within developing states: irrespective of 
whether the aimed conflict stems from tensions between ethnic communities or 
resistance to persecution of a minority by a majoritarian state, the solution is 
ultimately the same: a democratic state with strong liberal institutions, a civic 
polity and an open economy. Even in the context of popular minority demands for 
self-rule, what is not desirable is the ‘fragmentation’ of the state along ‘ethnic 
lines’.58
58 Even in the exceptional instances where new states have emerged, such as in the former 
Yugoslavia, this has happened through probationary periods of international trusteeship and active 
management in which, as rites of passage, these tenets of Liberal Peace have to be adopted and 
ingrained. See, for example, Michael Pugh (2005)
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As such, apart from the state, any actors who have the capacity for organized 
violence are an anathema and constitute the locus of the problematic of conflict. 
The political projects such armed non-state actors represent (or claim to 
represent), the debates about whether their military actions constitutes terrorism, 
insurgency, wars of national liberation, warlordism or something else, and 
whether they characterize themselves as liberation movements, people’s fronts, 
de-facto states and so on, have little bearing on the conditions of their appearance 
in the terrain of liberal peace: here they are all simply ‘aimed groups’. The road to 
liberal peace begins therefore with ceasefires and, ideally, demobilisation of non­
state combatants i.e. the restoration of the state’s monopoly on force - 
(re) establishing the ‘legitimacy’ of the state in the eyes of its population is a 
related, but separate, matter. Thereafter, the need for the international community 
is to “maximize opportunities to help strengthen state capacity to respond 
appropriately to conflict” (OECD 2001:62 emphasis added). Even in the case of 
the state having been involved in ethnic or political repression, such international 
support and engagement remains the way forward: in its conspicuously brief 
discussion of situations when “the state takes on an oppressive and predatory role 
in relation to society, foments internal conflict and abrogates its core functions as 
“protector”, the OECD wains categorically against severing engagement 
(2001:20).59
Concomitantly, the rarely stated but nonetheless obvious assumption of liberal 
peace is that taking up aims against a state, even in cases of ‘systematic racial 
discrimination’ or ‘large scale ethnic cleansing’ is not an option for the population 
concerned. The notion of ‘wars of national liberation’, for example, is thus utterly 
unacceptable to liberal peace and disciplinary action against sovereign states is, as
59 In a short section (half a page out of 160-odd pages) titled ‘situations of repressive or divisive 
governance’ in its landmark publication on preventing armed conflict in Southern sites, the OECD, 
while insisting that “experience suggests donor countries should seek opportunities for continued 
engagement with such states”, argues that international withdrawal “risks encouraging state 
actions contravening human rights standards, possibly leading to state collapse, or denying 
humanitarian assistance to affected populations” (2001:62). This is even though, as the OECD 
admits, “providing development or even humanitarian assistance to, or through, oppressive 
regimes engaged in conflict with their own citizens can serve in effect to support or legitimise the 
regime. This can happen through diversion of resources away from intended beneficiaries, 
fungibility of assistance or conferring a ‘moral’ legitimacy by being perceived to support the 
regime in question” (2001:20).
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the ICISS (2001) seeks to institutionalise, the sole preserve of the (liberal) 
international community and not the repressed themselves. Whilst the use of force 
by a people in pursuit of self-determination is neither barred nor authorised by the 
UN Charter, a view had once emerged internationally that use of force by 
liberation movements was acceptable in the case of forcible denial of the right to 
self-determination (Muller 2008:8). The new unqualified opposition to non-state 
violence, even in the case of oppressive states, tons entirely on the notion that the 
compulsions behind the desire to exercise the right to self-determination are 
entirely resolvable by the establishment of liberal peace.
The transformation of armed groups is thus a prominent programme of Liberal 
Peace. In short, the only trajectory available to an armed group is, first, it must 
cease its destabilizing violence and, at some point thereafter, disarm, demobilize 
and either disband or transform itself into a political party. This process might or 
might not be imbricated in a process of negotiation with the state -  itself also 
engaged in separate transformatory programmes of Liberal Peace -  but the 
priority is not a negotiated solution per se, but ending armed groups5 violence and 
foreclosing their capacity for violence (proper solutions would, in any case, 
emerge only out of peaceful, democratic politics). Both the halting of violence and 
the transformation of conflict are therefore central problematics of Liberal Peace. 
An extensive array of mechanisms and bodies of expertise have thus emerged 
around the ‘internal conflict5 issues of negotiation, third party mediation, ceasefire 
monitoring, peace agreements, rehabiliation and reintegration of former 
combatants, and so on. So have mechanisms and expertise with regards to 
sanctions, conditionalities and incentives that could compel warring parties to 
come to the table and remain there till they complete their respective 
transformatory trajectories. In the logic of liberal peace, aimed groups are held to 
prefer the force of aims to democratic politics and, as such, are unlikely to 
negotiate peace or transform unless their violent projects are stymied by military 
stalemate, resource/supply problems, or similar* difficulties, or, indeed, are 
compelled to do so by external factors. The rational-choice based techniques of 
sanctions, incentives and conditionalities (see discussion and case studies in 
Conciliation Resources 2008) are therefore amongst the ways in which ‘liberal 
peace making5 comes to be rendered technical. With ‘trust* held to be scarce in
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conflict situations, ceasefire agreements, third party mediation and external 
monitoring, are some of the other techniques by which peace making is also 
rendered technical.
In other words, faced with the complexity of demands, counter-demands, 
actualities on the ground and the general messiness o f4local’ politics in which 
they are unable, unwilling or, more often than not, uninterested to engage, 
international actors reconstitute the reaching of negotiated settlements and peace 
agreements by conflict parties in the South into a range of technical issues in 
which they (‘externals’) have the requisite expertise and ‘capacity’. Crucially, as 
noted in Chapter 3, rendering technical also means rendering non-political. So, for 
example, whether an agreement is reached or not come to turns less on the 
substantive content or moral imperatives of the issues under negotiation, than on 
the skills, capacity and, above all, flexibility of the negotiating parties. With its 
abhorrence of violence and its privileging of democracy, political pluralism and 
rule of law, Liberal Peace does not take aimed groups’ advocacy of political 
projects seriously. Often the goals being pursued by violence are unacceptable 
anyway (i.e. ‘extremist’), for example secession or overthrow of the state. 
Furthermore, as mobilisers of violence, aimed groups are held to lack moral 
legitimacy and widespread popular support and, until they disarm and win 
elections, their political views cannot be accorded much weight - even though the 
‘grievances’ they articulate may be recognized or echoed by others, including 
political parties and members of ‘civil society’. To be taken seriously, therefore, 
the aimed groups should enter the political arena and compete with other, 
‘moderate’, political parties, whose platforms of compromise and accommodation 
are held to have been marginalized by the effects of conflict and/or persecution by 
the aimed groups.
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4.2 Sinhala-Buddhism
The rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism
Krishna has argued that “Sri Lanka’s movement from a peaceful, indeed idyllic 
Ceylon to a synonym for macabre ethnic violence is the story of a majority 
community’s attempt to fashion a nation [‘Sri Lanka’] in its own image through 
monopolisation of the state and of the consequent emergence of a secessionist 
ethnonational movement” (1999:31, insert added). Whilst many of the post­
independence developments that have led to this characterisation have been well 
studied60, international policy makers, albeit to differing degrees, also often see 
these as less than salient with regards to how to make peace now. For example, 
one advocate of liberal peace, while noting that after independence Sinhala 
Buddhist ‘revivalism’ “attained a new dominance in national politics”, 
nonetheless argues: “at the heart of the Sri Lankan crisis is a crisis of the state... 
the Sinhalisation of the state is a manifestation of the deeper problem of the 
failure of the state to institutionalise democratic politics” (Goodhand 2001:30,32, 
emphasis added). Such characterisations, turning on an ideal of state, society and 
individual, thus do not take seriously the political rationality that has informed 
“the production of the modem nation in Sri Lanka through a process that has been 
extraordinarily violent in both physical and epistemic terms” (Krishna 1999:31, 
emphasis added), and which, just as importantly, informs contemporary 
governance and politics of war and peace in the island. This governmental 
rationality, termed ‘Sinhala-Buddhism’ in this dissertation, reflects a specific 
conception of how population, territory and forms of political rule should be 
organized on the island.
Sinhala-Buddhism posits a specific linkage between the Sinhala people, the island 
and Buddhism: that the island is, firstly, the homeland of the Sinhala people 
(‘Sinhala’) and, secondly, a bastion for the defence of Buddhism, a task which is 
the specific responsibility, moreover, of the Sinhalese (‘Buddhism’). This
60 See, for example, Bose 1994, Krishna 1999, Goodhand 2001, Winslow and Woost 2004, JBIC 
2003, World Bank 2003:Appendix 1
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ordering accepts non-Sinhalese - and non-Buddhist Sinhalese - as part of the 
island’s population but only on these specific terms.61 This conceptualisation is 
outlined most vividly in the Mahavcimsa, Culavamsci and Dipavamsa - ‘Great 
chronicles’ - written by, and from the perspective of, Buddhist monks (Little 
1994:27). Whilst these texts have been explicitly drawn on by some, though not 
all, Sinhala nationalists, as well as many post-independence Sinhala leaders, the 
political rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism is not reducible to this ‘mytho-history’. 
Rather, the adoption of the Mahavamsa and others as central texts in the pursuit of 
Sinhala-Buddhist governance since independence can be seen as a consequence of 
this governmental rationality, rather than its ‘source’. Stokke and Ryntveit 
(2000:301) have pointed out that “nationalist mobilization cannot be reduced to 
essentialist notions of primordial nations, territorial nation-states, or internal 
colonialism,” but instead should be understood as “the outcome of cultural and 
political practices by a multitude of actors, operating in time- and place-specific 
contexts.” However, it is not only ‘nationalist’ mobilisation that is informed by 
the rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism, but also the myriad mundane activities of 
government (i.e. conducting conduct), often underway at a distance from the 
centres of power. These vary, for example, from the compiling of international 
and local tourist guidebooks that privilege certain archaeological and historic sites 
on the island over others or make prominent some ‘Sri Lankan’ cultural events 
and practices over others, to the publicised visits by newly elected or appointed 
state officials and foreign ambassadors to meet leaders of the Buddhist clergy and 
the adoption of Buddhist rituals in ceremonies of state. Nissan and Stirrat, for 
example, find it “striking that several assumptions which underlie popular 
representations of the past are also found in many academic writings in Sri 
Lanka.” (1990:21, emphasis added). In this sense Sinhala-Buddhism as 
govemmentality is more than the sedimented effects of a project long pursued by 
self-serving elites. Rather, it is an ordering of Sri Lankan space that has been and
61 As Winslow and Woost (2004:25) note, “over the twentieth century, religion has gained in 
importance as a marker of ethnicity. Almost all Sinhalese are Buddhists, and most o f the Tamils 
are Hindu, but some of each are Christian. Thus religious divisions have never exactly mirrored 
ethnic ones. However, Sinhalese who are not Buddhist have found it socially and politically 
expedient to downplay their religious identity and give more emphasis to their Sinhala ethnicity.
... Increasingly since independence in 1948, a single, discrete Sinhalese Buddhist categoiy has 
been rhetorically opposed to all the rest, who then are, by reduction, not Buddhists, not Sinhala 
speakers and, in some eyes, not true Sri Lankans.”
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continues to be propagated by a range of actors. These are not limited to state 
agencies or the ruling political parties, actors committed to the tenets of Sinhala- 
Buddhism or, indeed, only Sinhalese actors. For example, international diplomats 
who ensure they pay official visits to the leadership of Sri Lanka’s powerful 
Buddhist clergy (the Sangha) or minority (Tamil, Muslim, Upcountry Tamils) 
political leaders who accept positions in ruling coalitions and take up specific 
material and discursive practices (such as rejecting the notion of ‘internal5 
homelands), also serve to advance that specific ordering of Sri Lankan space 
sought by Sinhala-Buddhism.
As a political rationality, Sinhala-Buddhism therefore turns on a division of the 
island’s population into specific collectives with specific and different rights, 
responsibilities and relationships with the state and the island’s territory. On the 
one hand, it defines a specific linkage between the Sinhalese, Buddhism and the 
territorial state (the present constitution, for example, declares categorically that 
it is “the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism”) and, on the other hand, 
between non-Sinhalese, Sinhalese and the state.63. What is important here is that 
Sinhala-Buddhism is not antithetical to the notion of a state with multiple 
ethnicities or religions, but assumes a hierarchy amongst collectives on the island, 
with the Sinhala-Buddhist one at the top (Kapferer 1988:100). Sinhala-Buddhism 
is also not inherently antithetical to the practice of other religions, but the 
promotion and protection of Buddhism is, in the words of the present constitution, 
a “first and foremost” concern of the state and the Sinhalese. In that sense, 
‘Sinhala’ here is not just a cultural or ethnic term, but also an inherently political 
one - as indeed are ‘Tamil’, ‘Muslim’ and others; all have specific rights and 
responsibilities, albeit not equal ones, on the terrain of Sinhala-Buddhism.
62 As Kapferer puts it, in theoretical frameworks different to that adopted by this dissertation, “in 
the ideology of Sinhalese nationalism, the state, its bureaucratic apparatuses, and its agents are 
both the custodians o f Sinhalese Buddhist culture and, in their cosmically ordained duty, 
responsible for the order of society and of the person” (1988:100).
63 “The state in such a conception unites its internally differentiated population in a logic of 
hierarchy. As the state finds its coherence in this hierarchical order, so does the [Sinhala] person 
... And so rich and poor and the powerful and the weak can unite as one, as a hierarchical 
combination of strength, and crush the fragmenting forces that have removed themselves from a 
controlled subordinate condition at the base and are ranged demonically against the coherence of 
Buddhist state and Buddhist person” (Kapferer 1988:103, insert, emphasis added).
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Examining the logic of state building in Sri Lanka through a close analysis of 
Golden Threads, an important official text authored by President Junius R. 
Jayawardene in 1984, Krishna notes that apart from being “intended as a history 
primer,”64 the publication is
“an encapsulation of history as understood and lived by 
... the Sinhala-speaking Buddhists [and] is writ largely 
in terms of that community’s difference from various 
minority groups, especially the Tamils, who are 
rendered both inferior and age-old antagonists of the 
Sinhalese” (1999:31, emphases added).
\
The core tenet of the rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism were summed up in 2008 by 
Sri Lanka Army commander, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka:
“I strongly believe that this country belongs to the 
Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we 
treat them like out' people. We being the majority of the 
country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the 
right to protect this country. We are also a strong nation 
... They can live in this country with us. But they must 
not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, 
demand undue things” (Bell 2008).
Sinhala-Buddhism as government
Apart from the ongoing armed conflict, the ‘problem’ with Sri Lanka, as argued 
by many advocates of liberal peace, is that after independence “state ideology 
gave prominence to the identity of the majority” (Goodhand 2001:31-2). This 
outcome, moreover, has been put down to politicians being “driven by incentives 
of electoral arithmetic” whereby, because “ethnic groups have provided a ready­
made constituency”, “democracy and communalism have fed off one another”
64 Moreover, the claimed chronicle of the island’s rulers as set out in Golden Threads - and which 
positions President Jayawardene as the most recent in this lineage - “is not some inane exercise in 
grandeur ... the same genealogy appears in K. M. De Silva’s widely read and authoritative work, 
‘A history o f Sri Lanka’” (Krishna 1999:40-41).
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(Ibid:32, see discussion o f ‘outbidding’ in De Votta 2004). This rational-actor 
calculation turns crucially on the primacy of zero-sum logics as well the 
assumption that ethnic constituencies “are easier to organise and consolidate than 
interest groups” (Ibid). Quite apart from the validity of such assumptions, such an 
analytical approach sees both elites and voters as making choices from a number 
of alternatives and opting for antagonistic, ‘nationalist’ ones. However, this 
rational-choice analysis does suffice as it does not take seriously the already 
existing political, cultural, and social milieus in which politicians and voters are 
submerged and whereby certain ways of organising political and social life, rather 
than others, appear’ commonsensically as the ‘right disposition’ of people and 
things.65 A govemmentality approach, by contrast, suggests that political 
manifestos, electoral results, state policies and other socio-political developments 
are the consequences and products of certain ways of thinking about how the 
nexus between population, territory and political life should be organised as well 
as the basis for subsequent efforts to seek out this better world. Politicians, social 
movements, other organisations and indeed voters may cynically or self- 
interestedly make choices of various kinds but government assumes this (see 
discussion of ‘translation’ in Chapter 3).
In newly independent Sri Lanka, the rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism positioned 
(Sinhala) politicians, voters, the Buddhist clergy, the territorial state and the 
island’s various ethnic groups and the departed colonial power, in specific ways 
and engendered certain problematizations and consequent programmes. To begin 
with, Sinhala challenges to British colonial rule were posed primarily by the 
Buddhist revivalists of the late 1800s (see Little 1994, Gombrich and Obeyesekere 
1988, Tambiah 1992:5-8), galvanised by expanding missionary activities: whilst 
formally separating religion and state, missionaries’ efforts nonetheless received 
the supposedly secular colonial state’s official support. In any case, Little 
(1994:14) argues that
65 Discussing Buddhist revivalism in the late 1800s onwards, Little (1994:3) points out, for 
example, that “ideas of exclusive communal identity and hostile competition over questions of 
race, language, ethnicity, religion and political control took shape between the Sinhala and the 
Tamil in the period leading up to 1948.”
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“the [colonial] government’s general attitude of 
neutrality in religious affairs was [itself] quite alien.
According to Sinhala tradition, it was not enough for 
the government to refrain from interfering religion and 
provide some legal protection. The government needed 
to take a more active role. ... Severing the connection 
between Buddhism and the state became an important 
source of resentment” (inserts added).
Conversely, for the Buddhist revivalists, throwing off the colonial yoke was more 
than simply ending foreign rule; it entailed the restoration of a particular order of 
state, society and religion held to predate colonial subjugation i.e. they sought to 
reverse the ‘Betrayal of Buddhism’ (by the colonial power), as the title of a key 
report produced in 1956 by the ‘Buddhist Committee of Inquiry’ put it. The 
Committee, comprising respected scholar monks, set out not only the injustices 
held to have been inflicted by colonial rule, but what remedial steps were now 
required (Tambiah 1992:30-41), Meanwhile, the revivalists of the late nineteenth 
century had drawn on the Mahavamsa, Culavamsa and Dipavamsa to envision 
what had been lost; at the heart of the charter implied in the chronicles is “the 
inseparable connection between state and sangha [Buddhist clergy]” (Little 
1994:27). This conceptualisation also made possible the forging of “an effective 
oppositional platform which was open to all Sinhala Buddhists irrespective of 
their caste, class and regional affiliations” (Amunagama 1985:713 cited in Little 
1994:32) and, thus, mass mobilisation against colonial rule. Moreover, this “mix 
of ancient myth and modem resentment... was to provide a warrant for 
intolerance, for viewing as inferiors and discriminating against peoples perceived 
as obstacles to what rightfully belongs to the Sinhala” (Rogers 1990:12 cited in 
Little 1994:33).
The point here is that Sinhala-Buddhism as governmentality, embodying a 
particular* ideal of population, territory and security, was extending well before
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colonial rule ended,66 Thus, even before 1948, the “theme of unity among ruler 
[state], sangha [Buddhism] and Sinhala people” (Little 1994:32, inserts added) at 
the heart of this govemmentality was already competing with other political 
rationalities, such as that embedded in the Westminster-style Parliamentary 
democracy and multi-ethnic politics that Britain felt had been institutionalised in 
the unitary state being granted independence. Although power was transferred to 
an English-educated, westernised, multi-ethnic elite (Wilson 1994:133), the 
Sinhalese among them were held in the prevailing Sinhala nationalist discourse to 
be inauthentic due to their recent collaboration with the colonial state (see 
Vijayavardhana 1953, Guruge 1965). Thus, the adoption o f ‘pro-Sinhala’ or ‘anti- 
Tamil’ discursive and material practices by Sinhala elites takes place in the 
context of this being the appropriate conduct, in the rationality of Sinhala- 
Buddhism, for leaders of the Sinhala people. (The concomitant conduct of Tamil 
leaders and polity is discussed later.) The point here is not whether such conduct 
was cynical and self-serving or not, but how it sprang forth from a specific 
political rationality that was embedded in and ordering the conduct of individuals, 
the Buddhist clergy, politicians and other (Sinhala) actors and doing so in 
competition with that of Westminster-style liberal politics being pursued by the 
colonial power, other Westernized elites and minority political parties.
The expansion of Sinhala majoritarianism began almost immediately with the 
disenfranchisement in 1948 and 1949 of almost a million ‘Upcoimtry’ Tamils 
(sixth or seventh generation descendents of Tamils from South India brought 
down by the colonial state for labour on the island’s plantations). Whatever the 
elite interests behind this move, the rejection from ‘Sri Lankan’ identity of these 
unfortunates, can be seen as part of the ‘right disposition’ of people and things 
within the rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism. Conversely, the Tamil-and Muslim- 
dominated areas in the island’s Northeast were a decidedly ‘wrong disposition’ of 
people and things. Thus state-sponsored settlement of Sinhalese in these areas,
66 For example, Tambiah notes how the efforts of leading Buddhist revivalists such as Anagarika 
Dharmalapala after 1880 were “supported by and served the interests of a rising Sinhala-Buddhist 
middle class and a circle of businessmen” in the early 20th century (1992:7). From the 1920’s, not 
long after their predecessors successfully engaged the missionaries in publicised theological 
debates (Little 1994), radical monks were heavily engaged in island’s (Sinhala) politics — such as 
supporting political parties, trade unions and labour strikes (Ibid: 15)
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which had begun in a limited way during colonial rule under the logic of 
‘development’, accelerated sharply after independence.67 This ‘internal’ 
colonization, one of the earliest and longest-running programmes of Sinhala- 
Buddhism, has had a profound effect on Tamil political activity and identity, 
including the foregrounding of the Tamil ‘homeland’, and consequently on the 
island’s ethnic politics (a point taken up later). Moreover, state-led colonisation 
put “the full weight of national economic policy behind one community’s vision 
of the island’s past and future, at the expense of competing visions of other 
groups” (Winslow 2004:32, emphasis added). Colonisation and Sinhalisation of 
state-led development reached its zenith in the 1980s: significant amounts of 
foreign aid were devoted to the implementation of the country’s largest and most 
ambitious irrigation and colonisation project, the Accelerated Mahaveli 
Development Programme (AMDP). The Sinhala Buddhist dimensions of the 
scheme were reflected in its own rhetoric such as “monks and peasants of the 
Mahaweli”, “return to the land of the kings”, and, especially reference to the 
Mahaweli river as a “mighty guard upon foreign invasion” (official texts cited in 
Hennayake 2006:108-9), and in how state development strategy was geared 
towards the breaking up of areas of Tamil contiguity in order to undermine Tamil 
assertions to a homeland on the island (Manogaran 1994:114-5, for a 
practitioner’s accomit see Gunaratna 1988).
More generally, ‘development’ and economic progress were pursued in Sri Lanka 
in specific ways informed by the rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism. As Winslow 
notes, “never, in independent Sri Lanka, has economic policy been isolatable from 
issues of ethnicity, because how the government [of the time] has chosen to define 
and to resolve economic difficulties has consistently been informed by ethnic 
politics, just as ethnic politics has been informed by economic choices” (2004:31, 
emphasis insert added). Or, as one DFID-funded study puts it, “state-led 
development in the post-colonial period operated in a framework of dominant 
nationalism and favoured one ethnic group over another” (Goodhand 2001:34). 
Whilst Sri Lanka’s government has alternated between the ‘conservative’ UNP
67 See, for example, Keamey and Miller 1987,Peebles 1990, Manogaran 1994, Krishna 1999:68- 
73, Herring 2001:147-153
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and the ‘leftist’ SLFP (Moore 1990:347), all have tended to pursue the 
development of the Sinhala areas at the expense of the minorities (Nithiyanandam 
2000:294-5). Whilst this has been attributed to Sinhala chauvinism (Winslow 
2004:32), in the rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism, however, this is an appropriate 
response by the state to what is held to be the exploitation of Sinhalese during 
colonial rule by the British as well as the Tamils, Muslims and other minorities 
(see Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988:213, Tambiah 1992:8). It is in this sense 
also that policies which discriminated against the minorities and favoured the 
Sinhalese in terms of jobs in the state, then the largest employer, (Moore 
1990:380) and ethnic quota driven restrictions on university admissions for 
Tamils (Winslow and Woost 2004:36) came to be pursued in the sixties and 
seventies. This state logic did not change after 1977 when the UNP regime of 
President Jayawardene embarked on a radical liberalization program (Bastian 
2005:11)68 and “aid flows into Sri Lanka became a veritable flood, making the 
country the world’s leading aid recipient” at the time (Arunatelike et al 
2001:1485). As Herring notes, “the expanded flow of benefits enabled by aid was 
skewed [and] the lion’s share of boons appeared in Sinhala areas” (2001:65,148, 
insert added).
The passing of the ‘Sinhala Only’ Act in 1956 -  by an SLFP government that had 
been swept to power on its pledge to enact this69 - replaced English with Sinhala 
as the official language and established as law the superiority of the Sinhala 
language, and thus people, over Tamil and its speakers. By 1961, official policy 
was that Sinhala was the only language of government administration (Winslow 
2004:35). As Winslow notes, “the 1956 elections, particularly the branding of 
Tamils as somehow not really Sri Lankan, is now seen as a turning point where 
anti-Tamil rhetoric became firmly entrenched in Sinhalese political positioning” 
(2004:34, see De Votta 2004 for a close discussion). The 1972 Constitution, 
which changed the country’s name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka and was enacted 
over the protests of minorities, represents an important step forward in terms of
68 See also discussion in Moore 1990, Herring 2001 and the seminal article by Gunasinghe 1984
69 Notably, the other Sinhala parties “wasted no time in embracing the Act” (Nithiyananthan 
2000:291).
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the right disposition of people and things: it concentrated power in the Sinhala- 
dominated legislature and, accorded Buddhism a ‘first and foremost place’. It also 
deemed it, in beguilingly benign terms, “the duty of the state to protect and foster 
Buddhism.” In other words, the Sri Lankan constitution “takes for granted that 
religion [Buddhism] and politics are intertwined” (Bartholomeusz 2002:5, insert 
added). Today’s public agitation over Christian INGOs undertaking 
developmental work, the state’s repeated efforts (against Western pressure) to 
promulgate ‘anti-conversion’ laws, the lack of popular discord over not infrequent 
church burnings and so on, can thus also be seen to be informed by the same 
rationality that is embedded in the Sri Lankan constitution. Even President 
Jayawardene’s UNP regime, which had swiftly become a poster-child for the IMF 
for its aggressive liberalisation, openly hailed the goal of dharmistha - “a 
righteous Buddhist society” (see Krishna (1999) for an extensive discussion of the 
Sinhala-Buddhist ethos of the conduct of Jayawardene and his regime).
The largely ceremonial, multi-ethnic military established by Britain at handover 
was an important problem in the rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism, In his historical 
survey of Sri Lanka’s military, Blodgett (2002:54) notes how “in 1962, a policy of 
recruiting only from the Sinhalese Buddhist community was instituted. This was 
the beginning of an ethnically pure army”. Noting that by the time the armed 
conflict began, “the armed forces are filled with Sinhalese and the Tamils are 
excluded from serving in them,” Tambiah found it “disconcerting that there has 
been virtually no recruitment of Tamils into the aimed forces, and very little into 
the police force, for nearly thirty years” (1986:15) -  i.e. since ‘Sinhala Only’. The 
transformation of the military is further underlined by the adoption of Buddhist 
rituals officiated by leading monks into the military’s ceremonial practices and the 
naming of its regiments after Sinhala warrior-kings famed for defeating Tamil 
enemies. Meanwhile, excavating the powerful religious imperative behind the 
state’s search for a military solution to the Tamil demand for self-rule, 
Bartholomeusz’s study, ‘In Defense ofDharmct: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist 
Sri Lankaf notes how the Sri Lankan state government “asks its warriors to 
consider their campaigns against terrorism as religious work” (2002:36). It is also 
worth noting how, whilst conventional international analysis considers Sri 
Lanka’s war* expenditure and expansion of the armed forces, which have
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relentlessly increased as the war against Tamil militancy has progressed, as a 
dreadful drag on the country’s economic advancement, in the rationality of 
Sinhala-Buddhism, these state efforts towards defending the ultimate bastion of 
Buddhism from its (internal and external) enemies as well as the establishment of 
a permanent guard are necessary and integral to securing a better world, even 
when undertaken to the neglect of other state functions.
The changes in Sri Lanka outlined above with regards to state policies - on the 
make up the military, higher education, the official language, religion, 
international aid, ethnic demographics, and so on - have been studied in recent 
decades by academics and policy analysts and in frameworks such as 
‘discrimination’, ‘chauvinism’, ‘failure of governance’ and ‘patronage’. In other 
words, these analysts have adopted frameworks that conceptualise the 
developments outlined above as ‘failures’ of a particular ideal of governance, that 
inherent to Liberal Peace. However, this dissertation argues these developments 
can also be seen as successes from within the political rationality of Sinhala- 
Buddhism, whereby a particular ordering of population, territory and security in 
the island has been increasingly pursued. In other words, what is termed 
‘Sinhalisation’ in the literature on Sri Lanka can also be seen as 
‘govemmentalisation’ of the Sri Lankan state in terms of this particular’ 
rationality. Moreover, Sinhala-Buddhism as govermnentality has been advanced -  
deliberately and inadvertently - in different ways by the activities of myriad local 
and international actors, ranging from (Sinhala) political parties and leaders, 
individual voters, the Buddhist clergy, academics, activists insurgents (such as the 
JVP of the late eighties) and others, as well as foreign aid donors, international 
diplomats, Sri Lanka’s military allies, international NGOs and multi-lateral 
donors. This is of course not to suggest some grand conspiracy of collusion 
between foreign powers and local elites, but to argue that different actors’ pursuit 
in Sri Lanka of their own perceived interests in specific ways have enmeshed 
them in the networks of governance informed by the political rationality of 
Sinhala Buddhism.
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4.3 Tamil Freedom
The rationality of Tamil Freedom
The Tamil struggle for political emancipation in Sri Lanka has changed over the 
past sixty years in both the political objective it has pursued (from equitable 
power-sharing at the centre, to federal autonomy, to an independent state of Tamil 
Eelam) and in the modalities it has adopted (from negotiation by political elites, to 
mass protest and civil disobedience, to armed struggle). At different moments, 
what later became described as ‘national liberation5 has been rationalized through 
differing, though not exclusive, frameworks (resisting ‘state discrimination5 or 
pursuing ‘self-determination5, for example) and drawn on different legitimating 
logics (‘historical5 existence in the island's Northeast or present-day ‘Sinhala 
chauvinism5, for example). Despite the heterogeneity of claims, arguments and 
modalities adopted over decades by Tamil actors, this dissertation argues that a 
specific rationality, which it terms ‘Tamil Freedom5, has informed Tamil political 
activity since well before independence. This political rationality is to be found 
embedded in the texts, practices, problematizations, programmes that have 
emerged over that time, as well as the activities of a multitude of actors. The 
essential elements of this rationality are, as Rasaratnam (2009) has outlined, 
firstly, that the Tamils and the Sinhalese comprise distinct and equal collectives 
(‘Tamil5) and, secondly, that the Tamil collective's pursuit of progress, broadly 
defined, should be unhindered, in particular' by Sinhala domination (‘Freedom5).
Precisely what the Tamil collective is -  a ‘people5, a ‘community5, a ‘nation5, a 
‘race5, etc -  is less important in this rationality than the notion that Tamils and 
Sinhalese constitute the same type of grouping and are equal in the sense of 
collectives rather than as individuals. It is this logic that, for example, underpins 
assertions by Tamil politicians of the late nineteenth and eai'ly twentieth centuries 
that Tamils and the Sinhalese are the two ‘founding races of the island5 (Wilson 
2000:48) or by more recent Tamil leaders that “the Sinhala nation wants to 
continue the war' to subjugate the Tamil nation” (Pirapaharan 1998, see also LTTE 
undated:4, TNA 2001, 2004). In other words, what is taken-for-granted is that
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these collectives exist and, just as importantly, are equal. For example, as 
discussed in more detail below, the demands for power-sharing put forward by 
successive Tamil leaders are rooted in the notion that Tamils and Sinhalese 
compromise distinct and equally valuable collectives and that it is between these 
two wholes that power must be shared.70 It can already be seen how the notion of 
equality between collectives would render that of Tamils as a ‘minority’ and 
Sinhalese as a ‘majority’ problematic when it underpins distributions of state 
power. Tamil and Sinhala collectives in this rationality are thus political entities, 
imbued with (equivalent) rights and responsibilities. Moreover, there cannot be a 
single ‘Sri Lankan’ collective in this logic, unless it is based on equal ‘Tamil’ and 
‘Sinhala’ ones.
The basis of the ‘Tamil’ identity in this rationality is an inexact admixture of 
language, ethnicity, cultural practices, historical habitation on the island, and so 
on.71 Crucially, however, an implicit condition of membership of the Tamil 
collective is the acceptance of the equality of the Tamil collective to the Sinhala 
collective. In other words, those who deny either the existence or equal worth of 
the Tamil collective (say by accepting that Tamils have a minority status in Sri 
Lanka) are not considered part of it, even if they claim the ethnic, linguistic or 
other attributes of ‘Tamilness.’ In this way too, the Tamil identity here is an 
inherently political one (Rasaratnam 2009). Concomitantly, well being or rights of 
the collective is privileged over the individual’s. This is not to say individual 
rights are inconsistent with Tamil Freedom, but -  just as the rights of state trump 
those of individuals (in the context o f ‘national security, say) - the rights of the 
‘Tamil’ individual are subordinate to the well being of the ‘Tamil 
people/race/nation’. The homogeneity of the Tamil collective does not extend, 
however, to all aspects of ‘being Tamil’. In other words, Tamil Freedom accepts
70 These proposals including a ‘50-50’ split at the centre between Sinhalese and non-Sinhalese, and 
forms of territorial self governance in the Northeast -  federal autonomy, an independent state or, 
more recently, a Tamil-dominated ‘interim administration’.
71 Inevitably, there is disagreement as to where the boundaries of this collective are to be found. 
Religion, for example, is not integral to the Tamil identity; most Tamils are Hindu but a sizeable 
number are Catholic or Anglican. However, the island’s Muslims mostly speak Tamil but see 
themselves as a collective that is distinct from the ‘the Tamils’. At the same time, the label of 
‘Tamil-speaking people5 has been used by both communities and embodies the notion of a shared 
identity vis-a-vis the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan state.
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the existence of various differences -  class, religion, caste, region, etc - amongst 
Tamils but does not see this as contradictory to the notion of a rights-bearing
* • 79Tamil collective. "
What exactly constitutes progress in this rationality — be it modernity, economic 
prosperity, cultural achievements, social improvement, or ‘development’ -  is less 
important (and indeed has changed over time) than the sense that advancement is 
a good that should be pursued by the collective. Thus, the notion of progress or 
improvement here is akin to what Mclellan (1995:71) has called the 
Enlightenment project of modernity, the belief that man can effect material and 
moral progress through the application of reason and science. For example, the 
commitment to moral and material progress and improvement that underpinned 
the constitutional foundations of the British colonial state was taken on board by 
Tamil politicians from the late nineteenth century onwards and was used to 
increasingly frame a criticism of colonial governance (see discussion in Scott 
1999). The LTTE meanwhile argues: “ours is a national liberation struggle, a 
struggle for freedom to shape our future political destiny” (LTTE undated: 4, 
emphasis added). This second dimension of Tamil Freedom is important in the 
sense that, rather than redress for the past, what matters more in governmental 
calculations is the removal of, and safeguards against, bars to the “Tamils’” future 
progress. In this logic, a lasting peace rests more on guarantees against future 
repeats of past injustice, rather than correctives for past ‘grievances’. For 
example, just prior to independence, the past injustices of Colonial rule were less 
a source of concern and a target of Tamils’ agitation than Britain’s promulgation 
of a unitary constitution that effectively institutionalised Sinhala numerical 
superiority in Parliament and, thus, a veto over future Tamil interests (Indrakumar 
2001:227).
72 Over the past century, Tamil leaders espousing both socially progressive and regressive attitudes 
towards caste, gender, class, etc have taken up the defense o f ‘Tamil’ interests. Whilst for some 
Tamil political actors, gender and caste hierarchies were seen as a natural part of the Tamil 
collective (see comments by Ponnambalam Ramanathan in 1934 on extending the vote to lower 
castes and women cited in Russell 1982:16), Tamil activists, particularly since the 1970’s, have 
tended to see the eradication of these hierarchies as part of the collective progress and 
improvement o f the Tamil collective. The LTTE’s explicit programmes of social emancipation - -  
see ‘Socialist Tamil Eelam’ (LTTE undated) - were not, for example, in the foreground o f Tamil 
leaders pursuing ‘Tamil’ interests in the late 1800’s or early/mid 1900’s.
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Whilst the idea of the Tamil homeland has become as a foundational component 
of Tamil political thought and practice, the rationality of Tamil Freedom itself 
does not turn upon a territorial space. For example, Tamil political activities 
before independence, whilst positing the Tamils and Sinhalese as the two 
‘founding races' of the island, envisioned the entire island as a common homeland 
the governance of which would be a project shared between these races (GG 
Ponnambalam cited in Indrakumar 2001:4). The post-independence 
operationalising of the rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism through state-sponsored 
colonisation of Tamil areas and the enactment of discriminatory state politics led 
to programmatic responses in the rationality of Tamil Freedom, whereby the 
Northeast, where the majority of Tamils have resided for centuries, become 
conceptualised as a geopolitical bastion, only within which could the interests of 
the Tamil collective and the possibilities of its progress be pursued (Tambiah 
1986:80). The ‘Tamil homeland’ is thus a political technology of government 
through which the programmes of federal powersharing and, later, independence 
and statehood were pursued in response to the problems for Tamil Freedom that 
arose after independence.73
Tamil Freedom as government
Despite its inherent logic of racial superiority, colonial rule in Ceylon was 
unproblematic in one importance sense: it did not operate through a hierarchy of 
indigenous races. Instead, it constituted Tamils and Sinhalese as distinct and 
implicitly equal collectives (Scott 1999). Moreover, colonial rule adopted a light 
touch approach to governance in which Tamil literary, cultural, religious and 
social traditions (but not, of course, martial ones) continued to flourish -  even 
though conversion to Christianity was heavily, if non coercively, supported. Tamil 
leaders of the late 19th century and early 20th century also welcomed the
73 This is not to suggest there is no basis for a homeland, of course - Tamils have long 
predominated the island’s Northeast (see discussion in Winslow and Woost 2004:2006) -  but that 
the incorporation o f this ‘fact’ into the Tamil political project is a programmatic step. As Tambiah 
puts it, “the slogan of ‘traditional homelands’, whatever its objective truth, is first and foremost a 
political claim meant to ensure the security o f the Tamils [and] ... is integrally connected to Tamil 
insistence on regional autonomy” (1986:80, emphasis, insert added).
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modernising aspects of colonial rule (in terms of imports of education or 
technology, for example) as well as the opportunities for their community’s 
economic progress via trade across the island and the rest of the empire. Their 
logic was that the benefits of modernity could and should be taken up, but without 
losing the Tamil (or Sinhala) identity, that the ‘improvements’ made possible by 
Western civilization should be taken up without necessarily becoming 
Westernised (see, for example, a speech by Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan quoted 
in Vythilingaml971:477-83).
However, as independence neared, the constitutional model being envisaged by 
Britain for a future Ceylon - a Westminster Parliament-style distribution of power 
across the island i.e. representation based on individuals grouped by territorial 
space - was decidedly not the right disposition of people and things. Not only 
would this give Parliament a de-facto Sinhala majority, and thus a veto over Tamil 
interests, such an organising of political life was devoid of any political 
recognition of the Tamil collective (or, for that matter, the Sinhala one). In the 
1920s Tamils began asking for power to be balanced across the island’s 
indigenous ‘races’ (Wilson 2000:chapter 4). This notion of powersharing across 
collectives was the basis for All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) leader G.G. 
Ponnambalam’s often misquoted and mocked proposal in the mid 1930s of ‘SO­
SO’, whereby seats for the Sinhala majority (50 percent) was balanced by equal 
representation in total (50 percent) for all the minorities (Tamils, Muslims and 
Upcountry Tamils). ‘50-50’ was thus a programmatic solution, based on the tenets 
of Tamil Freedom, to the problem of possible Sinhala majoritarianism. The 
proposal was rejected out of hand by the Sinhala leaders and the British rulers. In 
the elections to the new Parliament, the Sinhalese captured 67 percent of the seats, 
a share that would increase and stay around 80 percent in later decades (Krishna 
1999:67-8). Sri Lanka’s parliament today has 225 seats of which about thirty 
represent the population of the Northeast.
The period after independence was turbulent for the island’s minorities. As noted 
above, almost a million Upcountry Tamils were promptly disenfranchised while 
state-backed Sinhala colonization of the Tamil- and Muslim- dominated Northeast 
accelerated. The problem of Sinhala colonization was quite specific in Tamil
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Freedom terms: it was not racial hostility to Sinhalese per se, but the inexorable 
weakening of Tamil political power entailed by demographic dilution of Tamil- 
majority areas when political power is parcelled territorially. Different Tamil 
leaders envisaged different ways to address this. The ACTC continued its policy 
of pursuing ‘responsive cooperation’ with ‘moderate’ Sinhalese leaders based on 
the logic of equal co-existence (Wilson 2000:79). But some Tamil politicians, led 
by S J.V. Chelvanayagam, split from the ACTC and formed the Federal Party 
(FP), advocating, as its name implied, “the demand for a Tamil majority region 
with a high degree of provincial autonomy in a federal, rather than unitary order” 
(Krishna 1999:71). The ACTC and FP thus adopted different programmes in 
response to the problematization of Sinhala colonisation. Both parties were, 
however, also committed to a united country: the FP also envisaged “maintaining 
the unity of the country while preserving the integrity of the Tamil people by the 
establishment of an autonomous Tamil State within the framework of a Federal 
Republic of Ceylon” (TULF 1976). Just like ‘50-50’ before it, federalism was a 
programmatic response in the rationality of Tamil Freedom to programmes 
(colonisation) being pursuedin the rationality of Sinhala-Buddhism.
The republican constitution in 1972 gave a pre-eminent position to Buddhism, in 
addition to the Sinhala language, and concentrated power in the Sinhala- 
dominated legislature (Goodhand 2001:31). It also presented Tamil Freedom with 
a crisis. Not only had Tamil leaders’ earlier efforts to negotiate with Sinhala 
leaders effectively come to nought, Tamils were now living under a constitution 
institutionalising a racial and religious hierarchy. The response engendered by 
Tamil Freedom was to constitutionally separate the Tamil homeland from the 
British-engineered all-island state. In May 1972, the FP, the ACTC and the 
(Upcountry Tamils’) Ceylon Workers’ Congress united to form the Tamil United 
Front (TUF). In 1975 the TUF changed its name to the Tamil United Liberation 
Front (TULF) “to indicate its explicitly secessionist aim” (Krishna 1999:76) and 
issued a clarion call for the establishment of the independent state of Tamil Eelam 
in the Northeast. This new programme of Tamil Freedom was vividly enunciated 
in the famous Vaddukoddai Resolution passed at the TULF’s first annual 
convention on May 14, 1976. Stating that the Tamils are “a nation distinct and 
apart from tire Sinhalese” the Resolution protested that Colonial power “over the
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entire country” had been “transferred to the Sinhalese nation on the basis of a 
numerical majority, thereby reducing the Tamil nation to the position of subject 
people” (TULF 1976, emphases added). In other words, quite apart from what had 
happened following independence, the British constitution itself was now held to 
have established a hierarchy between the two collectives. Setting out the 
discrimination against Tamils since 1948 and the refusal of Sinhala leaderships to 
accept even minor Tamil demands, the Resolution called for “the restoration and 
reconstitution of the Free, Sovereign, Secular, Socialist State of Tamil Eelam” 
(Ibid). Independence, the TULF said, “has become inevitable in order to safeguard 
the very existence of the Tamil nation” (Ibid).
These changes since 1972 have been described as “a momentous shift in the 
political aspirations of the Tamils, from demands for structural changes and 
constitutional reform, to an assertion of the right to self-determination” (De Silva 
1988:154-5). However, it can be seen how all these categories of ‘aspirations’ 
nonetheless sprang from the same political rationality, that of Tamil Freedom. It 
can also be seen how all these different ways of pursuing a better world in terms 
of Tamil Freedom clash with what Sinhala-Buddhism defines as ‘right 
disposition’ of people and things on the island. Following the TULF’s landslide 
victory in the 1977 elections, which it contested on the single issue of Tamil 
Eelam, it was not only held that a “mandate to create an independent Tamil state” 
had been issued, but that a “Tamil national consciousness” had emerged 
(Balasingham 2004:29, emphasis added). Given that the Vaddukoddai Resolution 
emphasised that in the new state, “caste and ... inequality of any type based on 
birth shall be totally eradicated and its observance in any foim punished by law” 
and that “Tamil Eelam shall be a secular state giving equal protection and 
assistance to all religions”, it is worth noting how citizenship was conceptualised 
in a state that was to comprise the Northeast i.e. including a majority of the 
Muslims and some Sinhalese; the Resolution declared:
“the State of Tamil Eelam shall consist of the people of 
the Northern and Eastern provinces and shall also 
ensure full and equal rights of citizenship to all Tamil 
speaking people living in any part of Ceylon and to 
Tamils of Eelam origin living in any part o f the world
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who may opt for citizenship. ... The constitution of 
Tamil Eelam shall be based on the principle of 
democratic decentralization so as to ensure the non­
domination of any religious or territorial community by 
any other section” (TULF 1976, emphases added).
Sinhalese in other parts of the island, the Resolution suggests, either would not, or 
perhaps should not, apply. It is also taken for granted that the Tamils, if not the 
Tamil-speaking people, would wish to live in Tamil Eelam. Moreover, it is also 
worth noting how the rights of the Sinhalese (minority) in Tamil Eelam were 
envisaged: “Tamil shall be the language of the State but the rights of Sinhalese 
speaking minorities in Tamil Eelam to education and transaction of business in 
their language shall be protected on a reciprocal basis with the Tamil speaking 
minorities in the Sinhala State” (TULF 1976, emphasis added). In other words, 
Tamil Freedom’s crucial notion of equality between the island’s two ‘founding 
races’ was built into not only the constitution (citizenship) of Tamil Eelam, but 
into the state’s future relationship with its Sinhala neighbour.
The problematic of ‘armed struggle’
Since the early eighties, the ‘war for national liberation’ has become the 
quintessential programme of Tamil Freedom, embodying a vision of two 
independent states -  two equal collectives -  that would allow the Tamils (and 
separately the Sinhalese) to pursue progress on their own terms, and pitting a 
Tamil military against a Sinhala one. Anti-state violence is, of course, integral to a 
‘war for national liberation’. However, unlike that of Liberal Peace, in the 
rationality of Tamil Freedom, violence is imbued with specific political and moral 
significance. To begin with, violence is a technique of both oppression and 
resistance i.e. it is a technology of governance that can be deployed in the pursuit 
of a given political rationality. For example, since independence, the island’s 
history has been “punctuated by bouts of amiihilatory violence, often called 
pogroms, directed against the Tamils in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983” 
(Krishna 1999:67) in which Sinhala political leaders, state agencies and even
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Buddhist monies participated.74 Krishna points out that these “periodic explosions 
of violence against Tamils represent efforts to put them back in their places on 
grounds they have become too assertive and need to be taught a lesson”
(1999:54). Conversely, as Herring notes, “official complicity with and 
encouragement of newly virulent ethnic forces in the pogroms reinforced 
perceptions that the state could be dealt with only through violence” (2001:165).
There are two ways in which Tamil Freedom is embodied in ‘aimed struggle’. On 
the one hand, violence is unavoidable resistance to state violence: “the Tamils 
took up arms when they were presented with no alternative other than to defend 
themselves against a savage form of genocidal oppression, when peaceful forms 
of democratic political agitations were violently repressed” (LTTE 1997:5). On 
the other hand, violence is deployed in the service of an explicitly political goal: 
as the LTTE argues, “the aimed struggle of our organisation is only a means to 
achieve our political ends. ... Therefore the LTTE gives primacy to politics and 
upholds that politics dictates the gun” (LTTE undated: 9, emphasis added). A 
liberation struggle need not proceed by aimed struggle, but in the absence of 
viable alternatives to secure freedom, recourse to aims is justifiable. As such, 
aimed struggle -  i.e. ‘conflict’ -  does not constitute an ‘exogenous’ shock to a 
peaceful status quo ante, but, in Clauswitz’s famous dictum, is the continuation, 
by other means, of politics; a politics held already to be dominated by the 
untrammelled violence of the state and Sinhalese.75
Thus, the programme of an independent Tamil Eelam, conceived of as a solution 
to the problematic of Sinhala state repression, extended into the programme of a 
war of national liberation. Firstly, although the TULF had received a thumping 
popular mandate, there was a fundamental problem: it had no practical strategy for
74 This “physical discrimination” against the Tamils, as Nithiyanandam puts it, stemmed not only 
from the use of state (military) violence against Tamils, but also that when anti-Tamil rioting took 
place, “governments in power, by and large, condoned these” (2000:300-1).
75 As the LTTE undated:8) put it, in the characteristic revolutionary idiom of the time, “Our 
commitment to political armed struggle as the form of popular mass struggle was undertaken after 
a careful and cautious appraisal o f the objective historical conditions specific to our case, with the 
fullest comprehension of the concrete situation in which the Tamil masses were presented with no 
alternative other than to resort to revolutionary resistance to advance their national cause.”
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implementing the programme of an independent Tamil Eelam.76 Yet, despite the 
context of heightening state terror and political impasse after 1977 (Gunesinghe 
1984, Krishna 1999), the notion of aimed resistance remained a step many Tamils 
hesitated to take; it was only in the wake of the horrific anti-Tamil pogrom of July 
1983 (Thornton and Niththyananthan 1984), when Tamil youth flocked to 
numerous aimed groups, some long established, some new, that an all out armed 
struggle to establish an independent Tamil Eelam began (Bose 1994, Wilson 
2000, Balasingham 2004).77 In other words, when communal violence against 
Tamils erupted in 1983, it appeared within the rationality of Tamil Freedom not as 
a breakdown of the law or eruption of Sinhala chauvinism against Tamil 
neighbours but as an organised Sinhala onslaught against the Tamil collective.78 
In this context, aimed struggle for Tamil Eelam appeared as not one of many 
options for realising Tamils’ security and progress, but the only one. The point 
here is that after the July 1983 pogrom, aimed struggle -  as opposed to civil 
disobedience or mass protest - appeared the commonsensical, if perilous, response 
to the (Sinhala) state’s conduct.
A war of national liberation is a manifestly monumental undertaking, confronted, 
as it inevitably is, by the state’s military might and international norms of 
territorial integrity and sovereignty. The war of national liberation consequently 
resulted in new problematizations and in diverse and sometimes conflicting
76 Moreover, the TULF leadership made a catastrophic mistake when they accepted the offer by 
the UNP -  which had received a phenomenal return in the 1977 polls, relegating the formerly 
ruling SLFP to just eight seats -  of becoming the official opposition in Parliament. The TULF’s 
attendant acceptance of the ‘Sinhala-first’ constitution devastated its credibility amongst its voters 
(Krishna 1999:77, see also Balasingham 2004, De Votta 2004).
77 Although in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s the existence of dozens o f militant groups were 
recorded, only five were of significance in the ensuing conflict: the LTTE, PLOTE (People’s 
Liberation Organisation o f Tamil Eelam), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation), EPRLF 
(Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front) and EROS (Eelam Revolutionary Organisation 
of Students). Notwithstanding their common stated goal of an independent state, confrontations 
with the LTTE led to the collapse of the other major groups and (in the context of the Indo-Sri 
Lanka Accord of the late eighties) their switching allegiances to the Indian and Sri Lankan armed 
forces, leaving the LTTE as the dominant Tamil liberation movement,
78 The political context in which three thousand Tamils were slaughtered in the capitol by 
organised Sinhala mobs is reflected in comments by President J. R. Jayawardene two weeks 
earlier: “I have tiled to be [an] effective [leader] for sometime but cannot. I am not worried about 
the opinion o f the Jaffna [Tamil] people now... Now, we cannot think o f them. Not about their 
lives or of them opinion about us. The more you put pressure in the north, the happier the Sinhala 
people will be here [in the south] ... really, if I starve the Tamils [in Jaffna] out, the Sinhala people 
will be happy” (Daily Telegraph 11 July 1983)
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strategies by numerous armed and unarmed actors which began pursuing ‘new’ 
goals such as the military ‘liberation’ of the Tamil homeland from Sinhala 
control, the constitution of a new state in the Northeast and the securing 
international recognition for this proposed state. These strategic goals, pursued in 
parallel, in turn inspired new sets of programmes, as an early LTTE (undated: 9) 
manifesto, Socialist Tamil Eelam, sets out: the creation of a ‘National Liberation 
movement of the people of Tamil Eelam’, “inspiring and awakening the Eelam 
National consciousness” and “organizing and uniting all freedom loving, patriotic 
sons and daughters to fight for the cause of national liberation and social 
emancipation”, and “bringing to the focus of the international community, the 
fight for self-determination of the oppressed people of Tamil Eelam”.
The Tamil Eelam state
Finally, it is worth noting how the rationality of Tamil Freedom is embedded in 
practices of the Tamil Eelam state. Stokke (2006) has closely studied the 
administrative complex developed by the LTTE over the past two decades in 
those parts of the island over which it has established control. Firstly, he notes 
how the LTTE’s state building activities “must be understood as a political 
counter-strategy of institutionalising a ground-level reality of dual state power as 
a precursor to future power-sharing arrangements with either internal or external 
self-government for northeast Sri Lanka” (Ibid: 1026, emphases added). Crossing 
the frontlines between the two controlled areas, for example, resembles a border 
crossing between two states, “with well guarded border control posts where 
travelers are required to show identity cards, goods are inspected and customs fees 
are collected” (Ibid: 1022). The Tamil Eelam administration includes revenue 
collection, police and judiciary as well as public services and economic 
development initiatives (Ibid). A central bank, managing $15m in funds, fosters 
the domestic economy (AFP 2005). Different uniforms, procedures, and 
documentation render visible the dual state powers, as do different time-zones 
(while Tamil Eelam operates in the same time-zone as India, Sri Lanka is 30 
minutes behind). In general terms, Stokke argues, the “LTTE’s state building is
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closely linked to their political project of representing the Tamil nation and 
delivering self-determination for it” (Ibid: 1026). In its practices, the state 
“has a primary focus on guaranteeing external and 
internal security in the context of protracted warfare, 
but also ... there are key state institutions geared 
towards the welfare of the civilian population and the 
economic development of Tamil Eelam” (Ibid: 1024).
Secondly, the LTTE state institutions are “rooted in and committed to the rights, 
welfare and development o f the Tamil community on whose behalf the militant 
and political struggles have been waged” (Ibid: 1024, emphasis added). Thus 
social welfare “has been given a central place in the building of the LTTE state, 
although in a subordinate role to that of maintaining external and internal security 
through military, police and judicial means” (Ibid: 1029). It is in this context that 
the liberation of Tamil territory from Sinhala sovereignty has specific nuances: 
not all Sri Lankan state apparatuses are targeted. In the LTTE’s controlled areas 
Sri Lankan state institutions related to health and education are maintained and 
encouraged (Ibid: 1031), whilst police and legal structures have been dismantled 
and replaced with Tamil Eelam ones (Ibid: 1022). Furthermore, in GoSL- 
controlled parts of the Northeast, whilst military and police are targeted during 
times of war, institutions and infrastructure related to health, education and 
welfare are not (Ibid: 1030). Neither are internationally funded development 
programmes or foreign investments in the Northeast. “Rather, LTTE has sought to 
make local state institutions work to their advantage and simultaneously develop 
additional welfare programmes” (Ibid). The focus is governing the Tamils and the 
Tamil homeland. Whilst revenue collected by the Tamil Eelam state is spent on 
governing the homeland, the Tamils are taxed to support this: apart from covering 
LTTE-controlled Vanni, the revenue regime extends into GoSL held pails of the 
Northeast, with Tamil public servants, manufacturers and service providers being 
taxed on their monthly incomes and fanners and fisherfolk on a share of their 
output (Ibid: 1034). Taxation is undertaken in parallel to development in ways 
embedding a logic of redistribution and regeneration (see discussion in O’Sullivan 
1998 and Alison 2004). After the Norwegian-led peace process began, the LTTE 
established the Planning and Development Secretariat to coordinate and oversee
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the activities in its controlled areas of myriad INGOs and UN agencies. It also 
imposed taxes on these actors’ purchases of building materials or, especially, 
“imports” from outside Tamil Eelam. Whilst these actions are typically viewed 
through the narrow lens of extraction or authoritarianism, this does not capture the 
governmental logic embedded in these practices of ‘taxation’ or ‘control’.
The point here is how the LTTE’s civil administration is informed by a particular 
governmental rationality, Tamil Freedom. On the one hand there is the 
establishment of dual state structures, setting apart governance of the Tamils and 
their homeland (the Northeast) from that of the Sinhalese and their homeland (in 
the South). On the other hand, there is the establishment of key institutions geared 
towards the welfare of the civilian population and the economic development of 
Tamil Eelam. As such, the specific forms of evolution and expansion of the 
LTTE’s security apparatus (including police and judiciary) and the Tamil Eelam 
state administration (including social welfare and economic management), can be 
seen to render real the rationality of Tamil Freedom. In others words, this is the 
‘govemmentalisation’ of the LTTE and the Tamil Eelam state in terms of this 
particular rationality.
4.4 Clash of rationalities in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s protracted and violent conflict, indeed much of politics on the island 
since late colonial rule, can be seen as a struggle to re-constitute and re-arrange 
space, identities and demographics in keeping with two different understandings 
of the ‘right disposition’ of people things; one seeing the island as the home of 
two equal ‘founding races’, the other seeing it as the motherland of a people 
entrusted with a duty to protect and foster Buddhism in which others may remain 
as guests provided they abide by this natural order. Both rationalities recognize 
Tamils and Sinhalese as historical collectives, albeit ones bearing very different 
constellations of status, rights and responsibilities. Consequently, since well 
before independence in 1948, these rationalities have confronted each other in 
territorial, legal, political, cultural, social and military spaces. The enactment of 
laws and constitutions that give Sinhalese and Buddhism ‘first and foremost’
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places are part of the right disposition of things in Sinhala-Buddhism terms, but 
constitute a crisis in Tamil Freedom terms. The Tamil aimed struggle and the 
demand for self-determination are programmatic solutions in terms of Tamil 
Freedom, but in Sinhala-Buddhism terms these represent a problem, a terrorist 
challenge that warrants, not compromise and sharing of power, but a ‘just war’ in 
defense of the redoubt of Buddhism. It is across the terrain in which these two 
govemmentalities are clashing that a third ‘external* govemmentality has 
increasingly sought to conduct conduct in terms of establishing a liberal peace on 
the island. Before a detailed examination of how exactly liberal peace was 
pursued in Sri Lanka, especially after 2002, this chapter concludes with a brief 
discussion of how the elements and assumptions o f ‘Liberal Peace* conflict and 
overlap with those o f ‘Tamil Freedom’ and ‘Sinhala-Buddhism5.
Liberal Peace considers ‘multi-ethnic* Sri Lanka as a viable arena for establishing 
a liberal democracy and market economy in the island. Elections are held for local 
and national government and Presidency, with high levels of participation, and 
there are thriving, albeit factional and polarized, media and non-governmental 
sectors. Overall social indicators - health, education, etc - are considered high. 
Moreover, despite being gripped by armed conflict for three decades, the country 
has demonstrated consistent economic growth (ADB 1999:1, World Bank 2001:1, 
2003:1) and despite the strong welfarist traditions of all post-independence 
governments, the country has since 1977 been a model economic reformer, 
complying, albeit at a slower pace than demanded, with international neo-liberal 
demands (Shastri 2004, see also ADB 1999:15, World Bank 2001:3).
Appreciation of all this has not been dulled by awareness that patronage politics, 
electoral malpractice and corruption are common (Dunham and Kelegama 1997, 
Rampton and Welikala 2005:58) or that the island’s communities are sharply 
polarized along ethnic lines that cut through electoral politics (De Votta 2004), 
media (Nadarajah 2005) and civil society (Oijuela 2003): the basic elements of a 
market democracy are held to be already in place.
By unqualifiedly holding the state’s territorial integrity (and - rhetorically, at least 
- sovereignty) inviolable, rejecting armed non-state challenges to the state as an 
anathema, shunning the sharing of power on ethnic bases, rejecting the notion of
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ethnic homelands (unless, perhaps, these are accepted as such by all within the 
state) and privileging the procedural aspects of democracy (i.e. majority rule), the 
terrain of Liberal Peace has considerable overlaps with that of Sinhala-Buddhism. 
By rejecting any ‘inherent5 superiority of one set of individuals over another, 
insisting the state must be secular and indifferent to ethnicity and that race or 
religion should not define individuals’ life chances, insisting (individuals’) 
economic, social and cultural progress should be encumbered unless these impact 
negatively on other individuals, Tamil Freedom and Liberal Peace have overlaps 
too. However, whilst Liberal Peace deems the people of Sri Lanka’s Northeast to 
be rightly aggrieved about their states of poverty and underdevelopment (but not 
to the extent to justify resort to violence), Tamil Freedom considers the Tamils not 
as simply individuals unfortunately left behind by the march of progress, but a 
collective deliberately chosen to be excluded. Beyond these largely self-evident 
aspects, however, it is in how Liberal Peace seeks to establish its vision of ‘peace’ 
in Southern warzones that the contradictions and overlaps between these three 
govemmentalities come especially to be highlighted.
Whilst both Tamil Freedom and Sinhala-Buddhism see conflict as a meaningful 
social act -as armed struggle against Sinhala state oppression or a just wax* against 
Tamil terrorism, respectively -  Liberal Peace sees it as a lamentable condition or a
70state of being characteristic of problematic Southern sites. In other words, rather 
than a strategy or project by the protagonists, ‘conflict’ here is the collective 
condition of the country that incorporates the entire gamut of violence (including, 
say, election-related violence, crime by military deserters and clashes between 
caste groups) and is at variance from liberal peace. Moreover, it is the 
responsibility of the state to maintain law and order and to protect citizens from 
each other - though it is worth noting here how, in contexts such as armed 
uprisings against state oppression, the line between the state upholding the rule of 
law and persecuting the rebellious minorities is decidedly indistinct. In Liberal 
Peace terms, conflict as a condition, notably, is apolitical. It is also a problematic
79 An important DFID study on Sri Lanka argues, for example: "although the so-called ‘ethnic 
conflict’ in the north east is spatially defined, ... militarized violence has become an island-wide 
and endemic feature o f Sri Lankan society and ... it has to be responded to in these terms” 
(Goodhand 2001:24, emphasis added).
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that includes both violence that is underway and that which could potentially erupt 
in future: with its own understandings as to why violence breaks out and the 
faultlines along which this is likely, Liberal Peace thus identifies its own range of 
potentialities which must be addressed in any process to resolve ongoing conflict. 
With poverty cited as a primary cause of conflict in the South and radicalizations 
of all sorts deemed immanent to underdevelopment, Liberal Peace sees a limitless 
range of ‘stakeholders’ who must be ‘included’ for a peace effort to be successful. 
If violence is a condition, and a single market state and democratic polity is the 
goal, then ideally every armed group, every faction, every community must 
somehow be part of the peace effort, not least lest they become ‘spoilers’ of it. 
Thus, just as Liberal Peace dismisses all non-state actors as equally illegitimate, it 
also holds all ‘armed groups’ to be equally entitled to participate in shaping 
‘peace’. In effect, the status of the main armed non-state actor is the same as the 
smallest, irrespective of their political values, popular* support or motivations.
In Sri Lanka, the armed stakeholders that Liberal Peace deems necessary to seat at 
the table include, at a minimum, the state (albeit with a special status of 
legitimacy), the LTTE and the Army-backed Tamil paramilitary groups. In Tamil 
Freedom terms, the paramilitaries are quislings working with the state oppressor 
who consequently have no claim to represent Tamil interests or to be involved in a 
bilateral dialogue between two nations. In Sinhala-Buddhism terms, however, the 
government-allied paramilitaries are the genuine representatives of the Tamils (i.e. 
they recognize the Tamils’ proper place in Sri Lanka), unlike the ‘extremist’ 
terrorists of the LTTE, and are the ‘moderates’ with whom a ‘solution’ must be 
reached. Even though the Muslims have not been involved as a distinct collective 
in Sri Lanka’s war, they are (as one of the country’s three ethnic groupings), held 
in Liberal Peace terms to require a place at the peace table to resolve ‘the 
conflict’. Tamil Freedom sees the Muslims as already represented at the table, 
whether the latter consider themselves part of the Tamil speaking people and 
residents of the Northeastern homeland or instead accept the sovereignty of the 
Sinhala-dominated state. Sinhala-Buddhism accepts the Muslims must be 
involved in any solution, provided they, as must the Tamils, ultimately accept 
their subordinate status and the primacy of the Sinhalese and Buddhism. For 
Tamil Freedom, which sees the conflict in Sri Lanka as an armed struggle for
140
national liberation from an oppressive state, the resolution of the conflict must 
take place between the Sinhala nation (represented by the state) and the Tamil 
nation (represented by the LTTE). The inclusion of other actors or communities 
outside this bilateral arrangement between collectives is a rejection of the 
fundamental basis of their grievance i.e. national oppression. For Sinhala- 
Buddhism, which does indeed reject this fundamental basis, the inclusion of all 
entities in a negotiation, whilst distasteful, is acceptable as long as the supremacy 
of the state is untrammeled, as is the first and foremost position of Buddhism,
The three rationalities, informing very different problem-definitions of Sri 
Lanka’s conflict, see very different sets of victims and aggressors. For Tamil 
Freedom, the Tamil nation is the victim of Sinhala state aggression. For Sinhala- 
Buddhism, the Tamil collective’s uprising against its subordinate status is an 
affront to the natural order of things and, thus, the state -  and indirectly Buddhism 
and the Sinhalese - are the victims. For Liberal Peace, everyone -  except the 
armed groups, the self-serving instigators of wholly unnecessary violence -  are 
victims: those who are suffering are ‘all Sri Lankans’ and ‘all communities’, 
especially ‘women’ and ‘children’. This denial of a fundamental ethno-political 
logic to the war, support for the state, and the pointed faulting of the LTTE 
overlaps neatly with Sinhala-Buddliism’s characterization of the conflict. 
Moreover, the three rationalities see very different difficulties for ensuring 
‘lasting’ peace between the island’s residents. Tamil Freedom sees recognition of 
the Tamils and Sinhalese as equal collectives and, now, of the distinct homelands 
as sine qua non. Sinhala-Buddhism sees the acceptance by all of the primacy of 
Buddhism and the Sinhala as fundamental. Liberal Peace sees recognition of the 
equal worth of all individuals and thus ‘reconciliation’ and amity - i.e. ending of 
‘polarizations’ - between all communities as essential. Liberal Peace does not seek 
the eradication of ethnic identities, but their reconstitution as subordinate to a 
shared civic identity of the ‘Sri Lankan’. Tamil Freedom requires a reconstitution 
of Sinhala (collective) identity to one that sees itself as equal to the Tamil 
(collective) one. Sinhala-Buddhism requires the reconstitution of Tamil 
(collective) identity to one that accepts its position as a ‘minority’ with a lesser 
belonging than the Sinhalese.
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It is in the above senses that three governmental rationalities - three different 
conceptions of the ‘right disposition5 of people and things, three different visions 
of what constitutes a ‘better world5 - have been clashing in the Sri Lankan space 
since well before the international ‘peace5 engagement began in 2002. Having set 
out the rationalities that were competing during the 2001-2006 international 
intervention in Sri Lanka, the rest of the dissertation examines how two of these, 
Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom, informed the conduct of various international 
and local actors during the international peace effort in Sri Lanka, and how the 
differences and overlaps between these rationalities consequently played out. In 
particular the chapters examine the production of specific objects, behaviours and 
subjects within the Sri Lankan space. They also seek to demonstrate how the 
‘realities5 visible on the terrains of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom both 
inspired and were constituted by specific practices. In other words, they examine 
problematizations -  failures of government -  and the programmes - ‘proposed 
solutions5 - that emerged in terms of these two rationalities, and how these 
programmes were consequently turned into practical efforts of government i.e. 
‘rendered technical5.
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5. Seeing Peace In Sri Lanka
In July 2006, Japan’s Special Peace Envoy to Sri Lanlca, Yasushi Akashi, 
reflected dining a press conference on the ‘lively discussion’ he had had with 
LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirapaharan when they met -  for the first and only time -  
three years earlier. Akashi said he had argued with Pirapaharan “that this conflict 
cannot be resolved if the people in Sri Lanka only looked at the past, the 
persecution and racial antagonism” (IANS 2006). “I strongly emphasized the need 
for the people, irrespective of their ethnic origins, to look at their common future 
together ... I emphasized the need to put aside their (Tamils’) obviously very 
tragic, very real experiences, but to work for the sake of their children, their 
grandchildren.” (Ibid). However, Akashi said, “[Pirapaharan] argued very strongly 
that the past history tells him that the Tamil people have to seek [the 
independence of] their homeland.” (Ibid, inserts added).
Akashi’s account of the meeting outlines a quintessential instance of the clash of 
rationalities that has characterised international engagement with Sri Lanka in the 
past decade and a half, including the Norwegian-led peace initiative o f2001- 
2006, It reflects two different conceptions of the ‘right disposition’ of people, 
places and political authority on the island i.e. what constitutes ‘peace’, how this 
peace could be secured, what were the obstacles, what were the causes and drivers 
of the conflict, what were the possibilities and risks of the future and, in short, 
what was the appropriate Tasting solution’ to the conflict. In other words, it 
reflected two different visions of how things should be ‘arranged to so as to lead 
to a suitable end’ and what these ‘suitable ends’ were for the different entities 
visible on their respective landscapes.
This chapter sets out, firstly, to outline the main objects that appeared on the 
terrains of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom and, secondly, by contrasting the 
values, interests and capacities attributed to these objects, to illustrate how this 
engendered specific points of contradiction, specific clashes between these 
governmental rationalities. It does so by examining how these are embedded in 
the statements -  including those constituting ‘speech acts’ (Austin 1962) - and
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practices by international actors on the one hand, and Tamil actors on the other. It 
is worth noting before beginning, however, that attributing a particular political 
rationality to the actions of various actors is not to deny the subject producing 
effects of discourses and disciplinary frameworks that induce conduct inconsistent 
with that rationality (see chapter 8).
5.1 Conceptualising Sri Lanka’s conflict
Whilst Liberal Peace’s conceptualisation to Southern conflicts in general has been 
discussed in Chapter 4, this section examines how Sri Lanka’s conflict 
specifically appeared on its terrain of government. The Tamil Freedom 
conceptualisation o f ‘Sri Lanka’ and its internal dynamics, including the conflict, 
was also discussed general tenns in Chapter 4, but is briefly summarised in this 
section, so as to make possible a closer comparison of the two rationalities in the 
specific context of the 2001-2006 international intervention. The final part of this 
section considers important contrasts between how specific objects appear on the 
two terrains of government, as well as the capacities, interests and values 
respectively attributed to these objects by these rationalities.
In Liberal Peace terms
For the past two decades the dominant international discourse has held Sri Lanka 
to be a multi-ethnic market democracy in the making, one admittedly some 
distance from this ideal but whose gradual steps towards fulfilling its ‘potential’ 
had been abruptly interrupted by the ‘secessionist’ violence launched by Tamil 
militants in the early eighties.80 As the US recently put it, “the decades-long 
conflict in Sri Lanka between the Government and the ... terrorist organization 
LTTE, is preventing the country from transforming into a prosperous, stable 
democracy” (US Government 2008:591).81 In societal terms, Sri Lankans are thus
80 As one senior Norwegian diplomat put it, “Sri Lanka is an unfinished state building project. The 
LTTE is part of that.” (NW01 August 16, 2006).
81 According to US Ambassador Wills (2003), “[the LTTE’s] pursuit o f an extreme, separatist 
agenda, by violent means, has cost Sri Lanka's North and East, but the rest of Sri Lanka too, 
thousands of lives and 20 years of peaceful development.”
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held to constitute a single national collective that has fractured along ethnic and/or 
religious lines due to past ethno-nationalist mobilisation, ascent to state power of 
illiberal (in economic and political terms) parties and, of course, protracted armed 
conflict. The underlying problems of the country are thus ethnicised perceptions 
of economic inequalities caused by uneven and under-development, past 
economic policies and incomplete state reform.82 These perceived inequalities had 
enabled the rise of politics of ethnic exclusion and competition and, in turn, been 
exacerbated, first by the policies implemented when parties seemed power on
O '] QA
nationalist platforms , and thereafter by a needless and destructive war. Post 
independence societal frictions and fractures had led to communal violence, 
further ethno-nationalist mobilisation and antagonisms, and eventually the 
emergence of Tamil militancy. Thereafter, over two decades of violence had 
followed, not just in the Tamil areas but also separately in the South where the 
state had viciously battled a Sinhala Marxist insurgency by the JVP in the early 
seventies and late eighties. The JVP’s rebellion, widely held to be sparked by 
economic grievances amongst Sinhala youth, is sometimes also held to be linked 
to the Tamil rebellion. These conflicts had led to the ‘militarisation' of society,
82 The World Bank’s view (2003:2) is that “incidence of poverty varies only slightly across ethnic 
groups” in Sri Lanka. The US Dept, o f State’s ‘Background Note’ on Sri Lanka says Sinhalese are 
the original inhabitants o f the island forced southwards by Tamil invaders, and adds: “Historical 
divisions continue to have an impact on Sri Lankan society and politics. From independence, the 
Tamil minority has been uneasy with the country’s unitaiy form of government and apprehensive 
that the Sinhalese majority would abuse Tamil rights. ... Those/ears were reinforced [by the 
Sinhala Only Act] -  felt by Tamils to be a denigration of their own tongue -  [it] was the first in a 
series of steps over the following decades that appeared discriminatory to Tamils” (2008, 
emphases added).
83 The UN’s 2004 Human Development Report, asserts, without citation or qualification: “Civil 
war in Sri Lanka since the early 1980s has been linked to tensions resulting from inequalities 
between the Tamil minority and Sinhalese majority. Colonial administrators had favoured the 
Tamil minority economically, but this advantage was sharply reversed once the Sinhalese gained 
power and increasingly sidelined the Tamil minority in such areas as educational opportunities, 
civil service recruitment and language policy” (2004:41, emphasis added).
84 As US Ambassador Wills (2003) put it, “we need to undo the damage caused by some two 
decades of war and terror and even more years of failed economic policies.”
85 While the LTTE’s armed struggle was waged mainly in the Northeast (and Colombo), the JVP’s 
leftwing insurgency in the south, which having being subdued in 1971, erupted anew in 1987, 
using the arrival o f Indian troops to mobilize Sinhala nationalism to challenge the rightwing, 
neoliberal UNP government of President R. Premadasa. However, the two very different conflicts 
are sometimes defined as linked. Arunatilake et al argue the JVP uprising “was not unrelated to the 
secessionist war, as it fed on a nationalist reaction among the Sinhalese to an Indian intervention in 
the ethnic conflict” (2001:1497, fii7) while the UK’s Peace Building Strategy states simply: “The 
conflict in the north and east caused the loss of over 60,000 lives. A political backlash in the south 
in 1990s (sic) claimed another 30,000 lives” (UK Government 2007:4, emphasis added).
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weakening of restraints on state violence, lack of protection for human rights and 
civil liberties, stifling and radicalisation of civil society and so on. As one DFID 
study (Goodhand 2001:24) argues,
“[apart from] the ‘hot’ war in the north east... there are 
also several other axes of violent conflict, some of 
which have become militarised (for example, the JVP 
insurgency) and others which have remained latent (for 
example grievances amongst the Hill Country Tamils).
... Therefore militarised violence has had an impact on 
Sri Lankan society in its totality. Increasingly, it has 
been argued that violence has become the main 
arbitrator of social grievance”.
Inequalities, not contradictions
Crucially, therefore, the armed violence in Sri Lanka is directly linked to the 
LTTE’s exploitation of (perceived) economic inequalities, rather than any
o/r
fundamental ethno-political or ethnic identity conflicts. Tamils’ grievances, 
though legitimate, are thus less a question of state racism than the unequal 
distribution of opportunities and access to (state and other) resources.87 In that 
regal'd also, the state’s liberalisation in the late seventies and eighties (Miller 
1990, Herring 2001, Shastri 2004) had unfortunately slowed amidst the violence 
of the LTTE (and JVP), while Sri Lanka’s potential was being held back by state 
subsidies, state-owned businesses, attendant inefficiencies, ruling party patronage,
86 Abeyaratne, for example, rejects the ‘narrow focus’ on ethnic relations, and argues instead that 
Sri Lanka’s conflict “has its roots in the post-independence development process, resulting from 
policy errors’'' (2004:1313 emphases added). Linking the LTTE’s armed struggle and the JVP’s as 
‘two major facets’ o f a single political conflict, he argues “widespread social exclusion in a 
stagnant economy ... created a fertile ground for ... political conflict... [This] was exploited and 
frustrated youth mobilised into the twin political conflict” (Ibid). Other scholars disagree with this 
denial of intentionality, but do not go so far as explicitly positing state racism (see for example, 
Goodhand 2001:34, Winslow 2004:31, Nithiyanandam 2000:294-295).
87 For example, the World Bank’s main strategy document for 2003-2007 notes that “while Sri 
Lanka has made remarkable strides in the area of human development -over the last decades, 
serious equity issues remain - i.e. equality o f opportunity and access to services. Access to and the 
quality of services in Sri Lanka differ greatly from one area to another.” (2003:17, emphases 
added; see also ADB 2003:23).
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corruption;, and so on.88 In this context, some analysts even argue Sri Lanka’s 
‘problem’ is thus less an ‘ethnic conflict’ than a ‘complex political emergency’ 
(Goodhand and Hulme 1999), and that “at the heart of Sri Lanka’s crisis is a crisis 
of the state” (Goodhand 2001:30, emphasis added) i.e. Sri Lanka’s problem is a 
question o f ‘exclusion’ of some citizens from ‘governance’ (UK Government 
2007:5-6).89
Nonetheless, Sri Lanka and ‘Sri Lankans’ are held to be resilient. For example the 
World Bank (2003:1) emphasises how, despite the conflict, the state ‘did not 
break down’ and the country had demonstrated steady economic growth,
(although well below its potential), was maintaining high literacy and had good 
social indicators. Crucially, Sri Lanka’s more recent governments were keen to 
draw on international assistance and expertise to alleviate poverty and address 
inequalities, so as to reduce tensions and bring about peace (e.g. World Bank 
1999:3). Moreover, Sri Lanka was a democracy, if an imperfect one (US 
Department of State 2008a): regular elections are held for local government, 
Parliament and the Presidency and draw large turnouts even if these are often 
marred by violence and vote rigging and the country* s parties are constituted 
along ethnic lines. Whilst the armed conflict had sprung from legitimate 
resentments and recent governments recognised the need to address Tamil 
‘grievances’, they were nonetheless now saddled with a serious terrorist challenge 
from the LTTE (e.g. World Bank 1999:3). Sri Lankan governments had tried 
unsuccessfully to pursue twin-track strategies i.e. militarily confronting the LTTE 
while attempting to devolve power to the regions, including the Tamil-majority 
ones.90 Unfortunately, however, the ability of the LTTE to sustain its armed
88 Abeyaratne argues liberalization after 1977 did not have “adequate time to neutralise the fertile 
ground for conflict created by three decades of economic stagnancy” (2004:1313).
89 The UK’s Peace Building Strategy points to “a growing body o f literature that links governance, 
development and conflict” and argues that in Sri Lanka, “there will need to be an improvement in 
the s)>stems o f democracy and governance in order to achieve a successful resolution o f the 
conflict and its causes. In turn a permanent transition to peace is more likely to sustain improved 
governance systems and will facilitate more rapid economic development and poverty reduction” 
(UK Government 2007:8, emphasis added).
90 The oft-asserted position by international actors that ‘there cannot be military solution’ is a 
reference to apolitical solution being needed for Tamil grievances as well as the military defeat of 
the LTTE - see, for example, comments by US Ambassador Robert Blake (2006). US Ambassador 
Ashley Wills (2002) stated “In the last two decades, as this conflict has arisen and been prolonged,
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‘Permanent peace’ therefore, means very different things also. Tamil Freedom 
requires the restructuring of the state in a way that strips it of its majoritarian 
ethos and the establishing of power-sharing between Tamil and Sinhala 
collectives, including recognition of a Tamil homeland in the northeast. Sinhala- 
Buddhism requires the erasing of non-Sinhala ‘homelands’, ensuring that 
particular groups have no collective claim to political power - i.e. ensuing 
(Sinhala) majority rule is the ultimate arbitrator. Sinhala-Buddhism also requires 
the centralizing of power such that state can continue its duty to foster and protect 
Buddhism against internal and external threats. Liberal Peace requires the 
establishment of a market democracy, with a power-sharing agreement that is 
“acceptable to all”. ‘Building’ peace, in the sense of a producing a shared 
understanding across all the island’s inhabitants, also entails very different things. 
Liberal Peace requires the erosion of the primacy of ethnicity in individuals’ 
interactions with each other and its replacement with a sense of civic citizenship 
and a democratic ethos (one moreover, that willingly rejects the notion of ‘ethnic 
enclaves’ as a basis for power). Tamil Freedom requires the Sinhalese to accept 
their race/people/nation and its Tamil counterpart are equally valuable. Sinhala- 
Buddhism requires the non-Sinhala minorities to accept that the island as the 
Sinhala motherland on which they are, as the legacy of late, invasive arrivals, 
guests.
Finally, ‘security’ also means different things in terms of the three rationalities. 
For Tamil Freedom it requires a permanent counter-balance to Sinhala military 
power; for Sinhala Buddhism it means the removal of all challenges to a distinctly 
Sinhala-Buddhist military; Liberal Peace requires the restoration of the state’s 
monopoly on force, constituted through a multi-ethnic and secular military. 
Similarly, the ‘right’ distribution of state power has different connotations: Tamil 
Freedom requires a sharing of power between the Tamil(-speaking) and Sinhala 
collectives such that neither can have a veto over the other’s progress; Sinhala 
Buddhism requires power to be concentrated in a unitary state and the Sinhala 
people so that the fostering and protection of Buddhism is assured, especially 
against antithetical claims from minorities; Liberal Peace requires the equitable 
distribution of power across all Sri Lankan individuals.
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campaign and governments5 ineffective efforts to destroy the organisation had led 
to the relentless and deleterious escalation of the conflict. Apart from the 
casualties, physical destruction and fraying of inter-ethnic harmony, the conflict 
had, in turn, enabled Sinhala nationalists to mobilise against power sharing 
between the centre and the regions that would benefit the Tamils. The ethnic 
‘outbidding5 amongst Sinhala parties (De Votta 2004), as well as the LTTE's 
elimination o f ‘moderate5 Tamil politicians who sought accommodation with 
Sinhala leaders, meant recent governments had been unable to establish the 
required ‘political solution5 and thereby restore peace and ethnic harmony. The 
country’s politics had thus ended up caught between ‘competing nationalisms5 
(Goodhand 2001, emphasis added), represented by extreme, but fringe, elements 
amongst Tamils (especially the LTTE) on one hand and the Sinhalese (including 
the once insurrectionist JVP, the JHU and similar groups) on the other. 
Mainstream Sri Lankan politics and society is held, however, to provide sufficient 
space for accommodation of diverse interests, including regional (rather than 
ethnic) power sharing.
Sri Lanka’s protracted armed conflict is thus a case of a democratic multi-ethnic 
state struggling to overcome its economic inequalities and unite its people in the 
face of a violent ethno-nationalist group exploiting the anger caused by some of 
those disparities to divide Sri Lankans. ‘Grievances5 were inevitable in a society 
characterised by ‘inequalities5 and would persist till these were removed, but 
violence was both unnecessary and unacceptable.91 Crucially, therefore, the 
conflict was being sustained by the LTTE - and by other vested interests, such as 
those benefiting from the ‘war economy5, including corruption in state arms 
procurement (Goodhand 2001). As US Ambassador Ashley Wills declared in a 
landmark speech delivered in 2001 to residents in Jaffna, a militarised town of 
half a million Tamils and 40,000 Sinhala soldiers,
we’ve expressed solidarity with the government of Sri Lanka as it tries to end the conflict, while 
also expressing sympathy for the Tamil people, who have had legitimate grievances about the way 
that they have been treated in this country.”
91 As Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helegesen (2002a) put it: “no peace process 
seeks to achieve a society rid o f conflict, because there is no society rid of conflict. What the 
parties to this process are seeking, is a different way of settling conflicts, namely through peaceful 
and democratic means.”
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“Sri Lanka’s various ethnic groups have lived together 
on this lovely island, mainly peacefully, for many 
centuries. All that is needed is to find a mutually 
satisfactory, contemporary political system to 
accommodate the island’s diversity” (2001, emphases 
added).
09In this revisionist reading of Sri Lanka’s recent history, the main problem today 
is the armed conflict itself which, moreover, is less a manifestation of deep-seated 
ethno-political contradictions, than a degenerative condition, one brought about 
by the LTTE and now affecting ‘the whole country5 and ‘all Sri Lankans’.93 
Indeed, in their hundreds of pages discussing Sri Lanka’s conflict and economic 
and social difficulties, many key publications on Sri Lanka by the World Bank 
between 2001-2006 do not even mention ‘Sinhala’, Tamil’ or ‘Muslim’ as ethnic 
categories, let alone examine the asymmetric distributions of political power 
between these groupings or the dynamics of ethnic violence, discrimination and 
legislation (see, for example, World Bank 2001, 2003, 2005)94. Instead, IFIs’ 
emphasis on ‘social indicators’ and developmental metrics disaggregated these 
collectives into individuals and distributed them on a map of (under)development. 
Represented thus, and stripped of ethno-political dimensions and distributions of 
power, the problem in Sri Lanka becomes one of ‘development’ stymied by 
‘armed conflict.’ With the war divorced from any political contradictions between 
ethnic communities or between the state and a particular ethnic group, the most 
vulnerable ‘groups’ in the island were not ‘Tamils’, but “women and children”
92 As compared, for example, with Tambiah 1986, 1992, Moore 1990, Bose 1994, Little 1994, 
Krishna 1999, Herring 2001, De Votta 2004.
93 US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Annitage (2002), addressing an international aid 
conference for Sri Lanka, observed: “while the needs are most critical in the North and East, there 
is no question that the entire country has paid the price of this war; and we must help bind all of 
Sri Lanka’s wounds”. US Ambassador Wills said: “of course we are aware of the deprivations 
visited on Sri Lanka’s people, notably the people of Jaffna and the Northeast, by this conflict. To 
be fair, I must also point out that this ugly war has affected tens of thousands of Sinhala families 
too” (2001, emphases added),
94 World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (2003) has an appendix, ‘The Root Causes of the 
Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka”, which details the history of Sinhala majoritarianism and ethnic 
polarisation, but the first footnote of the appendix pointedly warns: “the views and opinions 
expressed here are those of the CAS team and do not necessarily represent those of the World 
Bank or the Government of Sri Lanka.”
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(RNG 2002b)95 and “conflict-affected and displaced populations” of all ethnicities 
(World Bank 2003:11).
Moreover, it is held that before the LTTE began its violence, Sri Lanka was doing 
as well as - or even better than - might be expected of any less-developed state 
(World Bank 2001:2). An EU statement (2002) on the developing peace process 
insisted, for example: “it is therefore of utmost importance that we don’t miss this 
historic oppoitunity to finally bring back peace and prosperity to the people of Sri 
Lanka.” The EU’s unproblematic and connnonsensical use of the singular 
‘people5 in reference to the inhabitants of the island and the logic of bringing 
‘back5 peace, rejects wholesale the role of long-polarised ethnic identity in the 
island’s politics and thus reflects a common assumption in international 
calculations.96 US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Annitage, comparing his 
visits to the island in 2002 and in 1983 (the year ethnic tensions erupted into the 
worst ever anti-Tamil pogrom), observed:
“my first visit was in 1983 on the eve of a terrible and 
destructive civil war*... my return was six months into 
the ceasefire to that conflict... The change was truly 
shocking. Back then Sri Lanka was a charming, island 
nation with an educated populace, a dynamic economy, 
and strong institutions o f democracy. And now it is a 
nation stunted by war with a populace weary to the 
bones of bearing the cost of fighting, and a territory that 
is, in places, nearly as desolate as a moonscape” (2002, 
emphasis added).
In the absence of any fundamental ethno-political contradictions, the political 
extremities of the conflict are therefore held to be, respectively, the LTTE’s drive
95 Welcoming the LTTE-GoSL agreement to explore federalism (see Chapter 8), UK Foreign 
Minister Mike O’Brien (2002) said it “is important that the two sides have undertaken to address 
human rights, including the priorities and needs of women in the peace process, and the situation 
of children affected by armed conflict”
96 As US Ambassador Ashley Wills (2001) put it, “the differences between Tamils and Sinhalese 
is not that great.”
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for an independent (‘mono-ethnic’) state and Colombo governments’ commitment 
to resist this and defend the (multi-ethnic) unitary state. The LTTE’s demand for 
Tamil Eelam, not state oppression of Tamils, is thus the central political issue of 
conflict. The Sri Lankan state is meanwhile seen as reacting to the LTTE’s violent 
aggression. Even claims of a Tamil homeland on the island thus become a 
manifestation of ethno-nationalism. As US Ambassador Wills (2001) put it,
“we reject the idea of an independent Tamil state 
carved out of Sri Lankan territory ... we do not believe 
Sri Lanka, or any part of it, is the special preserve of 
anyone ethnic group; indeed, we regal'd Sri Lanka as a 
multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi­
cultural state”.97
Tamil Eelam is thus a racist conception of a ‘mono-ethnic’ state, rather than a
ORvehicle for emancipation from racist oppression. Moreover, that an independent 
state was an impractical -  and thus irrational - goal was also self-evident: the 
international community, whose recognition was sine qua non for establishing an 
independent state, had repeatedly stated their support for the territorial integrity of 
Sri Lanka. They had also called for an internal power sharing - the degree of 
which was for ‘all Sri Lankans’ to work out and agree on. It was thus held to be 
patently obvious that not only were Tamil grievances entirely addressable within a 
united, democratic Sri Lanka, but that this finality, by virtue of its reasonableness, 
was what most Tamils -  save a minority of extremists, including the LTTE -  were 
seeking.99 Moreover, the LTTE’s claim to be the ‘sole representatives of the 
Tamil people’ is, consequently, a coercive imposition on the Tamils, who are 
being denied an alternative voice by the LTTE, which had assassinated and
97 Wills (2001) went on, in terms much stronger than most international voices, to argue: “those in 
Sri Lanka who advocate separation of the state long for ethnic purity, a genetic and geographical 
impossibility. ... these ethnic hygienists, or separatists, are about the past, not the future — or at 
least not a future that we wish for our children.”
98 For example, then British Foreign minister Peter Hain observed in 2000 that the LTTE needed to 
acknowledge "a Tamil Kingdom" would not receive recognition, but the principle of self- 
determination "would be supported by the international community" (cited in TamilNet 2000).
99 US Ambassador Blake asserted in May 2008, without reference or evidence, that “over 95 
percent of [Tamils] support a solution within a framework of a united Sri Lanka” (2008, insert 
added).
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intimidated ‘moderate’ Tamil leaders and other militant groups, thereby 
marginalizing the voices of most ‘ordinary’ Tamils (see discussion in Chapter 6). 
Crucially, the LTTE’s fanatical commitment to Tamil Eelam, based on an extreme 
etlmo-nationalist projection of Sri Lanka’s problems, meant it was actually not 
possible for any government to negotiate a compromise with it. Rather, the LTTE 
had to be militarily confronted and either destroyed or sufficiently weakened (UK 
Government 2007:6, US Government 2008:592) so that it would be compelled to 
accept what most Tamils wanted (and which, if they were allowed to express their 
views, would make clear'): a restructuring of the Sri Lankan state in an 
arrangement that, while keeping the country united, would allow Tamils greater 
say in their affairs -  especially in those regions where they were the majority.
Who wants war?
Meanwhile, the armed struggle by the LTTE -  a ‘specialist in violence’
(Goodhand 2006:68) - is deepening ethnic antagonisms, holding back the very 
economic development that could alleviate these (and other latent) tensions, 
worsening the destruction and poverty across the island and, thereby, exacerbating 
the perceptions of inequality sustaining the armed conflict.100 Thus, in a vicious 
cycle, the LTTE’s violence is preventing the ‘building of peace’ (i.e. the 
attenuation of ethnic tensions and reduction of poverty) and fuelling grievances 
and, in turn, support for its extremist cause. Conversely, recent Sri Lankan 
governments had made self-evident efforts to attenuate ethnic antagonisms and 
promote ethnic harmony, share power with the regions (including where Tamils 
‘were a majority’), liberalise the economy, alleviate poverty and strengthen 
democracy (the ideal ‘conflict prophylactic’), all of which would eradicate 
societal tensions for good. These laudable efforts were meanwhile being stymied 
by the counter-efforts of the LTTE to sustain nationalist mobilisation.
Unlike the LTTE, Sri Lanka’s two major parties, the SLFP and UNP (and thus 
their governments), recognised and appreciated the needs of modem (i.e. liberal)
100 As the World Bank puts it, “The 16-year long ethnic conflict in the Northeast has taken an 
enormous toll on the country's human, financial and physical resources. It has ... deteriorated the 
ethnic harmony and social cohesion within the coimtiy” (1999:2, emphasis added).
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governance and were committed to (re)building a multi-ethnic, pluralist 
democracy.101 These parties are not majoritarian or chauvinist, but rather, 
“embrace democratic values, international nonalignment, and encouragement o f 
Sinhalese culture55 (US Department of State 2008a, emphasis added). Their 
alternating governments had thus worked closely with international donors to 
alleviate poverty and end inequalities, including in the Tamil-dominated regions 
in the Northeast (World Bank 1999a:3), and were especially responsive to the 
plight of women (World Bank 2001:9), who are amongst the most vulnerable of 
'groups5. That most poverty-alleviation efforts had been conducted in the Sinhala- 
dominated South was an unfortunate consequence of the armed conflict in the 
North and East (ADB 1999:3, World Bank 2001:9) rather than deliberate neglect 
of these largely non-Sinhala regions. Moreover, recent governments also 
recognised the problems with a centralised state, especially for properly 
functioning market economies, and had thus accepted the need to devolve some 
power to the regions, including the Tamil-dominated ones.102 They had been 
liberalising the economy and were committed to continuing this (World Bank 
2001:5,6). These governments had also tried expanding human rights protection, 
setting up monitoring bodies, passing laws and sometimes trying to prosecute 
service personnel. Above all, they had tried to work with Tamil moderates, such 
as some Tamil political parties, and had tried to come up with reasonable 
solutions (which had been rejected by the LTTE) as well as trying to hold peace 
talks (which, when successfully initiated, had later been scuttled by the LTTE).
Advocates of liberal peace held it to be self-evident in 2002, as the international 
peace initiative was beginning, that, ‘most Sri Lankans5 were ‘tired5 of war - 
Norwegian chief facilitator Vidar Helgesen asserted, for example, that ‘over 80% 
of the population wanted peace5 and that it was the responsibility of the LTTE and
101 World Bank: “The Government recognizes that peace is essential for nation-building and 
economic development” (1999:3).
502 As US Ambassador Wills (2003) noted, “Local governments likely will matter more than they 
do now. That’s the best way to protect Tamil and Sinhala and Muslim rights and, most o f all, 
individual rights. The Sri Lankan Government must do a much better job of delivering services 
and assistance. It’s way too slow and bureaucratic. ... The biggest difference in economic terms 
will be made by national and local governments' adopting the right policies. And in today's world, 
my government believes that the right policies are those that favour the private sector and 
individual initiative.” (emphasis added)
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GoSL to deliver it (2002, see also Armitage’s comments earlier). It was thus held 
to be self-evident that most Sinhalese were prepared to accommodate Tamils’ 
grievances and that most Tamils were prepared to live within a united Sri 
Lanka.103 As Armitage said of his 2002 visit,
“I saw Sri Lanka as it could be: a thriving, multifaceted 
society once again enjoying peace and enjoying 
prosperity. And it was the Sri Lankans themselves who 
showed me that vision. Because finally, finally it is a 
vision they all, Muslims and Buddhists, Christians and 
Hindus, Sinhalese and Tamils -  it is a vision that they 
can all see a way in which to share” (2002, emphasis 
added).
In short, therefore, Sri Lanka was a flawed, but resilient and improving market 
democracy, whose society had in the past been fractured along ethnic lines due to 
perceptions of economic inequalities and which was now struggling 
commendably with the effects of over two decades of confronting a terrorist 
challenge. The central logic underlying international approaches to the 2002-6 
effort to resolve Sri Lanka’s conflict was succinctly put by US Ambassador 
Jeffrey Lunstead (2007:7):
“The US clearly differentiates between an elected 
government in a society with multiple centers of power 
and channels for redress of grievances, on the one hand; 
and an authoritarian terrorist organization which 
ruthlessly suppresses dissent, on the other.”
Or, as US Under Secretary for Asia Nicholas Burns (TamilNet 2006) put it,
“We believe that the Tamil Tigers, the LTTE, is a 
terrorist group responsible for massive bloodshed in the
103 US Ambassador Ashley Wills (2001): “Among the Sinhala and the Tamils, there are ethnic 
supremacists to be sure. ... But it seems to me obvious that Sri Lanka north, south, east and west -  
is a diverse nation. ... I believe most Sri Lankans accept that this is a complex nation and that they 
also believe its people can live together peacefully.”
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country and we hold the Tamil Tigers responsible for 
much of what has gone wrong in the country.”
In Tamil Freedom terms
In contrast to the Liberal Peace conception of Sri Lanka’s conflict, Tamil 
Freedom, as elaborated in Chapter 4, saw the nature of the state, the relationships 
amongst the island’s communities and the role of armed struggle differently. To 
begin with, Sri Lanka is not seen as a ‘multi-ethnic democracy’; there may be 
multiple ethnicities on the island, but they are not equal as underlined by state 
rhetoric and practice since independence in 1948 and the self-evident distribution 
of political power which marginalizes Tamils. Instead, the Sri Lankan state is held 
to be a chauvinist, majoritarian project that has deliberately been undermining in 
multiple ways the continued existence of the Tamil nation as a cohesive entity on 
the island. Moreover, the state’s chauvinism is held to stem from an ethnic 
hierarchy endorsed by the majority of the Sinhalese people (TNA 2004:para 5). 
Various pieces of legislations embodying this supremacy, begimiing with Sinhala 
Only in 1956 and later making up the core of the country’s constitutions in 1972 
and 1977, had been implemented with broad support from the Sinhala majority. 
Over time the state bureaucracy had become dominated by Sinhalese (TNA 
2001:para 10) and the military was overwhelmingly Sinhala (Blodget 2004:54, 
Tambiah 1986:15). Meanwhile the supremacist ethos is propagated and recycled 
by the country’s education system (Oijuela 2003, Uyangoda 1998).104 The formal 
assertions of respect for other religions and languages set out in the constitution 
are contradicted by the manifest practices of government, including how Sinhala 
is the language of much state practice, even in many Tamil areas (TNA 2001 :para 
8), and how Buddhist ritual has become the norm for ceremonies of the state and
104 Orjuela notes that in Sinhala areas, “in school, children have normally been taught about a 
Sinhalese-Tamil conflict, since time immemorial, and the Tamils are portrayed as ‘filthy’ invaders, 
fought by heroic Sinhala kings” (2003:202). Professor Jayadeva Uyangoda, a political scientist at 
the University of Colombo notes how in Sri Lanka, the disciplines o f history and Sinhala literary 
studies have a “privileged position of being conscious and active agents of Sri Lanka’s post­
colonial, majoritarian nation-state. Actually, no other academic discipline in Sri Lanka has so 
successfiilly, so comprehensively, been appropriated, disciplined and colonized by the ethnic 
majoritarian state as are Sri Lankan histoiy and Sinhalese literature taught in schools and 
universities” (1998:170).
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especially of the military and the waging of war (Bartholomeusz 2002). 
Furthermore, whilst elections may be held regularly in Sri Lanka, democratic 
mechanisms and procedures enable Sinhalese, by virtue of their sheer numerical 
majority, to maintain control of Parliament and the Presidency and thereby to 
advance a majoritarian project: the ‘will of the people’ thus constituted a self- 
evident ‘tyranny of the majority’. Whilst there is bitter rivalry between the two 
main Sinhala parties, they are held to conduct politics (as does the ultra-nationalist 
JVP, the third largest Sinhala party) within a shared chauvinistic understanding of 
the rightful place of the Sinhalese at the top of a hierarchy of ethnicities (TNA 
2004:para 1). Moreover, this already powerful Sinhala grip on state power is 
being consolidated by continued state-sponsored colonisation of Tamil areas, a 
process which is radically altering demographics in these places and allowing the 
creation of new, Sinhala-dominated parliamentary seats and local government 
bodies and, in a related vein, with the attendant renaming of Tamil places with 
Sinhala ones, is seen as intended to ultimately erase the Tamil identity as 
associated with the territories of the homeland (TNA 2001:para 5).
Thus, the Tamils’ problem in Sri Lanka is state racism and ethnic oppression, not 
economic inequalities. There is certainly economic disparity, but this stems from a 
deliberate, chauvinist project of exclusion and deprivation by the state, rather than 
the vagaries of uneven or under-development stemming from policy errors (TNA 
2001:para 9). On one hand, the Sinhala-dominated state had deliberately enacted 
policies that compelled Tamils to learn Sinhala, enabling restriction on Tamils 
joining its bureaucracy (when the state was the largest employer in the island) and 
had used the logic of ‘affirmative’ action to restrict Tamils’ access to university 
education (‘standardisation’ across districts deemed by the state to be well off or 
under-developed). The state’s pursuit of particular modes of warfare - economic 
blockade and indiscriminate bombardment - in the Northeast has served to disrupt 
Tamils’ fanning, fishing and other industries. The state has also consciously 
diverted foreign investment and state developmental funding away from Tamil 
areas to the Sinhala heartland in the South - and those parts of the Northeast 
colonised by Sinhala settlers. Thus, the fundamental contradiction at the heart of 
the Sri Lankan crisis is one of institutionalised and violent state racism. The 
solution to Sri Lanka’s conflict is therefore to be found not in development
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(especially when pursued through the machinery of state) and free markets, but in 
radically restructuring the state (constitutionally and bureaucratically) and 
balancing the mechanisms of state power such that Tamil agency could be 
unfettered and Tamils’ identity and well being could be protected from Sinhala 
domination and persecution.105
In this context, firstly, the demand for an independent Tamil Eelam is not an 
irrational whim but a perfectly logical mechanism by which the Tamils could 
escape implacable and institutionalised Sinhala chauvinism and safeguard their 
physical security and collective identity as a founding race on the island. 
Moreover, decades of history demonstrate that pursuit of redress for Tamil 
grievances within a united Sri Lanka had repeatedly proven to be impossible: 
Tamils had long peacefully agitated against multiplying Sinhala supremacist 
policies since soon after independence while elected Tamil leaders had sought 
accommodation and equality, but Sinhala leaders either refused to accept their 
grievances or, having struck limited agreements, abrogated these soon afterwards 
in the face of Sinhala nationalist mobilisation (TNA 2001 :para 16), Moreover, 
racist legislation, including the ‘Buddhism first’ constitutions, and other policies 
had been repeatedly passed by Sinhala governments over the explicit and vocal 
protests of elected Tamil representatives even in the first two decades after 
independence - and a full decade before Tamil militancy appeared. Even the 
demand for Tamil Eelam, which appeared in 1976 well before the armed struggle 
proper began, had, despite the overwhelming electoral support it had received 
amongst the Tamils, not moved Sinhalese or their leaders to reconsider the terms 
of Sri Lanka’s constitutional and ethno-political makeup (TNA 2001:para 13). 
Therefore, the present aimed conflict in Sri Lanka stems from the refusal by the 
Sinhalese and their leadership to accept the validity of Tamil grievances, or 
indeed the injustice of the ethnic hierarchy on which these turn, and Sinhala 
determination to violently crush legitimate Tamil demands (TNA 2001 :para 16).
105 l t t £  (2003b): “the LTTE and [the Sri Lankan] government also hold starkly divergent views 
as to the nature of the final political solution to end Sri Lanka's protracted ethnic conflict. While 
the [GoSL] envisages piecemeal reforms to the present constitution, the LTTE has proposed a 
radical transformation of the system of governance in Sri Lanka, through the institutionalisation of 
a new, secular and equitable constitution which recognises the Tamils’ right to self-determination 
and homeland” (inserts added).
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Secondly, Tamil militant violence began as armed resistance to state violence 
(aided sometimes by Sinhalese mob violence) in the pursuit of this Sinhala 
domination. The Tamil resort to arms thus constituted self-defence against 
genocidal violence by the Sinhalese state in pursuit of the status quo, and had 
followed the proven impossibility of achieving racial (‘national’) equality by 
peaceful means (TNA 2004:para 8). Above all, the armed conflict which began in 
the eighties was not a sudden rupture of prevailing peace and ethnic harmony, but 
constituted an escalation of an ethno-political struggle over the nature of the Sri 
Lankan state, a struggle that was marked by majoritarian/state violence long 
before Tamil militants appeared. The continuation of the Tamil armed struggle 
today, moreover, stems from the adamant refusal by Sinhalese (and their leaders) 
to accept the Tamils as equals and thus to negotiate an equitable solution with 
Tamil leaders - now the LTTE (and before it, the TULF and before it, the Federal 
Party). While not all of the LTTE’s actions enjoy universal support amongst all 
Tamils, the emancipatory logic of its stated goals and actions do.106 The 
difference between some Tamils insisting on independence and others prepared to 
accept federalism, say, reflects disagreements on the viability of the latter for 
Tamil emancipation, rather than on whether such emancipation is needed in the 
first place. As such, the basis of the LTTE’s leadership of the Tamil political 
project is its commitment to the principles of Tamil nationhood, homeland and 
self-determination, on the one hand, and its ability to compel the Sri Lankan state
107to take seriously Tamil grievances, on the other (TNA 2004:paras 9,10). Sri 
Lanka’s conflict is thus not an instance of a multi-ethnic democracy fending off a 
terrorist challenge, but of a violently oppressive state seeking to militarily crush 
legitimate Tamil rebellion against its chauvinist authority.
106 Analyzing the Indian military intervention in support of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Bose 
(2002:650) notes that by the late eighties, the Tamil Tigers “despite brutal propensities, were 
regarded as heroic resistance fighters by a large proportion of the Tamil population.”
107 TNA Manifesto (2004) also asserts: “The state of affairs [is] that all the efforts taken by the 
successive Sinhala chauvinist governments to defeat the armed campaign for Tamil Nation’s 
freedom and thereby crush the political aspirations of the Tamil people having ended in failure, 
and in the context of the reality being accepted and emphasized by the international community 
that the solution to the Tamil National problem cannot be settled by force of arms but only 
politically, the basis was laid for political negotiations with the help of the international 
community.”
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Contrasting terrains of government
It can be seen from the above that the Sri Lankan state, the island’s different 
ethnic groupings, the conflict, the LTTE, and so on, appear on the respective 
terrains of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom as very different kinds of objects, 
bearing very different characteristics, capacities, potentialities and interests.
Before examining the problematizations that informed the conduct of international 
and local (Tamil) actors during the Norwegian-led international peace effort of 
2001-2006, it is worth summarizing specific contrasts between these two different 
conceptualizations of the present and ‘better worlds’. To reiterate, these 
differences must be considered against the background of Sinhala-Buddhism, the 
political rationality that has informed the conduct of the Sri Lankan state and 
Sinhala polity since independence in 1948, for example how the international 
community’s refusal to accept the notion of a Tamil homeland on the island, its 
oft-asserted support for the country’s territorial integrity, its hostility to the 
LTTE’s armed struggle, and so on, overlap neatly with the tenets of Sinhala- 
Buddhism.
Who are the Tamils?
Liberal Peace sees the Tamils as a minority in a multi-ethnic country - along with 
the Muslims, Upcountry Tamils, and Burghers; a minority whose economic 
grievances and political aspirations could be well served by the establishment in 
Sri Lanka of a properly functioning liberal democracy with a market economy, in 
which all citizens are rendered equal. However, Tamil Freedom sees the Tamils as 
a rights-bearing collective, one which is equal to its Sinhala counterpart and 
whose fundamental problem is not economic inequality, but violent persecution 
by a racist state. Thus, whilst Liberal Peace posits the Tamils as a marginalized 
minority community requiring economic upliftment and full integration into the 
citizenry of the Sri Lankan state, Tamil Freedom sees the Tamils as an ancient, 
cultured people and one of the island’s ‘founding races’ which requires protection 
from Sinhala domination via the unitary state. Whilst Liberal Peace sees Sri
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Lanka today as a flawed but vibrant democracy gradually embracing liberal and 
neoliberal principles, Tamil Freedom sees it as implacable ethnocracy gradually 
cementing Sinhala domination over other communities. Liberal Peace recognizes 
the existence of Sinhala nationalism, which is deemed as equally pernicious as the 
Tamil nationalism with its advocacy of an exclusivist Tamil state in the Northeast, 
but posits these sentiments to be the preserve of an extreme few (the JVP, JHU, et 
al on the one hand and the LTTE on the other). Tamil Freedom does not consider 
the demand for Eelam as necessarily exclusivist and considers Sinhala nationalism 
as a mainstream logic within the Sinhala polity, with the JVP, JHU et al merely its 
most shrill advocates (TNA 2004:para l) .108 To put it another way, in 2002, whilst 
Liberal Peace was confronted with the effects of a quarter century of armed 
conflict, Tamil Freedom was faced with the continuation of six decades of Sinhala 
oppression.
Whilst Liberal Peace rejects the idea of homelands within Sri Lanka - other than a 
single multi-ethnic homeland spanning the entirety of the market democracy 
state’s territory, Tamil Freedom sees the Tamils as a nation with as valid a historic 
claim to the island’s Northeast -  just as it holds the Sinhala nation to have a 
legitimate claim to the island’s South. Liberal Peace sees the North and East (in 
contrast to Tamil Freedom, which sees the Northeast) as having suffered 
widespread destruction as a consequence of this being the locality of the LTTE’s 
violent resistance to the state’s efforts to restore law and order. Tamil Freedom 
sees the devastation in the Northeast as part of the racist logic of a state which 
readily adopts scorched earth policies and uses heavy weapons against villages 
and towns precisely because the population is Tamil and not Sinhala. Liberal 
Peace sees the North and East (especially those parts occupied by the LTTE) as 
having fallen behind the rest of the country as a result of the conflict, and 
therefore needing to be reintegrated (World Bank 1999a:2) with the rest of the 
country. Tamil Freedom sees the Northeast as having been ravaged by the state’s 
violent efforts to crush Tamil demands and thus needing to be protected from 
Sinhala encroachment, domination and violence and the Tamil homeland needing
108 Shastri points out how, in the 1990s, the main Sinhala political parties, increasingly cognizant 
of international opinions, were becoming “careful how they expressed themselves on the ethnic 
issue” (2004:88).
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to be demarcated (in some constitutional form) from the rest of the island. As 
such, in Tamil Freedom terms, the territory under LTTE control and 
administration in the Northeast are welcome spaces where the writ of the Sinhala 
state and military did not run. The LTTE’s civil administration, now amounting to 
a de-facto state (Stokke 2006), was a positive development, both politically (as a 
form of parity between the Tamil and Sinhalese nations) and practically (as 
governed spaces where Sinhala chauvinism did not hold and also where social 
justice issues were increasingly being addressed). In Liberal Peace terms, 
however, the LTTE-controlled areas are an anathema, representing the emergence 
of a ‘mono-ethnic’ space in which the autocratic and violent LTTE’s diktat ran 
and whose residents were cut off from the Sri Lankan state’s legitimate provisions 
as well as the political and economic life of the rest of the country.109
Does ethnicity matter?
Liberal Peace considers the ideal of a future Sri Lanka to be a united, “multi­
ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual, multi-cultural state” (Wills 2001) i.e. one in 
which ethnicity is not a factor in state decision-making, except in ways agreeable 
to ‘all Sri Lankans’, and in which the entire island is the homeland of everyone. 
The problem with the present unitary state is thus one of concentration of power 
and centralisation of political decision-making (UK Government 2007:5, see also 
Goodhand 2001). In Tamil Freedom terms, the ideal future state is one in which 
equality between the Sinhala and Tamil collectives (nation/ race/ people/ 
community/ etc) is irrevocably enshrined, including recognition of the Tamil and 
Sinhala homelands in the Northeast and South respectively, thereby preventing 
the disaggregating of the Tamil collective and effacing of its identity. The 
problem with the present state is one of institutionalised racism as well as
109 A senior Norwegian diplomat described the LTTE civil administration as a "dictatorial semi­
state in the Northeast” (NW01 June 1, 2006). US Ambassador Wills (2003) asked: “we are not 
blind to the faults of the Colombo Government. But what is the LTTE's economic ideology? Is it 
going to try to control everything? Is it hoping to pursue autarkic policies that isolate the North 
and East from the rest o f Sri Lanka? ... Or is it going to accept that the best way to help the Tamil 
people is to connect them to the rest of Sri Lanka and let their phenomenal talents find expression 
and wealth in a richer, wider context.” A major multi-donor funded study in 2005 observed of the 
devastated warzones: “the North-East had been shielded for more than two decades from the 
effects of liberalization and structural adjustment” (Goodhand et al 2005:86).
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concentration of power and centralisation of political decision-making which 
allows this racism to have force. In Liberal Peace terms, the present state is unable 
to progress further towards the ideal of a modem state (a liberal democracy with a 
market democracy), because of the debilitating aimed conflict with the LTTE. In 
Tamil Freedom terms, the LTTE's aimed struggle has stalled Sinhala hegemonic 
ambitions, which cannot be countered or contained by economic liberalization or 
by tinkering with Sri Lanka'a present constitution and electoral processes. Rather, 
the state, if it must remain united, has to be radically transformed; stripped of its 
majoritarian ethos and have both foimal recognition of the equality of peoples as 
well as safeguards against the return of Sinhala-dominance enshrined in its 
foundations.
In Liberal Peace terms, the demand for an independent Tamil Eelam is an ethno- 
nationalist ambition of the LTTE and its supporters, an ‘extreme’ goal which the 
majority of Tamils eschew. In Tamil Freedom terms, independence is one obvious 
way to ensure the Tamil collective’s existential need for political, economic, 
cultural and physical security from the Sinhala-dominated state and one which the 
majority of Tamils support, if not aspire to. However, i f  the Sinhalese and their 
leaders would recognise the equality of the Tamil and Sinhala collectives and 
agree to irreversibly rebuild the state in these terms, then a single united state 
would be just as satisfactory. A federal solution, for example, that recognised the 
Tamil homeland in the northeast and shared power, including security 
arrangements, in such a way that Sinhala rule could not be (re)imposed, would 
serve the same objectives as an independent Tamil Eelam - the question is 
whether such a radical transformation is possible. Conversely, a federal solution 
or, indeed, any other power sharing arrangement, must be established between the 
Tamil and Sinhala collectives and on the basis of a single Tamil political territory. 
In other words, the territorial unit of power sharing is crucial for Tamil Freedom: 
it must be the Tamil homeland in the island’s Northeast. In Liberal Peace terms, 
the redrawing of the state along federal lines constituted a move towards giving 
Tamil regions (though not Tamils per se) -  as well as other areas - a measure of
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self-rule while also allowing for the construction of pluralist polities within a 
single, united state.110
Liberation or chauvinism?
The Liberal Peace sees the LTTE as a violent, autocratic armed group pursuing an 
illiberal ethno-nationalist project and intolerant of Tamil dissent against this goal. 
The LTTE’s fanatical commitment to a mono-ethnic ‘separate’ state and brutal 
violence is held to have frayed the foundations of the democratic state (US 
Government 2008:593) while its killing and intimidation of moderate Tamil 
political voices have narrowed the space for compromise solutions to be sought. 
The LTTE’s military defeat and/or disarming and demobilization are thus sine 
qua non for a permanent peace. In Tamil Freedom terms the LTTE, though 
ruthless and brutal, is indubitably a vital defender of Tamil interests vis-a-vis the 
Sinhala state and its disarming and disbanding must be conditional on permanent 
security arrangements that would protect Tamils from Sinhala dominance and 
violence, especially through the apparatus of state (TNA 2004, see results in 
Social Indicator (2004) poll regarding conditions disarming of the LTTE). The 
LTTE differs from some other Tamil actors in that it is skeptical that the Sinhalese 
(leaders) will accept reshaping of the Sri Lankan state in such ways and is thus 
committed to an independent Tamil Eelam as the only viable way for the Tamil 
collective to progress. However, the LTTE’s demand for Tamil Eelam does not in
110 The assertion by liberal peace advocates that ‘most Tamils’ either ‘don’t want Eelam’ or ‘want 
a federal solution’ - for example, see comments by US Ambassador Blake (2008), cannot 
therefore be made without these fundamental qualifications. A key ambiguity about a federal 
solution was differing perceptions about what the federal entities would consist o f -  even how 
many there would be within the country -  and what powers they would have. The assumption 
amongst many Tamils (expressed in interviews with Tamil parliamentarians and LTTE officials) 
was that the Oslo Declaration envisaged a union of two federal states i.e. in the Northeast province 
and the rest o f the island respectively. By contrast, Liberal Peace emphasizes the relations amongst 
Sri Lankans, rather than territorial specificities. As US Ambassador Wills (2003) put it: “the 
outlines of a settlement have been pretty clear for years, at least since the mid-90's. Some sort of 
devolution of power that gives Sri Lanka's North and East - merged or not - considerable 
autonomy is in order. Call it internal self-determination if you like. Call it federalism if  you like. 
But Sri Lanka should remain united. And be diverse and democratic” (emphasis added). When 
asked how many sub-state entities were appropriate for the island, a senior official with a 
European government’s development agency (INT03 August 17, 2006) confidently replied: “ten.” 
In any case, this matter was, in Liberal Peace terms, held to be one for negotiation; the Forum of 
Federations (2003), brought into advise the LTTE and GoSL during the negotiations, circulated a 
concept note in early 2002, asking them to consider questions such as: how many federal entities 
should there be, and where would their borders be situated?
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itself constitute principled opposition to solutions short of independence per se, 
but the result of this skepticism amid its commitment to the Thimpu principles -  
Tamil nationhood, Tamil homeland and Tamil self-determination. The LTTE has 
targeted Tamils that have collaborated with the Sinhala hegemonic project, 
especially the Sinhala armed forces. Meanwhile, it is the LTTE’s aimed struggle 
that has compelled the Sinhala state to engage with Tamil grievances and 
‘internationalized’ the Tamils’ struggle against oppression. As such, the LTTE, 
though authoritarian in its governance of controlled areas and intolerant of Tamils 
who oppose it, is the only actor that can ensure Tamil grievances are dealt with by 
the Sri Lankan state and the international community such that Tamil aspirations 
are met (Bose 1994, TNA 2004).
In summary, Liberal Peace considers Sri Lanka’s present ethnic tensions to be a 
consequence of perceptions of economic inequalities, mobilization by ‘conflict 
entrepreneurs’ such as the LTTE, inadequate state responses, and animosities 
deepened by violence. The obstacle to progress is thus the aimed conflict itself 
and the way to lasting peace is to encourage and foster inter-ethnic dialogue and 
peaceful interaction along with individually equitable distribution of resources or 
public goods, including decentralising the state and devolving power to the 
regions. In contrast, Tamil Freedom considers ethnic tensions as a consequence of 
majoritarian control of and pursuit of a supremacist agenda through the state and 
the way forward is thus to end Sinhala hegemonic control of the state and ensure 
against its return by institutionalising equality between ethnic collectives, 
including recognition of two distinct homelands on the island. The obstacle to 
such progress, moreover, is Sinhala dominance of the state itself. As such, that 
Sinhala leaders had even entertained the notion of Tamil ‘grievances’ in recent 
years was a direct consequence of the state’s inability to crush the LTTE. Thus it 
was conflict -i.e. the LTTE’s aimed struggle - that had opened up the space for 
Tamil grievances and demands to be taken seriously. The way to lasting peace 
now was through a radical restructuring of the Sri Lankan state, through 
negotiations between Sinhala leaders and the LTTE, such that the Tamil and 
Sinhala collectives were accorded equal standing and rights.
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5.2 Problematizing peace: what is needed
The section examines international ‘peace’ engagement in Sri Lanka in terms of 
the different ‘realities’ that were confronted by Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom 
in 2002. It thus considers the different problematizations (‘deficiencies’ or 
Tacks’) of government that emerged within each of these rationalities in relation 
to what they deemed their respective ‘ideal’ for a future Sri Lanka and for ending 
the war. As such the section is concerned with the calculations behind the 
disparate actions of Tamil and international actors in the context of the 2002 
Norwegian initiative, such as: What needs to be done in the service of ‘peace’? 
What are the constraints and opportunities? What are the useful and problematic 
actors visible on these terrains? What were their responsibilities -  how are they to 
conduct themselves with regards to their ‘suitable ends’? How should they be 
encouraged or dissuaded from their likely conduct?
In Liberal Peace terms
Proponents of liberal peace were confronted in Sri Lanka with a number of 
serious obstacles in 2002. Although the Ceasefire Agreement (RNG 2002a) -  
henceforth CFA - had been negotiated and signed, the possibility of a resumption 
of the war was ever-present.111 Although the guns had been silent for two months, 
the truce was held to be ‘fragile’: the heavily armed protagonists were still poised 
across frontlines where these existed and, even more dangerously, were loosely 
separated elsewhere. Apart from ethnic animosities stirred up by the conflict, 
vested interests in continuing the violence remained. The fanatical LTTE had 
paused its armed campaign, perhaps in light of the unfolding ‘Global War on 
Terror’, but for how long? The lengthy war and, especially, the recent string of 
crippling defeats had substantially weakened the Sri Lankan military, thereby 
posing a risk of further violence from the LTTE. Moreover, there was hostility to 
the CFA and peace process from powerful actors -  including sections of the 
military, President Chandrika Kumaratunga and her recently defeated hardline
111 The full text of the CFA is included in the Appendices.
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SLFP and the Sinhala nationalist JVP. Then there were the stakeholders in the war 
economy. Quite apart from this latent danger, the consequences of protracted 
armed conflict were everywhere. Almost a million ‘Sri Lankans5 had been 
displaced by the fighting (rather than, as Tamil Freedom saw it, by state 
aggression against Tamils). Much of the infrastructure in the North and East had 
been destroyed, including roads, bridges, schools, hospitals and large numbers of 
houses. The rule of law and authority of the state had collapsed in many parts of 
the country -  not least in the swathes of territory now dominated by the Tigers in 
the North and East. The economy in the North and East had disintegrated while 
other parts of the country, including Colombo, had also been badly ‘affected5: 
‘investor confidence5 had collapsed and the cost-of-living was unbearable for 
most. Serious developmental shortfalls were to be found all across the country, 
especially in the Tamil-dominated North and multi-ethnic East, fuelling 
simmering anger and breeding new discontent along ethnic and other local 
faultlines. Although these regions were especially affected, the conflict had 
deepened poverty and ethnic hostility across the island.
On the other hand, there were many positive developments too. The LTTE had -  
at least for now -  stopped its violence (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of reasons 
attributed by international actors to the LTTE's cessation of its aimed struggle).
Sri Lankans of all ethnicities had voted into government, albeit just barely, a ‘pro­
peace5 coalition. The UNP was ideologically committed to market economics -  
privatisation, trade liberalisation, etc -  and to reducing the role of government. It 
was also eagerly seeking international cooperation in achieving the reforms 
required to revive the island's economy and, especially, to free the economy from 
the constraints (subsidies, regulation, and so on) that the citizens of the 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka had become used to. The ceasefire -  
should it hold -  would enable rehabilitation and developmental projects in the 
war-devastated North and East, including those parts seized by the LTTE and to 
bind these devastated areas and their residents back to the rest of the country and 
citizenry. The end to aimed confrontations would, with some time, also permit the 
restoring, first outside the war-zones and later, hopefully, within these too, of 
human rights protection, media freedom, rule of law and other goods which had 
increasingly collapsed during the conflict. Importantly, an end to violence would
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also open up space for inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation, both within lived 
communities and between ethnic communities at the national level: the violence- 
free space that moderates on all sides needed would gradually open up -  provided, 
once again, the ceasefire held and paramilitary or extra-judicial violence could be 
checked. With time, Sri Lankans from one part of the island would be able to 
travel to other areas and inter-regional trade would resume and expand, all of 
which would boost ethnic amity.
Thus, among the key problematizations that Liberal Peace confronted in Sri Lanka 
in early 2002 were: (1) the risk of a resumption of armed struggle by the LTTE,
(2) the militarised, socially fractured and ethnically riven condition of Sri Lankan 
society, (3) the highly centralised Sri Lankan state and its poor governance 
practices, characterised by human rights violations, patronage, corruption, and so 
on, (4) an economy characterised by subsidies, state industries and regulation and 
far from the ideal of free markets, and (5) unevenly and inequitably developed 
regions, with wealth concentrated in Colombo and the Western province and the 
war-tom North and East lagging especially far behind.
As Li (2007:7) points out, the identification of problems is intimately linked to the 
availability of solutions. Implementing solutions requires the active creating of the 
possibilities for, and eliciting of, specific desirable behaviours from individuals, 
groups and organizations, so as to ensure movement (‘transition’) towards suitable 
ends for people and things. The Sri Lankan state needed to be restructured and 
decentralized thus enabling local communities to better shape the conditions of 
their governance. The island’s economy needed to be restructured by cutting state 
subsidies, ending corruption and patronage, and so on. Amongst the urgently 
required changes were improving discipline in the military, restoring the rule of 
law, protecting human rights and ending impunity for abuses, allowing the free 
movement of people and goods -  all, of course, needing to be done without 
compromising ‘security’ vis-a-vis the LTTE. Space needed to be opened up for 
‘ordinary Sri Lankans’ of different ethnicities and religions to trade, travel, debate 
and otherwise interact with each other: Tamils, Sinhalese, Muslims and others 
needed (once again) to come to see each other as equally valuable members of a 
shared national community and thus to abandon exclusivist identities and cease
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being needlessly fearful of others. In short, the identity of the Sri Lankan citizen 
shared by all before the armed conflict -  and still cherished by most - had to be 
restored.
As such, civil society needed to be strengthened, bolstered and supported to 
facilitate the non-violent working out of the numerous conflicts within Sri Lankan 
society along either existing faultlines, and not just ethnic ones, or those likely to 
open up in future. The country’s vibrant media, riven by ethnic partisanship and 
parti cularist interests, had to be allowed the space, without intimidation and 
violence, to freely articulate ideas and facilitate debate 011 the country’s crucial 
issues. Political parties needed to be able to freely express their values and 
policies -  even unpalatable ones -  to all Sri Lankans, allowing the country’s 
strong democratic mechanisms to make clear the will of the peace-loving 
majority, thereby marginalizing fringe and extreme views from power. Tamil 
political parties, for example, should be able to take up moderate positions on 
power sharing and seek popular endorsement of these through elections. Armed 
groups like the LTTE and other paramilitaries needed to be constrained and 
prevented from using violence to thwart these processes in the short term and in 
the longer term, needed to be disarmed and disbanded or possibly transformed 
into political parties or civil society actors. There were and would continue to be 
grievances amongst all communities, but peaceful ways of resolving and 
addressing these had to be nurtured: society had to be demilitarized and violence 
prevented from being ‘the final arbitrator of social grievance’ (Goodhand 
2001:24), The state’s security and judicial structures needed to extend the 
protection of the law to all Sri Lankans without discrimination. Private enterprise 
needed to be fostered, encouraged and supported, while reliance on state subsidies 
and patronage networks needed to be ended. The Muslims, the island’s third 
largest ethnic community, needed to be supported in particular; located in both the 
North and East amongst the Tamils and in the South, amongst the Sinhalese, the 
Muslims had also been alienated from the state and, especially, been persecuted 
by the LTTE. There was thus a real risk they too would become radicalized and 
resort to violence. The peace process and any solution therefore needed to 
pointedly accommodate the Muslims and their demands as much as those of the 
Sinhalese and Tamils. A solution needed to be acceptable to ‘all Sri Lankans’.
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Crucially, with the liberal peace springing from all good things coming together, 
these disparate elements had to be pursued simultaneously and achieved at the 
earliest and as such, international actors needed to actively provide support for 
these myriad transformations in terms of funding, expertise, and other forms of 
facilitation.
In Tamil Freedom terms
In 2002, by contrast, those seeking Tamil liberation were confronted with very 
different challenges to those faced by those pursuing liberal peace in Sri Lanka. 
The Sinhala-dominated military and its genocidal war against the Tamils had been 
stopped, at least for now; but it had been a close-run thing. Moreover, the military 
as a whole remained vehemently opposed to the terms of the CFA, as were 
powerful sections of the Sinhala polity, including President (and Commander-In- 
Chief) Kumaratunga and the hardline SLFP and JVP - which notably had drawn 
most of the Sinhala vote in 2001. Past truces had rarely lasted more than a few 
months. The Tamil homeland had been devastated by seven more years of high 
intensity war as well as the harsh decades-long government embargo. The 
reconstruction of these devastated Tamil areas depended, moreover, on the very 
Sinhala governments responsible for the destruction, as international donors were 
insistent their funding must go through the sovereign state. Meanwhile, many 
more thousands of Tamils had been killed or wounded in the most intense seven 
years of the island’s war. There were tens of thousands of widows now in charge 
of their households. Scores of thousands of children were malnourished because 
of the embargo, large numbers of schools, places of worship, and villages had 
been destroyed. Over 800,000 Tamils were internally displaced and hundreds of 
thousands more refugees abroad. Large swathes of the Northeast, encompassing 
thousands of villages (some 30,000 homes), along with schools and places of 
worship, had been occupied by the Sinhala military and turned into ‘High Security 
Zones’. Meanwhile, the international community was clearly non-committal on 
Tamil self-determination, openly opposed to an independent Tamil Eelam and 
actively hostile to the LTTE -  the UK and US, in particular, had recently joined 
India in banning the LTTE, despite the manifest oppression of the Tamils by the
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Sinhala-dominated state. Indeed, the international community, especially the 
Western states leading the peace effort, were actively supporting the Sinhala state 
and insisting, despite advocacy by Tamil parties and parliamentarians and 
numerous Diaspora organisations, that most Tamils wanted to live within a united
— i.e. Sinhala-dominated - Sri Lanka.
On the other hand, there were many positive aspects also. The once apparently 
finished LTTE had been able to stop the Sinhala armed forces’ onslaught, push 
them back and destroy Colombo’s offensive capability, thereby compelling the 
state to sue for peace, even accepting international third-party involvement in 
what it had hitherto insisted was an ‘internal’ matter. For the first time the LTTE- 
GoSL ceasefire was being monitored by international observers, thereby lessening 
the chances of the GoSL unilaterally resuming the war once its forces were 
rebuilt; indeed, it was international pressure that had forced President 
Kumaratunga and the military to begrudgingly accept the UNP’s signing of the 
CFA. Though also a Sinhala right-wing party, albeit one less vocal than the JVP et 
al, the UNP’s nationalist tendencies were suppressed for now. Moreover, the UNP 
had also negotiated the CFA with the LTTE, which in turn had endorsed the party 
before the polls, and the party had also committed to an interim administration for 
the Northeast (the Tamil homeland). The possibility the UNP, faced with the 
heavy cost of pursuing military victory over the LTTE, might genuinely seek a 
solution was thus very real. Furthermore, the international community had 
become actively involved in a peace process in Sri Lanka despite the opposition 
of the Sinhala nationalist forces. Despite denouncing the LTTE as terrorists, 
international governments accepted the need for Sri Lanka to negotiate with them
-  unlike al-Qaeda, which was under attack in Afghanistan by a powerful coalition 
led by the US and UK. Meanwhile, the LTTE’s civil administration had expanded 
into those parts of the Northeast it had liberated from Sinhala rule and was 
providing rule of law and rudimentary welfare. The four largest Tamil parties had 
formed themselves into a united front to contest elections and advocate Tamil 
interests, and the Sri Lankan military’s poll disruptions had not been enough to 
prevent the TNA from seeming a dozen Parliamentary seats.
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Thus, amongst the key problematizations that Tamil Freedom confronted in post- 
CFA Sri Lanka were: (1) the risk of the Sri Lankan state resuming its military 
campaign, (2) the utter devastation of the infrastructure and economy in the Tamil 
homeland, (3) the impossibility of articulating a cohesive Tamil political stand, 
related on the one hand to the effects of war such as the displacement of one in 
four Tamils and, on the other, the absence of a robust Tamil political vehicle 
partly due to rivalries amongst the major Tamil political actors, and (4) 
international scepticism of the Tamils’ desire for self-govemance, especially 
independence, and hostility to the main Tamil actor, the LTTE.
These problematizations inevitably implied different solutions and the eliciting of 
different behaviours to those sought by Liberal Peace. The oppressive presence of 
large numbers of Sinhala soldiers in Tamil areas had to be reduced so that people 
could resume their livelihoods and restore life in their communities without fear 
of arrest, abduction, torture or extra-judicial killings. Occupied homes, schools 
and places of worship had to be returned to Tamil civilians’ use. Indeed, many 
schools, hospitals and other buildings in Tamil areas, where the war had mainly 
been fought, needed to be rebuilt. International aid had to be secured for this and 
the Sri Lankan state precluded from undermining or thwarting these urgent needs. 
The LTTE had to ensure the war did not resume, while also securing the 
protection of Tamils from the state aimed forces (including the release of tens of 
thousands of Tamils arbitrarily detained without charge, for example) and 
pursuing Tamil political aspirations: only the aimed LTTE and international 
pressure could secure such concessions for the Tamils from the state. The LTTE 
had to secure these Tamil interests through its participation in the peace process. 
The international community needed to be made aware of the genuine plight of 
Tamils in Sri Lanka and their desire for self-rule, even independence, so that it 
would cease its support of the Sinhala-dominated state. International pressure had 
compelled the state to pursue a peace process with the LTTE, on account of the 
latter’s military robustness, and further international pressure was needed to 
ensure the state would withdraw its military from civilian places to allow 
resettlement, allow internationally-funded reconstruction to take place, cease mass 
arrests of Tamils, and so on. Above all, international pressure was required to 
ensure the state negotiated sincerely with the LTTE. A permanent solution that
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afforded the Tamils, as a founding people of the island, adequate self-rule, free of 
Sinhala domination, needed to be secured in the longer term. However, the 
priority was ending the humanitarian crisis in the Tamil homeland, so that the 
Tamil people could participate - within the same existential conditions as the 
Sinhalese - in shaping these long term goals. Tamils had to set aside regional, 
caste and other differences, and unite behind these goals, which they had to make 
clear was not the preserve of the LTTE, but of the Tamils as a whole. Those 
Tamils collaborating with the Sri Lankan state and aimed forces, especially the 
paramilitary-cum-political parlies, needed to desist or be constrained in the 
interests of the wider community, especially at this crucial time when the 
international community had actively involved itself in the creation of a lasting 
peace; the LTTE needed to provide the space for these Tamils to rejoin the fold. 
Tamils also had to join hands with the (Tamil-speaking) Muslims in the Northeast 
to jointly pursue these short-term and longer-term goals against the Sinhala state. 
Despite acrimony and violence between Tamils and Muslims and the latter’s 
participation in the state’s repression of Tamils (McGilvray 1997, 2001), as 
another non-Sinhala minority in Sri Lanka, Muslims have similar' concerns against 
Sinhala domination (TNA 2004:para 18).
5.3 Same road to different ‘better worlds’
In 2002, two contradictory idealist projects - to reconstitute a harmonious, multi­
ethnic Sri Lanka on one hand and to unite and liberate the Tamil nation on the 
other -  came to be pursued simultaneously through the Norwegian-led peace 
process (see discussion in Chapter 7). Within both rationalities, notably, the peace 
negotiations had come about because of the LTTE having fought the Sri Lankan 
military to a standstill. However, in Liberal Peace terms, this was an unfortunate 
eventuality while in Tamil Freedom terms, the blunting of Sinhala militarism was 
instrumental in creating the space for peace. Consequently, the negotiation 
process between the LTTE and GoSL was itself conceptualized as having 
different relationships to the island’s populations. Liberal Peace posited Sri 
Lanka’s citizens, eager to live peacefully together, as standing apart from the talks 
and demanding of the GoSL and LTTE that they reach a negotiated peace that
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would end the war and allow their country to resume the economic and social 
progress needlessly interrupted by the protracted conflict; for example, the official 
Norwegian statement after the first round of direct talks held both sides to be 
“responding to the overwhelming call of the peoples of Sri Lanka to bring an end 
to the conflict and create the conditions for a lasting peace, prosperity and human 
rights” (RNG 2002c), Thus it is wai\ held to be naturally reviled by all Sri 
Lankans of any ethnicity, along with the lack of development (prosperity), which 
becomes the unifying referent problem. In this regal'd, the GoSL was also striving 
to avoid renewed war and only the LTTE and its nationalist supporters -  as well 
as hardliners amongst the Sinhalese -  were prepared to return to violence in 
pursuit of their extreme goals. Tamil Freedom, on the other hand, holds the 
Tamils to be expecting the LTTE, through its negotiations with the GoSL, to 
advance the securing of their freedom from Sinhala dominance (TNA 2004:para 
18.10). The referent element unifying Tamils is Sinhala oppression, represented 
by the state, the Sinhala parties that had held power, those espousing Sinhala 
dominance -  such as the powerful Buddhist clergy - and so on. Moreover, the 
LTTE and GoSL may do the actual negotiating, but the purpose of the peace 
process is to resolve the contradictions between the Tamil people and the Sinhala 
people (LTTE 2003f, TNA 2004para 18.10).
Government involves the ordering of activities and processes, but as outlined 
above, in 2002 the rationalities of Tamil Freedom and Liberal Peace engendered 
very different orderings as both constituting and, separately, making possible a 
peaceful Sri Lanka. At the heart of the contradictions was the individual Tamil: 
was she a member of a persecuted and threatened nation or a citizen who was 
excluded from the benefits of development and whose rights were not being 
upheld by the state? While amid this clash of rationalities, these could both be 
simultaneously ‘true’, the programmatic solutions that spring forth from these two 
conceptions are nonetheless different and divergent. To govern therefore is both to 
transform reality into a domain of thought (thus making it governable) and to 
translate these thoughts into the domain of reality (in order to shape and normalise 
conduct), a circular process in which the thought and practice of governance are 
inextricably linked (Salskov-Iversen et al 2000:191-2). Having set out two of the 
governmental visions that collided during the Norwegian-led peace process of
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2001-2006, it is to the practicalities of governance, the ‘rendering technical5 of 
governmental programs, that the dissertation now turns.
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6. Making Peace in Sri Lanka
Just as problematizations emerge when the ideal is measured against the real and 
the latter found wanting, programmes emerge when those seeking to configure 
specific locales and relations in ways thought desirable (i.e. to make the real 
match the ideal) put forward various designs - ‘solutions’ -  to this end (see Rose 
and Miller 1992:181). The relation between problematizations and programmes is 
thus not one of derivation or determination, but one of translation: programmes 
are not merely formulations of wishes or intentions; rather, they are efforts which, 
laying claim to a certain knowledge of a problem to be addressed, seek to exercise 
calculated power over it (Ibid: 181-2). No political rationality, moreover, simply 
“enables the unfolding of a central plan” (Ibid: 193)
This chapter considers the ways in which solutions to the problematizations 
identified in Sri Lanka in 2002 were subsequently pursued during the Norwegian 
peace process i.e. how efforts were made to close the gap between the ideal and 
the real. The below is not a comprehensive examination of the peace process, but 
a discussion of some of the more prominent sites of engagement between 
international and Tamil actors. This is not to say that all international actors or all 
Tamil actors acted in concert or pursued exactly the same goals. Indeed, amongst 
the various states, NGOs, IFIs and others, there were manifest disagreements and 
contradictions - as well as collaboration and mutual reinforcement - on how the 
different aspects of liberal peace were to be secured. Similarly, there were 
disagreements and contradictions between various efforts by Tamil actors -  the 
LTTE, the Tamil parties, NGOs, media, and so on - in how the aspirations, rights 
and different aspects of the well being of the Tamils should now be secured. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the world of programmes that flows from a 
particular rationality is often “heterogenous and rivalrous” (Miller and Rose 
1990:10). For example, some international actors believed the LTTE should be 
transformed into a non-military actor by coercing it to disarm and become a 
political party (Armitage 2003a). However, others thought the LTTE’s 
demilitarisation should be elicited by allowing it to participate as a partner of the 
GoSL in development of the Northeast and thereby to acquire new bases for its
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‘legitimacy’ amongst the Tamils other than its military standing vis-a-vis the 
government forces (NW01 August 16, 2006). Both bring forth different kinds of 
difficulties and avoid others, but what is taken for granted here is that the LTTE 
must come to function without arms. Similarly, while Tamil actors did not 
necessarily or always act in concert or unity, their calculations and actions were 
nonetheless informed by shared tenets of Tamil Freedom. For example, in 2002, 
some political parties within the TNA coalition and other Tamils, thought self- 
determination should be pursued through a federal model, especially given the 
international community’s strong support for this -  and its manifest hostility to an 
independent Tamil Eelam. However other members of the TNA, the LTTE and 
other Tamils, were sceptical federalism could lead to a permanent peace, not least 
given the Sinhala polity’s history of abrogating power-sharing agreements with 
Tamil leaders, and thus they advocated pursuing outright independence. What is 
taken for granted here is that the final political solution, whatever its form, must 
safeguard the Tamil collective and its self-governance and progress from further 
Sinhala domination.
As noted in Chapter 5, the Norwegian-led negotiation process between the LTTE 
and the GoSL was expected to serve different and even contradictory purposes 
within the rationalities of Tamil Freedom and Liberal Peace respectively. Quite 
apart from different conceptions of what would constitute an appropriate ‘final’ 
solution to Sri Lanka’s conflict, the two rationalities engendered very different 
short-term objectives and priorities for the negotiations. In Tamil Freedom terms, 
restoring the existential conditions of the Tamil collective to parity with that of 
the Sinhala collective -  i.e. normalisation in Tamil Freedom terms - was a pre­
requisite for meaningful negotiations between (representatives of) the two 
collectives on the future political arrangements of the island. The concern, 
therefore, was primarily with addressing the severe humanitarian crisis in the 
Northeast i.e. with ensuring the speedy resettlement of hundreds of thousands of 
Tamils, alleviating the economic hardships and ensuring the Sri Lankan state 
could not neglect or block the recovery and future development of the Tamil 
homeland (LTTE 2003d). Liberal Peace, on the other hand, was concerned with 
establishing across Sri Lanka, as early as possible, the requisite conditions for 
enabling ethnic reconciliation, intra-regional trade and travel, and ‘peace­
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building’ more generally to begin so that ethnic enmities could be attenuated and 
abolished. Such enabling conditions included protection of human rights, the rule 
of law, media freedom, and so on. Liberal Peace was also concerned with 
resuming, across the country, the processes of development and economic 
recovery. Above all, peacebuilding required the certainty of the contours of a 
permanent solution to be established so as to set the political and constitutional 
framework within which mechanisms for the provision of individual freedom, 
reconciliation, justice, governance, development and so on - normalisation in
• • 119Liberal Peace terms - could, in turn, be pursued. The LTTE-GoSL negotiation 
process was thus operationalised within Tamil Freedom and Liberal Peace in 
importantly different, even contradictory, ways.
The focus of this chapter is how programmes to address the problematizations 
engendered by Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom respectively came to collide in 
different ways when put into practice (i.e. rendered technical) during the 
Norwegian peace process. While the first section below sets out an overview of 
the developments from 2002 to 2006 of salience to the main issues analysed in 
this chapter, the next two sections examine aspects of the negotiation process and 
related issues in the background of the talks that reflected this clash of 
rationalities. The second section considers (i) how the peace process was to be 
‘sustained’, (ii) the appropriate agenda for the talks and (iii) the outcomes and 
efficacy of the negotiation process. The third section examines (i) the 
humanitarian crisis in the Northeast and (ii) violations of the ceasefire agreement. 
The next chapter, meanwhile, considers efforts by Liberal Peace to constitute a 
harmonious Sri Lankan society (i.e. to ‘transform society’ and ‘build peace’), on 
the one hand, and those by Tamil Freedom to constitute a Tamil political (as 
opposed to merely ethno-social) category (i.e. ‘unite the Tamil nation’), on the 
other.
112 The Berghof Foundation observed of the breakdown of the negotiations: “perhaps most 
disappointing [was] the various parties’ failure to develop any vision of a common, united effort 
by all communities to settle the conflict. In the absence o f such a vision the ‘peace process ’ 
became a journey towards an unknoMm, undefined destination” (2008:17, emphasis added). US 
Deputy Secretary of State Annitage (2003c) argued at the Tokyo donor conference: “1 believe it is 
time for the parties to delineate and agree to a shared vision, not only of where they want to end 
up, with a federal structure based on internal self-determination, but also of interim steps that will 
cany them in that direction and will lead the country to that destination.”
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6.1 Overview of 2001-2006 peace process
The Norwegian led peace initiative in Sri Lanka proceeded, importantly, against a 
specific backdrop: a deep-seated and wide-ranging humanitarian crisis in the 
Northeast. The crisis comprised several dimensions, amongst the most important 
of which were the continued displaced status of hundreds of thousands of people, 
the widespread destruction of much of the civil infrastructure and residential areas 
and continued military restrictions on fishing and fanning -  key livelihoods in 
Tamil areas. The inability of displaced people to return were linked directly, 
moreover, to the enclosure by the Sri Lankan aimed forces of large swathes of 
now de-populated residential and fanning lands into militarised enclaves, termed 
the High Security Zones (HSZs). These areas had been occupied in successive Sri 
Lankan offensives since the eighties and nineties - with concomitant waves of 
mass displacement. This was especially so in the government-controlled Jaffna 
peninsula, 30% of which was enclosed in HSZs. Moreover, the Sinhala military 
had used heavy weaponry indiscriminately in the Northeast and predominantly in 
Tamil areas, which had also been under a draconian government embargo for 
decades (Paust 1997). The consequences of these were especially acute in LTTE- 
controlled areas, especially the Vanni region (in the north) and in the sprawling 
hinterland of the Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts (in the east). Meanwhile, the 
Sri Lankan military’s long-standing ban on fishermen going to sea and farmers 
cultivating land in many areas had steadily impoverished tens of thousands of 
Tamil families in the Northeast. The CFA obligated the lifting of these 
restrictions, but frequently local military commanders refused to do so or 
arbitrarily reimposed them. Thus, whilst the CFA had ended further destruction 
and removed risk of further death or injury, an urgent widespread need to resettle, 
rebuild and revive livelihoods remained.
Thus, following the cessation of hostilities, addressing the various elements of the 
humanitarian crisis was a key priority for the Northeastern Tamils, almost all of 
who were affected in one way or another. However, the main obstacles to doing 
so were matters under the control of the Sri Lankan state. On one hand, the
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staggering amount of funding required for the reconstruction of destroyed 
villages, schools, roads, etc was unavailable to the Northeast, especially those 
areas under LTTE control: international donors were only prepared to transfer 
their funds to the Sri Lankan treasury or perhaps to NGOs, whose limited 
operations were also subject to government permission. It is in this context, for 
example, that during the negotiations the LTTE insisted on an ‘independent5 
channel for funding for the Northeast (a notion resisted by GoSL and, notably, the 
Norwegian facilitators also). It was agreed that the World Bank would become 
trustee of an account, the North East Rehabilition Fund (NERF), but the vehicle 
did not attract donor money and no rules of disbursement were arrived at -  in 
short, it was moribund: donor assistance went instead to the Sri Lankan state. On 
the other hand, the Sri Lankan military was refusing to implement the terms of the 
CFA. This non-compliance had more than one resonance in Tamil calculations. 
Apart from the hardships being endured by the Tamils because of the military’s 
intransigence, this blatant defiance of the CFA appeared as one more instance of 
Sinhala leaders signing an agreement with Tamils and then abrogating it at a more 
convenient moment (TNA 2004:paras 4, 12). Both practically and symbolically, 
therefore, the troops5 vacating the HSZs was a foremost Tamil concern.113
The humanitarian crisis was a central problematic in the peace process from the 
outset. Even the CFA, apart from formally recognizing the presence on the island 
of two separate controlled zones dominated by two separate military formations 
and codifying terms for their separation from each other, crucially also set out 
‘Measures to restore normalcy5 (Article 2). These obligations to improve civilian 
life in the Northeast included the lifting of GoSL restrictions on fishing and 
farming and a time-table for the withdrawal of Sri Lankan forces from occupied 
Tamil civilian spaces. The CFA also obliged the GoSL to open the A9 highway 
that linked the Jaffna peninsula with the south and traversed the LTTE-held Vanni 
region. The GoSL was also obliged to disarm Anny-backed Tamil paramilitary
113 Sri Lankan military occupation of Tamil areas was, for example, a central demand in the TNA 
Manifesto (2004:para 18.4): “The high security zones and armed forces camps which are located 
in areas populated by Tamils disregarding their welfare ,.. should be removed and arrangements 
made for the Tamil people to return and settle in their places o f residence. ... The armed forces5 
interdiction and oppression imposed must be lifted comprehensively to enable the Tamil people to 
cany on the activities needed for their livelihood and to move freely in their homeland.”
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groups and either disband them or incorporate them into the military. Unlike any 
previous truce in Sri Lanka, the CFA (in Article 3) also authorized an 
international body, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), to supervise the 
parties’ adherence to the CFA’s terms.
From September 2002 to March 2003 the LTTE and GoSL held six rounds of 
direct talks chaired by Norwegian facilitators (see Appendix 1 for institutional 
architecture of the peace process and negotiations). Initially the talks were 
scheduled to take a step-by-step approach, beginning with establishing an interim 
administration for addressing the humanitarian crisis in the Northeast. However, 
the interim structure was soon displaced from the talks’ agenda and replaced with 
discussions on the framework of a longer-term solution (with federalism coming 
to the fore), while discussions on humanitarian matters gave way to those on 
human/gender/child rights protection mechanisms. A short-lived agreement on 
both sides ‘jointly’ soliciting international funding for reconstruction of the 
Northeast led in November 2002 to LTTE and GoSL delegations sitting on either 
side of the Norwegian delegation as it chaired the first of three aid conferences 
(held in Oslo) to raise “urgently needed” humanitarian assistance for Sri Lanka’s 
Northeastern warzones. A mere $70m was pledged by donors ($30m from 
Norway), in contrast to the staggering $4.5bn pledged six months later, primarily 
for the whole country’s economic development (RNG 2002b, JMOFA 2003). In 
December, the LTTE and GoSL sides agreed to ‘explore’ federalism as a solution 
to the conflict -  an announcement soon dubbed the ‘Oslo Declaration’. The 
(misplaced) euphoria triggered by this (misconstrued) ‘agreement’ also proved 
short-lived. In January 2003, the military’s emphatic refusal to vacate Tamil 
villages and farmland came to be taken up in negotiations again, but were again 
soon were replaced with human rights-related matters and aspects of federalism.
In February, the negotiation agenda came to comprise a ‘Human Rights Charter’ 
(see Martin 2003) and the LTTE’s recruitment of under-18s. In March 2003, the 
Sri Lanka Navy attacked and sank an LTTE cargo vessel in international waters 
200 miles from Sri Lanka’s east coast, saying it was transporting aims. 
Nonetheless, the sixth round of talks went ahead a week later, centred again on the 
Human Rights Charter and the aspects of a federal solution. In April 2003 the 
second international aid conference was held in Washington, precluding the
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LTTE, banned in the US, from attending. A week later, the LTTE ‘temporarily’ 
suspended its participation in direct talks, protesting its ‘deliberate’ exclusion 
from the Washington meeting as well as Sri Lanka’s continuing non­
implementation of agreements on humanitarian issues reached in earlier rounds.
In June 2003, the third international aid conference was held in Tokyo. The 
LTTE, despite pleas and pressure from international actors, boycotted the event. 
Nonetheless, the 70 bilateral and multi-lateral donors who attended pledged 
US$4,5bn for Sri Lanka’s development and reconstruction. The conference’s 
landmark resolution -  labelled the ‘Tokyo Declaration’ (JMOFA 2003) -  
demanded both sides work out a federal solution at the earliest. Crucially, it also 
made only the - relatively small - portion of aid earmarked for the Northeast 
conditional on ‘progress’ in the peace process (Ibid:paras 11,12). The document 
also set out interim milestones for both sides to reach on the road to a federal 
solution and warned that the international community would monitor progress on 
these. A second LTTE vessel was sunk in international waters a few days after the 
Tokyo conference.
Declaring itself as not bound by the Tokyo Declaration, the LTTE called instead 
for fresh talks on establishing an interim administration for the Northeast, one 
capable of addressing the humanitarian crisis. Rejecting as inadequate proposals 
for an ‘Apex Council’ for developmental issues put forward by the GoSL, the 
LTTE said it would produce its own conception of an administrative structure. In 
mid 2003, the LTTE drafted proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority 
(ISGA), compiled by constitutional and other experts drawn from the Tamil 
Diaspora. The ISGA proposals were submitted to GoSL at the end of October 
2003. The UNP seemed prepared to resume negotiations. However, days later 
President Kumaratunga used her executive powers to seize three ministries from 
UNP government, plunging the country into uncertainty as to who was actually 
running it. The Tack of clarity’ prompted Norway to withdraw its peace 
facilitation -  though other forms of international engagement, including financial 
and military assistance, continued. After months of political deadlock and 
uncertainty, elections followed in April 2004, in which the hardline SLFP-led 
coalition defeated the ‘pro-peace’ UNP government. The TNA, endorsing the 
LTTE’s ISGA proposals in its manifesto, swept the Northeast, winning 22 seats.
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With a new government in place, Norway resumed shuttle diplomacy. However, 
negotiations on political issues never resumed (the two rounds in 2006 only 
discussed the by now fast disintegrating CFA). Following the devastating 
December 2004 tsunami, which killed over 30,000 people in the North, East and 
South, the LTTE and GoSL, under international pressure, successfully negotiated 
a joint aid-disbursing mechanism, the Post Tsunami Operational Management 
Structure (see EU 2005a, 2005b). However, the agreement was successfully 
challenged in the Supreme Court by Sinhala nationalists and never implemented. 
Despite the stalling of the negotiations and the lack of an aid-sharing mechanism, 
much international aid was disbursed, mainly to the island’s South, with aid 
pledged for the North-East being held back (Burke and Mulakala 2005:19). In 
November 2005, the SLFP’s Mahinda Rajapakse was elected successor to 
Kumaratunga, defeating UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe.114 The simmering 
‘shadow war5 between LTTE and GoSL intelligence services which re-emerged in 
mid 2003 escalated rapidly and all-out hostilities resumed in mid 2006, shortly 
after Canada and the European Union proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist 
organisation (the LTTE retaliated to the EU proscriptions by asking EU nationals 
with the Nordic-staffed SLMM to leave the Northeast). In January 2008, the 
Rajapakse government formally abrogated the CFA, dismantling the SLMM. The 
was no international protest or condemnation.
6.2 Struggles at the table 
Keeping the talks going
The shift by the international community from backing the Sri Lankan state’s 
military destruction of the LTTE to insisting in 2001 that Colombo sign a 
ceasefire and hold peace talks with the organisation is less a u-tum than it might 
first appeal-. With ongoing violence held to be the primary obstacle to the
114 This outcome was blamed by the furious international community, which had openly backed 
Wickremesinghe, on the LTTE: unlike the Parliamentary elections o f2001 and 2004 when the 
LTTE had tacitly endorsed the UNP, the LTTE called for and enforced a Tamil boycott of the 
Presidential polls in 2005, saying the outcome of what was largely a contest between the two 
Sinhala leaders was ‘irrelevant’ to the Tamils.
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processes of building peace in Sri Lanka, the first priority in Liberal Peace terms 
was stopping the armed conflict and ensuring against its resumption, something 
either the military destruction of the LTTE or a robust ceasefire and peace process
1 1 c
that eventually led to the LTTE’s disarmament could achieve. However by late 
2001 the Sri Lankan military was demonstrably unable to destroy the LTTE and, 
moreover, its efforts to do so were further fraying the foundations of liberal peace 
(Burke and Mulakala 2005:15). The urgency to stop the violence led to a change 
in the international approach to peace in Sri Lanka, beginning with intense 
Norwegian efforts to bring about the CFA.116 This urgency also led to tolerance 
for the LTTE’s insistence on some aspects of the CFA deemed problematic for the 
future peace process -  though, as discussed below, it was in the implementation 
(and thus the interpretation) of the CFA’s terms that practical contradictions 
between Tamil Freedom and Liberal Peace emerged. The international 
community, led by the US, UK and EU, were strong backers of the CFA, hailing 
it when it was signed and repeatedly endorsed it -  until 2007, when international 
emphasis returned again to the imposition of a military solution.117
An important question, however, was why had the LTTE entered into the 
ceasefire and negotiation process in the first place? The international discourse on 
Sri Lanka held that the intransigent, militarist LTTE had reluctantly done so due 
to external and/or local compulsions i.e. the need to escape the unfolding ‘Global 
War- on Terror’ and/or to buy time to rearm, regroup and recruit ahead of another 
phase of its armed struggle.118 (Subsequently, as the truce held, an alternative
115 Robert Rotberg (1999:15) has suggested, for example, that “the war in Sri Lanka can be ended 
either by brilliant generalship or by consummate diplomacy”. The productive effects of 
reconstituting the LTTE in international discourse from a violent, intransigent, terrorist group to a 
‘partner in peace’ (if only temporarily, from 2001 to 2006) are discussed in Chapter 7.
116 In important ways, Norway was a co-drafter o f the CFA, rather than simply providing good 
offices for the LTTE and GoSL. The CFA thus represents the first key step of the international 
peace intervention. Interviews with senior Norwegian official (NW01 June 1, 2006) and senior 
LTTE official (LT03 May 10,2006)
117 Conversely, the UNP government was denounced by the other Sinhala parties as well as 
President - and Commander-in-Chief - Kumaratunga for ‘betraying the country’ by signing an 
agreement with the terrorist LTTE.
118 Neither charge is irrefutable. If fear of the consequences of the ‘Global War on Terror’ was the 
LTTE’s motivation, this should have remained subsequently as GWOT expanded and international 
engagement in Sri Lanka extended, and is at odds with the LTTE’s subsequent actions, including 
quitting the talks in April 2003 and resuming (undeclared) hostilities against GoSL in 2005.
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explanation was that the LTTE was now pursuing economic and other benefits 
through the peace process.) Concomitantly, it was taken for granted that the 
(UNP) GoSL, despite its understandable loathing of the LTTE, was sincerely 
committed to a peaceful resolution of the aimed conflict.119 What is important 
here is not the ‘truth5 or otherwise of these doubts or claims, but how the tenets of 
Liberal Peace and the conduct (speech acts and practices) of international actors 
defined the LTTE as a cynical and reluctant participant in the peace process, and 
how these calculations informed much international analysis, rhetoric and action 
vis-a-vis the peace process. There is a specific implication of seeing the LTTE as 
an unwilling participant: if the peace process was to be sustained, the LTTE 
would somehow have to be ‘kept5 at the table. Given the LTTE’s ‘essentially 
military’ nature (Wills 2001), this meant deterring it from returning to armed 
struggle. This was not only because the LTTE was held to have a proclivity for 
violence but also because, as the peace progressed towards its intended and 
widely desired end (the construction of a liberal state and polity in a united Sri 
Lanka) the LTTE was held to be likely to respond to the thwarting of its 
‘separatist agenda5 by resorting to violence.120
It was on this basis that the peace process in Sri Lanka came to be characterised
by the heavy use of international sanctions, conditionalities and incentives to 
* • 121‘keep it going5. The logic of intervening in a peace process through such tools 
is that one or more of the parties -  in this case the LTTE - is participating 
reluctantly or half-heartedly and thus needed to be kept ‘on track.5 Moreover, the 
mix of coercion and incentives and its distribution is driven primarily by the
Meanwhile, a peace process provides the state’s armed forces also with space to rearm, regroup 
and recruit. Moreover, during times of peace the LTTE is no longer able to rely on capturing 
government arsenals for replenishing its own and was increasingly reliant on difficult ocean supply 
lines. Unsurprisingly, following the CFA, the Sri Lankan economy, boosted by increased 
international assistance, quickly bounced back while the aimed forces, also with substantial 
foreign assistance, rearmed, retrained and expanded (see Blodgett 2004).
119 As a senior Norwegian diplomat (NW01 August 16, 2006) unambiguously put it, “the GoSL 
was eager to come to talks, [but] we were trying to convince the LTTE. The GoSL was sincere.”
120 A senior Norwegian diplomat put it thus: “put the Tigers into a comer, they will do what their 
culture tells them to do: ‘get the guns, get the camions, let’s go blasting’.” (NW03 June 2,2006  
emphasis added).
121 See Conciliation Resources (2008) for an empirically wide-ranging discussion of these 
techniques in conflict resolution efforts across the world, including Sri Lanka.
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senders’ perceptions and assumptions of the protagonists. In Sri Lanka, keeping 
talks going meant militarily deterring the LTTE from resuming its armed struggle, 
constraining the organisation’s ability to mobilize and accumulate resources for 
this puipose and, to a lesser extent, offering likely inducements, such as access to 
international aid for its controlled areas.122 Among other elements, practical 
international ‘support’ for the negotiation process therefore included threats of 
further proscriptions of the LTTE,123 making international aid for Tamil areas 
conditional on ‘progress towards peace’ (i.e. on LTTE compromises) as well as 
support for ‘joint’ initiatives by the two sides on humanitarian efforts, though, as 
discussed later, ‘joint’ did not mean equitable). Most importantly, ‘sustaining the 
peace process’ translated into robust and swift international assistance for 
rearming and reconstituting the exhausted Sri Lankan military.124 As US 
Ambassador Jeffrey Lunstead, Ambassador Wills’ successor, later explained, ‘‘as 
part of its strategy for promoting the peace process, the US began to strengthen its 
military relationship with the Government of Sri Lanka” (2007:17, emphasis 
added. See also US Government 2008:592). The collective efforts to deter the 
LTTE came to be euphemistically referred to in Sri Lanka as the ‘international 
safety net’.125
122 Chapter 7 considers how such international practices comprised a disciplinary framework that 
elicited specific behaviours from the LTTE, including attempts at demonstrating ‘flexibility’ and 
‘moderation’.
123 An EU or Canadian ban was often threatened by Western diplomats between 2003 and 2006 
when they met with LTTE officials to demand compliance with international demands, including 
the LTTE’s return to the negotiation table. (LT01 June 20, 2006 and LT02 November 7, 2006).
124 In the first year of the peace process, the Navy (SLN) and Air Force (SLAF) both doubled in 
size while the Army expanded by 30% (Blodgett 2004). The Army tripled its artillery and doubled 
its battle tank strength while the Ah' Force acquired several more helicopter gunships (Ibid). The 
US donated a former Coast Guard vessel for deep sea monitoring of LTTE ships. The SLAF 
acquired from a US supplier a sophisticated aircraft capable of intelligence gathering and 
command-and-control, along with Israel-built unmanned drones. The unmistakable signal to actors 
in Sri Lanka was that the international community stood with Sri Lanka against the LTTE and that 
the hard-power of the GWOT was not far away.
125 US Ambassador Lunstead acknowledges that “these activities may well have contributed to a 
feeling by the LTTE that the international community was hemming them in and reducing their 
options” (Lunstead 2007:18). This, however, was the stated intention of international actions. 
Former Sri Lankan minister and negotiator Milinda Moragoda described to press in 2005 how, in 
his view, the government had “enmeshed the LTTE’s armed struggle in ‘an international safety 
net’ and thereby prevented a return to war” (TamilNet 2005g). LTTE Chief Negotiator Anton 
Balasingham, argued, meanwhile: “unfortunately the excessive involvement o f international actors 
and their own strategic interests and power projections, began to affect the balance o f power 
relations between the parties to the conflict. [The government’s] grand plan of an ‘international
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While threatened sanctions to deter renewed LTTE aggression constitute a 
framework of discipline in the service of Liberal Peace, it is also in this regard 
that two instances of a quintessential act of sovereign power occurred. On March 
10, 2003, days before the sixth round of negotiations, the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) 
intercepted an LTTE-owned merchant vessel around 200 nautical miles from the 
island’s coastline — well inside international waters. As international monitors, 
who had been informed by GoSL, and shortly afterwards by the LTTE, were 
basing a resolution with both sides, the Navy opened fire and sank the LTTE 
vessel, killing eleven crewmen. Again, on June 14,2003, a few days after the 
Tokyo conference, which the LTTE had refused despite international pressure to 
attend, the SLN intercepted and sank another LTTE-owned merchant vessel 100 
nautical miles off the coast (the LTTE said twelve crewmen who jumped 
overboard were arrested by the SLN, which the Navy denied). Notably, in both 
instances, the LTTE was accused of smuggling weapons into its controlled areas, 
a charge it denied. What is important about these incidents was the widely- 
speculated role of ‘international’ naval surveillance in alerting the SLN and 
enabling it to locate the vessels in international waters. In both cases, the 
international monitors said they were ‘unable’ to rule the sinking as a violation of 
the CFA and, in the second instance, criticised the LTTE for not following UN 
laws of the Sea (SLMM 2003a, 2003b). The subsequent wrangling over SLMM’s 
procedures and on the correct interpretations of the CFA’s terms for engagements 
at sea are not the issue here. In a context of undisguised international scepticism 
of the LTTE’s commitment to a negotiated solution and international practices 
visibly informed by a logic of the LTTE needing to be deterred from returning to 
war, the SLMM’s refusal to rule the attacks as CFA violations and, more 
importantly, the impassive response by the international community to significant 
acts of violence by the Sri Lankan military, reinforced the meaning signalled by 
the attacks themselves: renewed war is not an option for the LTTE. Moreover, the 
sinkings were ‘public spectacles’ (Foucault 1977:7), telegraphing to all concerned 
the position of the LTTE (and the Sri Lankan state) in international eyes, as well
safety net’ as a containment strategy against the LTTE made the Tigers cautious and suspicious of 
international entrapment via the peace process” (2004:465, insert added).
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as the violent consequences of straying from the path to a negotiated (liberal) 
peace.
Conversely, in Tamil Freedom terms, the peace process had been made possible 
precisely because the Sri Lankan armed forces had been unable to destroy the 
LTTE. In this regal'd, the LTTE’s military capability and international scrutiny 
and pressure were vital to deterring the Sri Lankan state from resuming its 
military pursuit of Sinhala domination. Moreover, with many of the foreign 
backers of the peace process having been staunch supporters of Kumaratunga’s 
‘War for Peace’, even this newfound international support for a negotiated 
solution was also held to stem from the LTTE’s military strength (TNA 2004:para 
9). Military ‘parity’ between both sides was thus fundamental to the peace process 
and any altering of this balance in the state’s favour was held a threat to it and the 
ceasefire.126 The LTTE, meanwhile, was held to have entered the peace process to 
give the people of the Northeast respite from the ravages of war, a point made 
self-evident by the heavy emphasis in the CFA, at the insistence of tire LTTE, on 
ending GoSL restrictions on fishing and farming, on government forces vacating 
the occupied residential territory in Tamil areas, and so on (TNA 2004:para 12). 
Moreover, the LTTE was held to be exploring a solution to the Tamils’ problems 
from a hard-won position of strength (TNA 2004:para 10). On all counts 
therefore, in Tamil Freedom terms, the continued military standing of the LTTE 
vis-a-vis the Sri Lankan armed forces was essential to progress towards the 
betterment of Tamils’ lives in the short term and a political solution that 
safeguarded Tamil interests in the long term.
126 The contradiction between the Sri Lankan state being eager to resume the war and at the same 
time engaging in talks was rationalized in Tamil discourse (by the LTTE, Tamil political parties, 
media, etc) firstly, in terms of the rivalry between the two centres o f power in Colombo (Prime 
Minister Wickremesinghe’s ‘pro-peace’ UNP government, dependent on minority allies on one 
hand, and President Kumaratunga and her hardline SLFP with its ultra-nationalist allies on the 
other) and, secondly, in terms of the close attention of the international community with its 
forceful insistence on a negotiated peace.
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Clash of agendas
As noted in Chapter 4, the Norwegian-facilitated negotiations served different 
purposes in the rationalities of Tamil Freedom and Liberal Peace, both in terms of 
the final political solution and the sequencing of issues to be resolved -  i.e. the 
order of priorities. These contrasting conceptions of what mattered most on the 
road to lasting peace were manifest in contests over the appropriate agenda for the 
six rounds of talks in 2002-3. In Tamil Freedom terms, the immediate urgency 
was addressing the severe humanitarian crisis in the Northeast i.e. with ensuring 
the speedy resettlement of hundreds of thousands of Tamils, alleviating the 
economic hardships and ensuring the Sri Lankan state could not neglect or block 
reconstruction and development of the Tamil homeland. In Liberal Peace terms, 
on the other hand, the urgency was to build on benefits of halting the violence and 
establish the conditions for ethnic reconciliation, development and ‘peace­
building’ more generally to proceed i.e. to move Sri Lanka from “negative peace 
to positive peace” (Berghof 2008:28, Goodhand et al 2005:8)
As Jacob Bercovitch points out, “mediators enter a conflict in order to affect it, 
change it, resolve it, modify it, or influence it in some way” (1997:126). More 
generally, “mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas, 
knowledge, resources and interests of their own or the group or organisation they 
represent. Mediators often have their own assumptions and agendas about the 
conflict in question” (Ibid). Bercovitch’s argument was amply demonstrated by 
the peace process in Sri Lanka, where the Norwegian government, formerly 
termed the ‘facilitator’, took an unabashedly interventionist approach to its third 
party role, actively shaping the agenda of the negotiations, inducting external 
‘experts’,127 and even setting an aggressive pace for talks.128 A senior Norwegian
127 The Forum of Federations was brought in by the Norwegians to advise the two sides on 
federalism-related issues. Former head of Amnesty International and international human rights 
expert Ian Martin, sponsored by the UK, was brought in to advise both sides and also draft a 
‘Human Rights Charter’ for them to sign up to as part of the peace process. UNICEF was brought 
in to lead advocacy and monitoring on underage recruitment by the LTTE. UNICEF was invited 
by Norway on the basis “there was a need for a credible international referee” on the LTTE’s 
conduct, as a senior Norwegian diplomat put it. (NW01 June 1, 2006).
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diplomat claimed “it was a modification to Norway’s usual hands-off role”
(NW01 June 1, 2006). While the Norwegians insisted their actions were always 
“subject to the approval of the parties” and that they “wanted the parties to take as 
much ownership as possible” (Ibid), as discussed in Chapter 8, there were severe 
constraints on the ability of certainly the LTTE, trying to secure international 
acceptance - and, for that matter, the aid-hungry GoSL - to resist Norway’s 
interventionist approach. Quite apart from the parties’ own agendas and interests 
in the negotiations, the international community and the Norwegian facilitators 
also held strong convictions about key matters that should be addressed by the 
parties as a part of their seeking a solution. Firstly, while the LTTE began the 
negotiations focusing on seeming an interim administration for the Northeast, 
Norwegian facilitators placed greater emphasis on mechanisms for protecting 
human rights, women’s rights and child rights (the latter operationalised narrowly 
in the talks as ending under-age recruitment by the LTTE).
The point here is not that the LTTE was fundamentally opposed to engaging on 
rights issues or that the international community was unconcerned by the 
humanitarian difficulties. Rather, it is that the LTTE prioritised agreement on an 
administrative mechanism that could address the ongoing humanitarian crisis in 
the Northeast, rather than those for protecting rights across the country while the 
international community prioritised the countrywide improvement of rights 
protection, the encouragement of ethnic reconciliation and so on over an interim 
administration. Although agreed on, in principle, between the UNP and the LTTE, 
the notion of an interim administration for the Northeast, especially one that 
institutionalised Tamil self-govemance or one dominated by the LTTE was 
problematic in Liberal Peace terms. Through an acrimonious process, active 
Norwegian intervention in setting the agenda first sidelined discussions on an 
interim administration, replacing these with discussions on a federal solution and, 
alongside, displaced humanitarian issues from the main negotiating table (to sub-
128 Norwegian facilitators often protested the slow progress of talks. While the talks were held each 
month for one-week duration, the facilitators unsuccessfully sought the holding o f either more 
frequent or longer rounds (LT01 March 12, 2006).
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tables) and replaced these with human rights ones. In Liberal Peace terms, as a 
senior Norwegian official put it, “we needed to establish human rights protection. 
... It was a natural progression to the CFA” (NW01 June 1, 2006). However, for 
the LTTE, TNA and other Tamil actors, the ‘natural’ progression to the CFA was 
not human rights but ‘normalisation’ of life in the Northeast- through the steps 
explicitly set out in Article 2 of the document itself.
While acknowledging that humanitarian issues were important, Norwegian 
facilitators prioritised human rights making them an integral, even central, part of 
the negotiation agenda,1 an effort undertaken from the outset. For example, the 
official Norwegian statement after the first round held “the overwhelming call of 
the peoples of Sri Lanka” to be for “an end to the conflict and ... a lasting peace, 
prosperity and human rights.” (RNG 2002c, emphasis added) Indeed, the formal 
Norwegian statements issued after each round of talks indicates how hmnan rights 
issues expanded steadily to. take up a substantial proportion of the agenda and also 
came to focus on specific rights issues such as LTTE under-age recruitment, for 
example.130 ‘Human Rights’ were even listed amongst the ‘substantivepolitical
129 It was only after the devastating December 2004 tsunami that the international community 
urged -  indeed insisted -  that the parties agree a joint mechanism for sharing international 
(humanitarian and reconstruction) aid for the Northeast. Indeed, aid -  in the context o f the natural 
disaster -  was now seen as a source of cooperation and engagement between both sides. During 
the 2002-3 talks, however, LTTE efforts to negotiate a joint structure for aid were frustrated - first 
by Norwegian facilitators who insisted rather that aid should go through the GoSL treasury and, 
later, by the displacement of humanitarian issues from the main table to the ineffective Sub- 
Committees of the peace process.
130 At the third round, the parties also agreed “to explore the effective inclusion o f gender issues in 
the peace process” while, particularly, the issue o f under-age recruitment was also formalized as a 
topic for negotiation between LTTE and GoSL: “inspired by international norms protecting the 
rights of the child, the parties underlined that children belong with their families and not in the 
workplace, whether civilian or military” (RNG 2002e, emphasis added). At the fourth round, the 
parties pledged, “human rights will constitute an important element of a Final Declaration” and 
agreed that “a schedule on human rights will be worked out ... at the next round o f talks [and] the 
assistance of [an agreed] human rights advisor will be sought” (RNG 2003a). That advisor was Ian 
Martin, who joined the fifth round of talks - to the surprise of the LTTE delegation. At that 
meeting, “following a thorough discussion of human rights,” the parties agreed to ask Mr. Martin 
“to draw up a roadmap for human rights related to the peace process” (RNG 2003b). These were to 
include, crucially, “substantive human rights activities and commitments to be implemented 
throughout the negotiation process; effective mechanisms for the monitoring o f human rights [and] 
training of LTTE cadres and GoSL officials in human rights and humanitarian law” (Ibid). At the 
sixth round, Mr. Martin was tasked to draft a ‘Declaration of Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Principles.’ This, the Norwegian statement said, “would reflect aspects of fundamental 
international human rights and humanitarian standards; which both parties would undertake to 
ensure are respected in practice by their personnel” (RNG 2003c). Mr. Martin was also tasked to 
plan “a programme o f hmnan rights training for LTTE cadres and government officials ... and of
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issues’ -  alongside issues such as ‘power-sharing between centre and the region’, 
‘geographical region’ and ‘public finance’ - that the parties agreed to discuss as 
part of exploring federalism as a solution (RNG 2002e, emphasis added). 
Crucially, at the same time, humanitarian issues, including the military’s refusal to 
implement the ‘normalization’ aspects of the CFA - thus preventing hundreds of 
thousands of Tamils from resettling in their homes - were displaced to sub-tables 
of the peace process (termed Sub-Committees)131, despite the LTTE’s efforts to 
keep these on the main table.132 Eventually, as the negotiations at the sub-tables 
drifted without progress, the LTTE withdrew from these fora, insisting -  
unsuccessfully - that these matters be brought back to the main table. That the 
negotiation process was neither addressing the humanitarian crisis nor taking the 
matter seriously was a central reason cited by the LTTE for its ‘temporary’ 
withdrawal from the talks pending the implementation of the CFA’s normalisation 
clauses. The international community’s view was outlined by US Ambassador 
Wills:
“We've reviewed carefully the ostensible reasons for
[the LTTE’s] decisions We do not find them
convincing. A well-intentioned party that truly wants a 
peaceful, political settlement to Sri Lanka’s conflict 
could deal with such grievances at the negotiating 
table” (2003, emphasis added).
Apart from seeking to entrench hmnan rights in the fabric of the peace process 
and explicitly within any final solution to the conflict, the Norwegian facilitators
human rights education and awareness fo r other sections o f the population” (Ibid, emphases 
added). The latter was to be provided by UNICEF (“in relation to the rights of the child”),
UNHCR (“in relation to the rights of internally displaced people”) and the ICRC (“in relation to 
international humanitarian law”). Mr. Martin was also tasked to come up with proposals to 
strengthen the GoSL agency, Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, “to enable it to develop the 
capacity for increasingly effective monitoring” (Ibid). The HRCSL, moreover, was to receive 
assistance from UNHCR and SLMM for its work (Ibid).
131 The three Sub-Committees were SIHRN (Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and 
Rehabilitation Needs), SDN (Sub-Committee on De-escalation and Normalisation) and SGI (Sub- 
Committee on Gender Issues). They comprised senior officials from both sides, including 
sometimes members of the main negotiating teams and their meetings were also chaired by 
Norwegian officials.
132 See Appendix 1 for the formal institutional architecture of the Norwegian-led peace process.
192
were also keen to secure agreement on such a solution as early as possible. This 
ran directly counter to the LTTE’s insistence -echoed by a chorus of Tamil voices 
- that the humanitarian crisis in the Northeast must be addressed and the 
conditions of normalcy restored there before ‘core’ political issues were taken up. 
The argument was, firstly, that the humanitarian suffering of the Tamil people 
could not be allowed to persist through the inevitably protracted and hard fought 
discussions that constitutional matters entailed and, secondly, that Tamils could 
participate in shaping a final solution only when they again enjoyed the same 
living conditions as the Sinhala community. Indeed, this emphasis on parity 
between the conditions of Tamil and Sinhala areas was reflected in the title of the 
CFA’s Article 2: ‘Measures to restore normalcy5 (emphasis added).
However, the international community’s urgency for the negotiations to reach 
agreement on a final political solution has to be seen against two factors; firstly, 
undisguised international scepticism of the LTTE’s bona fides in participating in 
the talks and, secondly, a calculation that such a final solution was necessary to 
set the framework for long-term peacebuilding and the transition from war to 
peace -  a transition which would of course include the disarming and disbanding 
of the LTTE (JMOFA 2003: Clause 18.j), the primary cause of the conflict, and 
therefore minimise the risk of renewed war. Norwegian facilitators thus pushed 
hard for greater and swifter ‘progress’ at every round of talks. This international 
insistence further raised pressure on the LTTE, which, attempting to dispel 
international scepticism, was keen not to be blamed for obstructing the peace 
process. In the very first round, the LTTE came under pressure to set aside its 
demand (and agreement with the UNP) for an interim administration. It did so on 
the condition the purpose of such a structure -  i.e. alleviating the humanitarian 
crisis in the Northeast - would be taken up and addressed by the negotiation 
process (LTTE 2003d). In the second round, however, Norwegian facilitators 
proposed that the discussions on humanitarian and normalisation issues should be 
transferred to Sub-Committees which would periodically report back to the main
133 As the declaration at a rally in June 2003 put it, “the Tamil people are not in a frame of mind to 
think about peace while being subjected to military oppression and living in an atmosphere of fear, 
A situation must be created whereby the Tamil people can, in an atmosphere free of fear and 
insecurity, participate freely and fully to bring about peace” (Pongu Thamil 2003).
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negotiating table, thereby enabling the main table to focus on a political solution. 
Under international pressure not to delay the peace process, the LTTE agreed to 
the “dual approach of moving step by step towards a lasting political settlement 
while remaining fully focussed on the ground situation” (RNG 2002d, emphasis 
added). While the transfer of humanitarian and normalisation issues to sub-tables 
also made it harder for the LTTE negotiators to keep these matters at the heart of 
the negotiation process, in the meantime, the Norwegians placed human rights 
issues - such as LTTE under-age recruitment and a ‘Human Rights Charter’ for 
both sides - on the agenda of the main talks, alongside a federal solution, as the 
core concerns of the negotiation process.
Success or failure?
The first fifteen months of the peace process - from the signing of the ceasefire 
(February 2002) to the LTTE suspending its participation in direct talks (May 
2003) - appeared on the terrains of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom in starkly 
different ways: for the former it was remarkably successful whilst for the latter it 
was a frustrating failure. The first few months, a period of extraordinary optimism 
both internationally and within Sri Lanka, augured well in terms of both 
rationalities. The ceasefire was well observed by both protagonists and 
international monitors opened offices in all seven Northeastern districts. The 
conditions of war rapidly began to ease: in the Northeast, the GoSL lifted its 
economic and humanitarian blockade on LTTE-controlled areas and opened the 
A9 highway enabling the movement of people and goods while in the South, the 
economy began to turn around as investor confidence, trade and tourist numbers 
increased. Despite the seething discontent of the hardline Sinhala opposition, 
President Kumaratunga remained critical, but passive.
However, the period from mid 2002 onwards appeared differently, depending on 
what constituted the ‘right disposition of men and things’. In Liberal Peace terms, 
even after the negotiations stalled, the LTTE continued to (in the main) observe 
ceasefire and remain in the peace process. This was despite tire occasional crisis -  
especially the incidents at sea in which two LTTE arms vessels were destroyed
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and, as discussed later, increasing ‘political assassinations’. On the other hand, the 
LTTE had agreed to a process of demobilising underage recruits (see Chapter 7). 
More importantly, the LTTE dropped its earlier insistence that the CFA must first 
be implemented fully -  i.e. the GoSL must carry out the ‘normalisation’ clauses of 
the agreement -  and entered into direct talks with the government, eventually 
agreeing to negotiations on a final political settlement. Moreover, within three 
months of talks starting, the LTTE had signed up to a federal solution (i.e. to give 
up its ‘separatist’ demand) and had begun to engage, albeit reluctantly, in 
negotiating a Hmnan Rights Charter. As demonstrated by the three aid 
conferences, international donors were increasingly coming forward to invest 
heavily in rebuilding and developing the country, in efforts to revive the economy 
and also in peace-building projects -  for example, promoting ethnic 
reconciliation, fostering civil society and encouraging free media. In short, the 
requisite conditions for the country to transition from war to peace had 
undoubtedly emerged steadily.134 As US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage 
(2003c) told the Tokyo Conference, “to date, this peace process has seen much 
progress. Indeed, so much that only the truly thorny issues are left”(emphasis 
added). This was despite the negotiation process having stalled and Tamil political 
actors vociferously protesting the still continuing humanitarian crisis - Armitage 
himself admitted in his upbeat analysis that 800,000 people remained displaced. A 
year' later, with the talks still stalled, a vicious ‘shadow’ war between Sri Lanka 
Army-backed paramilitaries and LTTE intelligence escalating, and frustration 
intensifying in the Northeast at the continuing humanitarian crisis, US Assistant 
Secretary for South Asian Affairs Christina B. Rocca insisted before the House 
Committee on International Relations that,
134 In his end-of-year statement in December 2002, the head of the SLMM, retired Norwegian 
Major General Tronde Furuhovde (2002), enthused: “During the last year people have stopped 
waging war and begun to build peace, people have stopped creating problems and have started 
solving problems, and people have stopped hurting each other and started trying to understand 
each other and live for each other. People have stopped asking if the war will start again and 
started asking how society can be made better. Fear and distrust is being removed and replaced 
with a feeling of increased safety and confidence. ... Democracy is developing. Schooling for the 
population has improved. Security has increased. Freedom has increased. These are dramatic 
changes and the speed of the development is even still increasing.. After a long period of 
stagnation and destruction we are now experiencing the initial phase of a country and society in 
transformation. Sri Lanka has entered a new era. The new Sri Lanka is no longer stuck in the 
vicious circle of war which has halted development for decades. These are times for changing and 
modernizing society.”
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“the ceasefire is holding, and an informal peace process 
continues, bringing increased interaction among the 
ethnic communities and growing trade and economic 
opportunities. As we press the government and LTTE 
to return to the talks, our programs are providing both 
an incentive to peace and a boost to reconstruction and 
reconciliation in war-torn areas. Our nationwide 
development and health programs support the 
government’s economic growth and anti-poverty 
efforts, while our democracy programs promote hmnan 
rights and political reintegration and reconciliation.”
(2004, emphases added).
In Tamil Freedom terms, however, the same period looks very different. While 
the cessation of hostilities provided much-needed respite for the Tamils, as did the 
lifting of the government’s economic embargo, crucially, the military was 
refusing to implement the ‘normalization’ clauses of the CFA. Although large 
numbers of displaced people had returned to their homes in both government and 
LTTE controlled parts of the Northeast, several hundred thousand more remained 
in homeless limbo, awaiting the military’s withdrawal from their homes, villages 
and farmland. The military’s restrictions on Tamils’ fishing and farming were 
largely continuing. The LTTE had initially insisted on full implementation of the 
CFA’s normalisation clauses as a condition for direct talks, but had relented to 
international pressure, on the proviso that an interim administration for the 
Northeast was negotiated and established as the first order of business. However 
the interim administration, despite being an election pledge by the UNP, had been 
swiftly dropped. The subsequent brief discussions on humanitarian issues had 
proven inconclusive and these talks had been relegated to Sub-Committees, 
which, largely out of focus, had drifted without resulting in any tangible 
difference on the ground. Thus, in effect, whilst the war-devastated Tamil 
homeland was stagnating, the South of the island was thriving: the economy was 
growing fast, foreign aid was being disbursed and a huge amount more was being 
pledged for Sri Lanka -  to be disbursed largely through the Sinhala state. In short, 
normalcy had returned quickly to the Sinhala areas which had largely been
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unaffected by the war, but the war-devastated Northeast was languishing with no 
end in sight and no way of seeming progress.
Moreover, even though the LTTE had been flexible and accommodative -  it had 
relented on its precondition of full implementation and entered into talks, agreed 
to drop its demand for an interim administration and even agreed to explore a 
federal model as a final solution - the international community remained palpably 
suspicious and hostile.135 Despite international actors accepting, to some extent, 
the LTTE was entering the peace process as representatives of Tamil interests, if 
not the Tamil people, the various foreign proscriptions on the organisation 
remained (even after Sri Lanka had lifted its own ban).136 In addition, as the 
holding of the second aid conference in Washington exemplified, the LTTE had 
been steadily marginalized from important processes and decisions on matters of 
concern to the Tamils - especially those relating to the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of the devastated Northeast. Instead the Sinhala state, responsible 
for much of the destruction in the Tamil homeland, had been accorded sole 
authority over Tamil affairs by the international community. Although the Sri 
Lanka navy had brazenly attacked and sunk two LTTE vessels, the international 
community was not pressuring Colombo over these violations of the truce nor, for 
that matter, over the military’s standing breaches of the CFA: the occupation of 
30,000 homes, schools and places of worship and continuing restrictions on 
fishing and fanning. On the contrary, the Sri Lankan state was enjoying 
demonstrable and enthusiastic international support, thus raising doubts over 
external pressure as a restraint on the state from returning to war.
135 Explaining its reasons for contesting the 2004 elections, despite the Sri Lankan political system 
being dominated by “two chauvinist parties”, the TNA’s Manifesto (2004) states: “However, with 
the current political environment and in the backdrop of the changes shaping the attitudes o f the 
international community towards our freedom struggle, the TNA has decided to make use of the 
opportunity presented by this election to bring forcefully to the attention of the world, and Sri 
Lanka in particular, our resolve for self-determination.” (emphasis added).
136 The TNA’s Manifesto (2004) argued: “the international community should create the 
environment by removing the restrictions put in place by certain countries on the LTTE, the 
authentic sole representatives of the Tamil people, so that they could, with authority, dignity and 
with equal status conduct talks with the government of Sri Lanka.” The TNA’s 2001 Manifesto 
states: “We have consistently ... asserted that war can never bring about peace, and that peace can 
only be achieved through rational dialogue. We have also consistently asserted that any attempt to 
draw a distinction between the LTTE and the Tamil people was meaningless.”
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6.3 In the background
The humanitarian crisis
Whilst, as discussed above, Tamil actors saw the problem of military HSZs as a 
humanitarian and political issue, international actors reframed the military’s 
vacating of the HSZs as a security issue. In other words, it was held that the Sri 
Lankan armed forces pulling back from its HSZs would constitute a military 
advantage for the LTTE. Although the LTTE said it was not demanding the total 
withdrawal of the Army from the Northeastern areas nor the transfer of territory in 
HSZs (mainly located well beyond the mutual frontlines) to LTTE control, the 
issue of HSZs was framed nonetheless in terms of a military ‘balance of forces’. 
This was despite other international actions, such as facilitating the rapid and 
substantial rearming of the Sri Lankan military and extending assistance for 
interdicting LTTE ships, having already tipped the ‘balance’ decisively in the 
state’s favour*. As the then head of the SLMM, retired Norwegian general Tronde 
Furuhovde, controversially declared,
“This discussion [on Resettlement in High Security 
Zones] is not only based on humanitarian concerns, but 
also reflects territorial concerns. .. .People want 
normalization and security, but one must not undermine 
the other. ... In Jaffna, simply dismantling High 
Security Zones for resettlement and handing over land 
for cultivation will decrease both security and combat 
potential of the Government forces. The balance of 
forces is the basis of the Ceasefire agreement and 
disturbing that balance is disturbing the Ceasefire. An 
unrealistic normalization program in the name o f  
progress and development should not be allowed to 
come into force at the expense o f security, as this could 
undermine the building of permanent peace”
(Furuhovde 2002, emphasis added).
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More precisely, as Gen. Furuhovde explained, “it is therefore clear* that further 
implementation of the Ceasefire agreement is linked to the harmonizing o f 
normalization and security” (Ibid, emphasis added). In other words, the 
dismantling of the HSZs and, therefore, the return of hundreds of thousands of 
displaced Tamils to their homes was linked to ending the security risk -  i.e. the 
disarming of the LTTE and the permanent end of the war. Implicit in the SLMM’s 
position on HSZs is a specific understanding of the relationship between the 
Tamil population and the Sri Lankan state: the security of one and the other are, if 
not the same, at least aligned. This not only echoed the Sri Lankan state’s 
characterisation of the situation, it was in sharp contrast to Tamil Freedom’s 
positing of the Sinhala-dominated state and its armed forces as a threat to the 
security and well being of the Tamil people (TNA 2004). Although the SLMM 
chiefs comments drew furious criticism from the LTTE and prompted his 
resignation, his statement merely made explicit the dominant logic amongst 
international actors i.e. that whilst admittedly there are important humanitarian 
dimensions, the demand that HSZs must be dismantled is primarily about the 
LTTE indirectly seeking a military advantage against the government’s forces
1 “^ 7and, moreover, these were matters for further discussions. As US Ambassador 
Wills (2003) told Reuters,
“I'm not saying I don't understand Tamil frustration 
over certain issues, but people must remember that the 
war is not conclusively and officially over. High- 
security zones, resettlement, development - these are all 
issues that need to be negotiated and dealt with”
(emphasis added).
137 As Gen. Furuhovde (2002) explained, “The LTTE have stated that maintaining their military 
strength is vital if they are to be successful in their negotiations. What applies to the LTTE in this 
context should also apply for the Government. The paradox in the peace argument is that the 
priority of normalization goes before that of security, while both rest on the present military 
balance. In order to build peace the forces on both sides must be kept stable.” This emphasis on a 
military ‘stability’ is worth considering in the light of wider developments, such as the substantial 
expansion of the Sri Lanka military in 2002. When the HSZs became a point o f controversy in the 
negotiations (in January 2003), the Norwegian government commissioned a retired Indian Army 
General to study the issue. His report, tellingly, proposed the LTTE’s heavy guns be gathered and 
placed under international supervision so as to enable the Sri Lanka military to comply with the 
CFA. Underlining the dominant international thinking on the issue, only the LTTE’s guns were to 
be internationally supervised and not the Sri Lankan military’s.
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Despite the controversy and Tamil protests that erupted after the SLMM Chiefs 
statement on HSZs, there were two incontrovertible Truths’ that emerged. Firstly, 
in practical terms, the CFA had been de-facto re-written by the international 
community. Much of Article 2 -  ‘Measures to restore normalcy’ -  that dealt with 
the foremost concerns of the Tamil population had been reduced from obligations 
on the Sri Lankan state to being matters for its negotiations with the LTTE. 
Secondly, the character of the peace process, more generally, had been explicitly 
defined: the SLMM’s role was less an ‘objective’ international effort to support 
the two ‘internal’ parties reaching a negotiated peace than an intervention to shape 
a specific political solution to the conflict, one centred on the (re)constitution and 
transformation of Sri Lanka’s state and society in liberal terms. In other words, 
the SLMM ruling - which is what Gen. Furuhovde’s statement effectively was - 
constituted an act of sovereign power in service of Liberal Peace.
A second dimension of the humanitarian crisis in the Northeast was the lack of 
funding for rehabilitation and reconstruction of destroyed homes and other 
buildings even in areas outside the HSZs. From a rationale that holds the Tamils 
and other minorities to have been deliberately excluded from developmental 
process by the Sri Lankan state, the continued lack of aid flows into the Northeast 
during the peace process was also seen as a continuation of (pre-CFA) 
discriminatory state policy -  especially in the context of continued military 
restrictions on Tamil livelihoods. The failures of successive efforts by the LTTE 
to get the GoSL to engage on these matters during the talks, the downgrading of 
humanitarian issues to Sub-Committees (which eventually collapsed amid, 
according to the LTTE, Sri Lankan government prevarication) and, at the same 
time, the rapid improvements in economic conditions in the Sinhala areas, not 
least through inflows of developmental aid, were also seen as continuation of 
Sinhala prejudice. The international community, operating within a framework of 
a single state, a single economy, a legitimate government and a Northeast blighted 
by war (rather than deliberate state neglect), saw this continuing lack of 
improvement in different terms: the improvement of the living conditions of the 
Northeast is something to be addressed through long-term processes of 
development to be effected after a permanent solution fell into place. As US
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Ambassador Wills, rejecting the LTTE’s citing of the GoSL’s non-action on prior 
agreements on humanitarian matters for its withdrawal from the talks, observed: 
“We think that expectations in Sri Lanka - in the North 
and in the South too - are way too high regarding 
economic development. Patience is in order. Tamils,
Sinhalese, indeed all Sri Lankans must understand that 
economic development takes time and unfolds most 
quickly in conditions o f lasting peace. And Sri Lanka 
doesn't yet live in conditions of permanent peace”
(2003, emphasis added).138
This particular conception of the humanitarian difficulties and restrictions being 
endured by the majority of Tamils as matters to be either alleviated by long-term 
development (in conditions of ‘permanent peace’) or resolved as part of the long­
term political solution (i.e. establishment o f ‘security’ by disarming of the LTTE), 
is mirrored in the Norwegian diplomats’ strategy vis-a-vis the agenda for the 
negotiations, whereby humanitarian issues were held to be of less urgency than 
establishing the ‘normalcy’ of human rights protection, rule of law, and so on as 
well as the specificities of a permanent solution. Amid the abject conditions being 
endured in the Northeast, the Tamil perspective was, of course, very different. The 
LTTE argued “there are two distinct issues here; firstly, the urgent and immediate 
problems faced by the Tamil people and secondly, the long-term economic 
development of the Tamil areas. The two should not be confused” (Balasingham 
2003). The TNA’s Manifesto (2004) argued:
“The international community, instead of waiting until 
the Tamil nation’s ethnic problem is permanently 
solved, should step forward and directly assist in the 
pressing humanitarian needs and economic 
development schemes and improve the economic life o f  
the Tamil nation” (emphases added).
138 Ambassador Wills added: “I don't mean to sound condescending, but sometimes I get the 
impression that some people in Sri Lanka expect an economic miracle now. Rome wasn't built in a 
day. Neither will Kiliuochchi [in the North], or Trinco, [in the East] or Hambantota [in the South] 
be developed as quickly as we would all like” (2003, inserts added).
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Violating the ceasefire
The CFA, as noted earlier, set out much more than the technical modalities of a 
cessation of armed hostilities; it also set out the obligations on the GoSL for the 
restoration of humanitarian normalcy in the Tamil areas in the Northeast.
However, as outlined above, different categories o f ‘ceasefire violations’ came to 
matter more than others on the terrains of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom 
respectively. While the productive effects of the SLMM’s conduct and its 
methodological dynamics of recording of complaints and issuing rulings are 
considered later (Chapter 7), this section considers how the rationalities of Liberal 
Peace and Tamil Freedom rendered different categories of CFA-violations more 
significant than others and as indicative of ‘progress’ or not towards ‘peace’.
From a Tamil Freedom perspective, the Sinhala military’s continuing occupation 
of the 30,000 (Tamil) homes as well as schools, places of worship and so on and 
its continuation of restrictions on fishing and farming constituted serious standing 
breaches of the CFA. The continuation of these long-running practices continuing 
after the CFA was signed had specific connotations: as well as racial persecution, 
these violations constituted yet another abrogation of yet another Tamil-Sinhala 
agreement. However, the international community redefined these issues, which 
directly affected the lives of most Tamils, as matters for future negotiations 
between the LTTE and GoSL. Concomitantly, what constituted breaches proper, 
in the eyes of the SLMM and the international community, were acts of 
‘violence’. Even in tills category, there were nuances: certain breaches by the 
aimed forces, such as attacks on LTTE ships deemed to be carrying aims, were 
not only acceptable to the international community but were in fact supported by 
external actors. Instead, what came to be the foremost CFA-related concerns of 
the international community, on the hand, were ‘political assassinations’ and 
‘child recruitment’ by the LTTE.139
139 A US (2003) call for talks to resume declared: “real progress towards peace and an end to 
violence in word and deed can begin the process of the LTTE's entering the political mainstream, 
and result in assistance for areas in the north and east most affected by conflict. Assassinations and 
suicide bombings are unacceptable. The recruitment of child soldiers must cease.”
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A key set of military actors in Sri Lanka were former Tamil militant groups which 
had switched sides during the Indian intervention of the eighties, registering in 
Colombo as political parties. Whilst their leaders ‘contested’ elections, their 
armed cadres operated as pathfinders, interrogators and so on for the Indian Peace 
Keeping Force (IPKF) and later, the Sri Lankan military.140 The specific problem 
of army-backed Tamil paramilitaries was addressed in the CFA: Clause 1.8 
obliges the GoSL to disarm these groups and demobilise their cadres or integrate 
them into the armed forces for service outside the Northeast. Whilst the GoSL 
insisted this had been done, the LTTE insisted it had not (the LTTE-GoSL 
negotiations of February 2006 focussed mainly on Clause 1.8, with both sides 
taking entrenched positions). Especially from mid 2003 onwards, a cycle of 
assassinations and counter-killings by Sri Lankan and LTTE intelligence services 
escalated into what was later termed a ‘shadow war’.
What is important here, however, is that killings of members of the paramilitary 
groups-cum-political parties were deemed by the international community, in the 
rationality of Liberal Peace, not to be part of an intelligence war, but ‘political 
assassinations' by the LTTE. The authoritarian, undemocratic and militarist 
LTTE, it was held, was killing ‘political rivals’, ‘opponents’ and ‘those Tamils 
who did not agree with it’. For its part, the LTTE, while denying any involvement 
in the killings, protested the GoSL was using Tamil paramilitaries to target LTTE 
cadres and, later, TNA parliamentarians and party activists, journalists, Tamil aid 
workers, and others. The point here is not the ‘real’ status of the various 
individuals who were killed, a matter which will, in all probability, never be 
resolved, but rather how members of well known Tamil paramilitary groups came 
to be represented in the international community’s calculations and wider 
discourse around the peace process: as alternate Tamil voices being silenced by 
the LTTE. This dynamic was fuelled by the SLMM’s pattern of rulings: the
140 These included the EPDP (Eelam People’s Democratic Parly) - the largest, the PLOTE 
(People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam), the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary 
Liberation Front), the TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation) and other splinters from 
these. Notably two of the ex-militant groups -  TELO and the ‘Suresh wing’ of the EPRLF - joined 
the TNA in 2001, having either given up or been stripped by GoSL of their weapons.
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killings of security forces’ personnel were self-evidently the work of the LTTE, 
but the killings of LTTE cadres (especially at LTTE Political Wing offices in 
GoSL areas), TNA parliamentarians and others were often held to be impossible 
for the SLMM to investigate and thus rule definitely as CFA violations by the 
GoSL. Meanwhile, the killings of members of the EPDP, PLOTE, and other 
paramilitaries were self-evidently the work of the LTTE - though because these 
were outside the LTTE-GoSL ceasefire, the SLMM would not rule on them. As a 
major donor funded study explains, “the majority of [violent] incidents involved 
Tamil on Tamil violence, which is not included in the CFA and does not affect the 
LTTE-SLAF military balance, the SLMM has not become involved” (Goodhand 
2005:71, emphasis, insert added). In short, despite there being a cycle of violence 
between LTTE and the GoSL intelligence, international actors tended to blame the 
LTTE, if not entirely, then mainly, for the deepening difficulties. A donor-funded 
report noted how, after the talks stalled, “high-level monitoring visits by special 
peace envoys and Co-Chair [US, EU, Japan and Norway] meetings offered 
statements that consistently condemned human rights abuses by the LTTE and 
urged both sides to return to the negotiating table, but had little impact’5 (Burke 
and Mulalcala 2005:20, insert, emphasis added). International urging of the GoSL 
to disarm paramilitaries only began in late 2005, when abductions, extra-judicial 
killings and other rights abuses attributed to these forces became widespread.
Another aspect of LTTE’s conduct that came under acute international focus 
during the peace process was ‘child recruitment’ -  i.e. of under-18s. To begin 
with, the CFA does not prohibit recruitment by either side — or even cover it. 
However, the SLMM unilaterally extended its monitoring mandate to include 
under-age recruitment (one SLMM Chief rationalised this on the basis of the 
reference to ‘international law’ in the CFA).141 ‘Child recruitment’ by the LTTE
141 This rationale was presented by SLMM Chief Brig. Gen (retd) H. Haukland at the Norwegian- 
chaired LTTE-GoSL negotiations in Geneva in 2006 February ( LT01, LT02 February 24,2006). 
Clause 2.1 -  the first item in Article 2 (‘Measures to restore normalcy5) -  states: “The parties shall 
in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, 
including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment.” However, under 
this logic, the GoSL’s shelling of civilian settlements in 2006 and its closure o f highways on 
which food and medicine reach hundreds of thousands of people are also breaches of international 
law. Paust (1997) argued a few years earlier that how the effects on Tamil civilians of Colombo’s 
embargoes legally constituted ‘war crimes’.
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came to dominate international discourse on breaches of the CFA, and to take an 
important place within the negotiation process. For example, it is the only ‘child 
rights’ issue explicitly mentioned in the Tokyo Declaration (JMOFA 2003, clause 
18.h). The purpose here is not to discuss the practice of recruiting under-18s -  a 
complex area in itself142 - but to examine how the phenomenon came to have such 
a prominent place in international discourse. This is especially so given the 
relatively small number of youth affected by recruitment, as opposed to other war- 
related deprivations. A UNICEF statement in January 2004, titled ‘Call to 
increased action for Sri Lanka’s war affected children’ (emphasis added) noted:
“It is estimated 50,000 children in the affected region [Northeast] are out of 
school, 140,000 have been displaced from their homes” (insert added). Moreover, 
during the period of conflict, large numbers of children (overwhelmingly Tamils 
in the Northeast) have been killed or suffered serious injury, malnutrition or 
starvation under government embargos, been denied schooling, and so on. 
However, without elaborating why, the UNICEF statement then declares: “Of 
particular concern is the use of children as soldiers. ... From reports submitted by 
families, UNICEF knows of at least 1,301 children still in the LTTE” (emphasis 
added).143
The engagement of UNICEF and other UN agencies, “in the North-East and on 
conflict issues more widely” has been described as “in step with a global move
142 In 2007, the LTTE declared its policy was (now) to recruit at 17 and deploy in combat at 18, 
pointing out that UN regulations set the legal age for recruitment to the military at 15; the LTTE 
operates several aims besides fighting regiments, including police, customs, administration, etc; 
the LTTE says many youth sign up to escape military harassment, poverty, abuse at home and so 
on; LTTE recruiters (especially Colonel Karuna, who defected to the GoSL in 2004) have 
breached the organisation’s own regulations, and so on.
143 The emotive expression ‘children’ used in relation to recruitment of under-18s must be 
considered in the context of, firstly, the UN law specifying 15 as the permissible age for 
recruitment to aimed forces and, secondly, many of the states stridently critical o f armed groups, 
including the US and UK, not having accepted the Optional Protocol’s limit of 18 and instead 
recruiting at 16 and of other states registering special case opt-outs. Indeed, in the negotiations 
leading up to the adoption of the Optional Protocols, the US, UK and Australia refused to give an 
undertaking not to deploy under-18s in aimed conflicts (Wall 2004). In 2002-2004 these states 
were amongst the foremost critics of the LTTE’s recruitment of under-18s (along with Canada, 
which also recruits at 16). At the same time the states were the also most vocal in opposing a total 
ban on recruiting under-18s by their armies (Ibid). By way of rationale, according to a Britsh 
colonel in charge of recruitment, the UK army targets younger recruits because it believes hat they 
respond better to training and stay longer than older ones. According to him, this is “received 
wisdom" in the armed forces (Coalition to stop the use of Child Soldiers 2008)
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towards recognising child rights as an overarching priority” (Goodhand 2005:24). 
However, given the scale of the humanitarian crisis, it is not immediately apparent 
why, especially during a period of ceasefire and peace negotiations, those specific 
under-18s said to have been recruited by the LTTE - and who constitute less than 
1% of war affected children144 - came to be deemed of ‘particular concern5 and to 
draw such close international focus, eclipsing other child rights issues.145 What is 
important here is how, despite various ways in which at least 140,000 children are 
‘affected by war5, including death and injury to parents and siblings, malnutrition, 
disrupted schooling, homelessness, and so on, the issue of ‘child rights5 in Sri 
Lanka's conflict was largely reduced in the overarching international narrative to 
one specific concern: under-age recruitment by the LTTE (see also discussion in 
Chapter 7).
6.4 Different perceptions and categories
The elements of the Norwegian-led peace process discussed above outline just 
some of the many instances where the tenets of Tamil Freedom and Liberal Peace 
came into contradiction and collision. The differences in strategies, techniques 
and procedures engendered by the two rationalities were profound and served, 
ultimately, to produce an impasse between Tamil and international aspirations that 
was never resolved. To begin with, Liberal Peace had the whole country and 
‘people5 as its field of visibility. In this context, with ‘armed conflict5 held to be 
the primary problematic facing Sri Lanka, Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims were 
deemed one society, albeit a fractured one, and the question of peace was
144 Moreover, with estimates of the LTTE’s fighting strength -  apart hum civil administration 
arms -  ranging from twelve to twenty thousand cadres, this number of under-18s constitutes 
between 5 and 10 percent of fighters.
145 This is especially so in the context of the numbers of under-18s being recruited by militaries of 
states such as the UK, US and others. The Coalition to stop the use of Child Soldiers (2008) quotes 
the British Army as saying 30% of all recruits in 2006/07 were aged under 18 and says that 25% of 
recruits in the British Navy and Air Force were also under-18. Meanwhile, according to the 
American Civil Liberties Union (2008), the US military regularly targets youth under 18 for 
recruitment and disproportionately targets poor and minority students. Moreover, the ACLU 
charged that exaggerated promises of financial rewards and coercion, deception and sexual abuse 
by recruiters nullify the so-called "voluntariness" of recruitment. A 2007 survey of New York City 
high school students found that more than one in five students, including students as young as 14, 
reported the use of class time by military recruiters.
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establishing security, unity and developmental possibilities for the entire island. 
The Tokyo Declaration, for example, called on the LTTE and GoSL “to move 
expeditiously to a lasting and equitable political settlement. Such a settlement 
should he based upon respect for human rights, democracy and the rule o f law” 
(2003, emphasis added).146
Tamil Freedom, on the other hand, had the Northeast and the Tamils as its field of 
visibility. The main problematic was Sinhala oppression and the question of peace 
was therefore about Tamils’ self-determination. As LTTE Chief Negotiator 
Balasingham (2003) put it,
“our people have suffered bitter historical experience of 
state terror ... over decades. The Tamils are seeking, 
not only substantial political autonomy but also a 
security system that would permanently ensure 
protection ... to live peacefully with dignity and 
freedom in their historical homeland.”
In Liberal Peace terms, the war devastation in the North-and-East and the poverty 
in the South were part of the same problem, one affecting the entire country and to 
be solved by internationally supported long-term development. However, in Tamil 
Freedom terms, these were, as the LTTE (2003e) put it, ‘qualitatively different5: 
“The Tamils faced the brunt of the brutal war. The 
poverty ... prevailing in southern Sri Lanka is a self- 
inflicted phenomenon, caused by the disastrous policies 
of past governments. In its fanatical drive to prosecute 
an unjust war against the Tamil people, the Sinhala 
state wasted all national wealth.”147
146 US Ambassador Wills (2002) observed: “We’ll be comfortable with any negotiated solution as 
long as Sri Lanka is permanently at peace, is democratic and is united.”
147 The LTTE (2003 e) further argued: “The economic situation of the south has been ... worsened 
by the mismanagement of state funds, bad governance and institutional corruption. Therefore, the 
conditions prevailing in the south are distinctly different from the northeast where the scale and 
magnitude of the inffa-structural destruction is monumental and the poverty is acute.”
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Thus, in Tamil Freedom terms, the first priority of the peace process was restoring 
‘normalcy’ to the war-shattered Northeast i.e. resettling the 800,000 displaced 
Tamils, rebuilding the war-shattered civil infrastructure and reviving the local 
industries, thus putting it on par* with the South, untouched by such devastation. 
Quite apart from insisting on appropriate measures being enshrined in the CFA, 
the LTTE sought to impose the humanitarian crisis on the agenda of the 
negotiations. In Liberal Peace terms, ‘normalcy’ meant the restoration of the rule 
of law, protection for human rights, creating space for public debate and 
democracy to thrive and development to resume across the entire country and this 
was the first priority. As such, a permanent political solution had to be agreed at 
the earliest so as to enable the process of liberal peacebuilding that would bring 
all Sri Lankans together. The Norwegian facilitators thus sought to make human 
rights and a permanent (federal) solution the agenda for the Track 1 talks. In 
Tamil Freedom terms, however, a permanent solution must be arrived at between 
(representatives) of the Tamil people and Sinhala people and for this to be 
possible -  i.e. for the Tamils to participate as equals - the existential conditions of 
the Tamils and Sinhalese must first be restored to parity i.e. normalcy must 
prevail in the Northeast as it did in the south before a solution could be discussed. 
In Tamil Freedom terms, therefore, the military’s continued occupation of Tamil 
homes, schools, places of worship and its continuing imposition of fishing and 
farming restrictions constituted the most serious breaches of the CFA. In Liberal 
Peace terms, these were matters for either negotiation (HSZs and military 
restrictions, for example) or problems to be alleviated through long-term 
development i.e. through reviving local industries, post-conflict reconstruction, 
etc; therefore, the most serious breaches of the CFA were those that threatened the 
democratic process, the rule of law and peace building space of public debate i.e. 
the LTTE’s ‘political assassinations’ and ‘child recruitment’.
In Liberal Peace terms, the armed conflict was a perverse externality to the 
‘normal’ processes of politics and development in Sri Lanka; sustaining the peace 
process thus meant deterring and preventing the LTTE resuming its armed 
struggle. As US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage (2003a) put it, “the Tigers 
need to honor the restrictions and conditions that the ceasefire - and future 
negotiations - set on their arms supply. Logically, down the road, this is going to
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include disarmament issues themselves” (2003 a, see also the Tokyo Declaration 
(JMOFA 2003, Clause 18.j)). It is in this context that the sinkings of two LTTE 
ships (in March and June 2003) should be seen -  as Liberal Peace inspired acts of 
sovereignty. In Tamil Freedom terms, the armed conflict was a direct 
consequence of Sri Lanka’s majoritarian politics and state policies i.e. it was a 
manifestation of Tamil resistance to Sinhala state terror; sustaining the peace 
process meant deterring the Sri Lankan aimed forces: “the ethnic conflict is not 
yet resolved and the threat of Sinhala military aggression of Tamil lands is not yet 
over. Under these circumstances, decommissioning or abdication of [LTTE] arms 
is non-negotiable.” (Balasingham 2003).148
More generally, whilst Liberal Peace posits the Sri Lankan state an imperfect, 
multi-ethnic democracy unable to transform itself into a fully-fledged one because 
of the LTTE’s terrorism, Tamil Freedom sees it as a chauvinist entity that has to 
be resisted, compelled to respect Tamil aspirations and, for a permanent solution, 
radically transformed. At the heart of this contradiction were different conceptions 
of what ‘the Tamils’ were: whilst Liberal Peace saw them as a ethno-cultural 
category whose members are pail of the political collective of ‘Sri Lankans’,
Tamil Freedom saw the Tamils as an Qtlmo-polifical collective, bearing equal 
rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis the Sinhala collective. These two divergent 
conceptions of the Tamils underpinned different understandings of the Sri Lankan 
state, the aimed conflict, the LTTE and ‘peace’ as well as the appropriate form 
and trajectory of the peace process, the ceasefire and the ‘permanent solution’. As 
a senior Norwegian diplomat unselfconsciously observed in 2006, “when the 
international community talks about minority rights and pluralism, they do not 
realize the LTTE is coming from a different understanding. The international 
community has no understanding of where they are coming from.” (NW01 June 1,
148 US Ambassador Wills observed in 2003: "I've heard Tamils say that they may not like the 
LTTE's tactics but they need the Tigers to protect them. I think that's completely wrong. The 
LTTE's weapons and armed cadre aren't protecting Tamil rights; they're prolonging this conflict 
and delaying the day when Tamils can live in truly peaceful conditions.” Responding, LTTE Chief 
Negotiator Anton Balasingham (2003) said: "The Tamils resorted to aimed resistance as the last 
resort to defend their right to existence. Having gone through turbulent periods o f state repression 
and armed resistance, of failed negotiations and betrayals, the Tamil people have genuine fears and 
anxieties with regards to their safe and secure existence. I sincerely hope that the Americans will 
appreciate and understand the aspirations as well as apprehensions of a people who have faced 
genocidal oppression from State terrorism and violence.”
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2006). Or, as the LTTE’s Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham (TamilNet 2002e) 
said of the Tamils and the international community, “we are now operating 
entirely with different perceptions and categories.”
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7. Creating New Realities
As Rose (1999:31) points out, government does not just act on a pre-existing 
thought world with its natural divisions. Rather, to govern “is to cut experience in 
certain ways, to distribute attractions and repulsions, passions and fears across it, 
to bring new facets and forces, new intensities and relations into being” (ibid, 
emphasis added). Whilst, as Rose also notes, “this is partly a matter of time,” the 
point here is that it is governing itself that brings ‘natural* divisions into being and 
thus renders such orderings ‘real’. This underlines a paradox of government noted 
in Chapter 2: as Hindess (1993:308) points out, categories to be governed appear* 
at times as objective realities and at other times as collectivities that do not or do 
no longer properly exist. In the first case, practical decisions may be taken on the 
basis of the ‘natural’ or essential features of such entities, while in the other case, 
the question is how to create or re-create these collectivities (Ibid). In Sri Lanka, 
Liberal Peace seeks to reorder the collective humanity of the island into a single 
category, the Sri Lankan citizenry, whilst Tamil freedom seeks to reorder them 
into two distinct and equal ones -  the Tamil and Sinhala nations. It is this 
imperative that leads to Liberal Peace’s pursuit o f ‘ethnic reconciliation’ or ‘peace 
building’ and Tamil Freedom’s quest for ‘national unity’ and ‘recognition’. The 
former requires Tamils, as Japanese peace envoy Akashi (IANS 2006) told LTTE 
leader Pirapaharan, “to put aside their obviously very tragic, very real 
experiences” to meet the need for “the [Sri Lankan] people, irrespective of their 
ethnic origins, to look at their common future together”. In other words Tamils 
must willingly behave as part of a ‘Sri Lankan people’ so that this harmonious 
society may come into being. Conversely, Tamil Freedom requires Tamils to set 
aside their (‘internal’) differences and stand together against Sinhala oppression. 
As Pirapaharan replied to Akashi, it is through the deprivations of the past that the 
imperative for Tamils’ national liberation becomes clear’ (Ibid). In other words, 
Tamils must behave (unite) as a nation so that it may free itself of Sinhala 
domination.
In other words, governing through the rationalities of Tamil Freedom and Liberal 
Peace requires the inculcation of very different subjectivities amongst the island’s
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inhabitants. It means inciting, inducing, seducing individuals to take up specific 
attributes, values and capacities to act, and to discharge certain responsibilities of 
government i.e. to act upon themselves and others, to self-govem. The focus of 
this chapter is how the activities of a range of local and international actors after 
2002 sought to shape, guide and direct individuals’ and groups’ behaviour and 
actions in particular directions, to “structure their possible fields of action” 
(Foucault 2002c:341) -  or, as a senior Norwegian diplomat put it, to “create ‘new 
realities’” (NW01 August 16, 2006) -  such that they become well behaved, self- 
governing subjects.
Both liberal peace and Tamil national liberation are transformative projects which 
sought to bring into being specific orderings and divisions in the interests of their 
respective visions of lasting peace. In doing so, these govemmentalities faced 
specific forms of disarray. Liberal Peace had to contend with questions such as: 
How were ‘Sri Lankans’ to (again) see themselves as a united yet diverse 
collective? How were they to see themselves as rights bearing citizens - as 
opposed to members of distinct rights bearing collectives, irrespective of whether 
those rights stem from equality or hierarchy? How were all citizens and all 
communities to see themselves as ‘stakeholders’ in a shared Sri Lankan state and 
society of the future? Tamil Freedom faced different questions: How were Tamils 
to behave as a persecuted nation should? How were they to seek to address their 
unique problems, such as exclusion by the Sri Lankan state and scepticism of the 
international community towards their collective demand for self-rule. How were 
they to come together as one voice, demanding their nation’s rights -  to be free of 
state oppression, to self-determination, for equality with the Sinhala nation?
Government is “a domain of strategies, techniques and procedures” through which 
different forces seek to render programmes operable, and by means of which a 
multitude of connections are established between the aspirations of authorities and 
the activities of self-interested individuals and groups (Rose and Miller 
1992:183). In other words, government does not take place through some ‘top- 
down’ logic or imposed rationality, but through translation i.e. the forging of 
alliances between the aims of governors and the particular projects of those -  
organizations, groups, individuals -  who are subjects of government. Networks of
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government emerge not because the goals of government are necessarily 
consciously shared by those who participate in government, but because subjects 
of government come to construe their specific problems in allied ways.
The processes of governing inherent to Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom 
respectively are illustrated in this chapter by examining, on the one hand, the 
activities initiated and supported after 2002 by international agencies such as the 
Berghof Foundation which engaged in ‘peace building’, ‘conflict transformation5 
and similar activities, and, on the other, those of a myriad of Tamil actors -  the 
LTTE, the TNA, media, and community-based organisations, both in the 
homeland and in the Diaspora - which sought to address the problems faced by the 
Tamil nation. This is not to say that these activities comprise the totality of 
governing activities outside the ‘high politics’ of the Norwegian-led negotiation 
process between the LTTE and the GoSL (they do not). Rather it is to argue that 
the calculations, assumptions, desires and loathings reflected in a variety of 
important projects and activities of Tow politics’ pursued after 2002 sprang from 
two different understandings of the way things were, of what constituted a better 
world, and how it could and should be brought into being. The focus here is, 
therefore, on the micro-practices of government and the mundane attempts at 
conducting conduct.
7.1 Bringing Sri Lankans together
The emergence of liberal peace requires the transformation of individual, state and 
society, as well as the relationships between them, into specific ideal types (see 
Chapter 4). However, in 2002 Liberal Peace was faced with a contradiction: 
whilst it was held that ‘Sri Lankans’ were eager to put the war behind them and 
move on to a harmonious, well-governed and prosperous coexistence, it was also 
held that this would not naturally or spontaneously follow: “peace can not be 
expected to ‘just happen and persist’” (FLICT undated-a). Sri Lanka’s social 
fabric was held to have become fractured and riven in recent decades from an 
admixture of armed conflict, uneven and under-development, ethnic outbidding 
and nationalist mobilising, and similar problems. All ethnic communities were
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held to now have fears and aspirations vis-a-vis a political solution, stemming 
from zero-sum calculations worsened by the consequence of protracted war. In 
addition, amid conditions of war and (ongoing) patronage, corruption, ‘over- 
centralisation5 and institutional weakness, many people had become distanced, 
disconnected or alienated from the state. Although the aimed conflict had been 
halted, other conflicts and associated forms of ‘violence5 -such as over caste, 
class religion, gender or access to resources and opportunities- were continuing 
across the island in communities, villages and homes (see, for example, FSCT 
2005, FLICT 2005 :i). Thus, trapped in self-reinforcing webs of antagonism and 
societal conflict of all sorts, Sri Lankans were unable to progress towards the 
united, harmonious and well governed society that they all, nonetheless, desired. 
There was hence a need for determined international intervention to ensure that 
they could and did. As one leading donor-funded peacebuilding project in Sri 
Lanka, FLICT (Facilitating Local Initiatives for Conflict Transformation), argues, 
“socio-economic development needs to be supported 
with efforts to restore trust in democratic processes and 
institutions and strengthening them to transform Sri 
Lanka into a society that is able to accept its pluralistic 
identity’5 (2005:1, emphasis, added).
The question was how this could be made to happen. Firstly, therefore, the central 
arena for peacebuilding and conflict transformation was society itself.149 Whilst a 
negotiated political solution was necessary for peace, this was not sufficient: 
“these top level interventions are crucial, ... [but] the involvement of middle and 
lower levels in peace building is an essential pre-requisite to bringing about 
sustained changes in social structures and processes55 (FLICT 2005:2).150 The 
central plank for international efforts at conflict transformation and peacebuilding, 
crucially, is thus not ending institutionalised majoritarianism or rebalancing state 
power between Sri Lanka's peoples, but rather addressing problems in Sri
149 Whilst there are important differences in the purposes, logics, processes, etc between conflict 
transformation and peace building, for the purposes of this chapter, which focuses on attempts to 
transform Sri Lankan society -  as opposed to changing the conduct of the LTTE, LTTE-GoSL 
relations, or the state’s governance practices, for example, these labels are used interchangeably.
150 It is worth noting how this conceptualization decouples the production of ‘peace5 from (the 
vagaries of) the LTTE-GoSL negotiation process.
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Lankans’ interactions with each other i.e. physical and attitudinal separations 
amongst individuals, communities and groups, including their misplaced fears and 
anxieties; seemingly incompatible (but eminently negotiable) political aspirations; 
zero-sum, non-cooperative and particularistic ways of thinking and so on. As 
such, whilst armed conflict is seen as a negative externality exploiting and, in 
turn, fuelling these divisions within society, internationally backed peacebuilding 
is envisioned as another externality, but a positive one that would instead 
ameliorate these. What was required to make peace in the island was to first create 
the overarching conditions in which the process of stitching Sri Lankan society 
(back) together could proceed, and thereafter, to actively undertake efforts to this 
end. In 2002, with the former achieved through the internationally monitored 
ceasefire, the emphasis was very much on the latter. The sought after 
transformations within society were sweeping and radical. Sri Lankans had to 
become more tolerant of their differences, less fixated 011 their ethnicity or 
religion as politically salient identities and to reject violence and rebellion against 
the state. They also had to come to eschew patronage, subsidies and other 
dependencies on the state and to become more assertive vis-a-vis the state, 
insisting on their human and constitutional rights and the ‘good governance’ they 
were all entitled to.
Secondly, the vehicle by which citizens’ relationships with each other and with 
their state should be mediated was ‘civil society’. Civil society, coincidently, was 
also the mechanism by which the international community could undertake the 
requisite transformation of Sri Lanka’s fractured society. At the same time, 
however, it was held that civil society, where it existed in Sri Lanka, was weak 
and stifled by dominant forces such as nationalist movements (like the LTTE or 
JVP), powerful landowners, business interests, and so on (see, for example, 
Orjuela’s (2003) discussion on polarisations within Sri Lankan civil society). 
There was therefore a need to foster the emergence and strengthening of an active 
civil society unconstrained by such particularist forces and committed, moreover, 
to the values of liberal peace. To this end, international peacebuilding efforts had 
to bypass the state — with its understanding and approval, of course - and to 
engage ‘directly’ with citizens. As FLICT (undated-a) states, its work
215
“is based 011 the assumption that active and skilled civil 
society organisations can contribute significantly 
towards the acceptance of pluralistic values and non­
violent conflict resolution; leading to a peaceful 
tolerant society, which adopts more democratic means 
of decision-making and is able to cherish diversity and 
pluralistic values”.
Thus, soon after the ceasefire began, the international community -  here mainly 
the Western bilateral donors151 - backed several local initiatives for conflict 
transformation and peace building. These sought variously to raise ‘public 
support’ for the negotiations and wider process, encourage cultural diversity and 
tolerance, promote inter-religious and inter-ethnic cooperation, erase 
developmental asymmetries, protect ‘vulnerable’ and ‘marginalized’ groups, build 
‘constituencies for peace’, and similar goals. Donors funded projects, among other 
things, to initiate inter-ethnic dialogue, foster discussion of constitutional models 
(especially federalism), train media to be more ‘professional’, teach ‘local 
communities’ to resolve their problems peaceably through discussion and 
compromise, or ‘raise awareness’ of human and gender rights. Tamils, Sinhalese 
and Muslims were brought together in all manner of engineered social 
interactions, local peace-builders were sought out, encouraged and ‘empowered’, 
and a variety of ‘experts’ were inducted to train, advise, and supervise them (see, 
for example, the activities of the Berghof Foundation (2008) outlined in its end- 
of-project report).
Soon after the peace process began, various combinations of donors set up at least 
four* significant programmes - “peace funds” - to facilitate conflict transformation
151 These included Germany, UK, Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland and Canada (Burke and 
Mulakela 2005:13-14). Whilst the proportion of international aid devoted to transforming conflict 
and building peace was small -  the three top donors by far (Japan, World Bank and ADB provided 
over 75% of Sri Lanka’s aid) focused on economic reforms and development, supposedly in a 
‘conflict sensitive’ way (Ibid:5, 24-25) -  the amount expended on ‘peace’ by these countries after 
2002 was significant.
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and peace building in Sri Lanka.152 Whilst there were important differences in
these projects’ areas of focus and operational styles, these are not of concern to
this dissertation, given the focus here on the thought involved in the
problematizations and programmes engendered by Liberal Peace. This study uses
as illustrative examples the activities of one of the larger operations, FLICT
(funded by the Development ministries of UK, Germany and Australia), those of
FSCT (Food Security and Conflict Transformation Project), a small ‘coalface’
conflict-transformation organisation, also funded by Germany and those of the
highly influential Berghof Foundation’s Sri Lanka operation, jointly funded by 
• 1Germany and Switzerland. The focus here is on international interventions to 
transform society i.e. ‘ordinary’ Sri Lankans’ relationships with each other and, 
separately, with their state. Whereas FSCT’s projects are illustrative of efforts to 
transform individuals -  via ‘communities’, FLICT’s work exemplifies 
international attempts to establish and foster ‘civil society’ as both an end in itself 
and as a means towards transforming the conduct of individuals and thus society. 
The Berghof Foundation’s activities, like FLICT’s, are demonstrative of how 
networks of governance were encouraged to translate the ambitions of Liberal 
Peace into the micro-practices of various actors (including elements of the Sri 
Lankan state also) operating ‘at a distance’ from the centres of global liberal 
governance.
Of lacks and capacity
The way to the ideal of a diverse but united, harmonious and peaceful Sri Lankan 
society was through the provision of spaces and mechanisms for non-violent 
interaction amongst its different factions, and the inculcation of peaceable
152 Apart from FLICT, the others were a program for ‘Promoting the Benefits o f Peace’, run by the 
Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the ‘National Program for Peace and Development by Civil Society’ managed by the 
long-established local Consortium o f Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) and funded by the 
Netherlands, Australia, Sweden and Denmark, and the ‘Small Grants Fund in Support of Peace’ 
run by UNDP (Keenan 2005)
153 The study draws on these organizations’ websites and publications - including a controversial 
donor review of FLICT (Keenan 2005) which is closely guarded but nonetheless circulates 
amongst some Sri Lankan journalists - as well as interviews with prominent individuals in the 
wider international peace building/conflict transformation community in Sri Lanka.
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approaches to resolving disputes, tensions and conflicts. Crucially, Sri Lankans’ 
apprehensions and fears were held to stem from their not being aware of, or not 
appreciating, those of others, and from their inability to see that the interests and 
aspirations of all could be best met through compromise and cooperation, that a 
political solution acceptable to all was both desirable and entirely possible. These 
shortcomings within Sri Lanka’s society were held to stem, moreover, from 
specific, identifiable lacks: a lack of physical access to other communities and 
thus a lack of interaction (such as trade, dialogue or sports), a lack of secure 
spaces for tensions to be non-violently worked out, a lack of skills (to 
communicate, to negotiate, to mediate, etc.), a lack of understanding and 
knowledge (of complex constitutional forms, of how other similar, if not identical, 
conflicts had been resolved, of forms of political compromise, etc), a lack of 
experience of the benefits and obligations of belonging to a multi-cultural, multi­
ethnic, multi-religious society, and even of protected human and gender rights, 
and so on. These lacks, moreover, were precisely what the international 
community was well able to address. Expertise, skills, funding and access to 
international networks and spaces could be amply supplied by a range of 
international actors -  states, NGOs, businesses, experts -  and who, in the service 
of Tasting peace’ in Sri Lanka, were more than prepared to do so.
A key objective of international intervention was therefore that of ‘capacity- 
building’, whereby Sri Lankan individuals and organisations would not only come 
to participate in activities to build peace between and amongst themselves and 
thereby acquire the capacity for self-government, but also to attain the 
wherewithal to propagate appropriate behaviours, ideas and values further afield 
within their (local) communities, social networks, work places and so on. 
Concomitant with all manner of lacks, there were all kinds of capacities that 
needed to be built, from those of villagers in outlying areas who had to learn to 
interact and share resources with different or antagonistic 
(ethnic/religious/caste/gender/etc.) others, to elite circles concerned with 
constitutional reform, power-sharing, and so on. To this end, donors funded for 
ordinary Sri Lankans myriad training programmes - on human rights, negotiation 
skills, peace building and conflict-resolution skills (conflict here being not just 
armed conflict, but also communal tensions, domestic disputes, village feuds, etc)
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and ‘trauma’ counselling, amongst others. Sri Lankan parliamentarians, 
constitutional lawyers, even a 25-member LTTE delegation, and others were 
taken 011 study tours to countries deemed success stories in peace-making (South 
Africa and Northern Ireland, for example) or operating various models of 
government and power-sharing (especially several in Europe). Various 
international experts and personalities were brought to the island to impart their 
‘experience’ -  the latter included, for example, Rolf Meyer, the chief negotiator 
for the Apartheid government vis-a-vis the ANC and Martin McGuinness, the 
IRA’s negotiator with the British government, whilst amongst the former were 
various prominent scholars of federalism.
The key point here is the problem definition of Sri Lanka’s troubles inherent to 
these activities: it is not state oppression or institutionalised majoritarianism that 
is held to sustain conflict, but the lack of the wherewithal (expertise, knowledge, 
etc.) amongst Sri Lankans, including various elites, to translate their competing 
aspirations and demands into models acceptable to all. As such, rather than the 
peace process itself, it was the socio-political environment in the country 
conducive to ethnic reconciliation engendered by the LTTE-GoSL negotiations 
that made possible the addressing of “the more deep-rooted conflict 
transformation needs in the country” (FLICT undated-a, emphasis added). The 
Berghof Foundation, the leading international peace agency in Sri Lanka, 
summarised its efforts after 2005 - when the peace process was undeniably 
disintegrating - as comprising:
“dialogue promotion and capacity building on issues of 
state reform, power-sharing, devolution and federalism; 
institutional capacity building and programme support 
for peace-related organisations close to key 
stakeholders; and promoting opportunities for dialogues 
and discourses on ‘multiple peaceful futures’”
(2008:10).
What is notable here is how the practices of peacebuilding (based on concepts 
such as Tacks’, ‘capacity building’, ‘dialogue promotion’, ‘promoting 
opportunities’, and so on) render apolitical an essentially political project: that of
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transforming individual, state and society in Sri Lanka into those compatible with 
liberal peace. This ‘depoliticising’ - or, as this study argues, ‘re-politicising’ (see 
Chapter 3) - was exemplified by repeated assertions by all international actors, 
including the Berghof Foundation (2008:12), that “we did not advocate any 
particular solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka [but] rather we were committed to 
helping Sri Lankan stakeholders find lasting peace for all communities in Sri 
Lanka.” Even this disavowal was not entirely accurate as much international 
peace-building activity was, at least in the early stages, geared towards promoting 
federalism (though the point here is how Sri Lankans were themselves to arrive at 
this model as best suiting all their various political aspirations). What was 
completely ruled out in international peacebuilding efforts therefore was 
recognition of the Tamils -  and, for that matter, the Sinhalese -  as a collective 
bearing its own politico-territorial rights, especially that of self-determination. 
Instead, peace in international peace building has a specific meaning: as FLICT 
put it, “our dream [is] a peaceful, pluralistic, democratic, inclusive, and 
prosperous Sri Lanka” (undated-a). That international ‘peace-building’ efforts 
expanded rapidly in Sri Lanka after 2002 even without a political settlement 
having been reached underlines how the former presumed and anticipated the 
content and form of the latter.
Individual conduct and liberal peace
The FSCT was a Germany-funded initiative that sought from 2003-2006 to work 
with internally displaced people returning to resettle in Batticaloa (FSCT 2005:1). 
Batticaloa is a Tamil-speaking district in the island’s east with a history of deep 
animosity between the Tamils and the Muslims and protracted aimed conflict 
between the LTTE and the military. The context of Tamil displacement here is a 
particularly brutal history of large-scale massacres and atrocities by the military, 
the police’s counter-insurgency Special Task Force and military-backed Muslim 
and Sinhala militias (Hasbullah et al 2005, McGilvray 1997, 2001). The context 
of Tamils’ impoverishment is one of state seizures of privately owned land, state- 
backed Sinhala colonisation, repeated displacement by GoSL offensives, state- 
imposed embargo (on the Tamil-dominated, LTTE-controlled hinterland) and the
220
concomitant economic growth, relative to the Tamils, of the Muslim community 
(located mainly in government-controlled areas on or close to the coast). The 
southern part of Batticaloa was aggressively settled with Sinhalese by the state 
and eventually hived off into a separate district -  Amparai. Batticaloa can 
therefore be seen as a locality that brings together many of the overarching 
problems faced by Sri Lanka’s Tamils -  violence by the Sinhala military, 
embargo and economic neglect by the state, Sinhala colonisation of Tamil areas, 
and so on. In this context, FSCT’s approach to ‘conflict transformation’, set out in 
a 2005 strategy document, and summarised below, is emblematic.
To begin with, FSCT has a view of what it seeks to transform: the strategy 
document warns that in Batticaloa “the word ‘conflict’ is “immediately associated 
with the ethno-political conflict in the country [but the] people tend to ignore that 
there are various other conflicts within households and communities causing more 
tensions and problems in villages.” (FSCT 2005:2, emphasis, insert added). 
Moreover, whilst aiming to address “all levels” of conflict, FSCT “believes that 
these arise from structural, economic and socio-cultural gaps that prevail in 
society” (Ibid:l, emphasis added). Thus, the overarching context of Sri Lanka’s 
thirty-year war, the ethno-political developments since independence and the 
present skewed distribution of state power, all of which impact on locales like 
Batticaloa across the island, are effaced and the focus is instead directed to 
individuals’ and communities’ supposedly problematic social interactions. FSCT 
points out that “a project and its participants have to be politically and socially 
neutral. However, as .., change agents, a project must always side with the 
weaker and poorer members of society. Only then can it have impacts in peace” 
(Ibid:4). Moreover, the ‘main disputes’ in the Batticaloa communities where 
FSCT operates are said to be “about land and water” while the main causes of 
conflict within communities are “grievances and greed” (Ibid:2,4). As such, with 
people returning from refugee camps to their homes, “a rehabilitation and 
development process for victims of conflict will contribute to reducing conflict 
and increase capacities for peace” (Ibid:2, emphasis added). Notably, the 
definition of displaced Tamils as victims of ‘conflict’ - as opposed to ethnic 
persecution by the military and state -  makes possible the pursuit of specific 
peacebuilding programmes and not others, even at the local level. However, in
221
any case, “conflict sensitive/conflict preventive rehabilitation and development” is 
held to be not enough to build peace; in addition, FSCT also “aims to build the 
capacity o f local communities to transform conflicts and build peace” (2005:1 
emphasis added). In other words, ordinary people have to take responsibility for 
resolving (their own) conflicts and for their own development (Ibid:4). FSCT 
nonetheless has an important role in all this because, at present, “their [returning 
displaced people’s] current self-help capacity and self-reliance is non-existent” 
(Ibid: 1).
Crucially, it is work that will set the people free of their prejudices: the activity of 
development itself must serve to attenuate society’s tensions and animosities. 
Firstly, FSCT projects must place an emphasis on “giving and sharing” amongst 
recipients, as this “is one of the most important indicators of a peaceful society or 
one that is capable of living in peace” (Ibid: 1,4 emphasis added). Communities 
must learn to look out for the weaker and poorer individuals amongst them, “to 
include the excluded”, to take pride in shunning assistance and instead directing 
these to the more needy (Ibid:6). FSCT itself will, anyway, be careful to ensure 
this happens, that the poorer and weaker sections of a community do receive the 
most benefits from a project (Ibid:5). (The latter are identified, moreover, by a 
process of “participatory wealth ranking” of the community’s members (Ibid:6).) 
Secondly, people must learnt to collaborate and cooperate; they “must be 
organised into groups so that they can collectively engage in concrete activities to 
improve their quality of life”, while development work “must be implemented in a 
labour intensive manner” (Ibid:6,7). Men and women, different castes, etc should 
work together on building houses, schools and so on. Moreover, the FSCT project, 
“while teaching local communities about their rights, also focuses on making 
them aware of their responsibilities towards their own development, and how they 
can assist others who are vulnerable” (Ibid:3). However, it is not a question of 
supervision, but 'participation’: quite apart from working together, “in order to 
reduce the gap between people in society, people’s voices need to be heard” 
(Ibid:9).
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The trusteeship manifestly inherent to the work of FSCT and other development 
actors across the global South has been well studied.154 Indeed, the work of FSCT 
is emblematic of the early form of governmental management, that Foucault terms 
‘police’ (Foucault 2007,chapters 12 and 13), whereby rule was effected by 
rendering populations transparent and ordered through detailed administrative 
interventions. The salience of FSCT’s practices for this chapter, however, is in 
relation to the redefinition of the Sri Lankan conflict inherent to them. Firstly, the 
circumstances of Tamils (in the volatile eastern province in this case) come to be 
reframed such that the alleviation of their deprivations becomes a question of 
addressing lacks inherent to them and their interactions with others, rather than 
addressing Sinhala domination of the state or its pursuit of a violent project to 
alter the demographics of the east. Secondly, the individuals concerned, whilst 
acknowledged as ‘victims’, nonetheless have to adopt specific forms of social 
behaviour if they are to receive international rehabilitation/ development 
assistance. In other words, international aid, especially when directed towards 
‘conflict transformation’ and ‘peacebuilding’ in ways exemplified by FSCT, 
becomes part of a disciplinary framework directed towards changing the 
behaviours of individuals and communities in the warzone to those compatible 
with liberal peace across the island.
It is in this context, moreover, that the frequently repeated maxim of international 
development actors to be seeking out the “most vulnerable”, “the poorest”, “the 
marginalized”, “the disadvantaged” and so on for assistance should be seen. In 
other words, “the voiceless” must be celebrated and made audible, provided they 
speak of a particular kind of peace (liberal peace), rather than of ethno-political 
rights or, especially, resisting the state. Communities and individuals genuinely 
committed to ‘peace’ in this framework cannot participate, for example, in 
political mobilisations towards Tamil liberation (such as organising rallies, 
protests and so on) or, especially, in activities supportive of Tamil Eelam, the 
LTTE or armed struggle. As FLICT noted while calling for peace building 
proposals from Sri Lankan (civil) society, projects “should work towards the 
transcendence of narrow identities of Sinhala, Muslim and Tamil subjects and to
154 See, for example, Ferguson 1994, Escobar 1995, Duffield 2001, Abrahamson 2004, Li 2007.
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develop a common culture enabling people to deal with dissent democratically 
and non-violently” (undated-c, emphasis added).
Networks of liberal peacebuilding
As noted earlier, whilst Sri Lankan society is the wellspring from which liberal 
peace would emerge, civil society was both the means through which individuals’ 
and groups’ conduct could be shaped, guided and directed towards this, as well as 
the medium between citizens and state through which (present and future) societal 
conflicts were to be resolved. At the same time, it was held in 2002 that civil 
society in Sri Lanka was anaemic and marginalized by more powerful societal 
forces such as nationalist movements and patron-client networks (NW04, May 31, 
2006, INT04, August 17, 2006). The first step towards peacebuilding, after 
silencing the guns, was therefore “creating a network of [peace] organisations, 
domestic and international, to ensure this work can be carried forward” (Berghof 
Foimdation 2008:10, insert added). Peacebuilding necessitated ‘partnerships’ 
between those outside seeking peace for Sri Lankans and those Sri Lankans 
seeking peace for themselves. The activities of international peace organizations 
such as the Berghof Foundation (2008:11) tinned crucially, therefore, on their 
“close collaboration with several domestic partner organizations from civil 
society, academia and the public sector” on one hand, and “international [expert] 
organizations such as the Forum of Federations (Canada) and the Swiss Institute 
of Federalism” on the other.
To begin with, conceptualising peace as something that must emerge from the 
activities of a network traversing ethnicities and regions as well as the inside and 
outside of Sri Lankan (constitutional/social/political) space in itself contrasts 
sharply with the idea of peace turning on the outcome of ethnic collectives 
negotiating with each other, as politically organized wholes, to reach political 
accommodation and a lasting constitutional solution. What exactly constitutes 
peace here is embedded within the organising and functioning of peacebuilding 
networks. As exemplified by FLICT’s call for proposals above, despite the 
repeated insistence by international actors -  and echoed by some of their local
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‘partners’ - that only Sri Lankans could solve their ‘own’ problems, as well as 
peace-builders’ assertions they did not advocate “any particular solution to the 
conflict”, what exactly constituted peace and thus what is meant by ‘peace- 
related’ (Berghof 2008:10) was also embedded in the discourses and practices of 
international peacebuilding. For example, a conference on the meaning of self- 
determination that brings together participants of different ethnicities and various 
views - even ‘extreme’ ones -  is a peace related activity, but organising a Ponghu 
Thamil rally to call for ‘Tamil Self-Determination’ is not. The former must be 
supported and the latter avoided. With regards to civil society, producing ‘peace’ 
meant strengthening and supporting some local actors over others, incorporating 
the former into the peace-building networks and either excluding the problematic 
latter or including them in tightly circumscribed ways into specific spaces of 
‘dialogue’. Thus, despite international peace-builders’ claimed indifference to the 
specificity of political solutions, the kinds of (local) partners they sought out, the 
projects they were prepared to fund, the expertise they would induct, and so on, 
were geared specifically towards a specific vision of a future Sri Lanka: a multi­
ethnic, multi-religious society and polity and, at least fiom 2002 to 2006, a federal 
constitutional structure.
These dynamics are amply illustrated by the activities of FLICT, whose very 
raison d’etre was to facilitate the emergence of island wide peacebuilding activity 
by “strengthening the capacity of Sri Lankan civil society to contribute towards 
conflict transformation, particularly at the local level” (2005:1). FLICT’s concern, 
therefore, was first to foster the emergence of appropriate “intermediary” 
organisations to work ‘at the local level’ in all areas of the island and deal with the 
different lacks found in Sri Lankan society, and thereafter to select and strengthen 
such entities through supplies of funding and expertise of various kinds. To this 
end, with substantial donor funds to hand, FLICT established a small coordinating 
hub and then widely publicised its calls for peacebuilding proposals in a number 
of defined ‘issue areas’, including “strengthening democratic space in the 
Northeast”, “supporting peace through transformative cultural practices”, 
“building democratic and pluralist forms of governance”, “civil society 
reconciliation mechanisms” and so on (2005:2,8-9). In short, existing or newly 
formed civil society actors could apply for FLICT grants to pursue, in their local
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areas, activities falling into one or more of the defined issue areas, and for grants 
to strengthen themselves institutionally to this end (Ibid:5).
Some of the “more promising” examples of conflict transformation supported by 
FLICT, according to one of two self-commissioned reviews (Keenan 2005: Annex 
One), include organisations such as: ‘Peace-Promoting Women’, which taught 
Tamil to Sinhalese people and Sinhalese to Tamils and Muslims; ‘Jana Karaliya’, 
a travelling “multi-ethnic and multi-lingual theatre with democratic and inclusive 
spirit” (and described by the review as “an exemplary case of using the arts for 
peacebuilding and politically transformative purposes”); ‘Child Rehabilitation 
Centre’ in Amparai which brought together Tamil girls and women (from LTTE 
areas) with Sinhalese girls and women -  hailed as an instance of “cross-ethnic 
exchange”; productions by ‘YATV’ television and other media - “which promise 
to influence at least some minds in positive ways”, and a peacebuilding course for 
LTTE cadres by Bradford University and the Socialist Studies Association (SSA). 
Initially, amongst the works supported by FLICT was the dissemination to the 
public of ‘awareness’ of the LTTE-GoSL negotiations -  which at the time were 
seemingly fast moving towards a federal solution. However, as the talks broke 
down, donors were urging FLICT to “shift from focussing on the macro-level 
peace process to strengthening the ability of civil society actors to deal with both 
existing conflicts and those emerging” (2005:5). Notably, this shift was intended 
to “better enable civil society forces to set their own agenda of peace, equality and 
inclusiveness rather than simply following the agenda set by larger and more 
powerful forces” (Ibid, emphasis added). In other words, peacebuilding could still 
proceed, for example, even if there was no progress towards a negotiated political 
solution, or if the LTTE was attempting to restart negotiations on its interim 
administration (ISGA) proposals.
The process and criteria adopted by FLICT and similar international ‘peace funds’ 
to select their ‘partners'’ and ‘intermediaries’ for local peacebuilding meant that 
the peacebuilding network in Sri Lanka came to comprise solely those actors 
advocating and promoting the elements of liberal peace. Activities by local actors 
outside this space, be they Tamils arguing for self-determination and 
independence or Sinhalese promoting majoritarian rule, were largely frozen out
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and reduced instead to objects of peace-related study and management. Inclusivity 
may be a foundational principle of liberal peacebuilding, but it only applies to 
those who embrace its principles in the first place. The peace-related network that 
rapidly emerged after 2002 centred especially on a small number of Colombo 
based NGOs, staffed by elite, English-speaking Sri Lankans with university 
educations. This handful of donor-supported TocaT organisations, alongside 
international agencies and the “peace funds”, came to hold considerable sway 
over most peacebuilding activity in Sri Lanka, either as implementers or as 
overseers, referees and critics of other local actors’ efforts. In short, they come to 
speak authoritatively on what was ‘peace-related’ and what was not, when it came 
to both organisations and their project ideas. Thus, whilst it was accepted that 
self-interests were often at play in the nodes of the peacebuilding network (for 
example, that new organisations were “mushrooming” to take advantage of 
available international funds, that individuals were attending courses on 
peacebuilding, journalism, etc for their own career ambitions, and so on), the 
point here is that liberal peace nonetheless became established as the only game in 
town, if there was to be any local engagement with the international community.
In other words, those subscribing to Tamil (national) self-determination, for 
example, were largely excluded from ‘peace-building’ processes on the basis of 
their political views alone.
The point is well illustrated by the case of NESOHR (North East Secretariat On 
Human Rights), which was established in mid-2004 in the LTTE-controlled Vanni 
to monitor rights violations and implement actions to strengthen human rights in 
the Northeast (NESOHR 2004). Whilst it was welcomed by the LTTE, 
NESOHR’s staff comprised religious leaders, parliamentarians, union officials 
and civil society activists, but not LTTE members. Yet NESOHR’s efforts to 
secure international financial support so as to be able to function as an 
independent human rights group proved dismally abortive: donors refused funding 
on the grounds that NESOHR -  based in Vanni - was part of the LTTE’s civil 
administration structure and therefore not independent - even though the body was 
staffed by prominent, archetypal ‘civil society’ persons. By contrast, the Human 
Rights Commission or HRC, which was set up and funded by the Sri Lankan 
government, did not suffer fi'om such doubts about its neutrality (the HRC was
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even formally incorporated into the ‘human rights’ promotion aspect of the 
Norwegian peace process). The difference is the context ascribed to ‘human rights 
violations’ by the practices of NESOHR and HRC respectively. Whilst the former 
was concerned with the Northeast (i.e. the Tamil homeland), the latter represented 
an island-wide concern, for example. The point here is that ‘peace-related’ actors 
are identified not simply by their focus — here the quintessential liberal peace 
concern of human rights - but rather their conceptualisation of what constituted 
‘natural divisions’ on the island.
In concluding this section, it is worth noting the striking failure of Liberal Peace 
to produce a diverse yet united and harmonious Sri Lankan citizenry, despite 
substantial investment after 2002 of funding, expertise and institution building. 
This failure is reflected in the results of the Social Indicator (2004) survey 
outlined in the next section, for example, and especially in the rapid emergence 
since mid-2005, of hyper -nationalist sentiments amongst the Sinhala public and a 
political climate stridently intolerant towards minorities (Hampton, forthcoming 
2009, Blake 2009). That Sri Lanka did not become “an internationally supported 
success story in liberal peacebuilding” (Goodhand et al 2005:67) is not, however, 
merely a consequence of insufficient funding, weaknesses in Sri Lankan civil 
society, inefficiencies in peace-building, or the escalation in ‘shadow’ violence 
from 2003. Rather, this failure of Liberal Peace can be seen as the outcome of the 
consequences o f ‘counter-conducts’ (Foucault cited in Gordon 1991:5) i.e. 
governmental efforts undertaken within other, competing rationalities: Tamil 
Freedom and Sinhala-Buddhism.
7.2 Uniting the Tamil nation
In 2003 and 2004, hundreds of thousands of Tamils attended a series of mass 
rallies, held in each of the seven districts of the Northeast, to express their support 
for the Tamils’ right to self-determination. The stages of the ‘Ponghu ThamiP 
(Tamil Upsurge) rallies were trod by a range of speakers -  TNA MPs, LTTE 
Political officers, Tamil community activists, even religious leaders -  and were 
decorated with huge cutouts of the Eelam silhouette, the LTTE’s emblem,
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sometimes pictures of LTTE leader Pirapaharan, and signature red-and-yellow 
(‘Tamil national colours5) bunting. Meanwhile, in the April 2004 Parliamentary 
elections, the TNA won all 22 Northeastern seats it contested. It did so, having 
endorsed the LTTE in its manifesto as “the national leadership of the Tamil Eelam 
Tamils and ... as the sole and authentic representatives of the Tamil people”, and 
stating it was issuing
“a clarion call to the Tamil-speaking people to unite 
under one flag and give overwhelming support to the 
TNA ... so as to emphasize the aims of the people of 
the Tamil Nation, to proclaim again the political 
resolve of our people, to strengthen further the Tamil 
nation and to win the political rights of the Tamil 
speaking people” (TNA 2004: para 19).
The manifesto also declared:
“Let us endeavour' determinedly, collectively as one 
group, one nation, one country ... under the leadership 
of the LTTE for a life of liberty, honor and justice for 
the Tamil people. Let us work side by side with the 
LTTE, who are fighting for the protection and 
autonomous life of the Tamil speaking people, for the 
political initiatives under their leadership” (Ibid).
What is remarkable about both the success of the Ponghu Thamil rallies -  held 
mainly in GoSL-controlled locations in the Northeast - and the TNA’s electoral 
results of 2004 (as well as in 2001) is that for at least a decade before the CFA, 
there had been almost no major Tamil ‘nationalist’ political activity (rallies, 
campaigning, etc) in Sri Lanka. The TNA itself was a recent coalition, having 
been formed in 2001 and including some parties that until shortly before then had 
been opponents of the LTTE and even allies of ruling Sinhala parties. Indeed, in 
the mid nineties, the TULF and the Tamil paramilitary groups were even being 
promoted, on the basis of their participation in elections, as the ‘authentic’ Tamil 
leadership. The question, therefore, is how, despite grumbles about LTTE taxation 
and fears of recruitment or conscription by the LTTE, an internationally funded
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survey of public opinion in 2004 found that even in government-controlled areas, 
94% of Tamil respondents endorsed the establishment of a LTTE-run interim 
administration for the Northeast (Social Indicator 2004:22), and why the TNA 
(2004:paral8.10) could endorse the LTTE as ‘authentic sole representatives’ of 
the Tamils and resoundingly win elections in the Northeast. While critics and 
opponents of the LTTE, not least Sinhala nationalists, have suggested intimidation 
of the population, vote-rigging and so on, an analysis that focuses on the micro­
practices after 2002 provides an alternative explanation, one that centres on the 
production of Tamil parliamentarians, community organisations and individuals 
as self-governing subjects of Tamil Freedom.
Making up the TNA
Whilst the TNA was formally established in late 2001, shortly before the 
December Parliamentary elections at which it won the 15 seats it contested, the 
dynamics that led up to this began well before then. As noted earlier, in the late 
nineties many Tamil parties, including the TNA constituent members (except the 
ACTC), were allied to President Kumaratunga’s SLFP-led ruling coalition. As the 
GoSL, with overt international support, launched its ‘War for Peace’ to destroy 
the LTTE, the TULF and Tamil paramilitary groups were promoted by Colombo 
and accepted by international actors as the ‘democratic’, and thus ‘authentic’, 
leadership of Sri Lanka’s Tamils. These parties sided with the GoSL, for example 
on the monthly votes to renew the draconian Emergency Regulations and 
endorsed Kumaratunga’s ‘Devolution Proposals’ which were hailed by 
international actors as radical and ground-breaking, but had been critiqued by 
other Tamil voices (see for example TIC 1996). However, as the ‘War for Peace’ 
became bogged down in the northern battlefield, these dynamics changed. The 
sufferings of Tamil civilians worsened as the government’s embargo on LTTE- 
controlled areas precipitated acute shortages of food and medicine while 
abductions, extra-judicial killings, torture and rape of civilians became 
widespread in GoSL-controlled Tamil areas. Under the Emergency Regulations, 
thousands of Tamils were mass detained without charge, often for years. Most 
importantly, the Devolution Package (which had been co-drafted by the TULF)
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withered in Parliament, first watered-down under Sinhala opposition (UNP) 
criticism and finally defeated in a vote. Meanwhile, the LTTE’s counter­
offensives took back lost territory and captured important Sri Lankan military 
bases. International frustration with the GoSL’s conduct of the war resulted in aid 
being curtailed and mounting criticism becoming open.
Against this backdrop, some members of the putative Tamil leadership began to 
change their conduct.155 Without any coordination, these parties began to first 
abstain and then vote against the Emergency Regulations. They became openly 
critical of the Sinhala parties conduct and of the ‘War for Peace’. From October
2000, “it was almost like there was an understanding [amongst us] on how to 
behave, on what to say and do,” one party leader said (TNA01 June 10, 2006). 
“These changes were picked up by the [Tamil] media, all the [Tamil] newspapers. 
They praised the behaviour of the Tamil parties, sometimes speaking of the ‘10- 
party’ alliance - though there was no such tiring” (ibid, emphasis added).156 In
2001, six TULF emissaries began informally sounding out rival parties (those 
with armed wings were not included) on a short-term electoral alliance. The logic 
was Tamil parties should be united and not undercut each other in securing space 
for Tamil interests to be articulated. Though the parties could not come together 
on a specific political formula, they agreed (again) on the Thimpu principles: 
recognition of the Tamils as a nation, of the Tamil homeland, and the Tamils’ 
right to self-determination. They also agreed that GoSL must “immediately [stop] 
the war being currently waged in the northeast” and commence negotiations with 
the LTTE “with international third party involvement” - then being strongly 
opposed by the government (TNA 2001). Crucially, they also agreed “in order to 
ensure that the negotiations are properly focussed and are purposeful and 
successful, no parallel negotiations should take place with any other Tamil 
political formation” (ibid). They also wanted the ban on the LTTE lifted on the 
basis that “such proscription does not constitute an impediment to the free and full
155 A notable exception was the paramilitary EPDP (Eelam People’s Democratic Party), a former 
militant group whose leadership has consistently backed the SLFP-led governments.
156 “We had a sense o f Tamils having to be united at this juncture -  the people were suffering, the 
war was going badly for the government, the international community was unhappy with it. The 
climate was changing and we felt the Tamils shouldn’t be with the government” (TNA01 June 10, 
2006)
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participation of the LTTE at such negotiations on behalf o f the Tamil nationality” 
(ibid, emphasis added). Shortly before the December 2001 polls, the TNA 
emerged as an alliance on these bases.
Whatever the individual calculations of the constituent parties in joining the TNA 
and subscribing to its manifesto, the effect, especially after the coalition’s 2001 
resounding win, was to constitute as ‘real’ a particular* ordering of the world. The 
TNA was according the LTTE not only the right, but also the responsibility for 
negotiating on behalf of the Tamils. The LTTE’s armed struggle, moreover, was 
held to “occupy a pivotal role in the struggle of the Tamil nationality to win their 
rights” while “any attempt to draw a distinction between the LTTE and the Tamil 
people was meaningless” (TNA 2001, emphasis added). These stances have to be 
seen, moreover, amidst the parties’ full awareness of international sentiments on 
the ‘terrorist’ LTTE and on Sri Lanka’s ethnic question. Whatever the specific 
interests of these former GoSL allies in taking up the stances enunciated in the 
TNA manifesto, those of the Tamil media in reporting and endorsing these and the 
individual Tamils who voted for the TNA, the result was the Tamils ended up 
uniting behind the LTTE as their ‘authentic representatives’ vis-a-vis the (Sinhala) 
state.157 In other words, the various (self-) interests of various Tamil actors and 
individuals came together to establish and reinforce a specific intepretive 
framework of Sri Lanka through which later developments in the Norwegian-led 
peace process were played out.
Apart from the rights and responsibilities accorded the LTTE, rather than simply 
being Tamils’ representatives in Parliament, the TNA’s MPs became ambassadors 
for the Tamil liberation cause, alongside the LTTE. Indeed, throughout the peace 
process, the TNA and LTTE leaderships met regularly in Vanni to coordinate 
their politico-diplomatic activities. These well publicised meetings were followed 
closely by Tamil media which reported in detail on the positions being jointly
157 This point is made amidst the prevalence in Sri Lanka of patron-client networks, politically- 
active proprietors’ control o f ‘independent’ media outlets, and so on (Nadarajah 2005) This is 
certainly not to question the TNA’s electoral successes, the bona fides of its members, the integrity 
of journalists or the sentiments of ordinary Tamils, but to outline widely recognized practices other 
than individual and institutional autonomy to which electoral outcomes and media reporting is 
sometimes attributed.
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taken, the successes achieved and difficulties faced by Tamil interests in the 
Norwegian-led negotiations. Meanwhile, the TNA met regularly with 
international diplomats in Colombo, undertook briefing tours to other countries 
and otherwise articulated the Tamils5 stances and perspectives. Though critics of 
the TNA dismissed it as ‘proxies’ or ‘mouthpieces’ of the LTTE, such 
characterisations do not capture the relative positioning of the Tamils, the LTTE 
and the TNA engendered by the dynamics around the alliance’s formation, its 
stances on various issues and its election victories. In other words, irrespective of 
the individual interests of politicians and their parties, of individual voters and of 
the LTTE, the practices and developments outlined above contributed towards 
rendering ‘real’ specific meanings to the TNA’s success, the war*, the peace 
process, the LTTE, the Tamils and the Sri Lankan state.
From ‘grievances’ to ‘aspirations’
In 2002, many Tamils across the island and especially in the Northeast had been 
badly affected by the war, but in very different ways and to differing degrees. 
Some were incarcerated without charge in government prisons and detention 
camps. Over 800,000 were internally displaced -  driven from their villages now 
occupied by the military. Others were in their homes, but unable to fish, farm or 
earn a livelihood. Some faced the fear and grind of military checkpoints, house 
searches and so on. Others faced military-backed encroachment by Sinhala 
colonists on their farms or villages. The meaning attributable to these disparate 
deprivations is not self-evident, hi Liberal Peace terms, for example, these are 
consequences of ‘poor governance’ or aimed conflict and are thus resolvable 
through a permanent political solution and demilitarisation, strengthened human 
rights protection and rule of law, ethnic reconciliation and so on. In Tamil 
Freedom terms, however, these are all aspects of oppression of the Tamil nation 
by the chauvinist Sinhala state. How were Tamils, therefore, to come together and 
resist this oppression as a united nation? How were they to recognize their 
individual difficulties as inexorably bound up with those of Tamils in other parts 
of the island and to see the Tamil nation’s self-determination as the (only) way for 
improvement of their conditions and those of their fellow Tamils? The answer
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came in two forms. The first was the foregrounding of “the Tamil people’s day to 
day hardships” in the LTTE’s engagement in the peace process. The second was 
via a raft of ‘grassroots’ mobilization programs, an example of which in Jaffna 
came to be termed the ‘Village Awakening Program’.
Article 2 of the CFA deals directly with the hardships faced by the Tamils of the 
Northeast and, for that matter, the rest of the island. Whilst across Colombo and 
other parts of the South the UNP government quickly dismantled the feared 
checkpoints and ended many other security measures, such as cordon-and-search 
operations, not least in the interests of supporting the revival of the tourist 
industry and foreign investment, Tamils in the Northeast continued to be 
confronted by various difficulties, including the HSZs and military restrictions 011  
fishing and fanning. Whilst international actors saw these as matters for future 
negotiations, in Tamil Freedom tenns the gamut of issues set out in Article 2 of 
the CFA constituted obligations imposed on the GoSL by the LTTE on Tamils1 
behalf.158 This was reinforced by the LTTE insisting for months on ‘full 
implementation’ of the CFA before it would undertake face-to-face talks with 
GoSL, a condition it later relented on (See Chapter 8). Having signed up to the 
CFA with the LTTE, the GoSL was thus now backtracking, just as past Sinhala 
governments had done on earlier deals with Tamil leaders. These perspectives 
were repeatedly articulated in various fora by the LTTE, the TNA, Tamil media, 
community organizations and others. Even when the LTTE, under international 
pressure, agreed to direct talks without Article 2 being implemented, it insisted 
that the hardships of the Tamil people be the focus of the negotiations. What was 
self-evident, therefore, was that the LTTE was placing the Tamils’ humanitarian 
difficulties at the centre of the Norwegian-led peace process, both via the 
internationally-monitored CFA and the negotiations themselves. The LTTE also 
took up the problem of Tamils being held without charge under the Emergency 
Regulations: thousands of people were subsequently released - except those few
158 Even the opening of the A9 highway, linking GoSL-controlled Jaffna to the north of LTTE- 
held Vanni to the rest o f the island could be seen thus: although the opening served Liberal Peace's 
desire for greater interaction and trade between north and south, between Tamils and other 
communities as well as allowing the UNP to assert to the Sinhala electorate they had ‘unified5 the 
island once again, Clause 2.10 obliges the GoSL to open the A9, the only land route to the Jaffna 
peninsula.
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the GoSL had actually charged under the PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), for 
example. In effect, therefore, the HSZs, restrictions on fishing and fanning, 
detention without trial, etc became issues that the LTTE took up with the GoSL 
on behalf o f the Tamil people. The TNA MPs and sometimes community 
organisations were also taking up these self-evidently Tamil concerns -  as 
opposed to those of ‘Sri Lankan citizens’ - with the GoSL. Thus they were not 
matters, as Liberal Peace would have it, related to ‘national security’, the 
exigencies of ‘conflict’ or ‘poor governance’, but of Tamils’ difficulties caused 
and perpetuated by the Sri Lankan (Sinhala) state’s actions and intransigence. 
Conversely, the alleviation of the Tamil people’s hardships became mediated 
primarily by the LTTE’s internationally brokered engagement with the GoSL. 
Over time, a combination of speech acts -  by the LTTE, TNA, the media, etc - 
and other discursive practices established this understanding as commonsense. 
This discourse, of course, overlapped with others, such as those on the protracted 
conflict -  state violence, displacement, failed peace efforts, etc -  and on ethnic 
relations since independence — Sinhala Only, discrimination in education, 
employment and so on. The point here is how Tamil Freedom-framed meanings 
attributed to such issues contrasted and competed with those by Liberal Peace.
Discourse defines objects, but subjects emerge when people take up and live out 
the characteristics, capacities and attributes accorded to them. For Tamils to take 
responsibility for their own liberation, government needed to penetrate social and 
individual bodies i.e. to incite, induce and seduce appropriate behavior. In the 
Jaffna peninsula, one program of Tamil Freedom through which this was done 
was called the Village Reawakening Program.159 To begin with, there had been 
almost no political activity in Jaffna or elsewhere in the Northeast, save the 
sporadic electioneering by Tamil parties. This was attributed to the stultifying 
effects of over a decade of military occupation -  the peninsula’s half million 
residents are supervised by forty thousand soldiers. Between the Emergency 
Regulations, the outlawing of advocacy of partition or secession and the ‘public
159 ‘Village’ (a literal translation of the Tamil term) here refers to shared understandings of 
indistinct territorial divisions sometimes encompassing hundreds of families — for example, many 
of Jaffna town’s suburbs are known as villages.
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spectacle5 killings of outspoken Tamil figures, Tamils were shunning involvement 
in politics (TN01 July 17, 2006).
In the absence of established political vehicles, another site of social interaction 
by which Tamils could be brought together appeared on the terrain of 
government: the ‘Sanaa SamukaNilayam5 (community house). These socio­
cultural, usually avowedly ‘non-political5, associations are found across the 
peninsula. In early 2002, Tamil activists -  cadres from Tamil political parties, 
some from the LTTE's political wing, university students and so on -  began to 
meet with community house leaderships. The latter were encouraged to invite 
prominent Tamil personalities such as MPs, regional LTTE Political officers, 
university lecturers, etc -  depending on the appropriate speaker for the village's 
context - to address their gathering. Discussions with these invited speakers 
inevitably turned to the unfolding dramatic developments of ceasefire and peace 
process. Public awareness about how conditions were rapidly improving in 
Colombo and the South was high, meanwhile, not least because of the local 
media. Community house members would invariably, with a little encouragement, 
raise their continuing day-to-day difficulties. The speakers would then urge the 
community house to work out their specific priorities and to invite them back 
once they had done so. “You can be sure one of two things will top their list," one 
TNA MP said. “Either a livelihood restriction or something to do with the 
military" (TNA02 June 10, 2006). Each village had different priorities; for some it 
was the inability to fish or farm, for others a vital access road blocked by a 
military camp, for others still fears for their children passing the local 
military/paramilitary checkpoint and so on. On a return visit, usually several 
weeks later, the speaker would take note of the local grievances and promise to 
have it taken up with the GoSL or military, usually through the local MP. On the 
rare occasion the Sri Lankan authorities' response was positive, new grievances 
would follow. However, “almost certainly, the GoSL or the Army will either 
refuse outright or prevaricate,” the TNA MP said. “We return and spell out the 
official response: a refusal or impossible conditions to be met by the residents 
first.” The villages are then asked if they want to take matters to the next level: 
asking the LTTE to take it up with the GoSL as part of the negotiations. Through 
these interactions and reports in the media, villagers also became aware that
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Tamils in other parts of the Northeast were facing similar difficulties, whilst 
Sinhala areas were doing well: “the understanding that emerged over time is that 
the Sri Lankan state is only concerned with the Sinhalese and doesn’t give a damn 
about the Tamils” (TNA01 June 10, 2006).
An act towards liberation
In this context, the LTTE’s manifest and well-publicized efforts to place 
humanitarian issues on the negotiation agenda, even whilst unsuccessful in 
themselves (see Chapters 6, 8), served to underline the ‘reality’ of the Tamils’ 
grievances being of no consequence to a Sinhala-dominated state, now rapidly 
receiving substantial international funds for development and 
reconstruction/rehabilitation. Subsequently, the LTTE’s argument that if Tamils’ 
hardships are to be genuinely addressed, an interim administration with a 
dominant role for the LTTE must be established for the Northeast, came to serve 
as a plausible way forward for hundreds of thousands of Tamils facing a myriad 
of practical problems in their day-to-day lives. It is in this way that the interests of 
individual Tamils across the Northeast comes eventually came to be bound up 
with the pursuit of the Tamil nation’s self-rule. This is certainly not to suggest 
cynical manipulation of villagers by the LTTE or the TNA: in its controlled areas, 
for example, the LTTE’s civil administration arms strove to improve humanitarian 
conditions, inducting, as discussed below, Diaspora funding and expertise, efforts 
that came indisputably to the fore in the wake of the December 2004 tsunami. 
Rather it is to suggest that the different hardships being endured by Tamils in 
different locations and different circumstances come, through such discursive 
practices, to be presented and interpreted as the hardships collectively being faced 
by the Tamil nation on account of Sinhala state oppression.
It was amid such rising awareness and frustration that the Ponghu Thamil rallies 
began from mid-2003.160 Held in each district of the Northeast, they brought
160 Whilst not discussed here, a massive grassroots campaign under the ‘Ponghu Thamil’ banner, 
mirroring the ‘participatory’ logic o f ‘Village Awakening Program5 had resulted in village-level 
dramas and other cultural events, well before mass rallies began to take place. Street performances 
which gathering observers were invited to join in, embodying the logics o f state- and military-
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together local Tamil grievances with wider Tamil aspirations — self-rule in the 
homeland and self-determination. Moreover, whilst Tamils in each district came 
together at one location, the placing of each event in a pre-scheduled and 
publicized chain of rallies across the Northeast brought the participants together 
with Tamils in other parts of the homeland in a collective act of protest and self- 
affirmation as a political category: the Tamil nation. The unifying symbolism was 
strengthened when Ponghu Thamil rallies were also staged in the main Diaspora 
centers of North America, Europe and Australia and widely reported in local 
Tamil media. With the outraged Sinhala press denouncing the rallies as ‘LTTE 
events5 and the sullen security forces imposing petty obstructions (such as 
security checks or complaints to the SLMM about the raising of the ‘Tamil 
Eelam5 flag), participating in the rallies in itself became an act of resistance to 
Sinhala rule -  as opposed, for example, to the exercise of freedom of association 
or legitimate politics within a pluralist Sri Lanka.
When the power struggle between President Kumaratunga and Premier 
Wickremesinghe5s government precipitated fresh elections in April 2004, a 
concerted campaign was mounted by Tamil actors to secure for the TNA as many 
Parliamentary seats as possible out of the thirty-odd allocated to the Northeast 
(out of 225). However, the objective of this electoral effort was not securing the 
‘ldng-maker5 status (sought by Muslim and Upcountry parties especially), 
whereby the victorious Sinhala party, with too few seats to form a government, 
seeks out minority allies through offers of ministerial portfolios and other 
concessions so as to stitch together a coalition that could rule. Rather, the stated 
objective of the Tamil mobilization was to send a message of Tamil unity to the 
international community. As the TNA5s manifesto (2004) put it, “[we] have 
decided to make use of the opportunity presented by this election to bring 
forcefully to the attention of the world, and Sri Lanka in particular, our resolve for 
self-determination55 (insert added). Apart from the constituent parties of the TNA, 
the LTTE’s Political Wing, student unions, and other associations campaigned
oppression, Tamils’ day-to-day difficulties and so on, were staged in hundreds of places across the 
Tamil areas of the Northeast
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across the Northeast for the TNA. As one regional head of the LTTE’s Political 
Wing declared at a TNA rally:
“[This] election is a unique opportunity for the Tamil 
speaking people to express their political aspirations.
The international community wants to see if we are 
united in our cause. It is the responsibility of every 
Tamil person to show the world we are united”
(TamilNet 2004g, insert, emphasis added).
The TNA’s (2004) manifesto endorsed the LTTE’s proposals for an Interim Self- 
Governing Authority (ISGA), enunciated the Tamil people’s historic post­
independence grievances against the Sinhala-dominated state, and enumerated the 
humanitarian hardships being endured by the Tamils of the Northeast. Prevailing 
day-to-day hardships and historical grievances thus coalesced into long-standing 
state oppression. The individual Tamil voter was asked, even as she struggled 
with her specific day-to-day difficulties, to take responsibility for her part in 
liberating the Tamil nation. The act of voting was thus not one of participating in 
Sri Lankan democracy and governance, but a blow for national liberation and of 
an act of petitioning the international community. As R. Sampanthan, veteran 
politician and TNA leader, told a rally days before voters delivered a landslide 22 
seats for the alliance,
“Tamils should not think that they send their 
representatives to Parliament to fulfill their needs. This 
time it is not so. The people should bear in mind this 
time TNA MPs have a historic role to play in 
pressurizing the Colombo government and to canvass 
support of the international community jointly with the 
LTTE to convert the ISGA proposal into reality”
(TamilNet 2004c, emphasis added).
Later that year, an internationally administered survey conducted by Social 
Indicator (2004:22) found that, in addition to 94% of Tamils wanting the 
establishment of the ISGA, 95% supported the dismantling of military High 
Security Zones and 96% wanted the making permanent of the temporary merger,
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enacted under the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, of the Northern and Eastern 
provinces - which comprise the Tamil homeland.
National self-reliance
Among the key problems Tamil Freedom saw in 2002 was the devastation of the 
infrastructure and economy in the Tamil homeland, a problem that acquired 
specific meaning in terms of the glaring and widening gap between the respective 
existential conditions of the Tamils, as a whole, in the Northeast and the Sinhalese 
in the South. With international aid inflows held to be benefiting the latter and this 
massive assistance being augmented by investment inflows and rising tourist 
numbers, the impasse in securing international assistance for the Northeast, 
especially the LTTE-controlled Vanni - where there was no GoSL presence save 
schools and hospitals (Stokke 2006), framed a range of activities which sought to 
bring the Tamil Diaspora’s financial, intellectual and professional support to bear 
on reconstructing the Tamil homeland and addressing the humanitarian crisis 
there. The scale of the crisis meant that the support extended by Tamil expatriates, 
as established in the hostlands as they were by then, would be nowhere near 
enough. Nonetheless, a myriad of projects emerged which linked Tamil 
expatriates and community organisations with the people of the Northeast, 
especially LTTE-controlled Vanni. From early 2002 onwards, thousands of 
expatriates -  engineers, doctors, teachers, and other skilled workers - travelled 
from Diaspora centres to Vanni to support rehabilitation and developmental 
efforts. Although the visits were initially coordinated (in terms of establishing 
contacts with the Tamil Eelam civil administration, for example) by activist 
groups in tire Diaspora with contacts to the LTTE, such exchanges soon became 
institutionalised and routine, with many expatriates simply arriving at the LTTE- 
GoSL ‘border’ posts of Omanthai or Muhamalai seeking opportunities to start or 
join a project. Whilst some Diaspora activists went to do more for ‘the struggle’, 
in the main the Tamils who travelled to Vanni and volunteered their services and 
funding for all manner of local projects were ‘ordinary’ people, ranging from 
second generation youth to former refugees and emigres, seeking to help fellow 
Tamils. Some took sabbaticals from their jobs, a handfril quit to continue their
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humanitarian or development roles. The December 2004 tsunami in particular 
triggered a flood of such activity, with many expatriates, especially youth, simply 
showing up to do whatever they could to help.
From 2002 onwards, till the war resumed in 2006, expatriate donors, both 
individuals and organisations, sought out institutions and projects to support in 
Vanni and parts of GoSL-controlled Jaffna - including orphanages, health centres, 
displaced camps, and so on, while volunteers arrived to provide physical 
assistance and impart skills and training. In various Diaspora locations, 
investment vehicles emerged to collect funding for housing and other community 
projects in Vanni and Jaffna. Past pupils associations, temple associations and 
village societies in the Diaspora raised funds and conducted projects for their 
respective concerns in the Northeast. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation 
(TRO), the largest Tamil aid agency, expanded rapidly into a major institution for 
both rehabilitation and developmental work in the Northeast, fielding over ten 
thousand staff, mainly volunteers. The TRO also rapidly became the apex 
coordinating body for a range of humanitarian efforts in Vanni by the Diaspora 
and INGOs. The overarching direction of rehabilitation and developmental 
activity in Vanni was carried out by the LTTE through the welfare institutions of 
the Tamil Eelam administration. Whilst the Diaspora activity that brought 
expatriate funding, labour, skills, expertise and networks to bear' on Vanni can be 
seen in Liberal Peace terms as one of Tamil ‘nationalist’ mobilisation or, in less 
pejorative terms, as needs driven rehabilitation or development, what is notable 
here is the participatory logic that emerged and became commonsensical in the 
wake of inflows of Diaspora contributions: that of Tamils returning to ‘do 
something’ for ‘our people’ and ‘our (home)land’. What is crucial here is how the 
myriad supposedly technocratic, apolitical activities of Tamil humanitarian and 
developmental assistance, including providing funding and imparting technical 
skills and even the establishing of local institutions, came collectively to render 
real a quintessentially political project: uniting the Tamil nation and building the 
Tamil Eelam state.
Even within the technocratic framework of assisting disadvantaged Tamils ‘at 
home’, there were nuances. If it was simply a question of rehabilitation and
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development of Vanni, there were many other possibilities besides the Diaspora. 
The lack of funding could have been -  and, to a limited extent, was -  partially met 
by the LTTE allowing international NGOs untrammelled access to Vanni. In 
actuality, the Tamil Eelam administration carefully regulated NGO activity in 
terms of locations, personnel and the content of projects undertaken. The acute 
shortage in skills -  civil engineers, masons, carpenters, and so on -  could have 
been met faster by inducting Sinhalese from the south (or workers from 
neighbouring states, including India). Indeed, there was considerable international 
pressure, under the rubric of ‘inter-ethnic interaction’, on the LTTE and important 
Tamil NGOs to do precisely this (INT07, June 4,2006). However, the emergent 
logic of rehabilitation and development in the Tamil homeland was not 
‘efficiency’ or ‘peace-building’ but rather ‘national self-sufficiency’ and ‘Tamil 
unity’. In other words, not only did it become increasingly commonsensical 
amongst Tamils that those in the Diaspora should help those in the homeland, but 
that Tamils, not Sinhalese or internationals, were most responsible for this role. 
Moreover, uplifting the homeland was not only a question of repairing or 
constructing buildings and sinking wells, but also of transferring the ‘capacity’ for 
self-development to local Tamils, a logic reflected most in the proliferation in 
Vanni of training centres for a variety of skills.
It was the manifest humanitarian situation in Vanni and the particular narrative 
that surrounded its continuation i.e. Sri Lankan state discrimination and 
international complicity, which served to bring Diaspora and local Tamils 
together under the rubric of helping ‘our people’. This is not to say necessarily 
that all Tamils sympathised with those affected in Vanni, supported the LTTE or 
even cared for ‘politics’ - indeed many Tamil ‘cultural* organisations in the 
Diaspora are self-avowedly ‘apolitical’, often asserting so in their literature and 
statements. Nonetheless, the self-evident humanitarian crisis in Vanni, combined 
with the manifest lack of progress in the LTTE-GoSL talks to secure international 
aid or get rehabilitation efforts underway in Vanni, created an overarching context 
in which claiming a Tamil identity meant having to ‘do something’ in this 
particular regard. The point here is that when the disparate interests of various 
Tamils, from the altruistic to the publicity-seeking, came to be pursued through 
rehabilitation activities in Vanni and other parts of the Northeast, the ‘reality’
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emerged of Tamils striving to alleviate the humanitarian crisis being endured by 
their people in their homeland while international donors assisted the Sri Lankan 
state and the Sinhalese.
7.3 Macro-ambitions and micro-practices
This chapter considered some of the micro-practices of government in relation to 
Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom respectively. It has looked at, in particular, how 
government, rather than operating on an a priori world with natural divisions, 
instead cuts experience in specific ways and thus brings “new facets and forces, 
new intensities and relations” into being. It also looked at how, governing eat a 
distance’ — in both constitutional and spatial senses - takes place when the ‘macro’ 
ambitions of governors come to pursued by others acting in their micro-locales 
and in the service of their own interests and objectives. Individual Tamils were 
mobilised through diffuse networks of governance as members of a persecuted 
Tamil nation, on one hand, and as citizens of a pluralistic and multi-ethnic society 
on the other. Tamil Freedom was pursued by Tamil politicians seeking re-election 
and village community houses seeking to address the daily hardships of their 
members. Liberal Peace was pursued through localised developmental projects 
and civil society actors who emerged to bid for international peacebuilding funds. 
As noted earlier, government does not take place through some ‘top-down’ logic 
or imposed rationality, but through the forging of alliances between the aims of 
governors and the particular ambitions and self-interested projects of those who 
are subjects of government. Networks of government do not rest on the goals of 
government being consciously shared by those who participate in government, but 
on how subjects of government come to construe their specific problems in allied 
ways.
Moreover, as government assumes that there is no superior alternative to the 
ordering it envisages, a concomitant supposition is that the consent of those being 
governed is not needed (Merlingen 2003:376). Inherent to government, therefore, 
is what Merlingen (2006:192) terms as “restricting the range of acceptable limits 
of heterogeneity out of which [people] can fashion their lives.” This can be both
243
‘good’ and ‘bad’. Producing the Tamil nation effaces differences and attendant 
hierarchies -  such as those based on caste, gender, region, religion and so on -  but 
precludes certain forms of socio-political interaction. The equality of individuals 
inherent to a plural, multi-ethnic citizenry also denies historic claims to territory 
(Tamils, Scots, Kurds, etc) - unless these are acceptable to (the majority) of other 
citizens. Thus, it is in the process of ‘recasting’ reality that the intolerance of 
governance emerges. For example, Liberal Peace discounts local articulations 
save those that reinforce its own vision; so those Sri Lankans seeking ‘ethnic 
harmony’, ‘unity in diversity’, etc are to be encouraged, ‘empowered’ and 
celebrated while other views - ‘spoilers’ or ‘extremists’ - are to be ignored, 
excluded or marginalized. Similarly Tamil Freedom discounts articulations that 
reject the principles of Tamil nationhood, homeland and self-determination - 
‘selfish opportunists’ or ‘tools of majoritarian Sinhala forces’ (TNA manifesto 
2004). Categorisations of governance, meanwhile, emerge through the goals of 
governance themselves: the liberal democratic citizen versus the ethno nationalist 
or the Tamil patriot versus the traitor, for example.
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8. Making up the LTTE
To govern is to “structure the possible field of action of others” (Foucault 
2002c:340) i.e. to so arrange things that actors, following only their own 
perceived self-interest, will do as they ought (Scott 1995:202). Efforts to act upon 
others by getting them to act ‘in their own interest5 are thus intimately connected 
to the production of appropriate self-governing subjects. This chapter considers 
how seemingly straightforward international practices such as third party led 
peace processes serve to constitute objects and subjects of global liberal 
govemmentality. It is argued here that the production of the LTTE as a particular 
kind of subject, one dangerously located on the fringes of political legitimacy, 
enabled the conduct of the organisation's conduct in the service of liberal peace 
by harnessing its desires and shaping its choices. In other words, international 
discursive practices regarding Sri Lanka's conflict positioned the LTTE in 
specific ways, thereby inducing, seducing and inciting specific behaviours from it. 
International discourse produced the LTTE by defining the characteristics, 
capacities and desires of the organization, and thereby making it ‘knowable' to 
others and itself. In short, the LTTE's conduct within the peace process, and in • 
particular the negotiation process, was conditioned by its need to demonstrate that 
it is not a violent and chauvinist entity fanatically committed to an independent 
state. The LTTE did not reject the liberal peace values promoted by the 
international community, but instead sought to demonstrate that its political 
project, Tamil liberation, and its practices were not incompatible with these. The 
rationalities of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom thus came to clash in the 
Norwegian-led peace process in terms of the appropriate conduct for the LTTE.
This chapter examines how the LTTE, despite describing itself as the ‘vanguard 
of the Tamil liberation movement', came in the course of the Norwegian-led talks 
to contribute to the international effort to establish a federal solution to Sri 
Lanka’s conflict, assert the importance o f ‘inter-ethnic reconciliation’, give 
‘human rights’ -  as opposed to ‘Tamil national rights’, such as self-determination 
-  primacy in the negotiations and, jointly with the GoSL, seek international 
assistance to rebuild Sri Lanka’s economy which the movement had hitherto
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sought, with considerable success, to wreck.161 Prior to 2001, international 
discourse largely held that the LTTE had to be militarily confronted and 
weakened, if not destroyed, to ensure the possibility of liberal governmental 
progress in Sri Lanka. However, the discursive practices comprising the 
Norwegian-led peace process repositioned the LTTE as still a terrorist 
organisation but, crucially, one imbricated in ‘legitimate’ Tamil grievances and, 
therefore, as a potentially transformable entity.162 Thus, in contrast to the 
regulatory framework of the ‘Global War on Terror’ which defined the LTTE as 
an object of liberal govermnentality whose behaviour had to be violently altered, 
the Norwegian-led peace process placed the LTTE in a transformative framework 
of international engagement, constituting it as a subject through - as well as on - 
which liberal govermnentality could operate.163
It is argued here that, firstly, the international peace intervention in Sri Lanka thus 
served as a disciplinary framework by which specific behaviours were elicited and 
compelled from the LTTE,164 and, secondly, that the LTTE had already been 
produced as the kind of subject on which such a framework could have purchase: 
provided the LTTE took up its (liberal governmental) responsibilities, it came to 
be entitled to certain rights - including a legitimate, even key, role in shaping Sri 
Lanka’s future. In other words, provided the LTTE played its part in ending the 
aimed conflict and the construction of a united, federal, multi-ethnic Sri Lanka, it
161 Even the LTTE’s insistence that the Northeast humanitarian crisis must be addressed before 
talks on a permanent solution came to be reframed in the neo-liberal language o f the need to ‘give 
the people a peace dividend’ and the urgency of the ‘economic recoveiy o f the suffering 
population’ (Balasingham 2002a) - language which echoes the ‘under-development sustaining 
conflict’ logic of Liberal Peace.
162 Since the collapse of the peace process in 2006, the LTTE has again become an object of 
international regulation, with the Sri Lankan state being urged to fight the terrorism o f the Tigers 
whilst coming up with a political solution for the Tamils. The UK’s Peace Building Strategy, for 
example, encourages the “weakening and marginalizing [of] the LTTE, thereby making it more 
likely to come to the negotiating table” as part of “supporting conditions necessary for sustainable 
peace in Sri Lanka” (UK Government 2007:3,6, emphasis added).
163 See, for example, the brief outline in Burke and Mulakala (2005:16-17) on ‘constructive 
engagements’ and ‘strategic partnerships’ with LTTE by World Bank, ADB, bilateral donors 
UNICEF to solicit, compel and induce appropriate behaviours from the organization regarding 
‘effective implementation’ of development projects, ‘underage recruits’, ‘reform on fundamental 
human rights issues’, ‘political transformation’ ‘power-sharing and federalism’, etc.
164 The GoSL was of course also placed in an international disciplinary matrix, albeit one 
involving different sanctions and incentives and aimed at producing different kinds of responsible 
behaviom' by the state.
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would become accepted internationally.165 Crucially, it was by this 
reconceptualization of the LTTE as a legitimate and key - as opposed to a 
problematic and marginal - actor in reshaping Sri Lanka’s socio-political makeup 
that Liberal Peace came to operate through, as well as on, the organisation. Thus, 
from simply a dangerous object of international regulation based on (‘social 
scientific’) knowledge about internal conflict and terrorism, the LTTE came to be 
(re)defined in the internationally managed peace process as a subject with rights 
and responsibilities i.e. as ‘transformable terrorists’. This is not to say there was a 
radical discontinuity between the earlier ‘counter-terror’ and the new ‘negotiated 
peace’ frameworks; the apparatus through which international support was 
extended to Sri Lankan military action against the LTTE up to 2001 (proscriptions 
and associated crackdowns on Diaspora activities, intelligence sharing, anti­
smuggling operations, etc) was an integral, and sometimes explicitly threatened, 
part of the internationally-backed peace process. Rather, it is to say that, unlike 
the counter-terror regime, the international peace intervention sought to co-opt the 
LTTE and to harness its capacities and interests in the service of liberal peace. As 
such, while the global anti-terrorism regime was intended to compel the LTTE to 
“renounce terrorism in word and deed” (US Department of State, undated)166 the 
peace initiative was the space and process by which it could do so.
8.1 An onus to convince
Condemning the LTTE as an ‘essentially military entity,’ the then US 
Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Ashley Wills, asked in April 2001: “can the LTTE be
165 It is worth noting how the LTTE and its armed struggle served the international project of 
transforming the Sri Lankan state; only in the context of resolving the conflict -  i.e. meeting the 
LTTE demands (albeit by compromise) - could the constitutional rewrite that would turn the 
centralized, unitaiy state into a devolved or federal one be brought about. It was through the peace 
process that the GoSL came, for example, to accept federalism as a powersharing solution to the 
conflict, sign up to an internationally sponsored and drafted ‘Human Rights Charter’ and accept 
international oversight (through the SLMM) of its military’s conduct.
166 As the US Department of State says, among the expected effects of the Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) designation imposed on the LTTE in 1997 are that it: "stigmatizes and 
isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally; deters donations or contributions to and 
economic transactions with named organizations; heightens public awareness and knowledge of 
terrorist organizations; signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.” 
(undated, emphases added).
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transformed into a democratic, political, non-violent organization?” This instance 
of a common international ‘speech act’ at a stroke both conceals and dismisses the 
relevance of the LTTE’s (undated) elaborate political programme and, especially, 
its governance of territory in which hundreds of thousands of Tamil people were 
resident (see discussion in Stolcke 2006). Posed two months after the UK also 
banned the LTTE as a terrorist organisation (the US banned the LTTE in 1997) 
and six months before 9/11 triggered the heightened program of violent 
international regulation which came to be termed the ‘Global War on Terror*, 
Ambassador Wills’ question also explicitly outlined what was now considered the 
only internationally acceptable form of conduct for aimed organisations fighting 
for political causes. Importantly, the Norwegian-led peace process in Sri Lanka 
coincided with the unfolding of the Global War on Terror. However, whilst the 
LTTE was placed on the same lists of international outcasts as al-Qaeda, and thus 
subject to the same censures, states such as the US and UK also repeatedly made 
cleat* that there was a distinction between the two: while the inveterate al-Qaeda 
had to be found and destroyed, the LTTE, which was unavoidably intertwined 
with ‘genuine’ Tamil ‘grievances’, might be engaged with politically. However, at 
the same, by their frequent condemnation of the LTTE and emphatic pledges of 
solidarity with Sri Lanka’s ‘own fight against terrorism’ the international 
community also made clear that this difference should not be overstated or taken 
for granted: the LTTE could not consider itself outside the ‘War on Terror’ but 
was, for the moment, not beyond the pale.167
The LTTE thus entered the Norwegian-led peace process from a relatively strong 
military position but with dangerously weak international credentials.168 It was 
perceived and also portrayed by international actors as a ruthless and intransigent 
terrorist group irrationally wedded to an independent Tamil Eelam and, moreover, 
as one which was probably cynically seizing on the Norwegian initiative for 
tactical reasons other than genuinely seeking peace (see Chapter 5). What is
167 This changed in 2006, with the EU and Canada imposing terrorist proscriptions of the LTTE 
months before Sri Lanka’s military began all out offensive operations.
168 As US Ambassador Wills (2001) put it, “one of the facts we must face is that although we 
regard the LTTE as a terrorist organisation and do not believe it is the sole representative o f the 
Tamil people, we accept that the leaders of the Tigers will be involved in the negotiations. This is 
because of the LTTE's military standing.”
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important here is not whether these claims are true or not, but that this 
characterisation was reflected and embedded in, and therefore reinforced by, 
statements and actions by key international actors. What is also important is that 
international actors suggested, as did Mr. Wills5 question about the possibility of 
the LTTE's transformation, that this perception of the LTTE could yet be changed 
by the organisation’s behaviour'. As US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage put it, 
“If the LTTE can move beyond the terror tactics of the 
past and make a convincing case through its conduct 
and its actual actions that it is committed to a political 
solution and to peace, the United States will certainly 
consider removing the LTTE from the [terrorist] list”
(2003a, emphasis, insert added).
The LTTE’s route to redemption was not only renouncing violence (‘terrorism9), 
but also a specific ‘moderation’ of its politics: as the US embassy’s transcript of 
Mr. Wills’ speech in Jaffna stated,
“If anyone in this audience has contact with the LTTE, 
please convey two messages from the US government:
(A) if the LTTE is still fighting for Tamil Eelam, please 
accept that goal cannot be achieved; and (B) if the 
LTTE really cares about the Tamil people and about 
assuring their rights, giving up violence and negotiating 
are the way to go” (2001, inserts original).
Speaking at a time when the LTTE was observing a unilateral, unreciprocated 
ceasefire, Mr. Wills also promised:
“If the LTTE can [transform], those who have seen it at 
its ugliest and those who are opposed to its tactics, 
including the United States, are obligated to reconsider 
how they consider the LTTE. Certainly, we can, even 
today, acknowledge there are encouraging indications 
in the LTTE’s recent conduct” (Ibid, emphasis, insert 
added).
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The assertion, therefore, was that the international community’s hostility towards 
the LTTE was a direct result of the organisation’s actions and policies, and not of 
any essential or interest-driven enmity. The buttressing elements of this argument 
are that the international community is fair-minded and merely seeking peace in 
Sri Lanka (see, for example, Armitage 2003a). While it may have a misperception 
of the LTTE’s ‘essential5 brutishness and other faults, the international 
community is also open to persuasion otherwise. This, however, can only be 
effected by the LTTE itself taking specific steps - renouncing armed struggle, 
committing to negotiations, being flexible on independence, and so on i.e. 
adopting behaviours sought after by Liberal Peace.
This logic also turns, crucially, on another important axiom of the international 
thinking about Sri Lanka’s conflict: that whatever its motives for participating in 
the peace process, the LTTE was also desperately keen to acquire international 
legitimacy -  i.e. to be accepted by the international community as a credible 
political actor representing Tamil political aspirations and interests (Goodhand et 
al 2005:9).169 This overlapped neatly with important problematizations of Tamil 
Freedom: a need to acquire international recognition of Sri Lankan state 
oppression and the need for the liberation of the Tamils from Sinhala domination. 
The LTTE’s position in both rationalities thus overlapped on the notion of 
international legitimacy (i.e. acceptance). In other words, the LTTE recognised 
itself as both a representative of the Tamil liberation struggle and an international 
pariah. As LTTE Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham told a press conference in 
September 2002, after the first round of talks with GoSL:
“we have already got a massive permanent 
administrative structure in areas under our control ...
What we are seeking [in these talks] is legitimacy -  
international legitimacy for [an] administrative
169 As US Ambassador Wills (2003) put it, “The Tigers want to be treated respectfully and 
seriously. My government understands that. But as our Deputy Secretary o f State, Richard 
Armitage, said recently, we can see a legitimate political role for the LTTE provided it renounces 
terrorism and violence.” HRW (2007b), urging GoSL to accept international human rights 
monitoring in Sri Lanka, said the LTTE would not resist: “the LTTE constantly seeks acceptance 
from the international community and it would only look bad if it objected to international 
monitors.”
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structure [for the Northeast] where we can co-ordinate 
and work with the government of Sri Lanka, as well as 
to seek some recognition from the international 
community” (2002b, inserts, emphasis added).
What is important here is not only how the LTTE was positioned, but how its 
consequent self-recognition as an international outcast led to it taking up specific 
behaviours in keeping with the goals of Liberal Peace. Firstly, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, this self-recognition led directly to the LTTE’s insistence on 
international involvement in the resolution of the Sri Lankan conflict, including as 
third party facilitators and ceasefire monitors. In other words, the LTTE sought to 
subject itself to greater international scrutiny so as to demonstrate its bona Tides, 
prove its sincerity and convince the world. It was the LTTE which began to insist 
in the late nineties that there must be third party involvement in any future 
negotiation process.170 By doing so, the LTTE accepted, even demanded, that its 
conduct at the negotiating table should, this time around, be witnessed by the 
international community. Moreover, the induction of international -  i.e. 
‘independent’ -  ceasefire monitors to supervise adherence to the CFA was driven 
by the LTTE’s calculation that its conduct off the table should also be transparent 
to international scrutiny, rather than projected by the Sri Lankan government, for 
example. If from an international perspective the Norwegian brokered peace 
initiative was the space in which the LTTE could transform itself, from the 
LTTE’s perspective, the peace process was an important opportunity to change 
international perceptions about its character.
Secondly, to this end, the LTTE recognised there were specific constraints on its 
conduct in the Norwegian-led talks: having sought and obtained an opportunity to 
demonstrate its sincerity towards a negotiated peace, the LTTE now had to do so. 
This entailed specific behaviours at the table, including making compromises, 
remaining engaged in talks despite GoSL provocations, being prepared to accept a 
solution short of independence and so on. In other words, amid international
170 The SLFP-led Sri Lankan government of 1995-2001 repeatedly rejected the notion o f such 
international intervention, arguing the state’s sovereignty (Burke and Mulakala 2005:15-16).
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assertions that the LTTE has a proclivity for violence and is awaiting an 
opportunity to resume the war, there was an onus on the LTTE, for the purposes 
of demonstrating its bona tides alone, to do exactly the reverse i.e. to remain at the 
table even amid lack of progress on issues it deemed important or external 
developments such as provocations by the Sri Lankan military. At the same time, 
however, as the representative of the Tamil people at the table, it also needed to 
pursue their goal of self-rule and autonomy from Sinhala domination. Therefore 
the LTTE was keen to demonstrate, if not its affinity with the political values 
espoused by the international community -  such as ‘human rights5, ‘pluralism5, 
‘democracy5 and ‘inclusivity5 - then at least its potential for ‘reform5 in these 
terms. The point here is that the LTTE did not reject these as unreasonable 
international expectations of it. The LTTE’s conduct in the negotiations and the 
wider peace process was thus heavily oriented towards challenging its 
international characterisation as a ethno-nationalist terrorist group and 
‘demonstrating5 its ability and suitability to govern the Northeast.
In summary, therefore, the LTTE entered the Norwegian-led peace process 
already constituted as the kind of subject required by the international peace 
initiative in Sri Lanka: a politico-military entity, acutely conscious of its lack of 
international legitimacy, eager to gain it and well aware of its specific 
shortcomings in terms of the international community’s values i.e. liberal peace.
In other words, the LTTE understood it was seen as an extremist and violent 
terrorist group that nevertheless had (or ‘was being given’) a chance to prove its 
critics wrong. The LTTE also recognized that it was situated in an international 
regime of sanctions and incentives that the organisation accepted it could not 
avoid if it was to advance its political goals. As Mr. Balasingham told reporters 
after the first round of talks, “we are confident [that] if the peace process succeeds 
... in the process other countries will be compelled to review their stand, and i f  
they are convinced that the peace process is going to succeed they might consider 
de-proscribing the LTTE55 (2002b, emphasis, insert added).
What is also important here is that by making international legitimacy and 
acceptance an important strategic objective even before it entered the peace 
process, the LTTE had already ruled out the possibility of taking a firm stand on
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its long-standing goal of Tamil independence and it had withdrawn a key 
bargaining chip, the threat of resinning hostilities. The LTTE’s field of 
possibilities had thus begun to be defined even from the outset. Indeed, the 
LTTE’s willingness, even eagerness, to participate in an internationally managed 
peace process is itself indicative of how it was already becoming a subject of 
Liberal Peace. The point was graphically underlined after the second round of 
talks, when Mi'. Balasingham felt compelled to stress to the assembled press: “the 
ultimate aim of the LTTE is finally to enter into the democratic, political 
mainstream. That is the objective o f the peace process itself You shouldn’t have 
any doubts about it” (2002c, emphasis added). The point here is not whether the 
LTTE meant or believed this or not, but that it understood that adopting such 
positions was the appropriate conduct for an armed organisation seeking 
international acceptance,
8.2 Discipline and diplomacy
The 2002-2003 Norwegian-led negotiation process in Sri Lanka constituted, as 
noted above, a disciplinary framework in which the LTTE’s conduct could be 
monitored and supervised and the armed movement trained in the ways of liberal 
peace. Like any other disciplinary framework, the international peace process was 
made up specific penalties, rewards, measurements of progress and judges to 
ascertain adherence to such progress. To begin with, as discussed above, the 
LTTE entered the peace process well aware of the characteristics attributed to it 
that made it internationally unacceptable: predisposed to violence, intransigent, 
yet with an undeniable place in discussions on Tamils’ ‘grievances’. Amongst the 
behaviours the LTTE therefore recognised as expected of it were eschewing 
further violence, being flexible at the table (especially on independence), and 
accepting liberal nouns (human, gender and child rights, pluralism, the rule of 
law, etc). These, in turn, brought pressure on its ability to pursue the goals of 
Tamil liberation — for example, to reject international demands that pro- 
goyermnent Tamil groups have a legitimate role in the peace process. At a 
minimum, the LTTE had to demonstrate a commitment to a negotiated peace, 
which in international terms included remaining engaged in talks under any
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circumstances. The penalties for not conforming to such appropriate behaviour' 
were also clear and, in any case, were often reiterated (privately) by the 
Norwegian diplomats and sometimes (publicly) by key international figures, such 
as senior Western officials. These included greater international isolation and 
punitive steps such as further proscriptions of the LTTE, crackdowns in countries 
that had already banned it and possible prosecutions of LTTE leaders for war 
crimes. At the same time, there were incentives and rewards: greater international 
legitimacy i.e. acceptance of the Tamil cause and (thus) the LTTE as the Tamils’
171political representatives.
However, notions o f ‘flexibility’, ‘commitment to peace’ and so on are not self- 
evident or objective measures, but subjective value judgements. Crucially, for the 
LTTE, these judgements were the preserve of international actors, especially the 
Norwegian facilitators. Having insisted that negotiations must be conditional on 
third party involvement and concurred with the GoSL that Norway was an 
appropriately neutral choice for the role, the LTTE was now reliant on Oslo to 
deliver an ‘accurate’ account of its conduct in the negotiations to the wider 
international community, especially Washington, London, Brussels and Delhi. 
This is not to say the LTTE genuinely considered Oslo a ‘neutral’ player, or that 
the Norwegians were ‘not’, but rather that having insisted on a third party and 
accepted Norway’s good offices (in the interests of securing international 
legitimacy for itself and the Tamil cause), the LTTE’s own actions served to 
reinforce the self-characterisation of the international intervention and the 
Norwegian role: as genuine, in the interests of ‘peace’ and impartial.172 Rather 
than merely providing diplomatic ‘good offices’, the Norwegian government thus 
became a character referee for the LTTE.173 It was the judge at the centre of the
171 In practice this would entail the LTTE’s involvement alongside the GoSL in the political and 
governance-related activities of the Northeast such as reconstruction/rehabilitation, constitutional 
restructing and so on.
172 Indeed, some of the formal statements produced by Norwegian facilitators on behalf of the 
parties at the conclusion of each round of talks, had the GoSL and LTTE jointly “expressing 
gratitude for the extensive goodwill of the international community” (RNG 2002c) or welcoming 
the “strong political and financial support of the international community” (RNG 2003a).
173 The statements issued by Norway after each round of LTTE-GoSL talks reflected this 
supervisory role with the published summary of each round’s proceedings beginning invariably 
with a report card-style comment on how the parties had participated: after the second round, for 
example, “the parties demonstrated a positive, pragmatic and conciliatory approach” while at the
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disciplinary framework: Norwegian opinion, for example, was cited by EU and 
Norwegian officials (NW01 August 16, 2006, INT06 August 17, 2006) as crucial 
in first staying -  and then allowing -  the EU’s ban on the LTTE. Thus, from the 
outset, despite frustration and suspicion over many of the facilitators’ actions in 
the talks (LT01, LT02, LT03 February 24, 2006), in public, the LTTE regularly 
hailed Norway’s "neutral and objective” approach to the third party role; it was 
only in late 2006, long after the war had resumed, that the LTTE explicitly 
included Noiway in its criticism of the international community’s bias towards the 
Sri Lankan state (Pirapaharan 2006).174
This authoritative position of character referee for the LTTE allowed Norway to 
take a muscular approach to facilitating; as LTTE negotiators put it, the 
Norwegian diplomats "took charge” and “dominated the talks” while “key 
proposals on the issues under discussion came mainly from them” (LT01 March 
12,2006, LT02 October 30, 2006, LT03 May 10, 2006). As noted in Chapter 5, 
Norway took an unabashedly pro-active approach, shaping the agenda of the 
negotiations, unilaterally inducting external actors like the Forum of Federations, 
‘human rights expert’ Ian Martin and UNICEF, and setting the agenda and pace of 
the negotiations. The facilitators insisted their actions were always “subject to the 
approval of the parties” and that they “wanted the parties to take as much 
ownership [of the process] as possible” (NW01 June 1, 2006, insert added). 
However, as discussed here, amid the severe constraints on the ability of the 
LTTE certainly - and, for that matter, the aid-hungry GoSL - to resist Oslo’s
third round the parties discussed in a “frank, open and constructive manner,” in the fourth round it 
was in a “frank and constructive atmosphere” and in the fifth round the parties focussed “on 
complex issues in a spirit o f cooperation and conciliation” (RNG 2002d, 2002e, 2003a, 2003b).
174 The neutrality of Oslo’s third-party role was questionable, not only given Norway’s ongoing 
bilateral relationship with Sri Lanka, but also their cooperation at the negotiating table. Norwegian 
proposals to resolve impasses, one LTTE negotiator said, “generally tilted towards GoSL.” For 
example, amid LTTE insistence that a third party like the World Bank should be custodian of 
humanitarian funds for the Northeast, Norwegian facilitators pushed for disbursment through the 
Sri Lankan treasury. When LTTE negotiators demanded extra-constitutional ways forward, citing 
peace efforts in other places, Norwegian diplomats, rather than Sri Lankan negotiators, countered 
these with the legal specificities of these cases. (LT01, LT02, LT03 February 24, 2006). Apart 
from the symbolic parity o f similar hotel rooms, vehicles and air tickets for GoSL and LTTE 
delegations, at the table he LTTE negotiators found the Norwegian facilitators argumentative and 
overbearing whilst away from the table, Norwegian facilitators, by and large, socialised and took 
meals with their Sri Lankan counterparts rather than the LTTE officials (Interviews with LTTE 
negotiators February 2006 and author’s observation).
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interventionist approach, the facilitators shaped the trajectory, pace and steps 
towards peace. At the same time, a key consequence of the LTTE’s endorsement 
of some international actors as ‘neutral’ and its refusal to publicly criticise or 
sometimes to welcome the participation of others -  including the Co-Chairs, 
UNICEF, etc (‘speech acts’) was to reinforce the self-characterisation of the 
principle external actors involved in Sri Lanka as primarily working for ‘peace’.
The official Norwegian statement issued after each round of LTTE-GoSL talks 
thus became an important document, rendering the conduct of the two parties -  
and thus their character - knowable to the outside world. Whilst the statement 
ostensibly summarised the proceedings, it was both a speech act, producing ‘truth’ 
about the parties and other issues, and, at the same time, a powerful disciplinary 
device inside the negotiating chamber. Whilst these official statements were 
formally subject to the approval of both GoSL and LTTE, as discussed here, the 
LTTE was, by virtue of its subjectivity, constrained from resisting specific, liberal 
peace-inspired, phrasings or wordings. Although in some instances there were 
heated private exchanges between LTTE negotiators and the facilitators over the 
phrasing of statements, in general, as one LTTE negotiator put it, “we didn’t want 
to be seen as being pettyminded or quibbling about details” (LT03 May 10, 2006). 
Thus, despite entering the peace process as the ‘liberation movement of the 
Tamils,’ the LTTE was often unable to avoid endorsing political positions more in 
keeping with liberal peace than that of Tamil liberation. After the second round of 
talks, for example, Norway reported that the parties had
“agreed on immediate measures to improve the security 
situation, inter-ethnic cooperation and respect for 
human rights in the north and east. Recognising that 
peace belongs to all peoples of Sri Lanka, the parties 
are committed to the needs and aspirations o f all three 
communities'. Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese” (RNG 
2002d emphasis added).175
175 The LTTE, whose armed struggle had weakened Sri Lanka’s economy had compelled the 
GoSL to negotiate with it in the first place -  also endorsed the declaration that “the international 
community will further be encouraged [by the parties] to increase investment in Sri Lanka.” (RNG 
2002d emphasis, insert added).
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The point here is that given prevailing international norms and the close 
international scrutiny of their conduct at the Norwegian-chaired table, it was not 
possible for the LTTE, especially, or the GoSL to oppose such phrasings without 
embarrassing themselves -  as illiberal, extremist, inflexible and so on - and 
drawing international ire. Conversely, the foregrounding of such concepts and 
agreements in these official accounts of the negotiation process had the powerful 
effect of defining the parameters and logics by which the Sri Lankan conflict as 
well as the search for peace and a solution were seen as being discussed by the 
parties. It was thus the LTTE and GoSL who were deciding, for example, to 
displace humanitarian issues to the Sub-Committees and instead take up the 
‘Human Rights Charter’ and child-recruitment for negotiation and, most 
significantly, to explore ‘federalism’ as a permanent solution.
8.3 The federalism ‘agreement’
As discussed in Chapter 5, the international community was keen to establish at 
the earliest the requisite conditions across Sri Lanka for peacebuilding to proceed. 
This involved, on the one hand, establishing the security of human rights 
protection, the rule of law and, on the other, defining the framework of the 
permanent solution to the conflict. The Norwegian-brokered agreement between 
the two parties to ‘explore federalism’ (RNG 2002e) and discussions on a ‘Human 
Rights Charter5 in early 2003 were thus central elements of this strategy. The 
LTTE’s compliance in these endeavours was obtained through the disciplinary 
(anti-terrorism) framework around the peace process, and the specific subjectivity 
of the LTTE within it. Encumbered by a need to demonstrate to the sceptical 
international community its commitment to a negotiated solution, the LTTE was 
also under pressure not to delay progress in the talks by focussing on what were 
deemed ‘minor’ or ‘peripheral’ issues in relation to a final political solution. Such 
pressure was, for example, crucial in securing LTTE acquiescence for the transfer 
of discussions on the ‘details’ of humanitarian issues to Sub-Committees.176
176 Although the LTTE had repeatedly insisted, between signing the CFA in February 2002 and 
commencing negotiations in September 2002, that the humanitarian crisis in the Northeast be
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As noted earlier, a specific behaviour expected of the LTTE during the peace 
process was flexibility and compromise, especially on Tamil Eelam. Although the 
LTTE had stated in the past that it would consider a solution short of 
independence, the Norwegian-led peace process brought the question of its 
sincerity to the fore. Having to contend with international hostility to 
independence while pursuing the goal of Tamil self-rule, the LTTE sought a way 
forward through the notion of ‘internal self-determination.’ In his amiual ‘Heroes’ 
Day’ address in 2002, LTTE leader Vellupillai Pirapaharan stated:
“We are prepared to consider favourably a political 
framework that offers substantial regional autonomy 
and self-government in our homeland on the basis of 
oui’ right to internal self-determination. But if our 
people’s right to self-determination is denied and our 
demand for regional self-rule is rejected, we have no 
alternative but to secede and form an independent state”
(emphasis added).
At the conclusion of the third round of talks, held a few days later, Norway (RNG 
2002e) announced an ‘agreement’ that was soon labelled the ‘Oslo Declaration’ 
and was lauded as a ‘paradigm shift’ in Sri Lanka’s conflict:
“responding to a proposal by the leadership of the 
LTTE, the parties agreed to explore a solution founded 
on the principle of internal self-determination in areas 
of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, 
based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka”
(emphasis added).
The statement added, moreover, “the parties acknowledge the solution has to be 
acceptable to all communities” (Ibid, emphasis added). This notion of universal 
acceptance, notably, is very different to that of the Tamils having an inalienable 
right to self-determination. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, without the
addressed before discussions on ‘core’ political issues be taken up, the LTTE was soon defending 
its climb down: as Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham himself told the November 2002 Oslo aid 
conference, “the peace process cannot be undertaken in isolation, without taking parallel steps 
towards the economic recovery of the suffering population” (2002, emphasis added).
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crucial foundations of the unit and extent of power sharing being defined, there is 
no direct equivalence between a federal model and Tamil self-determination. 
Furthermore, from the LTTE’s perspective, the operative word in the Oslo 
Declaration was ‘explore’: as Mr. Pirapaharan’s announcement had made clear, if 
self-determination was denied, the LTTE would pursue secession. In other words, 
the LTTE had not unqualifiedly given up independence. This, however, is not 
how the Oslo Declaration entered the international discourse on Sri Lanka.
The LTTE’s decision to sign up to exploring internal autonomy, and federalism in 
particular, without a concomitant agreement on the status of the Tamils (i.e. self- 
determination), can be linked to its specific constraints in the peace process: a 
desire to demonstrate ‘flexibility’. That the international community was seeking 
a federal solution had already become clear. The induction of the Forum of 
Federations (FoF), a Canadian NGO with expertise in federal constitutions, into 
the formal peace process as an advisor to the two delegations was a unilateral 
Norwegian move, for example. In their discussions with the LTTE, FoF officials 
argued that international perception of the LTTE as inflexible on independence 
was due partly to the organisation not making explicit what exactly it considered a 
‘reasonable’ solution short of independence. The LTTE had, they acknowledged, 
often indicated its willingness to accept ‘regional autonomy’ and ‘self-rule’ within 
a united Sri Lanka, but these terms, they argued, were ‘too abstract.’ LTTE Chief 
Negotiator Balasingham later echoed the FoF’s arguments when he told reporters: 
“this autonomous model or model of self-government we are referring to has to be 
couched or properly conceptualised within an appropriate concrete constitutional 
form” (2002d, emphasis added). Given that federalism was a wide-ranging 
concept (for example, the US, India, Switzerland and Germany are all federal 
states) it was suggested that by opting for federalism, the LTTE would clearly 
signal its preparedness to accept a solution well short of independence and yet not 
compromise Tamil aspirations for self-rule (LT01 March 12, 2006). 
Confederalism, it was also argued, was far too close to independence to be 
considered a demonstration o f ‘flexibility’ (Ibid).
However, once it was announced, far from being seen as the LTTE’s readiness to 
explore federalism, the Oslo Declaration, was instead seen as the Tigers’
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agreement to give up independence. Amid the ensuing euphoria about ‘a peace 
agreement’ and frenzied press reporting about the its climb down, the LTTE was 
now aware that seeking to clarify its stance would suggest it was backtracking on 
the Oslo Declaration (LT02, LT03 February 24, 2006). The LTTE’s dilemma was 
deepened when international actors, including the US and UK, promptly hailed 
what they deemed an agreement “to work to establish a federal structure within a 
united Sri Lanka” (officials quoted in TamilNet 2002f), Moreover, the Tokyo 
Declaration (JMOFA 2003), issued by the assembled donor community seven 
months later, stated:
“The conference commends both parties for their 
commitment to a lasting and negotiated peace based on 
a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. ... Donors 
remind the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE of 
the importance for both parties to make their utmost 
efforts to further promote the peace process founded 
upon the principles reflected in the Oslo Declaration”
(emphasis added).177
In interviews to media in the wake of the Oslo Declaration, LTTE officials 
stressed the agreement was to ‘explore’ federalism, but could not give a 
straightforward answer to the question: ‘have you given up independence or not?’ 
In short, for the LTTE to now qualify its position on the Oslo Declaration would 
be tantamount to retreating from its newly-‘demonstrated’ - and now being 
internationally hailed -  compromise. Indeed, it was only in November 2006, four 
years later (and after the war had resumed), that the LTTE explicitly stated it was 
again pursuing an independent Tamil Eelam (Pirapaharan 2006). Moreover, the 
LTTE’s efforts to ‘clarify’ its position only increased pressure on the organisation 
to commit unambiguously to the ‘Oslo Declaration.’178 The prevailing
177 There was, notably, no mention of ‘self-determination’, internal or otherwise, and while the 
Tokyo Declaration insisted the final settlement “should be based upon respect for human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law” (JMOFA 2003, emphasis added), there was an absence of any 
recognition of collective Tamil rights - especially given that federalism is a territorial concept.
178 Notably, meanwhile, there was no international pressure on the GoSL to do the same i.e. to 
affirm it would move from a unitary to a federal constitutional model. Amid much speculation as 
to whether the LTTE was committed to federalism or not, it was simply taken for granted in the
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international discourse after December 2002 thus not only held that an agreement 
on federalism had been reached, but also questioned if the LTTE was truly 
committed to it. Sceptics also seized on the LTTE’s attempts to clarify its stance 
as vacillation. Speaking two months after the ‘Oslo Declaration,’ Mr. Armitage 
(2003a), for example, made it clear that scepticism of the LTTE was 
undiminished:
“the US is encouraged by the vision of the LTTE as a 
genuine political entity. But for that to happen, we 
believe the LTTE must publicly and unequivocally 
renounce terrorism and prove that its days of violence 
are over. The LTTE is going to have to take a number o f 
difficult steps to demonstrate that it remains committed 
to a political solution” (emphasis added).
Indeed, the international community’s assertion that an ‘agreement’ had in fact 
been reached, opened up the space for specific new demands on the LTTE. As Mr. 
Armitage put it, two months after the Oslo Declaration, the Tigers needed to 
“honour” restrictions that, he insisted, the CFA “and future negotiations” placed 
on their aims supplies (2003a, emphasis added). He explained,
“Logically, down the road, this [negotiations] is going 
to include disarmament issues themselves. Internal self- 
determination, within the framework of one Sri Lanka, 
is not going to be consistent with separate armies and 
navies for different parts of the country” (Ibid, 
emphasis, insert added).
international discourse that the UNP government was. However, there was no basis for this 
sanguine view: any constitutional change in Sri Lanka needs to be approved by two thirds of the 
225 seat Parliament and pass a country-wide referendum (amid strong opposition amongst the 
Sinhala majority to ‘dividing the country’). The UNP had a wafer thin Parliamentary majority and, 
more importantly, was strongly opposed by President Kumaratunga and her main opposition 
coalition. Amid fierce resistance from powerful, albeit smaller right wing Sinhala parties, it was 
extremely unlikely that the deal (‘to divide the country’) would be approved at a referendum (as 
the Oslo Declaration itself implied it should be: “the solution has to be acceptable to all 
communities”). In 2007, amid a new war, the UNP formally denied it had ever agreed to a federal 
solution and instead blamed the media for creating such an impression.
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8.4 Presenting the LTTE
To summarise, the December 2002 ‘Oslo Declaration’ was less an agreement on a 
permanent solution between the LTTE and GoSL than an asserted claim of one by 
the international community. The actual agreement -  i.e. to explore federalism -  
was itself a result of the pressures generated within the peace process on the 
LTTE to demonstrate its flexibility on independence i.e. it was not an unqualified 
abandoning of Tamil Eelam by the LTTE. However, tire international discourse 
that flowed from the Oslo Declaration not only held that there had been an 
agreement on a federal solution, but that it was now questionable as to whether 
the LTTE would abide by it. The LTTE’s efforts to clarify its stand appeared, in 
the same logic, as vacillation by the intransigent organisation and further 
substantiation of its inherent untrustworthiness. Thus its efforts to demonstrate 
flexibility in themselves precipitated new and serious constraints on the LTTE. To 
repudiate the ‘deaf was to invite international condemnation and penalties, but to 
accept it was to pave the way for a range of new demands, including those for 
disarmament and that the LTTE become actively involved in promoting a united, 
multi-ethnic Sri Lanka. To be ambivalent, moreover, was to validate and reinforce 
long-asserted international scepticism of the LTTE’s willingness to compromise 
on Tamil Eelam.
This chapter sought to consider how international practices such as third party led 
peace processes, serve to constitute objects and subjects of global liberal 
governmentality. It argued that international discursive practices produced the 
LTTE as a particular* kind of subject, one dangerously located on the fringes of 
political legitimacy. This subjectivity thereafter enabled the conduct of the 
organisation’s conduct by harnessing its desires and shaping its choices within the 
framework of the Norwegian-led peace process. International discourse produced 
the LTTE but by defining its characteristics, capacities and desires, thereby 
making it ‘knowable’ to others and itself. Enmeshed in sets of relations of 
governance informed by two different rationalities, Liberal Peace and Tamil 
Freedom, the LTTE entered the peace process recognising itself as both a 
representative of the Tamil liberation struggle and an international pariah. The
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governmentalities of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom thus came to clash in the 
course of the Norwegian-led peace process in terms of what constituted the 
appropriate conduct for the LTTE in the period to come.
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9. Conclusion
Against conventional, top-down analyses that explain developments in ‘internal* 
conflicts and international interventions in them in terms of the relative power of 
external and internal actors, or other structural factors, this dissertation argues that 
the dynamics, trajectories and outcomes of international ‘peace’ engagement in 
the Sri Lankan conflict from 2001 to 2006 can be productively understood as a 
clash o f governmentalities i.e. as the result of the simultaneous pursuit of 
competing idealizations of how populations, territory and forms of political rule 
ought to be organized so as to secure the wellbeing of the population. By way of 
conclusion, this chapter first summarizes the dissertation’s explorations of the Sri 
Lankan case study and then briefly examines the potential of the notion of a ‘clash 
of governmentalities’ for further empirical and theoretical research and, in 
particular, for analyzing the constitution of a globalising liberal order and 
theorizing the changing relations between force and order in contemporary North- 
South relations.
Firstly, applying Foucault’s notions of governmentality and biopolitics, this 
dissertation sought to demonstrate how multiple, distinct political rationalities 
could be discerned, by careful empirical excavation, in the discursive and material 
practices of the various actors, individuals and collectives in a given site.
Secondly, by applying governmentality to the study of global liberalism, a 
reordering project massive in both scale and ambition, the dissertation sought to 
demonstrate that this approach can plausibly be taken to the study of practices, 
strategies and calculations in the realm of the ‘international’. In taking these steps, 
the study sought to adopt Foucault’s dictum to ‘cut off the king’s head’; actors - 
states and other ‘centres’ of power, non-state actors, populations and individuals - 
are not taken as self-evident entities bearing discernible values and interests, 
stated or hidden. Rather, actors’ identities, interests, values and their relations are 
understood as being continuously (re)produced and shaped by the networked 
flows of governmental power. As such, the notion of a ‘clash of 
governmentalities’ offers a way of analytically engaging with the complexities of 
Southern warzones and other places that is not hostage to ontological
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presuppositions about individuals or collectivities or positivist epistemologies that 
often attribute the dynamics and outcomes o f ‘internal’ conflict and ‘external’ 
interventions in such places primarily to the relative power of external and 
internal actors. This is not to suggest that conventional theories are necessarily or 
inherently flawed or ‘wrong’, but to argue that an ‘analytics of government’ 
approach allows the powerful effects of the myriad mundane practices through 
which conduct is conducted and power operates to be analytically grasped. In this 
sense, the primary goal of an analytics of government, such as that adopted here, 
is not to challenge, contradict or replace any particular theory per se, but to 
excavate the various rationalities of rule embedded in myriad governmental 
projects underway in a given context, to examine the mechanisms through which 
these are pursued, resisted, subverted and appropriated and thereby offer a more 
complete analysis of the sometimes perverse outcomes of international 
interventions in Southern conflicts.
The dissertation outlined how Sri Lanka’s protracted and violent conflict, in 
common with much of politics on the island since late colonial rule, can be 
understood as a struggle to re-constitute and re-arrange territory, identities and 
demographics in keeping with two different understandings of the ‘right 
disposition’ of people(s) and things, in the service of the wellbeing of the 
population. Tamil Freedom sees the island as the home of two equal ‘founding 
races’, while Sinhala-Buddhism sees it as the motherland of a people (the Sinhala) 
entrusted with a duty to protect and foster Buddhism, and in which others may 
remain as guests provided they abide by this natural order. Since well before 
independence from Britain in 1948 these two rationalities have confronted each 
other in territorial, legal, political, cultural, social and, recently, military spaces. It 
is across the terrain in which these two governmentalities clash that in recent 
decades a third, ‘external’- or ‘global’ -  governmental rationality, Liberal Peace, 
has increasingly sought to conduct individual and collective conduct towards an 
ideal of the modern state, its citizen and its society which is held, once rendered 
ubiquitous, to lead inexorably to the emergence of a pacific, liberal world order. 
Despite the heterogeneity of peoples, dynamics, factors and histories in the 
warzones of the global South, in this rationality, therefore, “there is concurrence
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on the main root causes of violence, how they should be addressed, and who 
should do so” (Richmond 2007:85).
The dissertation examined in particular various programmatic attempts between 
2001 and 2006 informed by the rationalities of Liberal Peace and Tamil Freedom 
to ‘make up’ specific kinds of subjectivities through the triangle of sovereignty- 
discipline-govemmentality. (Due to the space limitations of a doctoral 
dissertation, the profound effects of the rationality, Sinhala-Buddhism, were not 
focussed on.). It showed how collective subjectivities -  such as a liberal, multi­
ethnic Sri Lankan citizenry on the one hand, and a united Tamil nation on the 
other, whilst in and of themselves not necessarily contradictory, became so as a 
consequence of the ways their constitution has been pursued. At the heart of the 
contradiction is the individual Tamil: is she a member of a persecuted and 
threatened nation or a citizen who is excluded from the benefits of development 
and whose rights are not being upheld by the state? While amid this clash of 
rationalities both these conceptions could be simultaneously ‘true5, the 
programmatic solutions that spring forth from them are nonetheless divergent.
The various attempts to pursue conflicting governmental priorities and cope with 
threats engendered by the different ‘right disposition5 of people and things 
envisioned by the other rationality served ultimately to produce an impasse 
between Tamil and international aspirations for peace in the island. This impasse 
was never resolved and has led inexorably to a catastrophic resumption of war 
since 2006. Backed by the international community in the pursuit of liberal peace, 
the Sri Lankan state's renewed military onslaught since has resulted in the deaths 
of ten thousand more Tamil civilians and the suffering of virtually the entire 
Tamil population.
As an analytical tool, governmentality offers insights into dynamics and outcomes 
that are not available via other approaches. For example, conventional analyses of 
the post-2006 trajectory of Sri Lanka’s conflict take as self-evident necessity the 
military weakening of the LTTE and the increased possibility of ‘peace’ this is 
thought to engender. On the one hand, quasi-realist explanations focus on the 
disparity between GoSL and LTTE in firepower, troop numbers, supply levels, 
and so on, while, on the other, there is an emerging discourse on how Sri Lanka
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can or should ‘win the peace’ - a preoccupation which turns on an analytical 
separation between the LTTE’s ‘violence’ and the Tamils’ ‘grievances’. However, 
an analytics of government approach, focusing, say, on the changing practices of 
‘ordinary’ people amid the claimed 01* anticipated destruction of the LTTE, brings 
to the fore the stark and broad polarisations between the Sinhalese and the island’s 
smaller populations, especially the Tamils. Consequently it illuminates changes in 
identities that have led, for example, to a sharp rise in popular support amongst 
Tamils for an independent Tamil Eelam, aimed struggle and the LTTE, on the one 
hand, and a rejection by Sinhalese and Tamils of the liberal peace principles of 
political accommodation, pluralism, mutual recognition and peaceful co­
existence, on the other. In the Tamil Diaspora changing practices include 
increasing visibility of ‘Tiger’ motifs on the clothing of youth, large numbers of 
conservative and middle-class families attending raucous demonstrations 
demanding ‘Tamil Eelam must be free!’ and condemning the Sri Lankan state, 
and students quitting their university ‘Sri Lankan’ societies to form their own 
‘Tamil’ ones. Mass agitation, political advocacy and humanitarian assistance 
projects by the Diaspora have centred on alleviating the Tamil population’s 
physical suffering and political rights. At the same time, in Sri Lanka there are the 
efforts of ordinary Sinhalese to donate money, laptops, bottled water and blood 
for the aimed forces, the jingoistic triumphalism of mainstream (Sinhala-owned) 
media and even the attempts by leading local (former) ‘peace-building’ NGOs to 
form links with President Mahinda Rajapakse’s hardline government. Such trends 
suggest that, in contrast to conventional analysis, the possibilities of liberal peace 
in Sri Lanka are fast receding, rather than growing. It is not that conventional 
analysis cannot take such trends seriously. However, it often fails to see how they 
become constituent of what it means to be ‘Tamil’ or ‘Sinhala’ and the 
implications for liberal ‘peace’ and ‘peacebuilding’, as well as for future violence, 
both spontaneous and organised: the production of self-governing subjects whose 
relations are characterised by entrenched animosity, new and heightened 
grievances, and increased concentration - via democratic mechanisms - of 
racialised power.
The ‘analytics of government’ approach this dissertation has taken to the Sri 
Lanka case study can be easily extended to other sites of contestation, aimed or
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otherwise, in the global South. This entails careful empirical analysis that makes 
possible the excavation of the various rationalities informing the practices of 
effecting government within the site in question and the investigation of the 
‘making up’ of subjects as active agents in the conduct of their conduct. For 
example, the frustration of the US-led projects in recent year's to transform Iraq 
and Afghanistan into zones of liberal peace can be traced not to ‘extremism’, 
‘wariordism’, flawed Coalition strategies, poor implementation of plans, 
corruption, and so on (even though all of these can be discerned in these sites 
from within one rationality or another), but to the specific interplays between 
competing visions of what ‘Iraq’, say, ought to he: & multi-ethnic, multi-religious, 
liberal democracy, an Islamic theocracy, a multi-national state, a set of 
independent states, etc. Some of these orderings, for example, embody the idea of 
a Kurdish nation and homeland while others do not. Within Liberal Peace, the 
sharing of power between Sunni and Shia may seem a commonsensical necessity, 
but within other governmental rationalities it may constitute an unacceptable 
aberration. Similarly, people asking their religious leaders for guidance as to how 
to vote in elections may be at odds with the tenets of Liberal Peace but could, at 
the same time, be very much the right disposition, of people and things within 
another rationality. The precise difference between ‘Iraqis taking responsibility 
for their sovereignty’ and ‘aimed struggle against invaders’ may depend, again, 
on what constitutes the right disposition of people and things, as might what 
constitutes appropriate conduct for Iraqis patriots and other subjects of 
government. Practices such as Sunni militia opting to work for their erstwhile 
Coalition enemies, may not be simply a question of self-interest (i.e. payment) or 
the efficacy of new ‘strategies’, but the constitution of a new reality whereby 
foreign forces cede responsibility for the security and administration of territory to 
forces that actually live in these places.
A clash of governmentalities approach can thus serve to explain the dynamics of 
what might otherwise appeal* as irrational or self-serving opposition to liberal 
peace i.e. to the production of a global liberal order. In other words, it makes 
possible the exploration of the rationales behind ‘local’ responses in the global 
South to diverse international practices such as attaching conditionalities to aid, 
outlawing the use of landmines and ‘child soldiers’, pursuing ‘sustainable
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development’ and the ‘Global War on Terror5. A governmentality framework also 
brings to the fore the embedded relations between these diverse international 
practices - for example between core states’ support for peripheral states’ violence 
against their internal enemies and their own domestic crackdowns against 
‘extremists’, ‘supporters of terror* and others. This is also how asylum or 
immigration regimes and regulation of protest and giving to charity at home, 011  
one hand, and conflict resolution initiatives, foreign direct investment and 
development partnerships abroad, on the other, become joined up as apparatuses 
of security infonned by, and in the service of, the global governmentality of 
liberal peace.
As Dillon and Reid (2000) have already pointed out, to ask why conflict is 
‘endemic’ to many Southern places is often to elide the political character of the 
contestations playing out through violence and human suffering in these places, 
and, just as importantly, to mask the complex and deep implication of global 
liberal governance itself in the (re)production of these so-called ‘complex 
emergencies’. The very processes of globalisation celebrated in the core 
contribute to, if not engender, the disorder beyond the periphery of liberal peace. 
The ‘discovery’ of these problematic sites, as well as problematic actors, groups 
and communities, meanwhile engenders programmatic responses from the core. 
Some are discarded, but those followed lead to the emergence of ‘strategic 
complexes’ (Duffield 2001) of international NGOs, governments, military actors 
(both private and state), IFIs, IGOs and other actors to cope with these ‘internal’ 
crises. International ‘experts’ in a vast range of knowledges -  including those of 
security, development, finance, constitution and culture - provide the language 
and intellectual machinery for how the transformation of the borderland and its 
integration into the core should be pursued. An analytics of government approach 
thus serves to capture how global liberal order is produced by the various 
international practices which constitute the triangle of sovereignty-discipline and 
government and by both physical and epistemic violence. The production of self- 
governing liberal subjects is pursued not only by governmentality but also by acts 
of sovereignty (the use of violence against ‘rogue states’, ‘terrorists’ and others) 
and mechanisms of discipline (proscriptions, monitoring, internationally managed 
peace processes, etc.)
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Even especially problematic local actors, such as aimed organisations, become 
incorporated into networks of global liberal rule through the deployment of not 
only sovereign and disciplinary powers but also governmentality: the goal is, of 
course, ‘transformation’ into liberal peace - from conflict to peace, aimed group to 
political party, extremists to moderates, patronage to free markers, and so on. 
When, in this way, a ‘local’ actor like the LTTE comes to be seen as a threat to 
the ‘global’ order of liberal peace, then its destruction becomes a concern not only 
for the Sri Lankan state, but also for the international community - irrespective of 
the local state’s own problematic conducts. In this context, when repressive states 
enlist in the *'War on Terror’ and draw on the support of powerful liberal states 
and like-minded actors for violently pacifying their ‘internal’ borderlands, it is 
less a betrayal of the tenets of liberal peace than their very pursuit. As this 
dissertation has sought to demonstrate, the networks of global liberal governance 
include not only interventionist actors from the core and but also those ‘local’ to 
the borderlands pacification of which is being sought. Thus developing states, 
political parties, NGOs, ‘grass root’ movements, religious groups, aspiring 
entrepreneurs and others are essential to the transformation of complex emergency 
into liberal peace. International practices such as ‘conflict transformation’, 
‘peacebuilding’, ‘development’, and the ‘War on Terror’ can thus be seen to 
constitute liberal governmental efforts towards establishing a particular ordering 
of borderland peoples and sites such that these are amenable to, and capable of, 
integration into the liberal ‘zone of peace’ at the core of the international system.
The dissertation outlined how the production of the LTTE as a particular subject 
of global liberal peace -  i.e. one dangerously located on the fringes of political 
legitimacy - enabled Liberal Peace’s conduct of the organisation’s conduct by 
harnessing its desires and shaping its choices. As such, it can be discerned how 
seemingly straightforward international practices such as third party led peace 
processes, serve to discipline and shape the behaviour of actors like the LTTE and 
to constitute them as objects and subjects of global liberal governmentality.
Indeed, as the example of the Norwegian-led peace process in Sri Lanka 
demonstrates, it is particularly in the context of a peripheral state failing to secure 
its internal security and stability and its efforts to this end proving disruptive
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either to its own economy or that of the region (i.e. undermining ‘development’), 
that international ‘peace’ interventions become necessary. In this context, the 
launching of an internationally-backed peace process constitutes the peripheral 
state’s surrender of its responsibility for ‘internal security’ to international 
custody, where-after the processes of ‘building liberal peace’ (i.e. re-imposing 
security and resuming development) can be taken more closely in hand, including 
through international frameworks of discipline. In the case of Sri Lanka, the 
assumptions inherent to Liberal Peace have been demonstrably disproved since 
2007. In parallel with the strident Sinhala-Buddhism that has emerged within 
society, the state has spurned international norms regarding protection of human 
rights, ethno-political accommodation and equitable development. Instead, 
alongside genocidal violence against the Tamil population, the state has further 
institutionalised a Sinhala-supremacist logic, including aggressive and violent 
reordering of territory and population, using international development binding 
for Sinhala colonisation of Tamil and Muslim territory (Rampton and Nadarajah 
2008).
Finally, the notion of a clash of governmentalities can illuminate what might be 
otherwise seen as failures of government as, in fact, successes of simultaneous 
other attempts at conducting conduct, undertaken from within competing political 
rationalities. In other words, contrary to the concerns of some theorists (e.g. O’ 
Malley 1996b), a governmentality approach, along with careful empirical 
research, can lend itself to the theorising of resistance to rule. Resistance here is 
not “merely the obverse of a one-dimensional notion of power as domination” -
i.e. insubordination - as the notion has functioned with conventional analyses 
(Rose 1999:279). As Foucault put it in his 1978 lectures, the history of 
government -  the ‘conduct of conduct’ -  is interwoven with the history of 
dissenting ‘counter-conducts’ (cited in Gordon 1991:5). Resistance can emerge 
from government itself; Foucault (cited in Gordon 1991:5) terms what happens 
when norms implanted into subjects of government thereafter become the basis 
for demands ‘from below’ on governors, as the ‘strategic reversibility’ of power 
relations (see Rose 1993:296). Contingent and situated efforts to create 
subjectivities and conduct conduct may inadvertently stimulate political 
challenges (Li 2007:26, see also Hindess 1997:269). For example, international
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insistence on democratization can bring non-liberal actors like Hamas in Palestine 
or the JVP in Sri Lanka to power. Whilst some governmentality scholars reach for 
structural approaches to answer their particular research questions, the idea of a 
‘clash of governmentalities’ foregrounds consideration of other rationalities of 
government seeking to create different subjectivities and to alter or destroy 
‘existing’ or emerging ones. In other words, the source of ‘resistance’ may exist 
even before ‘government’, liberal or otherwise, begins. Whilst theorising 
resistance per se was not a primary goal of this dissertation, the concept of a ■ 
‘clash of governmentalities’ readily lends itself to such a research agenda.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Acronyms
ACTC All Ceylon Tamil Congress
ADB Asian Development Bank
CFA Ceasefire Agreement
DFID UK's Department for International Development
EPDP Eelam People's Democratic Party
EPRLF Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
EROS Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students
FLICT Facilitating Local Initiatives for Conflict Transformation
FoF Forum of Federations
FP Federal Party
FSCT Food Security and Conflict Transformation Project
FTO Foreign Terrorist Organisation (under US law)
GoSL Government of Sri Lanka
HRW Human Rights Watch
HSZ High Security Zone
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
INPACT Initiative for Political and Conflict Transformation
IPKF Indian Peace Keeping Force
ISGA Interim Self-Governing Authority
JVP Janatha Virnukthi Perumana
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NESOHR North East Secretariat On Human Rights
PLOTE People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam
PTOMS Post-Tsunami Operations Management Structure
RNG Royal Norwegian Government
SDN Sub-Committee on De-escalation and Normalisation
SGI Sub-Committee on Gender Issues
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
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SIHRN Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation
Needs
SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party
SLMM Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
TELO Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation
TNA Tamil National Alliance
TRO Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation
TULF Tamil United Liberation Front
UNP United National Party
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179Appendix 2: List of interviews
LTTE officials
Mr. Anton Balasingham (Chief Negotiator and Political Strategist)
Mi\ S. P. Tainilselvan (Negotiator and Head of Political Wing)
Mr. V. Rudrakumaran (Negotiator and International Legal Advisor)
Mr. B. Nadesan (Negotiator and head of Tamileelam Police Service)
Mr. S. Puleedevan (Secretary-General of Peace Secretariat)
Mi*s. Adele Balasingham (Negotiator)
Tamil politicians
Mr. Gajan Ponnambalam (TNA MP for Jaffna electorate, leader of ACTC)
Mr. Suresh Premachandran (TNA MP for Jaffna electorate, leader of EPRLF-S) 
Ms. Padmini Sithamparanathan (TNA MP for Jaffna electorate)
Norwegian officials
Mr. Vidar Helgesen (Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief Facilitator)
Mr. Jon Hanson-Bauer (Special Envoy to Sri Lanka 2006-2009)
Mi*. Jon Westborg (Ambassador to Sri Lanka 1995-2003)
Mr. Tore Hattram (head of Peace and Reconciliation unit, Foreign Ministry) 
Maj. Gen. (retd) Tryggve Tellefsen (head of SLMM 2003-2004)
GoSL officials
Mr. Austin Fernando (Defence Secretary 2002-2004)
Mr. Harim Peiris (Presidential Advisor 2000-2005)
Mr. Shanaka Jayasekara (Director (Policy), GoSL Peace Secretariat 2002-2004)
179 Does not include unstructured interviews or conversations of less than an hour.
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Others
Mr. Tyrol Ferdinand (Managing Trustee, Initiative for Political and Conflict 
Transformation, Sri Lanka)
Mr. Arjunan Ethirweerasingam (Director, TRO Colombo office)
Ms. Ann Marie Fallenius (Director, Director-General’s office, SIDA)
Mr. Arne Folleras (FORUT official, based in Vanni 2004-2006)
Mr. Tim Heath (Advisor, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Dept, DFID) 
Mr. Jan Hodann (Olaf Palmer Centre)
Mr. R. Reggie (Director, TRO)
Mr. Olof Sandkull (Country Coordinator (Sri Lanka), Asia Division, SIDA) 
Dr. K. Sithamparanathan (Director, Theatre Action Group, Jaffna)
Mr. Dharmeratnam Sivaram (Defense analyst, Sri Lanka)
Mr. Brian Smith (Asia Development Bank, Sri Lanka)
Mr. James Martin (Head of SOLIDAR in Vanni 2004-2008)
Mr. Peter Bowling (Director, International Working Group on Sri Lanka, UK) 
Ms. Luxshi Vimalarajah (Senior Program Coordinator, Berghof Foundation)
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Appendix 3: Institutional structure of the peace process
The institutional structure of the peace process consisted of Norwegian facilitated 
‘direct’ negotiations between LTTE and GoSL delegations, a linked trio of Sub- 
Committees (also comprising Norwegian facilitators and officials from both 
sides), an international ceasefire monitoring body (the SLMM, staffed by Nordic 
countries) and specialist ‘advisors to the parties’ on federalism (the Forum of 
Federations, a Canadian NGO) and human rights (former head of Amnesty 
International, Ian Martin) as well as UNICEF. The Forum of Federations, Mr. 
Martin and UNICEF were inducted into the peace process by the Norwegian 
facilitators. The Forum of Federations was tasked with advising the two 
negotiating parties on federalism-related constitutional issues. Mr. Martin, 
sponsored by the UK, was to advice on them on human rights and, especially, to 
draft a ‘Human Rights Declaration* for both sides to sign up to as part of the 
peace process. UNICEF was given the role of lead advocate and monitor on 
underage recruitment by the LTTE.
The three Sub-Committees (Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and 
Rehabilitation Needs or SIHRN, Sub-Committee on De-escalation and 
Normalisation or SDN and Sub-Committee on Gender Issues or SGI) were set up 
in the second round of talks in a bid to move ‘detailed’ discussions of these issues 
concerned off the main negotiating table. The Sub-Committees comprised senior 
officials from both sides, including sometimes members of the main negotiating 
teams, and were also chaired by other Norwegian officials.
Beyond the above, the wider ‘peace architecture’ (Goodhand 2005:16) included a 
series of Norwegian organised donor conferences “to mobilize and leverage 
international funding and support” (Ibid), one consequence of which was the 
formalising of the ‘Co-Chairs’ grouping (comprising the United States, European 
Union, Japan and Norway) which sought to use ‘security guarantees’, ‘peace’ 
conditionalities on aid and to provide an international framework for Sri Lanka’s 
‘transformation’ -  not only from ‘wax* to peace’ but into a “market democracy 
(Ibid). The six rounds of talks were held in Thailand (September 2002, October
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2002), Norway (December 2002), Thailand (January 2003), Germany (February
2003) and Japan (March 2003).
UNICEF*
SGISIHRN SDN
Ian Martin 
Human Rights Expert
LTTE-GoSL
Negotiations
SLMM
staffed by
Scandinavian
countries
Forum of 
Federations
Federalism experts
Norwegian diplomacy
(backed by US, EU & Japan)
* UNICEF was not formally part of the LTTE-GoSL negotiation process
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Appendix 4: 2002 Ceasefire Agreement
Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. 
Preamble
The overall objective of the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of 
Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (hereinafter referred to as the LTTE) is to find a negotiated solution 
to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.
The GOSL and the LTTE (hereinafter referred to as the Parties) recognize the 
importance of bringing an end to the hostilities and improving the living 
conditions for all inhabitants affected by the conflict. Bringing an end to the 
hostilities is also seen by the Parties as a means of establishing a positive 
atmosphere in which further steps towards negotiations on a lasting solution can 
be taken.
The Parties further recognize that groups that are not directly party to the conflict 
are also suffering the consequences of it. This is particularly the case as regards 
the Muslim population. Therefore, the provisions of this Agreement regarding the 
security of civilians and their property apply to all inhabitants.
With reference to the above, the Parties have agreed to enter into a ceasefire, 
refrain from conduct that could undermine the good intentions or violate the spirit 
of this Agreement and implement confidence-building measures as indicated in 
the articles below.
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Article 1: Modalities of a ceasefire
The Parties have agreed to implement a ceasefire between their armed forces as 
follows:
1.1 A jointly agreed ceasefire between the GOSL and the LTTE shall enter into 
force on such date as is notified by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
accordance with Article 4.2, hereinafter referred to as D-day.
Military operations
1.2 Neither Party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires 
the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such 
acts as:
a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, 
assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, 
suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units;
b) Aerial bombardment;
c) Offensive naval operations.
1.3 The Sri Lankan armed forces shall continue to perform their legitimate task of 
safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka without 
engaging in offensive operations against the LTTE.
Separation of forces
1.4 Where forward defence localities have been established, the GOSL’s armed 
forces and the LTTE's fighting formations shall hold their ground positions, 
maintaining a zone of separation of a minimum of six hundred (600) metres. 
However, each Party reserves the right of movement within one hundred (100) 
metres of its own defence localities, keeping an absolute minimum distance of 
four hundred (400) metres between them. Where existing positions are closer than
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four hundred (400) metres, no such right of movement applies and the Parties 
agree to ensure the maximum possible distance between their personnel.
1.5 In areas where localities have not been clearly established, the status quo as 
regards the areas controlled by the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively, on 24 
December 2001 shall continue to apply pending such demarcation as is provided 
in article 1.6.
1.6 The Parties shall provide information to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission 
(SLMM) regarding defence localities in all areas of contention, cf. Article 3. The 
monitoring mission shall assist the Parties in drawing up demarcation lines at the 
latest by D-day -1-30.
1.7 The Parties shall not move munitions, explosives or military equipment into 
the area controlled by the other Party.
1.8 Tamil paramilitary groups shall be disarmed by the GOSL by D-day + 30 at 
the latest. The GOSL shall offer to integrate individuals in these units under the 
command and disciplinary structure of the GOSL armed forces for service away 
from the Northern and Eastern Province.
Freedom of movement
1.9 The Parties5 forces shall initially stay in the areas under their respective 
control, as provided in Article 1.4 and Article 1.5.
1.10 Unarmed GOSL troops shall, as of D- day + 60, be permitted unlimited 
passage between Jaffna and Vavunyia using the Jaffna-Kandy road (A9). The 
modalities are to be worked out by the Parties with the assistance of the SLMM.
1.11 The Parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, on the 
recommendation of their area commander, be permitted, unarmed and in plain 
clothes, to visit family and friends residing in areas under the control of the other 
Party. Such visits shall be limited to six days every second month, not including
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the time of travel by the shortest applicable route. The LTTE shall facilitate the 
use of the Jaffna-Kandy road for this purpose. The Parties reserve the right to 
deny entry to specified military areas.
1.12 The Parties agree that as of D-day individual combatants shall, 
notwithstanding the two-month restriction, be permitted, unarmed and in plain 
clothes, to visit immediate family (i.e. spouses, children, grandparents, parents 
and siblings) in connection with weddings or funerals. The right to deny entry to 
specified military areas applies.
1.13 Fifty (50) unarmed LTTE members shall as of D-day + 30, for the puipose of 
political work, be permitted freedom of movement in the areas of the North and 
the East dominated by the GOSL. Additional 100 unarmed LTTE members shall 
be permitted freedom of movement as of D-day + 60. As of D-day + 90, all 
unarmed LTTE members shall be permitted freedom of movement in the North 
and the East. The LTTE members shall cany identity papers. The right of the 
GOSL to deny entry to specified military areas applies.
Article 2: Measures to restore normalcy
The Parties shall undertake the following confidence-building measures with the 
aim of restoring normalcy for all inhabitants of Sri Lanka:
2.1 The Parlies shall in accordance with international law abstain from hostile acts 
against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, 
abduction, extortion and harassment.
2.2 The Parlies shall refrain from engaging in activities or propagating ideas that 
could offend cultural or religious sensitivities. Places of worship (temples, 
churches, mosques and other holy sites, etc.) currently held by the forces of either 
of the Parlies shall be vacated by D-day + 30 and made accessible to the public. 
Places of worship which are situated in "high security zones" shall be vacated by 
all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when 
they are not made accessible to the public.
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2.3 Beginning on the date on which this Agreement enters into force, school 
buildings occupied by either Party shall be vacated and returned to their intended 
use. This activity shall be completed by D-day + 160 at the latest.
2.4 A schedule indicating the return of all other public buildings to their intended 
use shall be drawn up by the Parties and published at the latest by D-day + 30.
2.5 The Parties shall review the security measures and the set-up of checkpoints, 
particularly in densely populated cities and towns, in order to introduce systems 
that will prevent harassment of the civilian population. Such systems shall be in 
place from D-day + 60.
2.6 The Parties agree to ensure the unimpeded flow of non-military goods to and 
from the LTTE-dominated areas with the exception of certain items as shown in 
Annex A. Quantities shall be determined by market demand. The GOSL shall 
regularly review the matter with the aim of gradually removing any remaining 
restrictions on non-military goods.
2.7 In order to facilitate the flow of goods and the movement of civilians, the 
Parties agree to establish checkpoints on their line of control at such locations as 
are specified in Annex B.
2.8 The Parties shall take steps to ensure that the Trincomalee-Habarana road 
remains open on a 24-hour basis for passenger traffic with effect from D-day +
10 .
2.9 The Parties shall facilitate the extension of the rail service on the Batticaloa- 
line to Welikanda. Repairs and maintenance shall be carried out by the GOSL in 
order to extend the service up to Batticaloa.
2.10 The Parties shall open the Kandy-Jaffna road (A9) to non-military traffic of 
goods and passengers. Specific modalities shall be worked out by the Parties with 
the assistance of the Royal Norwegian Government by D-day + 30 at the latest.
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2.11 A gradual easing of the fishing restrictions shall take place starting from D- 
day. As of D-day + 90, all restrictions on day and night fishing shall be removed, 
subject to the following exceptions: (i) fishing will not be permitted within an area 
of 1 nautical mile on either side along the coast and 2 nautical miles seawards 
from all security forces camps on the coast; (ii) fishing will not be permitted in 
harbours or approaches to harbours, bays and estuaries along the coast.
2.12 The Parties agree that search operations and arrests under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act shall not take place. Arrests shall be conducted under due process 
of law in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code.
2.13 The Parties agree to provide family members of detainees access to the 
detainees within D-day + 30.
Article 3: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
The Parties have agreed to set up an international monitoring mission to enquire 
into any instance of violation of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. Both 
Parties shall fully cooperate to rectify any matter of conflict caused by their 
respective sides. The mission shall conduct international verification through on­
site monitoring of the fulfilment of the commitments entered into in this 
Agreement as follows:
3.1 The name of the monitoring mission shall be the Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission (hereinafter referred to as the SLMM).
3.2 Subject to acceptance by the Parties, the Royal Norwegian Government 
(hereinafter referred to as the RNG) shall appoint the Head of the SLMM 
(hereinafter referred to as the HoM), who shall be the final authority regarding 
interpretation of this Agreement.
3.3 The SLMM shall liaise with the Parties and report to the RNG.
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3.4 The HoM shall decide the date for the commencement of the SLMM’s 
operations.
3.5 The SLMM shall be composed of representatives from Nordic countries.
3.6 The SLMM shall establish a headquarters in such place as the HoM finds 
appropriate. An office shall be established in Colombo and in Vanni in order to 
liaise with the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively. The SLMM will maintain a 
presence in the districts of Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and 
Amparai.
3.7 A local monitoring committee shall be established in Jaffna, Mannar, 
Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai. Each committee shall consist of 
five members, two appointed by the GOSL, two by the LTTE and one 
international monitor appointed by the HoM. The international monitor shall chair 
the committee. The GOSL and the LTTE appointees may be selected from among 
retired judges, public servants, religious leaders or similar leading citizens.
3.8 The committees shall serve the SLMM in an advisory capacity and discuss 
issues relating to the implementation of this Agreement in their respective 
districts, with a view to establishing a common understanding of such issues. In 
particular, they will seek to resolve any dispute concerning the implementation of 
this Agreement at the lowest possible level.
3.9 The Parties shall be responsible for the appropriate protection of and security 
arrangements for all SLMM members.
3.10 The Parties agree to ensure the freedom of movement of the SLMM 
members in performing their tasks. The members of the SLMM shall be given 
immediate access to areas where violations of the Agreement are alleged to have 
taken place. The Parties also agree to facilitate the widest possible access to such 
areas for the local members of the six above-mentioned committees, cf.
Article 3.7.
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3.11 It shall be the responsibility of the SLMM to take immediate action on any 
complaints made by either Party to the Agreement, and to enquire into and assist 
the Parties in the settlement of any dispute that might arise in connection with 
such complaints.
3.12 With the aim of resolving disputes at the lowest possible level, 
communication shall be established between commanders of the GOSL armed 
forces and the LTTE area leaders to enable them to resolve problems in the 
conflict zones.
3.13 Guidelines for the operations of the SLMM shall be established in a separate 
document.
Article 4: Entry into force, amendments and termination of the Agreement
4.1 Each Party shall notify its consent to be bound by this Agreement through a 
letter to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs signed by Prime Minister 
Ranil Wickremesinghe on behalf of the GOSL and by leader Velupillai 
Pirabaharan on behalf of the LTTE, respectively. The Agreement shall be 
initialled by each Party and enclosed in the above-mentioned letter.
4.2 The Agreement shall enter into force on such date as is notified by the 
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
4.3 This Agreement may be amended and modified by mutual agreement of both 
Parties. Such amendments shall be notified in writing to the RNG.
4.4 This Agreement shall remain in force until notice of termination is given by 
either Party to the RNG. Such notice shall be given fourteen (14) days in advance 
of the effective date of termination.
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ANNEXA
The Parties agree to ensure the flow of non- military goods to and from LTTE 
dominated areas of the Northern and Eastern Province, as well as unimpeded flow 
of such goods to the civilian population in these areas. Non military goods not 
covered by article 2.6 in the Agreement are listed below:
- Non military arms/ammunition
- Explosives
- Remote control devices
- Barbed wire
- Binoculars/Telescopes
- Compasses
- Penlight batteries
Diesel, petrol, cement and iron rods will be restricted in accordance with the 
following procedures and quantities:
Diesel and petrol
The Government Agents (GA) will register available vehicles; tractors and 
motorcycles in the LTTE controlled areas. The GA will calculate the required 
weekly amount of diesel and petrol based on the following estimate:
Trucks/Buses 250 litre/week 
4 wheels tractor 310 litre/week 
2 wheel tractor 40 litre/week 
Petrol vehicle 30 litre/week 
Motorcycles 7 litre/week 
Fishing vessels 400 litre/week
Cement
Cement required for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Government property; 
registeret co-operatives; or approved housing projects implemented by the GOSL 
and international NGOs and more affluent members of the society; will be 
brought in directly by relevant institutions under licenses issued by Government 
Agents. The GA shall stipulate the monthly quantities permitted for such project 
based upon planned and reported progress.
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Cement required for indvidual shops/constructions/house owners/rehabilitation- 
initiatives will be made available through the co-operations on a commercial 
basis. The monthly import for this purpose wil be limited to 5000 bags during the 
first month and thereafter 10 000 bags/month. Individual sales by the co­
operatives will be registered and limited to 25 bags per household.
Iron rods
Iron rods for building constructions will be brought in to the LTTE controlled 
areas under licenses issued by the GA.
A monthly reassessment will be made to assess the possibilites of removal of the 
above restrictions.
ANNEX B
Checkpoints agreed in § 2.7 are as follows:
- Mandur
- Paddirupur
- Kaludaveli Ferry Point
- Anbalantivu Ferry Point
- Mamunai Ferry Point
- Vanvunateevu
- Santhiveli Boat Point
- Black Bridge
- Sitandy Boat Point
- Kiran bridge
- Kinniyadi Boat Point
- Valachenai
- Makemi
- Mahindapura
- Muttur
- Ugilankulam
- Omanthai
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Appendix 5: The Tokyo Declaration
Tokyo Declaration On Reconstruction And Development Of Sri Lanka
10 June 2003
Outline of the Conference
1. The Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka was 
held on June 9 and 10 in Tokyo with the participation of Ministers and 
representatives from 51 countries and 22 international organizations. The list of 
participating countries and international organizations is attached. The Prime 
Minister of Japan, Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, and the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, 
Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe made opening statements. The opening session was 
chaired by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Representative of the Government of Japan.
2. Japan, Norway, the United States and the European Union (Presidency and 
Commission) functioned as co-chairs of the Conference. Representatives of the 
co-chairs, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi; State 
Secretary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Olav Kjo erven; Deputy 
Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Richard L. Armitage; Mr. Ioannis 
Theophanopoulos, representing the Presidency of the European Union; and Mr. 
Bernhard Zepter, representing the European Commission, delivered statements at 
the opening session. The President of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Mr. 
Tadao Chino also delivered a statement at this session, followed by a video 
message Rom the President of the World Bank, Mr. James Wolfensohn.
3. In the operative session, the Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Mr.
A.S. Jayawardena reported on economic developments and prospects of Sri 
Lanka. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank reported on Sri 
Lanka’s macro-economic performance and the reconstruction and development 
agenda of Sri Lanka. The ADB and the United Nations (UN) system reviewed the 
“Needs Assessment” of the North and East prepared by the World Bank, the ADB
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and the UN system in full consultation with the Government of Sri Lanka and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Civil society organizations were 
consulted during this process.
4. In the plenary session, participating countries and international organizations 
presented statements which identified their intention to provide economic 
assistance to Sri Lanka. Presentations were made on the contributions of civil 
society organizations and of private enterprise to the development objectives of 
the country.
History of the Sri Lankan Peace Process
5. The armed conflict in Sri Lanka in the last two decades has claimed more than 
65,000 lives, and has resulted in more than 800,000 internally displaced persons 
and a large number of refugees from the North and East. The current peace 
process commenced in 2000, when Sri Lankan President, Ms. Chandrika 
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, and LTTE leader, Mr. Vellupillai Pirapaharan, asked 
Norway to serve as the impartial facilitator for peace negotiations. The 
Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE entered into a mutual cease-fire 
agreement on February 23, 2002, with the able facilitation by Norway. Since 
September 2002, six sessions of talks have been conducted between the two 
parties and significant progress has been achieved. Participating countries and 
international organizations, which met in Oslo on November 25, 2002, committed 
themselves to providing immediate humanitarian assistance in support of the 
peace process. In April 2003, a pre-Tokyo Seminar* was held in Washington DC 
chaired by the US Deputy Secretary of State with a view to building political 
momentum for the Tokyo Conference.
Objectives of the Conference
6. The objectives of the Conference are to provide the international community 
with an opportunity to demonstrate its strong and unified commitment to the 
reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka and to encourage the parties to 
redouble their efforts to make further progress in the peace process. While only
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one paily to the peace process is present at the Conference, the international 
community takes the opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to support the 
establishment by the parties of the necessary administrative structure for the 
effective reconstruction and development of the North and East. A partnership 
between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE will be necessary to rebuild 
these areas effectively. Adequate safeguards to secure the interests of all other 
communities should be included in this framework.
7. The Conference takes note of the economic challenges faced by the country and 
in this context endorsed the Government’s “Regaining Sri Lanka” initiative, 
which is a comprehensive programme to develop Sri Lanka on a balanced and 
equitable basis.
8. Participants express their regret over the absence of the LTTE from the Tokyo 
Conference. The Conference provides the Government of Sri Lanka with an 
opportunity to reaffirm its determination to pursue the peace process, and focus on 
the reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka.
Importance of the Conference in Promoting the Peace Process
9. Participants express the view that a negotiated settlement in Sri Lanka will be a 
landmark achievement with regard to peaceful resolution of an armed conflict.
The Conference commends both parties for their commitment to a lasting and 
negotiated peace based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. 
Furthermore, the Conference stresses the importance of bringing tangible 
dividends of peace to all the people of Sri Lanka.
Balanced Humanitarian and Economic Assistance
10. The Conference notes the importance of urgent humanitarian assistance as 
well as medium to long-term assistance to rebuild the conflict-affected areas in the 
North and East, and to assist in the development of the entire country. The 
Conference emphasizes the importance of taking full account of the delicate 
ethnic and geographical balance in providing assistance. The Conference
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welcomes the “Needs Assessment” of the North and East, which identified needs 
in the conflict-affected areas. The donor community expresses its willingness to 
extend assistance to Sri Lanka based on the source material provided for the 
Conference namely, “Regaining Sri Lanka”, the “Needs Assessment” of the North 
and East, the “Needs Assessment” for the conflict- related districts adjacent to the 
North and East, and the Bridging Document, which links the “Needs 
Assessments” and “Regaining Sri Lanka”.
Support Indicated by the Donors
11. The participating donor countries and international organizations have 
demonstrated their willingness to extend assistance to the entire country, to a 
cumulative estimated amount, in excess of US $ 4.5 billion over the four year 
period, 2003-2006. In addition, some countries and international organizations 
have offered technical support. Others have indicated that their commitments are 
based upon an assumption of a viable peace process.
12. Several countries and international organizations have specified significant 
part of their assistance to the North and East. A number of them have indicated 
that disbursement of such assistance will keep pace with satisfactory progress in 
the peace process; and others have indicated that, given such progress, they would 
be willing to consider making additional commitments.
Channels of Assistance to the North and East
13. The international community remains committed to supporting humanitarian 
relief and human rights protection, and takes the opportunity to encourage the 
parties to reach agreement on an innovative administrative structure for the 
reconstruction and development of the North and East. The international 
community also reiterates its commitment to cooperate with the parties for this 
purpose. This structure will itself contribute to the process of reconciliation in Sri 
Lanka. The Conference recognizes with satisfaction that implementation of some 
humanitarian assistance projects is already taking place in the North and East 
through bilateral and multilateral channels in cooperation with local and
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international NGOs. The Conference also welcomes the establishment of the 
“North-East Reconstruction Fund (NERF)”, which is to be administered by the 
World Bank, as an important channel for assistance to the North and East. The 
Conference also emphasizes the need for flexibility by the Government of Sri 
Lanka and the LTTE in accepting various forms of assistance from the donor 
community. The donor community also expresses its willingness to assist capacity 
building to enhance good governance so as to ensure accountable, transparent, 
speedy and efficient implementation of projects supported with its assistance.
Importance of Strong and Growth Oriented Macro-Economic Policy
14. The Conference notes that it is imperative for the Government of Sri Lanka to 
implement the sound macro-economic policy delineated in “Regaining Sri 
Lanka”. The Conference stresses the need to adopt economic policies aimed at 
reducing poverty. Sustainable development also depends upon economic growth 
and job creation as well as encouragement of private enterprise.
Progress of the Peace Process
15. The Conference notes that during the past sessions of the peace talks, 
significant progress was achieved. Donors remind the Government of Sri Lanka 
and the LTTE of the importance for both parties to make their utmost efforts to 
further promote the peace process founded upon the principles reflected in the 
Oslo Declaration. Donors recognize the urgent need to support the people in the 
conflict-affected areas of the North and East, and make allocations towards this 
purpose. With regard to the North and East, priority-setting and project- 
implementation will take place with the Government working in partnership with 
the LTTE, and with adequate safeguards for the interests of all communities. The 
Conference expects that the Government will ensure that the assistance pledged 
by the donor community to the reconstruction and development of the North and 
East is utilized specifically for that purpose.
16. The Conference also urges the parties to move expeditiously to a lasting and 
equitable political settlement. Such a settlement should be based upon respect for
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human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In this regard, the Conference looks 
forward to the parties reaching early agreement on a human rights declaration, as 
discussed at the sixth session of peace negotiations at Hakone.
17. The Conference welcomes the LTTE’s commitment to the negotiated peace 
process, and urges the LTTE to return to the peace talks as soon as possible. The 
people in the conflict-affected areas of the North and East must be able to enjoy 
the dividends of peace immediately. Manifest commitment by both the 
Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE to further the peace process will be 
necessary for the provision of international assistance to the reconstruction and 
development of the conflict-affected areas of the North and East.
Linkage between Donor Support and Progress in the Peace Process
18. Assistance by the donor community must be closely linked to substantial and 
parallel progress in the peace process towards fulfilment of tire objectives agreed 
upon by the parties in Oslo. The Conference encourages the Government of Sri 
Lanka and the LTTE to enter into discussions as early as possible on a provisional 
administrative structure to manage the reconstruction and development aspects of 
the transition process. The process would need the expeditious development of a 
roadmap with clear* milestones indicating the path towards a mutually acceptable 
final political solution. With this in view, the international community intends to 
review and monitor the progress of the peace process closely, with particular 
reference to objectives and milestones including:
a. Full compliance with the cease-fire agreement by both parties.
b. Effective delivery mechanisms relating to development activity in the 
North and East.
c. Participation of a Muslim delegation as agreed in the declaration of the 
fourth session of peace talks in Thailand
d. Parallel progress towards a final political settlement based on the 
principles of the Oslo Declaration.
e. Solutions for those displaced due to the armed conflict.
f. Effective promotion and protection of the human rights of all people.
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g. Effective inclusion of gender equity and equality in the peace building, the 
conflict transformation and the reconstruction process, emphasizing an 
equitable representation of women in political fora and at other decision­
making levels.
h. Implementation of effective measures in accordance with the UNICEF- 
supported Action Plan to stop underage recruitment and to facilitate the 
release of underage recruits and their rehabilitation and reintegration into 
society,
i. Rehabilitation of former combatants and civilians in the North and East, 
who have been disabled physically or psychologically due to the armed 
conflict.
j. Agreement by the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE on a phased, 
balanced, and verifiable de-escalation, de-militarization and normalization 
process at an appropriate time in the context of arriving at a political 
settlement.
Inputs from Civil Society Organizations and Private Enterprise
19. The Conference welcomes the inputs from the civil society meetings held in 
Colombo on 26-27 April 2003 and in Tokyo on 8 June 2003. The Conference is of 
the view that the intensity and continuity of involvement on the part of civil 
society organizations are essential to achieve success in the challenging task 
undertaken by the parties. The Conference is encouraged by the dynamic role 
played by private enterprise. The Conference also recognizes the contribution of 
academic communities, trade unions, professional groups, religious organizations 
and others.
Monitoring and Review
20. In view of the linkage between donor support and progress in the peace 
process, the international community will monitor and review the progress in the 
peace process. In implementing its own assistance programmes, the donor 
community intends to take into careful consideration the results of these periodic 
reviews. With full regard to the position of Norway as the facilitator, Japan, in
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cooperation with the United States and the European Union, will undertake 
necessary consultations to establish the modalities for this purpose as early as 
possible.
Follow-up Action
21. The Conference requests the Government of Japan, as the host country, to 
convey the outcome of the Conference to the LTTE.
List of Participating Countries and International Organizations of Tokyo 
Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka 09 and 10 June 
2003, Tokyo
Commonwealth of Australia 
Republic of Austria 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh 
Kingdom of Belgium 
Federative Republic of Brazil 
Brunei Darussalam 
Kingdom of Cambodia 
Canada
People’s Republic of China
Kingdom of Denmark
Arab Republic of Egypt
Republic of Finland
French Republic
Federal Republic of Germany
Hellenic Greece
State of the City of Vatican
Republic of Iceland
India
Republic of Indonesia 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
Ireland 
State of Israel 
Republic of Italy 
Japan
Republic of Korea 
State of Kuwait
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
Malaysia
Kingdom of Nepal 
Kingdom of the Netherlands
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New Zealand 
Kingdom of Norway 
Sultanate of Oman 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
Republic of the Philippines 
Portuguese Republic 
Russian Federation 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Republic of Singapore 
Republic of South Africa 
Spain
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Kingdom of Sweden
Swiss Confederation
Kingdom of Thailand
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
United States of America 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
European Commission 
Asian Development Bank 
Asian Productivity Organization
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
International Fund for Agricultural Development
International Labor Organization
International Monetary Fund
International Organization for Migration
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
United Nations Secretariat
United Nations Human Settlement Programme
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Population Fund
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Children's Fund
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
United Nations World Food Programme
World Health Organization
World Bank
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Appendix 6: TNA Manifesto 2001
November 12, 2001
1. The parliamentary elections scheduled for 5th December 2001 will be an 
important landmark in the political history of the Tamil nationality.
2. It is imperative that the present situation of drift and uncertainty be ended and 
that the Tamil national question be addressed with all the seriousness and urgency 
it deserves.
3. A brief reiteration of the political experiences and history of the Tamil 
nationality in the past fifty-two year's since independence would be relevant.
4. The Citizenship and Franchise Laws deprived hundreds of thousands of Tamils 
of recent Indian origin, who were domiciled in Ceylon at independence, of their 
citizenship and franchise rights. Though subsequent efforts were made to remedy 
this grave injustice, more than three hundred thousand of these people have been 
compelled to leave the country, while almost a hundred thousand yet remain 
stateless. This has diminished the political strength and representation of the 
Tamil people.
5. State aided colonization of the Tamil homeland with Sinhala people, from the 
time of independence has continued unabated despite agreements entered into by 
successive prime ministers with the Tamil political leadership, which if 
implemented, would have brought to an end this pernicious practice, that 
diminished the political strength and representation of the Tamil nationality, in the 
Tamil homeland and also deprives them of vital resources in the areas of their 
historical habitation. Successive governments have through the activities of State- 
funded corporations and through the encouragement of unlawful occupation of 
State land by the Sinhala people contributed to the worsening of the situation.
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6. The harmful impact of state-aided Sinhala colonization of the Tamil homeland 
is demonstrated by the inconvertible fact that while the natural increase of Sinhala 
populationcountry wide-between 1948 (the year* of independence) and 1981 (the 
year of the last available census) was 238 percent, the Sinhala population in the 
eastern province increased during the same period by 883 percent. The position 
now in the year 2001 is far worse than what it was in 1981.
7. The enactment of the Sinhala Only legislation and the implementation of that 
policy for over three decades, gravely impinged upon the employment and other 
opportunities of the Tamil nationality in the administrative system and reduced 
the Tamil nationality to a position of second class citizenship.
8. The dubious provision, by which Tamil was purported to be elevated to the 
same status as Sinhala, remains a dead letter. The Sinhala language is yet the only 
language used, even in some parts of the Tamil homeland. The resulting position 
is that the status of the Tamil nationality in the administration yet continues to 
remain the same.
9. Standardization in admissions to university education in the 1970s embittered 
Tamil youth who were deprived of equal opportunity to higher education. The 
district-wise admission to university education now in force is weighted in favour 
of the Sinhala nationality, and does not accord merit its rightful place in the higher 
education system. Equal facilities are not provided to Tamil students in the matter 
of the educational infrastructure and services. There is much frustration within the 
Tamil nationality in the field of education. Non-recognition of merit, deprivation 
of social development, and denial of economic opportunities, step-motherly 
treatment in the fields of industries, agriculture and fisheries, have led to social 
underdevelopment, and economic impoverishment of the Tamil nationality.
10. There is gross discrimination against Tamil youth in the field of public sector 
employment. The same practice is spreading to private sector employment. Not 
even three percent of the total employment is provided to the Tamil nationality in 
the public sector. Such blatant discrimination against the Tamil nationality, 
particularly Tamil youth, has continued for decades and successive governments
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have been utterly insensitive to the legitimate grievances of the Tamil nationality 
in this regard.
11. Racial pogroms against the Tamil nationality have been a regular phenomenon 
since the 1950's.The Tamil nationality has lost lives by the tens of thousands, 
many more have been grievously wounded and billions of rupees worth of 
property owned by Tamils has been destroyed in the northeast and other parts of 
the island. Places of religious worship, educational and cultural institutions 
including the public library of Jaffna were destroyed by the armed forces of the 
Sri Lankan State. The disappearances of Tamil people, particularly Tamil youths, 
and frequent sexual assault against Tamil females has been a continuing feature of 
the violence unleashed against the Tamil nationality: some governments have 
even collaborated with the perpetrators of violence.
12. Arbitrary and indiscriminate arrests of Tamil youth, prolonged detention under 
the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Emergency Regulations 
without trial, physical and mental torture, the humiliation and insults inflicted on 
the Tamil nationality allegedly on grounds of security, have been a continuing 
feature. Aerial bombing and shelling both from land and sea into Tamil civilian 
settlements has resulted in death and injury and in the substantial dislocation of 
the Tamil civilian population, and the dreadful fear amongst noncombatant 
civilians that they could be the victims of such bombing and shelling.
13. Having failed to resolve the Tamil national question, through negotiations, and 
civil disobedience campaigns, such as the massive 'satyagraha' campaign in the 
northeast in 1961, when the repression of the armed forces was unleashed on the 
Tamil nationality, and the Tamil political leadership detained in an army camp, 
the Vaddukoddai resolution was adopted on 14th May 1976, for the restoration of 
the sovereignty of the Tamil nation.
14. The position today is much worse than it was in 1976.
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15. It was in this background and in the context of the failure of successive 
governments to evolve a just solution to the Tamil national question, that Tamil 
youth - left with no alternative - were driven to resort to an armed struggle.
16. Even after the adoption of the Vaddukoddai resolution, and even after the 
commencement of an aimed struggle, the Tamil political leadership had always 
been willing to, and has made every possible endeavour to negotiate a just 
solution to the Tamil national question. The opportunities that thus became 
available were not availed, of by successive governments. There has thus been 
dismal failure on the part of successive governments, during the past fifty years, 
to evolve a just solution to the Tamil national question.
17. Consequently, it was inevitable, that the armed struggle gained in strength, 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam came to occupy a paramount position, 
and play a pivotal role in the struggle of the Tamil nationality to win their rights. 
It would be futile not to recognize this reality.
18. It would be relevant to recall the statement made by the widely representative 
delegation of the Tamil nationality on 13th July 1985 at talks with representatives 
of the Sri Lankan government at Thimpu, Bhutan. 'It is our considered view that 
any meaningful solution to the national question of the island must be based on 
the following four cardinal principles'.
1. Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality.
2. Recognition of an identified Tamil homeland and guarantee of its 
territorial integrity.
3. Based on the above, recognition of the inalienable right of self- 
determination of the Tamil nation.
4. Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental 
democratic rights of all Tamils who look upon the island as their country.'
19. The statement went on to state - 'Different countries have fashioned different 
systems of governments to ensure these principles. We have demanded and
301
struggled for an independent Tamil state as the answer to this problem arising out 
of the denial of these basic rights of our people...
20. In view of our earnest desire for peace, we are prepared to give consideration 
to any set of proposals in keeping with the above principles that the Sri Lanka 
government might place before us'.
21. The Sri Lankan State has lacked comprehension and consistency in its 
purported efforts to evolve a just solution to the Tamil national question. The 
sincerity of the commitment of the Sri Lankan State has thereby been called into 
serious question. By reason thereof, the Tamil nationality has encountered 
immense hardship and suffering, valuable lives have been lost on all sides, and the 
whole country has had to endure the multi-faceted adverse consequences of the 
continuing war.
22. The seriously flawed policies of the Sri Lankan State in the past six years, of 
claiming to 'conduct a war for peace’ and claiming 'that the war is being 
conducted against the LTTE and not against the Tamil people' has aggravated the 
situation and made a just solution to the Tamil national question even more 
complex. We have consistently rejected these positions, and asserted that war can 
never bring about peace, and that peace can only be achieved through rational 
dialogue. We have also consistently asserted that any attempt to draw a distinction 
between the LTTE and the Tamil people was meaningless, when there was no 
aspect of Tamil civilian life which was not gravely impaired by the continuance of 
the war, and that the war should therefore be ended. The hollowness of these two 
slogans of the Sri Lankan State today stands fully exposed.
23. It is such misconceived thinking on the part of the Sri Lankan State, that 
resulted in tardiness in accepting an international third party role, in order to 
evolve a just solution to the Tamil national question and the failure after the 
acceptance of the Norwegian initiative to grasp opportunities that because 
available to terminate the war, and further the negotiation process; and thereafter 
in the stultification of the Norwegian initiative on frivolous pretexts and the 
consequent frustration of the peace process.
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24. The above factors have made it imperative for the Tamil nationality to 
formulate a cohesive and coherent position in regard to their future political 
struggle.
25. The immediate aims and objectives of the Tamil Alliance comprising the 
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), 
the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and the Eelam People's 
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) are the following: -
i) The immediate lifting of the economic embargo currently in force in 
parts of the northeast province
ii) The withdrawal of the residential and travel restrictions foisted on the 
Tamil nationality
iii) The immediate cessation of the war being currently waged in the 
northeast
iv) The immediate commencement of the process of negotiations with the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with international third 
party involvement. This Alliance also states that unless meaningful 
negotiations are held with the LTTE no just solution can be found to 
the Tamil national question and that such negotiations should be held 
immediately only with the LTTE. This Alliance further states that in 
order to ensure that the negotiations are properly focussed and are 
purposeful and successful, no parallel negotiations should take place 
with any other Tamil political formation.
v) That to facilitate the commencement of such negotiations, steps should 
be taken to lift the proscription imposed on the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and thereby ensure such 
proscription does not constitute an impediment to the free and full 
participation of the LTTE at such negotiations on behalf of the Tamil 
nationality.
26. The Alliance contests the forthcoming parliamentary elections in order to 
achieve the aims and objectives, outlines above, and will campaign both 
nationally and internationally for the achievement of the said aims and objectives.
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27. This Alliance will mobilize the Tamil-speaking people of the northeast, in 
order to achieve the said aims and objectives.
28. The Tamil nationality is today at the crossroads, between despair as a result of 
their present pathetic plight, and hope for a better tomorrow.
29. We urge the Tamil speaking voters to repose faith in the hope for a better 
tomorrow, and extend their total support to the Tamil Alliance, by casting their 
votes for the rising sun, the common symbol of the Tamil Alliance.
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Appendix 7: TNA Manifesto 2004
1. Within two years of Parliamentary elections of December 5, 2001 the Tamil 
nation was forced to the position of having to face another election as a result of a 
power struggle between the two largest Sinhala chauvinist parties.
2. However, with the current political environment and in the backdrop of the 
changes shaping the attitudes of the international community towards our freedom 
struggle, the TNA has decided to make use of the opportunity presented by this 
election to bring forcefully to the attention of the world, and Sri Lanka in 
particular, our resolve for self-determination.
3. The Tamil Nation which from historical times had its own traditional 
homeland, sovereignty and rule over it lost them first to the European aggressors. 
When in 1833 the British brought the whole island of Ilankai under one 
administrative control the Tamil Nation, without its consent, was annexed to the 
Sinhala areas.
4. Later in 1948 at the time of their departure, the British rejected every 
constitutional proposal submitted on behalf of the Tamil Nation and the way was 
paved for the fate of the Tamil Nation to be at the mercy of the Sinhala nation. 
Subsequently, as a result of the measures taken by the chauvinist Sinhala majority 
such as the appropriation of Tamils’ land, disenfranchisement, abrogation of 
voting rights and language rights, discrimination based on race in education, 
employment, culture all of which threatened the distinctiveness and survival of the 
Tamil Nation, the non-violent struggle adopted by the Ilankai Thamil Arasu 
Katchi on behalf of the Tamil Nation based on the conviction that the affairs in 
our traditional homeland should be administered only by us and on the principle 
of self-determination, was put down by force of arms by the government. Since 
1957 the agreements entered into from time to time, by the leaders of Tamil 
people with the chauvinist Sinhala political leaders have been tom up and 
discarded.
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5. Continuing this behaviour, in the years 1956 and 1957 planned violence was 
directed at the helpless Tamil people. Because the provisions of the unitary-state 
republican constitution of 1972, which was approved in the midst of the 
opposition by Tamil people’s representatives by the chauvinist Sinhala majority, 
which denied totally and comprehensively the rights of the Tamil people, there 
arose the historical inevitability of the start of an armed rebellion on behalf of the 
Tamil people.
6. In this political environment the Tamil organizations got together and resolved 
on May 14, 1976 to establish a sovereign independent Tamil Eelam based on our 
inalienable right to selfdetermination. Independent Thamil Eelam received its 
mandate as a result of the overwhelming support given to the TULF by the Tamil 
speaking people of NorthEast in the general elections of July 1977.
7. In addition to the unleashing of genocidal attacks on the Tamil people as an 
immediate response to the mandate for an independent Tamil Eelam, in the 
following year-, a second republican constitution, further strengthening the 
unitary-state government was promulgated despite opposition from the Tamil 
people and their representatives. Subsequently in 1979 and 1981 and later on a 
enormous scale in 1983, genocidal attacks on Tamils was planned and agitated by 
the Sinhala chauvinist politicians.
8. In this circumstance, in order to safeguard the life and liberty of the Tamil race 
and to establish its birthright for self-determination, the Tamil Nation having been 
pushed to the unavoidable state of armed conflict as the only way, the war not 
only broadened but advanced under the generalship of the Tigers’ leader Hon. 
Pirapaharan.
9. The state of affairs being that all the efforts taken by the successive Sinhala 
chauvinist governments to defeat the aimed campaign for Tamil Nation’s freedom 
and thereby crush the political aspirations of the Tamil people having ended in 
failure, and in the context of the reality being accepted and emphasized by the 
international community that the solution to the Tamil National problem cannot
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be settled by force of aims but only politically, the basis was laid for political 
negotiations with the help of the international community.
10. We are obligated to remind ourselves at this stage that the only reason we 
have established the power of Tamil nationalism thus is because our people have 
demonstrated such determination and sacrifice for the ideals in the face of 
numerous hardships and the loss of nearly one lakh of lives and because of the 
legendary bravery, sacrifices and exploits of our heroes and fighters.
11. The unilateral cease-fire, declared by the LTTE midnight on December 24, 
2001 and the subsequent cease-fire agreement signed (between the LTTE and the 
Sri Lankan government) as a result of the efforts of the Norwegian government 
with the approval of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, paved the way for 
a series of talks.
12. On account of the failure to institute, in terms of the agreement reached in the 
talks, the administrative organs including 'SIHRN' to cany out the necessary and 
urgent functions based on humanitarian considerations required to restore 
normalcy in the daily lives of the Tamil people and the failure to organize the 
bureaucratic framework to put to use the huge amount of aid promised by the 
international community and bearing in mind the escalating daily hardships and 
misery to the people and the resulting perceptions, the LTTE put forward the 
proposal that an interim self-governing authority be set up for the regions of the 
Tamil nation.
13. Their draft proposals for the interim self-governing authority (ISGA) was 
submitted to the facilitators on October 31, 2003.
14. The LTTE requested the Sri Lankan government to appoint a date for the 
commencement of talks on these proposals. The political crisis that was 
precipitated by the president at this juncture by taking over the Defense, Interior 
and Information ministries within three days of the ISGA proposals culminated in 
the dissolution of the parliament and the announcement of general elections to 
take place on April 4, 2004. This state of affairs not only disrupted the efforts to
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set up an ISGA sorely needed for our people but also set back and put in peril the 
efforts to a political solution to the Tamil national problem. Despite this the LTTE 
has reaffirmed their determination to pursue the course of peace. The international 
community has praised and approved this.
15. In the forthcoming elections the Tamil national problem has been made to take 
the centre stage in South Sri Lanka. This has been used as the basis for Sinhala 
chauvinist propaganda in various forms to present to the Sinhala electorate. Thus, 
the responsibility resides with the Sinhala people to arrive at a mature position in 
the matter of resolving the Tamil national problem.
17. The LTTE announced the unilateral cessation of hostilities in December 2001. 
We wish to point out that following this on February 22, 2002 even though they 
signed the cease-fire agreement and continued to take part in the political 
negotiation regarding the Tamil national problem the LTTE not only has fully 70 
regions in the Tamil people’s traditional homeland under its complete control and 
is managing an administrative set up with characteristic features of a state 
government but also has a functioning government.
18. For these reason the TNA expects the Sinhala nation also to play its part in the 
productive and healthy resumption of the disrupted political settlement efforts. 
Based on this the TNA puts forward the following resolutions:
1) Find a political solution to the Tamil national problem based on the 
acceptance of the fundamental proposals regarding (Tamil Nation’s) Tamil 
homeland, Tamil Nation, Tamils’ right to self-government (autonomy).
2) The TNA has clear and definitive position on the political solution of the 
Tamil national problem in regal'd to the Muslims. Because of the fact the 
Muslims have Tamil as their Mother tongue like the Tamils and on the 
recognition that they have lived in amity amongst the Tamil in the Tamil 
homeland, the TNA has decided that any solution to the Tamil national 
problem must incorporate matters and features that reassure the 
distinctiveness, security, culture and economy of the Muslims. In this 
manner, in the ISGA proposals and features relating to the Muslims have
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been made manifest. That the Muslim community has the right to be a 
party in determining the part to be played by them in ISGA committee has 
been made clear by the LTTE. Moreover, LTTE has made known that the 
members appointed by the NorthEast Muslim community will take their 
place in the ISGA committee. The TNA is confident that the Muslim 
brothers will join with the Tamils in this front to erect a common future.
3) The Sinhala nation should accept in to the ideas developed in the ISGA 
document put forward by the LTTE which contains excellent proposals in 
regard to rebuilding the Tamil country devastated and Tamil lives ravaged 
in the twenty-year long war, to solve the day to day problems encountered 
by the Tamil people and to establish normalcy in the lives of the Tamil 
people, centred on their welfare, respecting human rights and conforming 
to the rule of law, and proceed to hold talks with the LTTE and set up the 
ISGA committee.
4) The high security zones and aimed forces camps which are located in 
areas populated by Tamils disregarding their welfare, priority given to 
strategic interest of warfare, should be removed and arrangements made 
for the Tamil people to return and settle in their places of residence.
5) The armed forces5’ interdiction and oppression imposed must be lifted 
comprehensively to enable the Tamil people to carry on the activities 
needed for their livelihood and to move freely in their homeland.
6) The international community, instead of waiting until the Tamil nation’s 
ethnic problem is permanently solved, should step forward and directly 
assist in the pressing humanitarian needs and economic development 
schemes and improve the economic life of the Tamil nation.
7) The political prisoners unreasonably held in jail for year’s should all be 
released forthwith.
8) An international judicial inquiry should be conducted to deliver justice to 
our people and to the relatives who are burdened with the unbearable 
sorrow of not knowing the fate of those innocents who disappeared after 
having been arrested by the armed forces and police in our homeland.
9) All the provisions of the cease-fire agreements must be completely 
fulfilled and peace and normalcy should prevail in our homeland.
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10) The LTTE has for the past two years put up with the violent, surly
behaviour of the armed forces without impairing the conditions for peace 
and observing the cease-fire and acting steadfastly and firmly towards the 
path of peace. Hence, the international community should create the 
environment by removing the restrictions put in place by certain countries 
on the LTTE, the authentic sole representatives of the Tamil people, so 
that they could, with authority, dignity and with equal status conduct talks 
with the government of Sri Lanka.
19. Accepting LTTE’s leadership as the national leadership of the Tamil Eelam 
Tamils and the Liberation Tigers as the sole and authentic representatives of the 
Tamil people, let us devote our full cooperation for the ideals of the Liberation 
Tigers’ struggle with honesty and steadfastness.Let us endeavour determinedly, 
collectively as one group, one nation, one country, transcending race and religious 
differences, under the leadership of the LTTE for a life of liberty, honor and 
justice for the Tamil people. Let us work side by side with the LTTE, who are 
fighting for the protection and autonomous life of the Tamil speaking people, for 
the political initiatives under their leadership. We emphasize that if the Tamil 
nation’s requests are continued to be rejected, rightful political solution denied 
and aimed aggression and oppressive rule return, based on the doctrine of self- 
determination, it is an inevitable reality that Tamil sovereignty and independence 
will be established in the Tamil homeland. We implore our people to identify the 
selfish, opportunistic packs and gangs that operate in our midst as the enemies and 
as the tools of the majoritarian chauvinist Sinhala forces against the Tamil nation 
which seeks an honourable and peaceful life and reject them totally and 
completely in the upcoming elections. We are sending a clarion call to the Tamil 
speaking people to unite under one flag and give overwhelming support to the 
TNA which is contesting (the elections) under the ILANKAI TAMIL ARASU 
KATCHI’S symbol of house, so as to emphasize the aims of the people of the 
Tamil Nation, to proclaim again the political resolve of our people, to strengthen 
further the Tamil nation and to win the political rights of the Tamil speaking 
people.
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Appendix 8: Vaddokoddai Resolution
Unanimously adopted at the First National Convention of the Tamil United
Liberation Front held at Vaddukoddai on 14-Mav-1976
Whereas throughout the centuries from the dawn of history the Sinhalese and 
Tamil nations have divided between them the possession of Ceylon, the Sinhalese 
inhabiting the interior of the country in its Southern and Western parts from the 
river Walawe to that of Chilaw and the Tamils possessing the Northern and 
Eastern districts;
And whereas the Tamil Kingdom was overthrown in war and conquered by the 
Portuguese in 1619 and from them by the Dutch and the British in turn 
independent of the Sinhalese Kingdoms;
And whereas the British Colonists who ruled the territories of the Sinhalese and 
Tamil Kingdoms separately joined under compulsion the territories of the 
Sinhalese Kingdoms for purposes of administrative convenience on the 
recommendation of the Colebrooke Commission in 1833;
And whereas the Tamil Leaders were in the forefront of the Freedom movement 
to rid Ceylon of colonial bondage which ultimately led to the grant of 
independence to Ceylon in 1948;
And whereas the foregoing facts of history were completely overlooked and 
power was transferred to the Sinhalese nation over the entire country on the basis 
of a numerical majority thereby reducing the Tamil nation to the position of 
subject people;
And whereas successive Sinhalese governments since independence have always 
encouraged and fostered the aggressive nationalism of the Sinhalese people and 
have used their political power to the detriment of the Tamils by -
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(a) Depriving one half of the Tamil people of their citizenship and franchise rights 
thereby reducing Tamil representation in Parliament,
(b) Making serious inroads into the territories of the former Tamil Kingdom by a 
system of planned and state-aided Sinhalese colonization and large scale 
regularization of recently encouraged Sinhalese encroachments calculated to make 
the Tamils a minority in their own homeland,
(c) Making Sinhala the only official language throughout Ceylon thereby placing 
the stamp of inferiority on the Tamils and the Tamil Language,
(d) Giving the foremost place to Buddhism under the Republican constitution 
thereby reducing the Hindus, Christians, and Muslims to second class status in 
this Country,
(e) Denying to the Tamils equality of opportunity in the spheres of employment, 
education, land alienation and economic life in general and starving Tamil areas 
of large scale industries and development schemes thereby seriously endangering 
their very existence in Ceylon,
(f) Systematically cutting them off from the main-stream of Tamil cultures in 
South-India while denying them opportunities of developing their language and 
culture in Ceylon thereby working inexorably towards the cultural genocide of the 
Tamils,
(g) Permitting and unleashing communal violence and intimidation against the 
Tamil speaking people as happened in Amparai and Colombo in 1956; all over the 
country in 1958; army reign of terror in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in 
1961; Police violence at the International Tamil Research Conference in 1974 
resulting in the death of nine persons in Jaffna; Police and communal violence 
against Tamil speaking Muslims at Puttalam and various other parts of Ceylon in 
1976 - all these calculated to instill terror in the minds of the Tamil speaking 
people thereby breaking their spirit and the will to resist injustices heaped on 
them,
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(h) By terrorizing, torturing, and imprisoning Tamil youths without trial for long 
periods on the flimsiest grounds,
(i) Capping it all by imposing on the Tamil Nation constitution drafted under 
conditions of emergency without opportunities for free discussion by a constituent 
assembly elected on the basis of the Soulbury Constitution distorted by the 
Citizenship laws resulting in weightage in representation to the Sinhalese majority 
thereby depriving the Tamils of even the remnants of safeguards they had under 
the earlier constitution,
And whereas all attempts by the various Tamil political parties to win their rights 
by co-operating with the governments, by parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
agitations, by entering into pacts and understandings with successive Prime 
Ministers in order to achieve the bare minimum of political rights consistent with 
the self-respect of the Tamil people have proved to be futile;
And whereas the efforts of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress to ensure non­
domination of the minorities by the majority by the adoption of a scheme of 
balanced representation in a Unitary Constitution have failed and even the meagre 
safeguards provided in article 29 of the Soulbury Constitution against 
discriminatory legislation have been removed by the Republican Constitution;
And whereas the proposals submitted to the Constituent Assembly by the Ilankai 
Thamil Arasu Kadchi for maintaining the unity of the country while preserving 
the integrity of the Tamil people by the establishment of an autonomous Tamil 
State within the framework of a Federal Republic of Ceylon were summarily and 
totally rejected without even the courtesy of a consideration of its merits;
And whereas the amendments to the basic resolutions intended to ensure the 
minimum of safeguards to the Tamil people moved on the basis of the nine point 
demands formulated at the conference of all Tamil Political parties at 
Valvettithurai on 7th February 1971 and by individual parties and Tamil members
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of Parliament including those now in the government party were rejected in total 
by the government and Constituent Assembly;
And whereas even amendments to the draft proposals relating to language, 
religion, and fundamental-rights including one calculated to ensure that at least 
the provisions of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regulations of 1956 be 
included in the Constitution were defeated resulting in the boycott of the 
Constituent Assembly by a large majority of the Tamil members of Parliament;
And whereas the Tamil United Liberation Front, after rejecting the Republican 
Constitution adopted on the 22nd of May, 1972 presented a six point demand to 
the Prime Minister and the Government o 25th June, 1972 and gave three months 
time within which the Government was called upon to take meaningful steps to 
amend the Constitution so as to meet the aspirations of the Tamil Nation on the 
basis of the six points and informed the Government that if it failed to do so the 
Tamil United Liberation Front would launch a non-violent direct action against 
the Government in order to win the freedom and the rights of the Tamil Nation on 
the basis of the right of self- determination;
And whereas this last attempt by the Tamil United Liberation Front to win 
Constitutional recognition of the rights of the Tamil Nation without jeopardizing 
the unity of the country was callously ignored by the Prime Minister and the 
Government;
And whereas the opportunity provided by the Tamil United Liberation leader to 
vindicate the Government's contention that their constitution had the backing of 
the Tamil people, by resigning from his membership of the National State 
Assembly and creating a by-election was deliberately put off for over two years in 
utter disregard of the democratic right of the Tamil voters of Kanlcesanthurai, and
Whereas in the by-election held on the 6th February 1975 the voters of 
Kankesanthurai by a preponderant majority not only rejected the Republican 
Constitution imposed on them by the Sinhalese Government but also gave a 
mandate to Mr.S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, Q.C. and through him to the Tamil United
314
Liberation Front for the restoration and reconstitution of the Free Sovereign, 
Secular, Socialist State of TAMIL EELAM.
The first National Convention of the Tamil United Liberation Front meeting at 
Pannakam (Vaddukoddai Constituency) on the 14th day of May, 1976 hereby 
declares that the Tamils of Ceylon by virtue of their great language, their 
religions, their separate culture and heritage, their history of independent 
existence as a separate state over a distinct territory for several centuries till they 
were conquered by the armed might of the European invaders and above all by 
their will to exist as a separate entity ruling themselves in their own territory, are a 
nation distinct and apart from Sinhalese and this Convention announces to the 
world that the Republican Constitution of 1972 has made the Tamils a slave 
nation ruled by the new colonial masters the Sinhalese who are using the power 
they have wrongly usurped to deprive the Tamil Nation of its territory, language 
citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment and education thereby 
destroying all the attributes of nationhood of the Tamil people.
And therefore, while taking note of the reservations in relation to its commitment 
to the setting up of a separated state of TAMIL EELAM expressed by the Ceylon 
Workers Congress as a Trade Union of the Plantation Workers, the majority of 
whom live and work outside the Northern and Eastern areas,
This convention resolves that restoration and reconstitution of the Free,
Sovereign, Secular Socialist State of TAMIL EELAM based on the right of self 
determination inherent to every nation has become inevitable in order to safeguard 
the very existence of the Tamil Nation in this Country.
This Convention further declares -
(a) that the State of TAMIL EELAM shall consist of the people of the Northern 
and Eastern provinces and shall also ensure full and equal rights of citizenship of 
the State of TAMIL EELAM to all Tamil speaking people living in any part of 
Ceylon and to Tamils of EELAM origin living in any part of the world who may 
opt for citizenship of TAMIL EELAM.
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(b) that the constitution of TAMIL EELAM shall be based on the principle of 
democratic decentralization so as to ensure the non-domination of any religious or 
territorial community of TAMIL EELAM by airy other section.
(c) that in the state of Tamil Eelam caste shall be abolished and the observance of 
the pernicious practice of untouchability or inequality of any type based on birth 
shall be totally eradicated and its observance in any form punished by law.
(d) that TAMIL EELAM shall be secular state giving equal protection and 
assistance to all religions to which the people of the state may belong.
(e) that Tamil shall be the language of the State but the rights of of Sinhalese 
speaking minorities in Tamil Eelam to education and transaction of business in 
their language shall be protected on a reciprocal basis with the Tamil speaking 
minorities in the Sinhala State.
(f) that Tamil Eelam shall be a Socialist State wherein the exploitation of man by 
man shall be forbidden, the dignity of labor shall be recognized, the means of 
production and distribution shall be subject to public ownership and control while 
permitting private enterprise in these branches within limit prescribed by law, 
economic development shall be on the basis of socialist planning and there shall 
be a ceiling on the total wealth that any individual of family may acquire.
This Convention directs the Action Committee of the TAMIL UNITED 
LIBERATION FRONT to formulate a plan of action and launch without undue 
delay the struggle for winning the sovereignty and freedom of the Tamil Nation; 
And this Convention calls upon the Tamil Nation in general and the Tamil youth 
in particular' to come forward to throw themselves fully in the sacred fight for 
freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign state of TAMIL EELAM is 
reached.
316
Appendix 9: Thimpu Declaration
Joint statement made bv the Tamil Delegation on the concluding day of
Phase I of the Thimpu talks on the 13th of July 1985
It is our considered view that any meaningful solution to the Tamil national 
question must be based on the following four cardinal principles:
- recognition of the Tamils of Ceylon as a nation
- recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Ceylon
- recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation
- recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils , in 
Ceylon
Different countries have fashioned different systems of governments to ensure 
these principles. We have demanded and struggled for an independent Tamil state 
as the answer to this problem arising out of the denial of these basic rights of our 
people. The proposals put forward by the Sri Lankan government delegation as 
their solution to this problem is totally unacceptable. Therefore we have rejected 
them as stated by us in our statement of the 12th of July 1985. However, in view 
of our earnest desire for peace, we are prepared to give consideration to any set of 
proposals, in keeping with the above mentioned principles, that the Sri Lankan 
Government may place before us.
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